A TEAM OF NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES?

A history of the football World Cup, c. 1930-2018

Gijs van Campenhout

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Een team van nationale representanten?

Een geschiedenis van het wereldkampioenschap voetbal, ca. 1930-2018

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To Anne-Mieke, Kaj and Ide

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'World Cup qualification had offered me a snapshot of the world, but the campaign had meant many things to many people. Unity, reflected power, revenge, redemption, even escape. The campaign had shown how, in the age of football's rampant commercialisation, something as old-fashioned, patriotism even, was still alive. It had also shown that the world is changing quicker than we realise. The mass migration of people because of wars, famine, revolutions or, simply, the desire to find a better quality of life had further blurred the boundaries of identity and belonging. In many places the national football team was the last institution left that still preserved it, even "it" was fluid, a reality that had long ceased to be. The idea of a national team representing a nation had become more stretched and more diffuse than ever. But it still mattered, which is why people go to extraordinary lengths to play, and support, international football, with the World Cup as it apex.'

– James Piotr Montague (2014, 313)

CHAPTER 1

MARKING THE FIELD

1 Marking the field

Introduction

In September 2013, the Brazilian-born striker Diego da Silva Costa caused a stir by publicly declaring that he wished to represent Spain in international football instead of his native Brazil. Costa, who had played two friendly matches for the Brazilian national football team in March that year, became eligible for the Spanish national football team after he successfully applied for Spanish citizenship based on his, more than, five year residency in the country (Manfred 2014). Following the news around Diego Costa, Luiz Felipe Scolari, who at the time was coach of the Brazilians, commented: 'A Brazilian player who refuses to wear the shirt of the Brazilian national team and compete in a World Cup in your country [the 2014 football World Cup] is automatically withdrawn. He is turning his back on a dream of millions, to represent our national team, the five-time world champions, in Brazil' (Rice 2014, para. 5 – brackets added). By defecting his Brazilian (sporting) nationality, Diego Costa instantly became a *persona non grata* in his country of birth. Also in Spain, Costa's switch in national allegiance was disputed as his selection for the Spanish national football team was met with mixed responses by its followers. Some Spanish supporters happily accepted Costa as 'their' new striker, while other fans 'welcomed' the naturalised Spaniard with boos and slogans like 'No eres Español!' ('You are not Spanish!') (Jenson 2016, para. 1; Hay 2014). Tony Manfred (2014), from the magazine *Business Insider*, even dubbed Diego Costa as 'the most hated man at the World Cup', disliked by both Brazilian and (some of the) Spanish football fans. Meanwhile, Costa explained his switch in national allegiance by declaring that '… it was a difficult decision [choosing to represent Spain over Brazil in international football] but everything I have achieved in my life has been given to me by this country' (Bryan 2014, para. 6 – brackets added).

The controversies and uneasiness of Diego Costa's change in (sporting) nationality exposes three interrelated issues central to this dissertation. First, it questions how, and why, the volume of foreign-born players in the (men's) football World Cup has changed over time. While

media reports suggest that (im)migrants and national diasporas are (increasingly) contributing to the outcomes of the football World Cup, especially in the last decades (Aarons 2018; Eigen-Zucchi 2014; Katwala 2014; Yameogo and Jammeh 2018), such claims have not been empirically substantiated. To overcome this, I systematically analysed the number of foreign-born national representatives who played in the football World Cup between 1930 and 2018, creating a historical overview on the presence of *migrant* players in this mega-sport event. The case of Costa, furthermore, seems to illustrate the denationalisation of international football (Poli 2007), a process which in a broader sense might be indicative of the (progressive) decoupling of the state and the nation, and of an increasing rift between citizenship and national belonging. Therefore I consider (the history of) the football World Cup to be a useful prism and laboratory to study the *natural* but complex, and sometimes paradoxical, interrelations between migration, citizenship and national belonging over time. In other words, this research uses the context of international football to contribute to the academic and societal debates on the interplay of these three concepts.

Second, most nationality changes in international football, like the case of Diego Costa, do not seem to happen at random. The majority of football players' changes in nationality seem to relate to and reflect broader historical patterns of migration, such as colonial migrations and guest-worker migrations, and gradual shifts in understandings of citizenship and national belonging. Therefore, I interpret the outcomes of my analysis of the volume and diversity of *migrant* football players within a historically changing framework of international migration patterns and trends. Moreover, by providing a historical overview of the presence of foreign-born players – and footballers with a migration background[1] –

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[1] I have not exclusively dealt with foreign-born players, but also with football players with a migration background. I have done so to take generational aspects of migration into account as the *genuineness* of national belonging of second generation, and even later ones, *migrant* football players seems to be questioned. By adding, wherever applicable, the phrase 'and football players with a migration background' to references of foreign-born players, I aim to avoid drawing lines between various types of national representatives with a migration background or to come up with a list of objective criteria that can draw such a line (see also Jansen 2020, 18).

in the football World Cup, and by explicitly taking broader historical (dis)continuities on migration, citizenship and national belonging into account, I may not only be able to correct or nuance widespread (mis)conceptions on these emotionally charged debates but also might help understand some of the general conditions under which countries are represented in international football.

Third, as Diego Costa's change in (sporting) nationality was met with mixed responses by nationals from both Brazil and Spain, I analyse (some of the) everyday processes maintaining the boundaries of the nation. I thereby extend upon Norbert Elias and John Scotson's (1994 – original from 1965) 'established–outsider model' by using the fluid and contextual borders between *formal* and *moral* deservedness of citizenship. Whereas the possession of a country's legal citizenship may neither be a necessary nor a sufficient condition for *migrants*, or even the children of *migrants*, to be *morally* perceived as individuals who *genuinely* and without question belong to the nation (confer Bassel et al. 2021; Hage 1998; Monforte, Bassel, and Khan 2019; Simonsen 2018; Skey 2010; 2013), this discrepancy illustrates the fragility of national belonging. Moreover, the increasing rift between *formal* and *moral* aspects of citizenship seems to indicate the power of *moralisation* in the social construction of imagined (national) communities.

In many places the national football team is one of the few institutions that seem to reflect the ideals of a country as a nation-state. Football players who 'don the national colours, salute the anthem and face the flag, [are] becoming the embodiment of the wider imagined community, carrying the nation's hopes' (Storey 2020, 129 – brackets added). The idea of the national football team representing a unified and, arguably, homogenous nation is however no longer tenable as national representatives are appearing to be more diverse than ever (Montague 2014). In this dissertation, I examine how migration challenges notions of citizenship and national belonging, and how understandings of these concepts are, and have been, shaped in controversies around the eligibility of foreign-born players and football players with a migration background throughout the history of the football World Cup, c. 1930-2018. To be more precise, this study is set up to gain a better

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understanding of the (increasing) discrepancy between *formal* citizenship and football players eligibility to represent a national football team on the one hand, and *moral*, normative ideals of citizenship and belonging to the nation on the other hand.

In questioning who can *formally* and *morally* be seen as a (*genuine*) national representative in international football, and in international sports more broadly, it is important to academically distinguish between the partly overlapping and often interchangeably used understandings of citizenship and nationality. Citizenship, despite its complexity and multiple aspects, in its core refers to an individual's *formal* state membership (Bosniak 2006; Joppke 2010; Shachar 2009). The juridical status of *being* a citizen of a state is often plasticised in the form of a passport (Joppke 2010). Nationality, however, can contain multiple meanings: sometimes it is invoked in legal terminology referring to *formal* citizenship (Vink and De Groot 2010b), while in other cases nationality seems to relate to the idea of *nationhood* (Bonikowski 2016) in which it can be considered as the *moral* aspect of citizenship (Schinkel 2017).

Probably at the heart of the distinction between citizenship and nationality lies the, rather confusing, difference between *state* and *nation*, or 'in tandem as in "*nation-state*"' (Storey 2012, 31 – emphasis added). States are 'legal and political organisations with power over their citizens, those people living within their boundaries' (Storey 2012, 31), and in essence reflect the countries forming the world political map. Although state and nation are clearly related, the nation is a somewhat more nebulous concept conveying a collection of people whose membership of a(n imagined) community is based on some sense of solidarity, common (cultural) values and a shared history (Anderson 2006; Brubaker 1992; Calhoun 2007; Storey 2012). While there generally are historically anchored material components, such as a shared language, at the root of a nation, I consider nations to be socially constructed communities as defined by Benedict Anderson (2006, 6 – emphasis in original, original from 1983): the nation 'is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign [...] It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most

of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'. Furthermore, whereas the term nation-state 'serves to provide an impression of national and cultural homogeneity within the borders of a given state' (Storey 2012, 31), few states are truly nation-states as most countries are 'having much more cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity than is often realized or acknowledged' (Stokes-DuPass and Fruja 2016, xiv). On the contrary, a collection of people who considers themselves to belong to the same nation can live separate within the territorial borders of different states. Moreover, from a historical and empirical angle, a full overlap between the categories of citizenry and nationhood is not, and arguably has never been, a reality (Shachar et al. 2017).

While some scholars, for example Adjaye (2010), Holmes and Storey (2011), Lanfranchi and Taylor (2001), Maguire and Falcous (2011), Poli (2007), Shachar (2011), Spiro (2012), and Taylor (2006), have been dealing with these and closely related debates in the context of sport, in particular football, it was my contention that further, more systematic and historically contextualised empirical inquiry was needed for two main reasons. First, I claim that a more systematic and historical comparative approach is needed to deal with the interrelated complexities between understandings of migration, citizenship and national belonging in the context of international football, and international sports more broadly. Just a few studies have taken on, or plead for, a quantitative-based approach (Day and Vamplew 2015; Vamplew 2015). Most existing studies and debates touching upon these issues have an anecdotical character and are, therefore, quite often based on (only) a limited number of individual, high-profile and mediagenic cases such as Diego Costa. While I emphasise the necessity, value and insights of these anecdotical-based studies for current debates on and shifts in understandings of citizenship and national belonging, their focus on personal stories and individual experiences sometimes runs the risk of neglecting 'the larger socio-historic developments in which empirical events or trends in sports are embedded' (Jansen 2020, 11; Van Bottenburg 2010). I, therefore, belief that using the strengths of quantitative analyses in combination with some high-profile cases, in this

study foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background, will result in a better understanding and historical contextualisation of the issues under debate (Day and Vamplew 2015; Vamplew 2015).

Second, Joost Jansen (2020, 11 – emphasis added) argues that 'related studies have always been, rightfully, embedded within wider academic debates about migration, citizenship, *or* national belonging'. However, few studies have made explicit connections between these concepts to illustrate and emphasise the *natural* but complex interplay between them. To me, using an iterative approach to these concepts is crucial for gaining a better understanding of the increasing discrepancy between *formal* and *moral* citizenship which seems to underlie the denationalisation of international football, and international sports more broadly (Poli 2007). National citizenship laws and policies are, for example, important in shaping peoples international mobility (Castles and Davidson 2000), which in turn challenges the ideas and ideals of the nation (Pratsinakis 2018; Skey 2010; 2011; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011). As a consequence, naturalised citizens and native-born nationals with a migration background, who *formally* belong to a nation as they possess legal membership of its state, can *morally* be excluded from the nation as they do not seem to (fully) meet the (invisible) norms of belonging set by the dominant, established group of the nation (Monforte, Bassel, and Khan 2019; Simonsen 2018). A better understanding of the interplay between these concepts might (partly) explain the (historical) uneasiness and controversies about the selection of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background in national football teams throughout the history of the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018).

As foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background seem to increasingly represent, literally embodying, the nation as national representatives in international football, a combination of the issues outlined above has led to the central question guiding this research: *How and why has the number of foreign-born football players in the football World Cup changed over time (c. 1930-2018), and how does a diverse football team of national representatives shape and challenge understandings of migration, citizenship and national belonging?*

This dissertation is part of the *Sport and Nation* research project that kicked off at the Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication of the Erasmus University Rotterdam in September 2016. The *Sport and Nation* research project was set out to study debates about the status of (talented) athletes with a migration background and how they, as national representatives, shape and challenge understandings of migration, citizenship and national belonging. A priori, this research project was subdivided into two studies: one about the Summer Olympic Games and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Jansen 2020) and, this, one about the football World Cup and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).

As Jansen's (2020) dissertation *Who can represent the nation?* stems from the same research proposal as this study, there are several similarities between the two. In both studies the same kind of research questions are addressed, the interplay between similar concepts are examined, and related theoretical perspectives are taken on. Moreover, most of the empirical studies presented in these two dissertations are based on historical overviews – in the form of databases – of the presence of foreign-born athletes at the Olympic Games (1948-2016) or foreign-born players at the football World Cup (1930-2018).

One of the main reasons for studying these two mega-sport events and their historical context stems from the different institutional settings of the IOC and FIFA. More specifically, from the question of eligibility for international sporting representation and the consequences of the established regulations in practice (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Van Campenhout and Jansen 2021). This dissertation further distinguishes itself from Jansen's (2020) dissertation in at least three ways. First, it takes more, and more explicitly, account of historical-contextual factors. For example, in the creation of a historical overview on *migrant*, foreign-born players at the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018), I not only included the country of birth of football players like Jansen (2020) did, but also took the countries of birth of parents and (great)grandparents of national representatives into account – as far as it was possible to find out (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018, see Chapter 2). Moreover, I critically reflected – both theoretically

and methodologically – on the use of the term *migrant* in counting the number of foreign-born players at the football World Cup, and came up with an alternative approach to counting *migrant* football players: the context-nationality approach (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018, Chapter 2). Although Jansen (2020, 42) acknowledges that 'the counting of changing numbers of foreign-born athletes comes with a number of challenges', he only briefly indicates some limitations of using a foreign-born proxy. Second, whereas the work of Jansen (2020) mainly looks at the volume and diversity of foreign-born athletes from an *im*migration perspective, I – in Chapter 4 – use the idea of *migration corridors* to examine the underlying structures that contribute to the diversification of national football teams from both an *im*migration and *e*migration perspective (Van Campenhout and Van Sterkenburg 2019). And third, in Chapter 5, this dissertation makes a theoretical contribution in its use and extension of Norbert Elias and John Scotson's (1994 – original from 1965) established-outsider approach by elaborating on it via the use of *formal* and *moral* deservedness of belonging (Van Campenhout and Van Houtum 2021).

This present study is not intended as, and does not pleads to be, a definitive history of the interplay between the understandings of migration, citizenship and national belonging in the context of international football, let alone of the (inter)national debates on which foreign-born players or footballers with a migration background deserve(d) to represent the country. It would be unrealistic to attempt an analysis of this kind as the phenomena under discussion are so vast, complex and everchanging (Bairner 2001; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001). Instead, I have focused on what I see as the most significant and interesting processes underlying the interplay between these three concepts.

The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured into three main sections. First, I demonstrate why and how international football, and international sports more broadly, can be used as a prism and laboratory to study social issues in wider society, indicating its relevance for historical and sociological studies. Then I discuss the theoretical debates, major shifts and the *natural* but complex interplay between the

academic fields of migration, citizenship and national belonging. Lastly, I outline the structure of this dissertation by linking the theoretical debates to the four empirical papers that make up this dissertation.

International football and wider society

With the football World Cup as its showcase, football matches between countries have grown into a serious, global businesses. Every four years, over two hundred representative teams are drawn into the quest to qualify for the football World Cup finals. The matches played in the context of the football World Cup are globally broadcasted and consumed by billions of unique viewers worldwide (Giulianotti and Robertson 2012; Duke and Crolley 2014; Solberg and Gratton 2014). To illustrate, the 2018 football World Cup in Russia had an official broadcast coverage in 210 countries and was, on estimation, viewed by 'a combined 3.57 billion viewers'; which is more than half of the global population aged four and over (FIFA.com 2018). While 'its growing scale and significance [in all aspects of (everyday) public life] demonstrates that, more than ever, sport demands the full attention of sociologists and other social scientists' (Giulianotti 2015, xix – brackets added), sport and topics related to sport have until now played a rather peripheral role in many academic fields amongst them history and sociology (Bairner 2001; Giulianotti and Brownell 2012). This stands out as several influential sociologists of the twentieth century have either explicitly used sport, or the broader notion of leisure activities, as a topic in (some of) their works or their writings have been used by other scholars to explain the role of sport in wider society. Most of these studies stress the value of (sociologically) studying sport and sport related topics to gain a better understanding of, historical and ongoing changes in, wider society.

Émile Durkheim, one of the pioneers in the academic discipline of sociology, is, according to Chris Shilling and Philip A. Mellor (2014, 7 – brackets added), 'known for insisting there are things [such as sport] considered sacred, "set apart" from egoistic organic life, accessed through "positive" and "negative" rites'. In his work *The Elementary Forms of Religious life*, Durkheim (1973 – original from 1915) analyses religion as

a social phenomenon, arguably putting it on par with sport, in his discussions on the secularisation of modern society. As sport has been attributed religious dimensions in debates on secularisation, some of Durkheim's (1973 – original from 1915) (religious) concepts were explicitly deployed in sport research. For example, Durkheim's conceptual definition of *ritual* is used by Susan Birrell (1981, 354) to argue that 'sport can be understood as a significant aspect of society because of the ritualistic overtones it possesses'. According to Birrell (1981), the ritual power of sport seems to contribute to feelings of satisfactions on both the individual level as well as on the level of the (imagined) community, of which the nation is but one.

Inspired by Durkheim's work, sociologists of sport Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning (2008 – original from 1986) not only point to the social functions of sport but argue that sport-related research is also significant to understand the historical development of (European) societies as well as it is for understanding the sport itself (Giulianotti 2015; Malcolm 2015). Moreover, with their figurational approach to sociology, Elias and Dunning (2008) stress that sport (and leisure) activities, which are often considered as the fun and irrational parts of life, are interdependent and not dichotomous to the more serious and rational aspects of life such as work and economics (Thing 2016). By doing so, Elias, and his followers like Dunning, 'developed both a sociology *of* sport, and [developed] his sociological theory *through* sport' (Malcolm 2015, 50 – emphasis in original, brackets added).

According to sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1988, 153), 'One of the obstacles to a scientific sociology of sport is that sociologists of sport are in a way doubly dominated, both in the world of sociologists and in the world of sport'. A sociology of sport is 'doubly dominated' as it is 'scorned by sociologists' and 'despised by sportspersons' (Bourdieu 1988, 153). In his *Program for a Sociology of Sport*, Bourdieu (1988, 153) argues that in order to constitute a scientific sociology of sport, a particular sport must, first of all, be understood as a sporting practice within 'the space of sports' – a system relating one sport to other sports. This 'space of sports' then needs to be 'related to the social space of which it is an expression' (Bourdieu 1988, 154), indicating that sport shapes, and is shaped by,

activities and events in wider society. It is therefore important to realise, as Bourdieu (1988, 155) points out, that:

> '… the space of sports is not a self-contained universe. It is inserted into a universe of practices and of consumptions that are themselves structured and constituted in a system. It is entirely justified to treat sporting practices as a relatively autonomous space, but one must not forget that this space is the site of forces that do not act on it alone'.

As events, practices and processes in society, both positive and not so, are largely reflected *in* and *through* sport, sport should be considered as, to use the words of Richard Arnold (2021, 2 – emphasis in original), 'both a reflection *of* and constitutive force *for* society, with latent tensions or disputes about boundary regulation often finding expression on the field of play'. In this dissertation, I therefore consider and study (international) football as a 'microcosm indicative of larger social forces' (Zenquis and Mwaniki 2019, 24).

Like all international sporting competitions, international football is entrenched by the banal, everyday acceptance that the world is composed of countries or nation-states (Arnold 2021; Billig 1995; Holmes and Storey 2011; Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). This 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) has, arguably, made global sport events like the Olympic Games and the football World Cup into stages *par excellence* for the expression of nationalist sentiments (Arnold 2021; Van Bottenburg 2001; 2010). The football World Cup, being the most prestigious tournament between national football teams, can therefore be considered as the apex in celebrating a, seemingly *natural* and inevitable, nation-state world. According to Michael Holmes and David Storey (2011, 253), 'sport has become a prism through which political identities, and especially national identities, are frequently viewed and it might be argued that sport is, in some ways, uniquely well suited to an examination of national identity'. The representative teams in the football World Cup offer a snapshot of a country's demographic diversity, and the attitudes of the (football) media and the public towards the diversity of the selected players make the politics of migration, citizenship and national belonging more transparent than in many other areas of public life (Goldblatt 2021). It is mainly because of the global

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visibility of the football World Cup, including its representative teams and the lives of individual players, that this mega-sport event has become a 'magnifying lens through which critical elaborations of the idea of the nation come to the fore' (Mauro 2020, 5; Skey 2015; Storey 2020).

The sporting success of a national football team – and successes in other international sports, on both team and on individual level – are, and historically have been, utilised by national governments to promote either domestic and international political goals (Arnold 2021; Holmes and Storey 2011; Grix, Brannagan, and Lee 2019; Grix and Houlihan 2014). With regards to the domestic and international aims of states, the ethnic origin of national representatives seem irrelevant as long as they successfully represent the country in international sporting competitions. On the contrary, failure, for example an earlier-than-expected elimination of a national football team from the football World Cup, will reflect badly on a country's national image and its international reputation (Arnold 2021; Holmes and Storey 2011). Domestically, national governments have used the same successes and triumphs in sport to 'bind individuals around collective, national experiences of sporting success and engender both a "feelgood factor" and a cohesive identity akin to Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities"' (Grix and Houlihan 2014, 576). As the nation is, arguably, reflected in the makeup of its representative football team, it is through the national football team that the 'we' of the nation seems just that little bit more real and concrete (Adjaye 2010; Arnold 2021; Duke and Crolley 2014; Holmes and Storey 2011), at least for some time and provided of course that the national football team performs well (Van Houtum 2010). The diversification of national football teams seems to detract from the ideals of representing the homogenous and unified nation as it points out the boundaries of (belonging to) the nation. This indicates that international football is also a site were social-cultural polarisation and (social) division come to the front, and might even be exaggerated (Giulianotti 2015; Jansen 2020).

Central to this dissertation is, from an institutional context, a historical exploration of how eligibility issues around foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background who represent the nation in the football World Cup may reflect and aggravate wider societal debates

about citizenship and national belonging. This implies that alterations in understandings of citizenship are not only exposed but also disputed and negotiated *in* and *through* international football. As the (perceived) *genuine* connection between nationals, the state and the nation are seriously questioned under the current social pressures of *globalisation* processes like, most notably, the growing population mobility and the liberalisation of citizenship regimes, these social pressures seem to challenge the *naturally* assumed correlation between the state and the nation. Today, the possession of *formal* state citizenship does not seem to guarantee someone's *moral* acceptance to, unquestionably, belong to its respective nation anymore (if it ever did) – I will discuss the *genuineness* of the perceived link between nationals, the state and the nation in more detail further on in this chapter. It is through the study over time in the volume and diversity of national representatives in the football World Cup, and by using international football as a prism to wider society, that this dissertation historically contextualises, and thereby contributes to, current debates on questions as 'who can represent the nation?' and 'who deserves to belong to the nation?'.

Conceptual interplay: migration, citizenship, and national belonging

This study uses international football, more specifically the (history of the) football World Cup, as a prism to further academic and sociological debates about migration, alterations of citizenship and changing ideals of the nation and national belonging. I approached the concepts of migration, citizenship and national belonging in an iterative way to illustrate the *natural* but complex interplay between them. Changes in patterns and trends of international migration have, for example, urged states to – pragmatically and strategically – adapt their national citizenship laws and policies, thereby defying the historically established understandings of belonging to the nation. Vice versa, national citizenship regimes play an important role in shaping international migrations, which in turn challenges normative ideals of the nation and national belonging (Bosniak 2006; Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles, de

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Haas, and Miller 2014; Joppke 2010; Pratsinakis 2017; Skey 2011; Strikwerda 1999). In each of this dissertation's chapters, I focus on one of these three theoretical concepts. The other two concepts remain always and unavoidably present in the background, illustrating the *natural* interplay between them on a more general level (Bairner 2001).

Migration: Has the football World Cup become more migratory?

International migration is nothing new. Migration historians have shown that people have been moving since the very beginning of human history (Lucassen, Lucassen, and Manning 2010; Strikwerda 1999). However, much of the academic literature on migration, citizenship and national belonging is implicitly based on the common held perceptions that international mobility of people has grown rapidly, has become more diverse in terms of the origins and destinations of migrants, and has increased in geographical scope over the past decades (Castles and Davidson 2000; Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). These indicated trends have, arguably, made international migration more complex, bringing along new challenges for citizenship and questioning the territorial basis for belonging to the nation (Castles and Davidson 2000; Czaika and de Haas 2014). Before delving into the issues of citizenship and national belonging, we need to question whether, and if so how, the character of contemporary migrations and those of the recent past differ from historical ones. Are we now, referring to the title of an influential book on migration by Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller (2014, 16), living in *The Age of Migration*, an era characterised by a 'tendency of more and more countries to be crucially affected by migratory movements at the same time'? Or should we be more tentative in discerning a 'globalisation of migration' tendency (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014, 16), and be hesitant, as Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas (2014, 283) argue, towards the common conception 'that the volume, diversity, geographical scope, and overall complexity of migration have increased'?

   In their article *The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?*, Czaika and de Haas (2014, 314 – emphasis in original)

conclude that, between 1960 and 2000, 'while international migration has not accelerated on a global level, main shifts in global migration have been *directional* and are linked to major geopolitical and economic shifts, the concomitant rise of new migration hubs in Europe, the Gulf, and Asia, development-driven emigration hikes in origin countries, and the lifting of emigration restrictions in former Communist and developing countries'. The common conception that international movements have become more globalised discloses, according to Czaika and de Haas (2014, 314), a 'Eurocentric worldview'. Some European countries have, rather recently, changed into (new) destination countries for immigrants – transited from an emigration to an immigration country – as they are nowadays confronted with higher numbers of immigration as well as with an increase in immigrant diversity when compared to past levels of national immigration. This 'is not always the case elsewhere, such as the Americas and the Pacific, where immigrant populations have become less European but not necessarily more diverse in terms of diversity of origin countries' (Czaika and de Haas 2014, 314). International migration may have become more globalised 'from a destination country perspective but hardly from an origin country perspective' (Czaika and de Haas 2014, 314), which means that migrations do not seem to have, and have had, a uniform influence on countries around the globe. What happened, above all, is that 'the global migration map has become more skewed' (Czaika and de Haas 2014, 315).

Central in the work of Czaika and de Haas (2014) is that, to properly understand contemporary migratory movements, international migrations always need to be embedded in wider historical, geopolitical and socio-economic context (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014; Sassen 1999). In each of these contexts, several historical global events can help explain contemporary migrations in general, and increases in immigration diversity in European countries in particular. The fall of the Iron Curtain, the proliferation of migration transitions, the decreasing significance of (post-)colonial relations, and the rapid socio-economic advances in transport and communication can, amongst other things, account for much of the variation in (historical) patterns of international migration

and the 'skewing' of the global migration map (Czaika and de Haas 2014, 315; Lucassen, Lucassen, and Manning 2010). In relation to the observation that international migration has only increased in some regions of the world, migration historian Carl Strikwerda (1999) points towards the critical role states play in determining, arguably even controlling, international migration. This is an issue I will come back to later in this introduction.

Strikwerda (1999, 371) further argues that international migration has never been the linear phenomenon it sometimes is assumed to be as the mobility of people to cross borders 'has flowed and ebbed in two long waves over the last two hundred years'.[2] The ebb and flow of international migration, processes also discussed by Czaika and de Haas (2014), do not only underline the importance of a broader contextualisation of contemporary migrations but also stress the need to position these trends in larger regional and national, historically distinctive, phases of migration (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014; Sassen 1999). In the Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, I will further look into the (relatively recent) migration histories of several, mainly Western, countries. For now, it is important to realise that while, for instance, some Western European countries have recently transited or are in the transition from an emigration to an immigration country, immigrations from near and far have always been an integral yet oft-forgotten part of (Europe's) history (Lucassen, Lucassen, and Manning 2010; Sassen 1999). That is not to say that contemporary migrations are not different from those of the past. It, however, does emphasise the importance of historically situating international migrations as they are 'produced, they are patterned, and they are embedded in specific historical phases' (Sassen 1999, 155).

While people have always been moving, these movements seem to become migrations when 'a person whose movement, or whose presence, is considered a problem' (Anderson 2019, 2). Although today's

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[2] The so-called *Great Migration* of the nineteenth century, between 1860 and 1914, is considered to be the first of these waves. The second great migratory wave refers to the movements of people across borders post-1945 (Strikwerda 1999, 371; Taylor 2006, 12–13).

movements across borders seem to be unparalleled, still only a relative small percentage of the world's population migrates, be it temporary or permanent, and for a variety of (personal) reasons (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Zlotnik 1999).[3] Imaginaries of 'mass migration', 'invasion' and 'massive waves' are, therefore, inaccurate and highly exaggerated depictions of the phenomenon of international migration (de Haas 2005; Sassen 1999). Yet, the relatively small numbers of immigrants can cause moral panic as they might be perceived by people belonging to the nation's dominant group as threatening outsiders, 'a direct threat to sovereignty, security and national identity' (Anderson 2019, 2). The (perceived) fear that immigrants 'will destabilise or even disrupt society' (Lucassen, Lucassen, and Manning 2010, 4; Lucassen and Lucassen 2018), has contributed to the (recent) rise of anti-immigration and nationalist sentiments in many (Western) countries, making the *moral* question of 'who deserves to belong to the nation' more pressing. However, as this *moral* panic is not new, it seems to ignore the fact that many (groups and types of) immigrants have, gradually, integrated in various (European) societies (Lucassen, Lucassen, and Manning 2010; Lucassen and Lucassen 2018). Despite success stories about integration, the *immigrant* has always been marked as an outsider in one way or another, and acts of other*ing* and racialisation have a long history. It is mainly the increased visibility of and changing public perceptions on (certain types of) *immigrants*, in terms of (perceived) phenotypical, cultural, and/or religious characteristics, which distinguishes migrations in the present from migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Anderson 2019; Jansen 2020; Sassen 1999).

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[3] Hania Zlotnik (1999, 42) already concluded that the number of people living outside their country of origin is 'remarkably small and has been relatively stable for a long period', oscillating between the 2,1 and 2,3 percent of the world population. Although the number of people crossing international borders has increased in the last decades, I would not consider it, as is often assumed, an 'acceleration'. The percentage of international migrants has remained fairly stable during the twentieth and the twenty-first century; three to four percent (Migration Data Portal 2020; Migration Policy Institute 2019). International migration is still the exception to the rule as around 97% of the world population continues to live within the borders of their native state (see Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Czaika and de Haas 2014).

All of this is relevant to international football as it provides a part of the theoretical background to my research on the migration of the football World Cup. As no studies have been conducted that systematically and empirically verified the common held perceptions that national football teams are increasingly represented by nationals who were not born in the country they compete for and that these footballers have diversified in terms of their origins over time, this study sets out to develop a historical comparative framework to do just that. With the creation of a historical overview on the participating players in the football World Cup (c. 1930 – 2018) – which I extensively discuss in Chapter 2 –, I question whether the volume and diversity of foreign-born players are reflections of historical trends and patterns in international migration. If so, these migratory patterns and trends can help to better understand, historically contextualise, and perhaps nuance the common held perceptions indicated above. This is what the Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation aim to do.

Albeit a somewhat different phenomenon than in international football, we know from research on football labour migration that football players have been moving around the globe for decades and that these movements are not at random (Bale and Maguire 1994; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Maguire and Falcous 2011). Matthew Taylor's (2006, 7) historical account of the globalisation of football migration, whose line of reasoning is remarkably reflected in Czaika and de Haas (2014) train of thought, demonstrates that the movements of professional football players across national borders 'is nothing new, but has a long and complicated history' and should, therefore, 'not be isolated from general migratory trends and patterns'. Like any other type of international migration, it is more likely to see the migration of football players 'as a series of waves rather than a simple upward curve' (Taylor 2006, 13). These movements are generally determined by 'long-established colonial, cultural, linguistic, social and personal connections' (Taylor 2006, 30).

The importance of historical, geopolitical relations between countries in structuring and shaping the movements of professional football players has also been addressed by various other studies on football

migration (confer Elliot and Harris 2015; Maguire and Falcous 2011; Maguire and Pearton 2000; Poli 2007; 2010; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001). Sport sociologist Paul Darby, for example, discusses how European football clubs have used and are practically still using their countries colonial and post-colonial relationships 'to seek out cheap, talented recruits in Africa' (Darby 2007a, 506; 2007b). His findings indicate that historically established relations between (pairs of) countries still seem to function as *migration channels* or *migration corridors* for individuals, including football players (Bakewell, Kubal, and Pereira 2016; Findlay and Li 1998). In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I use the idea of *migration corridors* to gain better insights in the dynamics, complexities and diversities of the presence of foreign-born players in certain national football teams. Also drawing on Portugal's colonial past, historian of Africa Todd Cleveland (2018) examines the active role that African football players who migrated to Portugal between 1949 and 1975 took on in their movement to another country, such as Benfica's (Portuguese) Mozambique-born star player Eusébio who eventually represented Portugal in international football. While these African footballers had to deal with various social challenges and legal restrictions in Portugal's politically-charged environment, in particular during the period of dictatorship by António de Oliveira Salazar (who was the prime minister of Portugal from 1932 to 1968), they were still capable of (partly) shaping their personal migratory-experiences. In his book *In Foreign Fields*, anthropologist Thomas Carter (2011) also claims that, from a wider perspective on sport *migrants* than only football players, the lived experiences of individual athletes should take centre stage when analysing sport migration. While Carter (2011) demonstrates, using ethnographic cases, how sport *migrants* – amongst them Archie, an 18-year-old Ghanaian football player – can (strategically) use their 'citizenship capital' (Kalm 2020), he also stresses that states, at least for now, continue to 'define, discipline, control and regulate all kinds of populations, whether in movement or in residence' (Carter 2011, 83; Ong 1999, 15).

The importance and value, as well as the opportunities and restrictions, of citizenship in the context of migration – referred to as

'citizenship capital' by Sara Kalm (2020) – becomes particularly visible and debatable in international football, as the case of Diego Costa illustrates. Reasons why individual footballers like Costa are becoming subject of national debates on migration, citizenship and national belonging has, in part, to do with FIFA's (2020, 74) regulations on 'the eligibility to play for representative teams'. Whereas its main principle of 'holding a permanent nationality that is not dependent on residence in a certain country' (FIFA 2020, 74) seems rather straightforward, this does not have to mean that a (foreign-born) football player literally moves to the country he [*sic*] represents on the field nor that he [*sic*] has a *genuine* connection with it. As player eligibility is based on the possession of *formal* citizenship, just taking on the legal nationality of another country seems to do the trick. 'Changing one's legal nationality or citizenship is', according to Hywel Iorwerth, Alun Hardman and Carwyn Rhys Jones (2014, 335 – emphasis added), 'an easier process than changing one's *genuine* loyalty and identity'.

Formal citizenship: Who can represent the nation?

The correlation between citizenship, the state and the nation has been called into question over the last decades by various academics, in particular geographers (see for example, Agnew 1994; Antonsich 2009; Appadurai 1996; Ohmae 1995). The growing international mobility of people seems to erode the *naturally* assumed hyphen between the state and the nation as it blurs state boundaries and questions the territorial basis for belonging to the nation (Bloemraad, Kortweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Castles and Davidson 2000; Ong 1999; Spiro 2016). As a result, strategic-instrumental approaches towards access to citizenship are on the rise (Bauböck 2019; Bloemraad, Kortweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Bloemraad 2018; Bosniak 2006; Harpaz and Mateos 2019; Joppke 2019; Kalm 2020; Ong 1999), and understandings of citizenship are challenged and increasingly seem to be *moralised* (Schinkel 2010; 2017; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010). Strategic citizenship refers to 'instrumental practices pertaining to the acquisition and use of citizenship', such as 'new acquisition strategies, practical uses and understandings' of citizenship (Harpaz and Mateos 2019, 843), whereby state membership increasingly

seems to become 'a resource' or 'a liability for the individual' (Kalm 2020, 529; Bauböck 2019; Harpaz and Mateos 2019; Joppke 2019). The *moralisation* of citizenship refers to the growing importance of a perceived *genuine* link of a national to the nation, eclipsing someone's possession of *formal* state citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Schinkel 2010; 2017). I will discuss both shifts in citizenship in more detail below. For now, it is important to realise that both shifts seem to alter understandings of citizenship: 'the basic principle of state membership is being redefined from exclusive and territorial to overlapping and portable' (Harpaz and Mateos 2019, 843), while concomitantly citizenship is becoming highly *moralised* in a sense that citizenship status has become 'a marker to identify membership of society' (Schinkel 2017, 197).

The modern institution of citizenship was born in the American and French Revolutions. Prior to these historical events, 'citizenship was based on allegiance to versus protection of the King' (Weil 2011, 615). This feudal-like relationship between an individual and the sovereign was considered to be *natural* as it was based on someone's place of birth and, therefore, seen as 'perpetual and immutable' (Spiro 2016, 13). The inextricably boundedness of individuals to their place of birth meant that they were loyal to only one sovereign (Carens 2013; Spiro 2016). In the late nineteenth century, with the gradual rise of liberalism, the principles of citizenship attribution changed as the notion of citizenship was 'transformed into a conditional [elective, but still exclusive] status based on rights but also on duties' (Weil 2011, 616 – brackets added). Through this shift, understandings of citizenship were no longer inextricably and perpetually related to the soil – and to the ruler – on which individuals were born as it turned citizenship into more of a representative connection of an individual with a more abstract entity called 'the state' and, arguably, its respective nation (Harpaz and Mateos 2019; Spiro 2016). Even though states reframed citizenship from a perpetual allegiance to a changeable and elective status, the idea of exclusive allegiance to a single state and its respective nation still seems to have been preserved (Harpaz and Mateos 2019, 845; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). The current 'resurgence of ethno-nationalism', and the

related rise of Western Europe's new populists, demonstrate that exclusiveness of citizenship remains the ideal for some (Agergaard and Lenneis 2021; Harpaz and Mateos 2019).

It is important to realise and emphasise that citizenship traditionally is 'a state mechanism regulating in- and exclusion (Brubaker 1992, 21; Bosniak 2006, 124–25) that is a crucial instrument [of national governments] in the management of populations (Hindess 2000)' (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010, 697 – brackets added). In its traditional understanding, citizenship consists of four closely interwoven components: status, rights, participation, and identity (Bloemraad 2018; Joppke 2010). Because the possession of *formal* state citizenship seems to mean an inclusion in its respective nation, states also seem to be able to maintain the boundaries of *their* nation (Schinkel 2010; Skey 2011). Legal state membership is therefore, on the one hand, internally inclusive as it legally bounds people together with the same (legal) nationality which might evoke them with feelings of belonging to the national imagined community (Brubaker 1992; Schinkel 2017; Yuval-Davis 2011). On the other hand, because of the (highly) selective ways in which individuals can acquire *formal* state citizenship, citizenship is also externally exclusive (Bosniak 2006; Brubaker 1992; Ong 1999). What should be kept in mind is that the power to attribute or decline citizenship to individuals predominantly lies in the hands of national governments. They can use citizenship as a strategic tool to determine who is, or may become, a citizen (and who not) and, relatedly, who belongs to *their* nation (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2019; Schinkel 2017; Shachar 2011; Shachar and Hirschl 2014; Yuval-Davis 2011).

In modern liberal democratic states, citizenship is transmitted to individuals at birth through (i) *jus soli*, or the right of the soil; citizenship is attributed to people born within the territory over which a state exercises or has exercised or seeks to exercise its sovereignty, and (ii) *jus sanguinis*, or the right of the blood; citizenship is attributed to individuals by a parent or a more distant ancestor (confer Bauböck 2019; Brubaker 1992; Carens 2013; Joppke 2010; Weil 2011). Because *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* are the main tools of national governments in attributing citizenship to individuals, 'divergences between nationality laws [and

policies] based on these two regimes have, for a long time, been presented as reflecting varying essential or dominant conceptions of the nation' (Weil 2011, 617 – brackets added). It was Rogers Brubaker (1992) who, in his seminal work *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, linked these two birthright tools for allocating citizenship to conceptions of the nation. Brubaker (1992) argued that citizenship laws based on the principle of *jus soli*, historically seen as *the French way* of allocating citizenship, lead to an open and inclusive understanding of the nation as everyone born within the jurisdiction of a state can become a citizen of that state and its respective nation. The, arguably, German *jus sanguinis*-principle to national membership culminates in, according to Brubaker (1992), a closed and ethnic conception of the nation as individuals can only become citizens through blood-based descent.[4] Although there is more than an element of truth to this distinction, Joseph H. Carens (2013, 32) argues that we need to be careful in understanding that one technique of citizenship attribution (*jus sanguinis*) leads to an *ethnic* community and the other one to a *civic* community (*jus soli*). While the use of a *jus sanguinis*-technique for the transmission of citizenship can certainly be important in terms of (ethnic) identity and (national) belonging, it does not make sense to interpret it as an expression of a state's ethnic conception of community; 'this would be to stretch the meaning of that term [ethnic identity] considerably beyond its normal use' (Carens 2013, 33 – brackets added). The use of a *jus sanguinis*-technique is, according to Carens (2013, 33 – emphasis added), 'simply a way to meet the legitimate *moral* claims that children of emigrants have

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[4] In his historical studies on citizenship and nationality, Patrick Weil (2009; 2011) argues that Rogers Brubaker's (1992) work is somewhat misleading. Weil (2009; 2011, 617) demonstrates that the citizenship-technique of *jus sanguinis* 'was not developed in Germany but instead first appears, in a break with the j*us soli* rule dominant in eighteenth-century Europe, in the French civil code of 1803'. France supplemented the *jus sanguinis*-principle with a *jus soli* rule in the late nineteenth century, indicating that granting French citizenship at birth was not ethnically motivated but more based on political-ideological motives. This commodification of citizenship was, according to Weil (2009; 2011, 617) and also acknowledged by Brubaker (1992, 8), not primarily meant to include immigrants into the French nation but was mainly done to make them subjects to military conscription (Weil 2009).

to be recognized as members of their parents' political community of origin'.

The 'dominant idea that citizenship derives not from the place where the individual lives, but from that of their birth and from their genealogy' (Carter 2011, 96) is obviously included in the attribution techniques of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. These citizenship-techniques expose the unequal and unfair distribution of citizenship, implying that being born in 'the right place' within a 'good' family is nothing but luck (Bosniak 2006; Carens 2013; Kalm 2020; Shachar 2009). In a *moral* rejection to this birth privilege, and in attempts to pragmatic and strategically deal with the increasing complexities and practicalities of citizenship in modern times, the majority of countries in the world have made legal membership to their state also available to people after birth via processes of naturalisation. The techniques of *jus domicilii* and *jus matrimonii* are generally accepted as ways to become a (naturalised) national of a state (Bauböck 2019; Bauder 2014; Vink and De Groot 2010b). Via the latter technique, *jus matrimonii*, immigrants can acquire *formal* state citizenship by marrying a native citizen. Through *jus domicilii*, citizenship is granted to individuals 'independently of the place and community of birth … after they entered a territory and established residence in this territory' (Bauder 2014, 93). The residency criteria to obtain legal membership of a state relates to living in a country for a minimum number of years, which varies across countries and over time, and are generally supplemented with other conditions such as citizenship tests, language proficiency and income criteria. Altogether, these measurements function as 'proof' of a *genuine* link between the naturalised national, the state and the nation (Bosniak 2006; Carens 2013; Shachar 2009).

The two birthright techniques to citizenship – *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* – are, traditionally, considered to *naturally* produce a *genuine* link between an individual, the state and the nation. Acquiring citizenship through one of the birthright privileges is, however, more 'a matter of chance rather than an indicator for a *genuine* link' (Bauböck 2019, 1019 – emphasis added; Shachar 2009). Still, the majority of national governments have conditioned their citizenship regulations in such ways

that satisfying either one of these birthright requirements qualifies an individual to become a *formal* member of the state (Bosniak 2006; Carens 2013, 32–33; Shachar 2009). Because of this, the attribution of citizenship based on a combination of the two birthright techniques has inevitably led to the emergence of dual or multiple citizenship at birth for some people (Bauböck 2019; Carens 2013; Joppke 2010; Spiro 2016). Moreover, the implementation of various naturalisation techniques to citizenship by some national governments has not only increased the chances of a rise in dual citizenship,[5] but this commodification of citizenship also contributed to the emergence of more strategic-instrumental uses of citizenship by either states and individuals (Bauböck 2019; Harpaz and Mateos 2019; Joppke 2019). For states, who always have been strategists in regard to (the attribution of) legal membership, these techniques expanded their citizenship-toolbox as it allows them to attract specific (groups of) migrants through skills-based selective migration programs or by 'placing a "for sale" tag on citizenship' (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 250); the latter strategy is by some seen as the *marketisation* of citizenship (Shachar and Hirschl 2014; Shachar 2018). For individuals, these extensions are additional possibilities to acquire legal state citizenship; opportunities that 'states have often inadvertently created for them' (Joppke 2019, 858). This, however, does not mean that 'individuals are more flexible in terms of national identity or citizenship' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 336). National governments are still the only actors that can shape the conditions to, and ultimately grant, *formal* citizenship to individuals. What has changed is that citizenship has turned (more) into 'an instrumental resource in the hands of individuals' (Joppke 2019, 858; Bauböck 2019; Harpaz and Mateos 2019).

The techniques to acquire *formal* state citizenship are, in a general sense, reflected in FIFA's regulations on the eligibility to play for representative teams. As 'the idea of having only players with a national

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[5] Several national governments, like those of Germany and the Netherlands, have set that people who want to naturalise first need to officially renunciate the *formal* citizenship they currently hold. Countries with these kinds of regulations do not allow its citizens to legally possess more than one citizenship.

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passport in national teams was not yet completely integrated' from the beginnings of international football (Poli 2007, 649), Antonio Papa and Guido Panico (2002, cited in Poli 2007, 649) stated that 'the concept of "national" was understood by football pioneers in a purely residential way'. Other scholars, however, argued that a football player's status as a citizen of a specific state only needed to be informally ensured before he [*sic*] was allowed to compete for a country's representative football team (Hall 2012; Holmes and Storey 2011; Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). Since the end of the 1950s/early 1960s, the main principle of FIFA's (2020, 74) eligibility regulations states that 'any person holding a permanent nationality that is not dependent on residence in a certain country is eligible to play for the representative teams of the association of that country'. This means that the eligibility regulations 'primarily rely upon, or take their normative orientation from, the citizenship practices of various nation-states' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 328; Spiro 2012). The implicit rationale behind taking *formal* citizenship as the main condition for player eligibility is that 'it is a fairly easy way of establishing that a *genuine* link exists between the person involved and the nation-state in question' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 335 – emphasis added). It is important to stress that, in this respect, FIFA does not seek to interfere with the ways in which national governments give, and historically have given, shape to citizenship laws and policies. Moreover, for FIFA it does not matter how a football player has acquired a nationality as long as he [*sic*] can prove a *genuine* link with the country he represents in international football.

FIFA's regulations on player eligibility barely changed for over forty years, until they were reconfigured by an emergency legislation in 2004. In part due to the globalisation of football but in particular as a direct reaction to the, in the eyes of FIFA unethical, market-oriented recruitment strategies of countries such as Qatar, FIFA restricted any form of strategic-instrumental strategies executed by either national governments and football players. Through the implementation of the supplementary *genuine* link clause, stating that 'players must have a "clear connection to that country" if they wish to wear the colours of a nation other than the one of their birth' (Hall 2012, 195), FIFA tends to

emphasise the nationalist character of its inter*national* sporting competitions. In addition to this *genuine* link clause, FIFA introduced the *one time selection*-rule which restricts a footballer from playing 'an international match for a representative team of another association' after he [*sic*] 'has already participated in a match (either in full or in part) in an official competition of any category or any type of football for one association' (FIFA 2020, 77–80). The latter regulation particularly affects football players with dual nationality as the rule, quite explicitly, forbids the existence of more-than-one nationality in the context of international football: 'one can either be Dutch or Surinamese, or French or Moroccan, but not both' (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001, 10). While these supplementary regulations are meant to protect the inter*national* character of FIFA's football competitions between countries, they are convoluted and ambiguous and have, arguably, 'only created loopholes that players and national governing bodies have been willing to exploit' (Hassan, McCullough, and Moreland 2009, 747), of which Diego Costa is just one example.

Organising international sporting competitions around general principles of *formal* citizenship is principally sustaining a rigid 'inter-state world view' (Mauro 2020, 2). One of the major difficulties with organising international sporting events, like the football World Cup, around the idea of (legal) nationality is that even with supplementary requirements football players can acquire *formal* citizenship in many circumstances with enormous differences between countries at particular moments in time (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Spiro 2012; 2020). Establishing eligibility for sporting purposes based on legal nationality basically means that these regulations lag behind national citizenship laws and policies and are, as a result, inconsistent and internationally unequal (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018; Vink and De Groot 2010b). For example, countries that have historically taken on a more liberal stance towards citizenship and naturalisations, like Australia, Canada and the United States, are often more willing to adjust, and arguably commodify, the conditions of the attribution of their legal membership by creating special requirements for highly-skilled individuals such as talented football

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players. By doing so, these countries increase the optional pool of footballers they can draw from (Chapters 2 and 3). Because of these historical inconsistencies, international differences and inequalities, the question whether it is (still) desirable to organise the football World Cup, and basically any form of international sporting competition, around the principles of *formal* citizenship, is an issue much debated in the literature on foreign-born athletes (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Kostakopoulou and Schrauwen 2014; Shachar 2011; Spiro 2012; 2017; 2020).

Moral citizenship: The denationalisation of international football?

Despite the interventions and supplementary regulations aimed to ensure FIFA's ideal of the football World Cup as a competition between countries represented by *genuine* national representatives, these attempts seem to be at odds or even contradictory to the growing mobility of football players and the increasing global acceptance of dual nationality – and the many more national governments who are turning a blind eye on dual citizenship in the context of international sport as it potentially benefits (the image of) their country (Adjaye 2010). What renders FIFA's eligibility regulations problematic is FIFA's seemingly lack of realisation that its main principle on player eligibility primarily relies on (historically) diverse citizenship laws and policies of various countries (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014), and their traditional idea of what a *genuine* link between a national representative, the state and the nation entails (Poli 2007; Spiro 2020).

That globalisation influences international football, and (international) sport more broadly, has also been pointed out by Raffaele Poli (2007) in his paper *The Denationalization of Sport: De-ethnicization of the Nation and Identity Deterritorialization*. According to Poli (2007, 646), two sets of processes are, in combination, denationalising (international) sport: (i) the de-ethnicization of the nation, referring to 'the progressive disconnection between the geographical origin of sportsmen and the nation-states that they are supposed to represent', and (ii) the deterritorialization of identity, and arguably national

belonging, which Poli (2007, 646) defines as 'the decrease in importance of the "origin label" in the identification process between fans, sportsmen and teams'. While athletes and representative teams are often characterised by the media through national symbols such as the flag, the impact of 'geographical entities on different scales (from the town to the nation-state)' (Poli 2007, 648) as markers of identification have seem to abate. Poli (2007, 656 – brackets added) observes that 'territorial aspects in the identification processes to sportsmen and [representative] teams' have become less and less important for supporters, and continues his argument by stating that 'other criteria of identification appear, such as, among others, aesthetic, lifestyle, biographical or behavioural ones' (Poli 2007, 656). This shift towards more individualist characteristics of athletes may, even in the context of international sport, indicate the erosion of the ideal of inter*national* sporting competitions and, more broadly, to the 'weakening of allegiance to the traditional nation-state' (Adjaye 2010, 37).

In attempts to cope with the denationalisation of (international) sport and the increasing pressure on the *genuineness* of the relation between national representatives, the state and the nation, several sociologists and jurists have plead for – in various forms, variants and extremes – the development of 'autonomous international sporting regulations which operate according to a more general and normative account of national and cultural belonging' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 328; Kostakopoulou and Schrauwen 2014; Shachar 2011; Spiro 2012; 2020; Storey 2020; Wollmann, Vonk, and De Groot 2015). For instance, Ayelet Shachar (2011, 2132) beliefs in revising existing international sporting regulations so as to restrict 'just-in-time talent-for-citizenship exchanges' labelling these revisions as 'the fair play mobility principle', Dora Kostakopoulou and Annette Schrauwen (2014) propose a flexible and residence-based 'participatory growth model' to counter the supposedly commodification of citizenship, Anna Sabrina Wollmann, Olivier Vonk and Gerard-René de Groot (2015) suggest the introduction of a 'sporting nationality' which is decoupled from *formal* citizenship, and Peter J. Spiro (2012; 2017; 2020) is in favour of abandoning legal nationality altogether in international sports. These suggested alternatives to move away from

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formal citizenship as the main principle of organising international sporting regulations are often based on and illustrated by several well-known and frequently recurring examples of athletes whose 'decisions to change [sporting] nationality are based on a pragmatic and instrumental desire to reap the extrinsic benefits of ISR [International Sporting Representations] rather than anything to do with cultural or national allegiance' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 335 – brackets added). Well-known cases in this respect are the two Kenyan-born steeplechasers Saif Saïd Shaheen (formerly known as Stephen Cherono) and Ruth Jebet who switched their (sporting) allegiances to respectively Qatar (Poli 2007) and Bahrein, and two Russian fast-trackings: US basketball star Becky Hammon and the South Korean short track speed skater Viktor An (born as Ahn Hyun-soo) (Shachar 2011).

As indicated above, it is argued that International Sporting Representations should be reconfigured with more of a normative account of (national) belonging in mind (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). Especially FIFA's eligibility regulations – with its position that the possession of *formal* citizenship *naturally* reflects a *genuine* link between nationals, a particular state and its respective nation – can be seen as outdated as it, increasingly, seems to mismatch public perceptions on these issues (Spiro 2020). Sociologically, this perceived mismatch also raises some questions on the *moral* meaning and use of the term *genuine* with regards to the *imagined-and-therefore-real* link between a foreign-born player or a football player with a migration background and the country he [*sic*] represents: What counts as a *genuine* link? For whom? What is the value of such *moral* connection? And why would it matter in the context of international football? In the core of questioning the *genuineness* of national representatives in international sport, one can find an elucidation of a broader shift in understanding citizenship; 'from a relative focus on *formal* citizenship to an emphasis on *moral* citizenship' (Schinkel 2017, 197 – emphasis added). Willem Schinkel (2010, 265 – emphasis added) has referred to this shift as the '*moralisation* of citizenship' (see also Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010, 697; Schinkel 2017, 199), implying that the criteria to be a *genuine* member of a state and its

nation are increasingly based on 'ideologically charged questions of nationhood and national belonging' (Brubaker 1992, 182).

I use the distinction between *formal* citizenship and *moral* citizenship in this dissertation (Chapter 5), to deal with the increased value placed on *genuine* national belonging in the *moral* aspect of citizenship. Although these two aspects of citizenship are inseparable in practice – as every *formal* conception of citizenship has a *moral* aspect to it – the value of this distinction is analytical, serving 'the analysis of relative weight given to *formal* or *moral* aspects of citizenship' (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010, 698 – emphasis added; Schinkel 2010, 268 – emphasis added; 2017). Yet, I do not consider *formal* citizenship and *moral* citizenship to be two distinct, opposing, aspects of citizenship but, as Willem Schinkel and Friso van Houdt (2010, 698) argue, 'as two aspects that may be more or less highlighted'. *Formal* citizenship refers to the legal, juridical status of national membership (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Schinkel 2010; 2017), covering the civic, political, social and cultural rights and duties that citizens have towards the state who, in return, have the obligation to protect them (Bosniak 2006; Carens 2013; Joppke 2010; Shachar 2009; Weil 2011). By *moral* citizenship, I denote the normative ideals of belonging that border the nation (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Schinkel 2010; 2017; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002).

National belonging: Who deserves to belong to the nation?

By shifting the relative focus from the *formal* to the *moral* aspects underlying the question of 'who can represent the nation' in international football, I pay attention to the *moral* understandings of national belonging. National representative with dual nationality seem to carry the extra burden of having to (continuously) prove to the dominant national group that they *genuinely* belong to the nation they compete for; something native players never have to (for a broader debate see Hage 1998; Skey 2015; Pratsinakis 2018). As *formal* citizenship may neither be a necessary nor a sufficient condition for migrants, or even the children of migrants, to be *morally* perceived as individuals who *genuinely* and without question belong to the nation (confer Bassel et al. 2021; Hage

1998; Jansen and Skey 2020; Monforte, Bassel, and Khan 2019; Simonsen 2018; Skey 2010; 2013), it is necessary to 'elaborate in more detail the conditions of a *genuine* cultural and national belonging' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 334 – emphasis added). By referring to the notion of deservedness, I aim to gain a better understanding of who, under what conditions, deserves to belong to the nation in the eyes of members of the dominant national group (Chapter 5).

Theoretically, it is important to differentiate between 'belonging' and the 'politics of belonging', at least on an analytical level (Antonsich 2010; Fenster 2005; Simonsen 2018; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011). Belonging is basically a personal emotional attachment, about feeling 'at home' (Antonsich 2010, 644; Yuval-Davis 2006, 197; 2011, 10). It consists of continuous acts of identifying one-self with or being identified by others to a social group 'in a stable, contested or transient way' (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199). While belonging may be derived from different degrees and kinds of attachments to other communities than the nation, national belonging is considered to be of central value in our supposedly *naturally* existing world of mutually exclusive *nation-states* (Anderson 2019; Billig 1995; Skey 2010; 2011; 2013; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). It is because of the often taken-for-granted notion of the nation that national belonging 'tends to be naturalised and to be part of everyday practices' (Yuval-Davis 2011, 10). The 'politics of belonging' are concerned with the political construction and maintenance of the, often spatial but always symbolic, boundaries of the nation (Antonsich 2010; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011). As both states and international sport organisations like FIFA are 'still accustomed to thinking in state-national reading grid terms' (Poli 2007, 658), the 'politics of belonging' can also be described as 'the dirty work of boundary maintenance' (Crowley 1999 cited in Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Agergaard and Lenneis 2021, 3).

As such, the boundary maintenance of the nation can be seen as political practices of identifying who stands 'inside or outside the imaginary boundary line of the nation and/or other communities of belonging, whether they are "us" or "them"' (Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Agergaard and Lenneis 2021; Hage 1998; Skey 2011). Through – subtle or not so subtle – everyday practices of border*ing* and other*ing* (Van

Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019), such as setting (invisible) norms of standard behaviour and by shaming and stigmatising (Duemmler 2015), members of the national dominant social group deploy (nation specific) markers – be they real or imagined – to (re)construct the boundaries of the nation. While these *banal*, daily practices are often made with reference to one marker of belonging, such as nationality or ethnicity/race, it is critical to consider national belonging in relation to other social criteria such as gender, religion or class to name a few (Agergaard and Lenneis 2021; Billig 1995; Poli 2007; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011). To discuss national belonging, it is important to take a variety of markers into account as the identification of people with modern sportsmen and (representative) teams seems to be less and less based on territorial aspects, such as nationality, and more often seems to be derived from – an intersection with – other markers (Poli 2007).

What should be kept in mind is that national boundaries are never fixed and permanent lines (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019). This means that national belonging also needs to be considered as 'a dynamic process, not a reified fixity, which is only a naturalised construction of a particular hegemonic form of power relations' (Yuval-Davis 2006, 199). Then considering national belonging as a discursive power struggle between in- and outsiders of the nation leaves room for interpretation, negotiation and hence also as a window of opportunity to (re-)define who, under what conditions, are accepted as national representatives and, as a consequence, are – at least temporally and conditionally – recognised to belong to the nation. As these relations of power are conditional and therefore temporal, they can change gradually, suggesting that 'certain "outsiders" may negotiate their position by presenting and adapting their behaviour in particular ways in order to gain access to established domains' (Black 2016, 984). Whether one is able to negotiate his [*sic*] way *into* the nation and, as a result, being recognised and accepted as 'one of us' (Black 2016; Hage 1998; Pratsinakis 2018), depends on the power of the outsider (group) to accumulate enough – but when is enough? – national cultural capital (Kalm 2020, Chapter 5).

The everyday 'dirty work of boundary maintenance' (Crowley 1999 cited in Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Agergaard and Lenneis 2021, 3) of the nation is often a response of people belonging to the dominant national group to subjective feelings of threat from (national) outsiders towards the unity of 'their' nation (Pratsinakis 2018; Skey 2010; 2011; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011). It should be no surprise to see debates around the *moral* deservingness of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background to flourish in the current era. As a consequence of these (national) debates, many players with dual nationality are, or have been, subject to value judgements regarding their eligibility to play for the national football team and their loyalty towards the country they represent on the field. These judgements increasingly seem to be based on rather normative markers of belonging that have little to do with a player's football qualities and his [*sic*] *formal* membership to the state but are related to personal (perceived) characteristics such as the possession of an extra, non-related nationality, their race/ethnicity and/or religion (Poli 2007; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019). As a result, the acceptance and recognition of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background to *genuinely* belong to the nation seems to be increasingly based on a complex, context dependent interplay between various normative markers border*ing* the nation. This indicates that national belonging is crucially a matter of *moral* deservedness.

Outline of this dissertation

This dissertation consists of four empirical studies. Each of these studies deals with one of the three central concepts in particular (migration, citizenship and national belonging), while the other two concepts remain always and unavoidably present in the background. In combination, these studies are meant to provide an answer to the central question guiding this research: *How and why has the number of foreign-born football players in the football World Cup changed over time (c. 1930-2018), and how does a diverse football team of national representatives shape and*

challenge understandings of migration, citizenship and national belonging?

The upcoming chapter (Chapter 2) challenges the common belief that footballers are increasingly representing other countries than their native ones in recent editions of the football World Cup: how has the volume of *migrant* (foreign-born) players in the football World Cup changed over time (c. 1930-2018)? By asking this question, this study aims (i) to provide a historical overview on the presence of *migrant* players in national football teams throughout the history of the football World Cup, and (ii) to critically reflect on theoretical and methodological difficulties with counting (football) *migrants*. Based on the broader academic literature on migration data and on general trends and patterns in international migration (Anderson and Blinder 2012; Bilsborrow et al. 1997; Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Czaika and de Haas 2014; Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011), a historical overview consisting of the 10.137 football players who ever participated in the football World Cup was created in an attempt to critically reflect on the term *migrant* and to offer an alternative approach to counting *migrant* footballers.

Despite the fact that I come up with, and personally favour, the alternative approach to counting *migrant* footballers in Chapter 2, the empirical data used in the Chapters 3 and 4 are based on a foreign-born approach to *migrants*. The reason for this is twofold: (i) most researchers on international migration use a foreign-born approach in estimating the volume and diversity of *migrants* (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011). Therefore, using a similar approach enables for a historical comparative analysis between data on international migrations and my data on foreign-born football players. And (ii), as national governments define and count their *migrants* differently and have done so in the past, being born in another country than the one a football player represents on the field is, arguably, one of the clearest indications of a possible rupture between *formal* and *moral* aspects of citizenship. This will be further explained in Chapter 5.

In the third chapter (Chapter 3), I continue to challenge presence of foreign-born players at the football World Cup by questioning whether it

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has become more migratory over time with respect to two dimensions of international migration: volume and diversity. By using a historical comparative perspective, this study aims to show how the numbers and geographical origins of foreign-born players have changed over time, and how these fluctuations relate to broader trends and patterns in international migration (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Czaika and de Haas 2014). Through analysing 4.761 footballers – of which 301 are foreign-born players –, derived from the fifteen national football teams that competed in at least ten editions of the football World Cup between 1930 and 2018, this study illustrates that countries' different histories of migration, in combination with historically developed citizenship laws and policies, largely influence the migratory dimensions (volume and diversity) of representative teams in international football.

Whereas Chapter 3 illustrates that the football World Cup has become more migratory over time, the actual dynamics and complexities surrounding the presence of (the variety of) foreign-born players in national football teams have remained under analysed. Chapter 4 explores the 'why-part' of the first section of the main research question. Using the idea of *migration corridors*, I examine the underlying structures that contribute to the diversification of national football teams in the historical context of the football World Cup. By connecting the foreign-born player data to three types of *migration corridors*, I discuss the bidirectionality of player movements and their nationality choices from both an *immigration-* and *emigration perspective*.

In Chapter 5, the relative focus on the *formal* aspects of citizenship and player eligibility shifts towards the *moral* aspects of citizenship. By discussing the politics of national belonging, I question who, under what conditions, (*genuinely*) deserves to belong to the nation. While for some the possession of *formal* citizenship reflects the presumed existence of a *genuine* link between nationals, the state and its respective nation, for others legal membership alone does not *naturally* expresses a *genuine* link. Because of differences in the perceived notion of what a *genuine* link entails, foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background can *formally* belong to the state while their belonging to the nation can *morally* be in dispute. Central in Chapter 5 is the debate on, the

fragility of, national belonging which is discussed through a detailed deconstruction of Mesut Özil's powerful resignation statement from Germany's national football team in 2018. By using the fluid and contextual borders between *formal* and *moral* deservedness of belonging, I extend Elias and Scotson's (1994 – original from 1965) 'established-outsider approach' which enables me to analyse the power dynamics underlying individual and collective processes of belonging to the nation in more detail.

Lastly, in Chapter 6, I tie the four empirical studies together by reflecting on their individual outcomes, indicating the academic contributions of this dissertation, and by providing some answers to the main research question posed at the start of this research. Moreover, I point out three limitations of this dissertation, thereby opening up possible directions for future research on related topics. Finally, I present what I consider to be the most interesting, challenging and fruitful directions for future research on the understandings and interplay between migration, citizenship and national belonging.

CHAPTER 2

WHO COUNTS AS A MIGRANT FOOTBALL PLAYER?

Other than minor changes, this chapter is a reflection of an article published as:

2 Who counts as a migrant football player?

Introduction

At the 2014 football World Cup in Brazil, 478 of the 736 players (almost 65%) selected to participate in this tournament lived and worked – playing professional football – outside the country whose national team jersey they wore. Further, 85 footballers (nearly 12%) represented a country in which they were not born; the highest number in the history of the football World Cup. Moreover, 25 of these 85 foreign-born football players were natives of France, making it possible to field another French national football team next to the actual one in the 2014 football World Cup (Katwala 2014).[6] While these figures may indicate an increase in the number of *migrant* football players in national football teams, this assumption has hitherto not been empirically tested. Moreover, a historical, numerical overview of this phenomenon is lacking, even at FIFA (FIFA 2020; Hall 2012; Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). Previous studies on *migrant* athletes and their representation of other countries in international sport have pointed to an increase in their numbers in absolute terms over the past decades. The first results on foreign-born Olympians, from a historical comparative perspective, indicate that migration and nationality switches in international sport is nothing new, as these movements can be traced back to the ancient Greeks (Jansen and Engbersen 2017). In addition, these migratory movements mainly seem to reflect patterns and trends in international migration (Elliot and Harris 2015; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Migration Policy Institute 2017; Taylor 2006).

Defining who counts as a *migrant* footballer, and recording this in the static context of a database, makes creating a historical overview on *migrant* football players a difficult task. This is a particularly complex task

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[6] While Sunder Katwala identifies 83 foreign-born players at the 2014 football World Cup, I counted 85 football players who represented a different country than their country of birth. In addition to Katwala's list of foreign-born players, I counted Toni Kroos (Germany) as a foreign-born player because he was officially born in East-Germany, as well as Rio Mavuba (France) because he was *born at sea*.

because there is no single straightforward definition of the term *migrant* and because states use, and have used in the past, different criteria to determine who are considered *migrants* within their national legislation and policies on migration and naturalisation (Anderson and Blinder 2012; Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011). Partly because of this, in studies into international migration, the number of *migrants* is traditionally counted by a foreign-born proxy; whereby a mismatch between someone's country of birth and country of residence leads to the classification of *migrant*. This way of classifying implicates that someone's place, or country, of birth is the most reliable variable in estimating migratory numbers. This approach to *migrants*, however, overlooks important migratory complexities related to citizenship and nationality (Özden et al. 2011, 17). Moreover, such a foreign-born approach to counting *migrants* uses current international borders as a reference to a person's place of birth. This means that, in the historical context of the football World Cup, the current state borders are used in retrospect to determine who counts as a *migrant* football player (Bilsborrow et al. 1997; Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011; Parsons et al. 2007).

While a foreign-born approach is a useful way to estimate the number of *migrants*, solely using a person's place of birth based on the current geopolitical situation to estimate the number *migrant* footballers is, from a historical perspective, overly simplistic and problematic as it neglects the complexities that come with counting the number of *migrant* footballers in a database (Cronin 2009; Vamplew 2015). Migratory data on football players should, therefore, be corrected for historical changes in international boundaries, colonial relationships between states and for nationality – especially in relation to bloodline connections – to improve this measurement (Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011). Citizenship principles can be a useful tool for this, as it is mandatory for players to have citizenship of the country they represent in international football and because data on personal (hi)stories of footballers is quite readily available (Holmes and Storey 2011). An alternative approach to counting *migrants*, aimed at emphasising the complexity of citizenship, is not only more accurate but also recognises historical contexts and

(changing) power relations. Moreover, such an approach is more flexible with regard to processes of globalisation, for example increases in the number of people with dual nationality, than a foreign-born approach (Ong 1999; Spiro 2016). Using what I have called a 'contextual-nationality approach' offers a different vantage on the subject. By using both approaches to count the presence of *migrant* football players in the history of the football World Cup (c. 1930- 2018), (i) insight is gained into how the number of *migrant* football players has changed over time, (ii) illustrates differences in outcomes between the two approaches, and (iii) reveals the added value of the contextual-nationality approach in counting *migrant* football players compared to a foreign-born proxy. The crucial differences between the two approaches for historical (sport) research emerges clearly in this process, validating the superiority of the contextual-nationality approach in counting (football) *migrants*.

The wider context of football migration

It could be argued that international migration has increased because of the (relative) openness of national borders and developments in (human) mobility (Carens 2013). More people than ever are crossing international boundaries, be it for work or leisure, staying abroad for various periods of time. However, taken as a percentage of the world's population, the (recorded) number of international *migrants* have remained fairly stable over the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries: only two to three and half percent of the world's population moves between countries, staying for longer periods of time (for over at least one year) and can, therefore, be categorised as international *migrants* (United Nations 2017; Zlotnik 1999). What should be kept in mind is that these statistics are at best estimates of the number of people migrating across international borders. The actual numbers varies considerably between countries and over time, and many illegal movements remain under the radar. Moreover, perhaps contrary to popular belief, such as the recent 'refugee crisis', most international *migrants* are highly-skilled individuals whose specific skills and rare talents make them globally employable and therefore highly mobile (Kerr et al. 2016; Lucassen and Smit 2015).

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Examples of this elite group of *migrants* include IT-professionals, academics, diplomats, health professionals and professional athletes, especially football players.

Although Pierre Lanfranchi and Matthew Taylor (2001, 3), who have studied the international migration of professional football players from a historical perspective, argue that the movements of footballers across the globe is nothing new because it 'has been fundamentally bound up with the general migration patterns',[7] the opening of the global football market in the mid-1990s, especially in Europe, made it (much) easier for footballers to play the game professionally where they considered the conditions to be a personal best. The commercialisation and professionalisation of club football has led to a growing inflow of foreign players into national leagues, in particular to the top European competitions such as the English Premier League, the Spanish LaLiga, the Italian Serie A, the German Bundesliga, and the French Ligue 1 (Bale and Maguire 1994; Elliot and Harris 2015; Van Bottenburg 2001). While the presence of foreign footballers in national leagues was initially limited by national governments, over time it became widely accepted that footballers moved internationally in search of employment, just like other *migrant* workers (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Taylor 2006). Today, international transfers of football players from one football club to another, crossing national borders, are considered as normal. It is plausible that the influx of foreign footballers in national leagues over time also influenced the composition of national football teams (Milanovic 2005; Sage 2010). This makes sense, as footballers who earn their living abroad can qualify for a state's citizenship after working and residing in a country for a certain period of time. Changing their (sporting) nationality can fulfil their sportive dreams of playing international football, as well as it can facilitate their economic earning capacity (Carter 2011; Holmes and Storey 2011). One of the most controversial examples in this respect, as illustrated in Chapter 1, is Brazilian-born striker Diego Costa. As a reminder, Costa became eligible

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[7] General migration patterns refer to trends derived from the estimations on international migration by the United Nation's Population Division. The percentage of international migrants is currently 3,4% of the world population (United Nations 2017).

to play for the Spanish national football team after obtaining Spanish citizenship through naturalisation based on his years of residence in the country (*jus domicilii*, see Chapter 1*)* while playing for several Spanish clubs, mainly Club Atlético de Madrid (Hay 2014; Jenson 2016).[8]

Nationality changes in international football are, however, a very different – perhaps a more controversial and emotionally charged – phenomenon than professional football players changing clubs internationally. The latter are only moving internationally between different football clubs, while remaining loyal to the same national football team and its respective country. The difference between these two 'international movements' stems mainly from the belief that a national football team is a representation of its state and nation, made up of national representatives who reflect a country's demographic diversity and values (Goldblatt 2014). Although, as Michael Holmes and David Storey (2011, 254) rightfully state, 'the teams themselves are often treated as relatively undifferentiated collectives, rather than as groups of individuals in their own right', the presence of foreign-born players or football players with a migration background in national football teams seem to be somewhat paradoxical, contributing to the denationalisation of international football (Poli 2007). Denationalisation here mainly refers to the seemingly increase in diversity of football players in national teams, in terms of nationality and ethnicity, which challenges the spirits of FIFA's international competitions between, more or less, homogenous countries; a process that, arguably, leads to the 'de-ethnicization of the nation' (Poli 2007, 646; Holmes and Storey 2011; Skey 2015; see Chapter 1).

To overcome a, further, denationalisation of international football, FIFA in the early 1960s decided to monitor the number and frequency of football players (trying to) change their (sporting) nationality. Based on these outcomes, FIFA introduced the so-called eligibility regulations in 1962 which, in their basis, oblige football players to officially have

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[8] In general, Spain handles a 10-years residency requirement for naturalisation. The required length of residency for a naturalisation is, for example, in Argentina only 2 years, in Brazil it is 4 years, and in it is Mexico 5 years. For more information, see: http://globalcit.eu/acquisition-citizenship.

citizenship of the country whose national football team they wish to represent in international football (Hafner 2014; Hall 2012; FIFA 2020).[9] In addition to this amendment, the eligibility regulations state that footballers are not allowed to switch allegiance after they competed for a national football team during an 'A' level status match.[10] Even football players holding dual nationality can, therefore, only decide once which country they wish to play for in international football (FIFA 2020, 74–76; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001).[11]

While FIFA determines under which conditions football players are eligible to play for a national football team, they have a say in the attribution of a state's legal citizenship. Therefore, FIFA's eligibility regulations are lagging behind national citizenship legislation and policies. National governments are still the only institutions that can legally grant citizenship to individuals (for a broader debate see Chapter 1). The imbalance between FIFA's eligibility rules and countries' national policies on acquiring citizenship leads to, and has resulted in, inequalities between national football teams in the optional pool of football players from which each national football team can select its national representatives (De Groot 2006; Holmes and Storey 2011; Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014).

In most states, people are attributed citizenship at birth based on one of the two (or in combination) legal techniques: (i) *jus soli* – the right of the soil – which grants citizenship on the basis of a person's birth within a state's territory, or through (ii) *jus sanguinis* – the right of blood –

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[9] Before the 1960s, it was not uncommon for players to represent multiple national football teams throughout their career. In 2004, as a reaction on the growing tendency of naturalised foreign-born players in national football teams, FIFA implemented an additional rule obliging player to have a 'clear connection' with the country they represent. This was done to ensure the balance between the interests involved in international football and to prevent spurious changes in (sporting) nationality through which national football teams might become more like football clubs (see Chapter 1).

[10] An 'A-status match' in international football is 'a match (either in full or in part) in an official competition of any category or any type of football' as acknowledged by FIFA (FIFA 2020, 74).

[11] FIFA does have special regulations for players with dual nationalities who want to change their association. A player may only request such a change at FIFA once. The Players' Status Committee decides on the request (FIFA 2020, 74–80).

granting a person citizenship on the basis of descent. The primacy of (either one of) these techniques is grounded in a country's national history and, therefore, varies between countries. Where, for example, the acquisition of French citizenship is, and has been, predominantly based on being born on French soil (*jus soli*), German citizenship can mainly be acquired through family heritage (*jus sanguinis*) (Brubaker 1992; Weil 2011; for a broader discussion on the acquisition of citizenship see Chapter 1). However, in most countries people are, nowadays, eligible to acquire citizenship based on either one of these two birthright techniques (Bosniak 2006; Shachar 2009; Vink and De Groot 2010a; 2010b). As the citizenship principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* can (*morally*) be considered as 'unfair', because they are based on being born at a place within a certain family which is beyond the control of an (new born) individual, citizenship can in most countries around the world also be acquired after birth via the process of naturalisation. *Jus domicilii* (right to citizenship based on residency) and *jus matrimonii* (right to citizenship based on marriage) – collectively known as *jus nexi* – are two of the legally accepted techniques regulating naturalisations (confer Bauböck 2019; Vink and De Groot 2010a; 2010b). When in possession of a country's legal citizenship, and meeting the other conditions set by FIFA, a foreign-born football player is eligible to represent his [*sic*] *adopted* country in international football.

As states use and have historically used different criteria to determine who counts as a *migrant*, and have institutionalised different practices of naturalisation in their national laws, counting (specific groups of) migrants – including migrant footballers – leads to differences *within* and *between* countries, and changes over time. These differences not only make it hard to compare migratory data cross-nationally and over time (Dumont and Lemaître 2005, 6; Özden et al. 2011, 17; Parsons et al. 2007, 5), they also contribute to different national policies and public opinions on issues like citizenship, (im)migration and national belonging. Whereas, for example, Japan and South Korea have been quite strict in providing state citizenship to *migrants*, countries like the Australia, Canada and the United States have (had) more flexible and open policies towards naturalisations of foreign(-born) persons. Partly therefore, the

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number of *migrants* residing in either Japan and South Korea is, and historically has been, significantly lower than the share of *migrants* in so-called 'nations of immigration' like Australia, Canada and the United States (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014, 5). Such historical differences in national policies on citizenship are, to a certain degree, reflected in the number of *migrant* footballers present in national football teams. While Japan included at least one foreign-born footballer – who acquired Japanese citizenship through either parental heritage or after naturalisation – in each selection of their national football team for their six football World Cup participations,[12] Frankfurt-born (Germany) Cha Du-ri has been the only foreign-born footballer (to this date) to represent South Korea (twice) in the (2002 and 2010) football World Cup. The United States, in comparison, has been represented by 48 footballers who were born outside of its juridical borders throughout their history of the football World Cup. In line with FIFA's eligibility regulations, all these foreign-born footballers had officially acquired U.S. citizenship before representing the United States in international football. These differences indicate that clearly defining, conceptualising and critically using the term *migrant* is of utmost importance in the exploration of the (changing) numbers of *migrant* footballers in national football teams throughout the history of the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018).

An alternative approach to counting migrants

As mentioned previously, solely using a person's place of birth in the current geopolitical context to determine who counts as a *migrant* footballer is, from a historical perspective, too simplistic and problematic. The simplicity of a foreign-born approach lies in the fact that only one variable is used to determine the notion of *migrant*. By doing so, this approach neglects many of the complexities surrounding migration, like the redrawing of territorial borders over time, the emergence and

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[12] Brazilian-born Wagner Lopes competed for Japan at the football World Cup in 1998; naturalised Brazilian Alex represented Japan in 2002 and 2006; Marcus Tulio Tanaka (born in Brazil) played for Japan in 2010; and in 2014, New Yorker (United States of America) Gōtoku Sakai was selected for the Japanese national football team.

disappearance of states, and (historical) political relations between countries such as (former) colonies. In these overlooked geopolitical contexts, citizenship can be a useful tool to determine and, consequently, estimate the number of *migrants* in specific countries at certain moments in time (Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011). While most studies on international migration consider citizenship to be a key variable in migration, they seem to shy away from explicitly using this variable in the counting of *migrants*. This is mainly due to uncertainties in, or the complete lack of, data on peoples' nationality/ies in (historical) population censuses (Özden et al. 2011; Parsons et al. 2007).[13] As football can be considered the global sport *par excellence*, (biographical) data on individual football players like their place of birth and (parent) nationality/ies are generally well documented, even for older cases (Taylor 2006). It can, therefore, be argued that international football, and international sports more generally, is a unique laboratory and prism through which complexities surrounding migration and citizenship can be viewed and critically analysed (Holmes and Storey 2011, 253). Through combining these variables, it becomes possible to provide a detailed, comparable, and (more) accurate picture of the presence of *migrant* footballers in (certain) national football teams throughout the history of the football World Cup. A historical contextualisation of citizenship by using (i) the territorial borders at the time of the respective football World Cup, (ii) taking into account the influences of colonialism on citizenship (and nationality), and (iii) by pleading that foreign-born footballers need to be considered *nationals* when they possess a *genuine* link with the state and its nation they represent in international football, will arguably result in more accurate numbers of *migrant* footballers in the context of a database. This approach to counting (football) *migrants* is what I call the 'contextual-nationality approach'.

Let me illustrate some of the differences between a foreign-born approach and the contextual-nationality approach when counting *migrants* in the context of international football. In a foreign-born approach, a football player who was born within the *current* territorial

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[13] Only since the population censuses of 2000 data on both a person's place of birth and their citizenship have become available for about half of the countries in the world.

borders of Ukraine before 1991 and who represented the national football team of the Soviet Union at the time, is recorded as a *migrant* football player in the database. After all, when the current geographic borders are taken as a reference point, this player represented a different country (Soviet Union) than the country in which he was born (Ukraine) (Parsons et al. 2007). However, since Ukraine, and related its national football team, did not exist before 1991, a footballer born within Ukraine's current territorial borders could only have had Soviet citizenship and was, therefore, only eligible to play for the USSR national football team. Because of this, such a football player is determined a *national* (of the Soviet Union) instead of a *migrant* in the alternative approach to counting (football) *migrants*.

Similar issues occur with footballers who are born in (former) colonies. In a foreign-born approach, these footballers are determined as *migrants* due to their place of birth in a (former) colony. These football players, however, represented the colonial ruler-state in international football as the geographical territory of the colony felt under another state's political sovereignty. This meant that means (most of) the people living in a colony (could) only possess legal citizenship of the ruling state. Moreover, the process of granting citizenship to people living in colonies underlined the power of ruling states over the colonies (Bleich 2005). Dutch representative Elisa Hendrik 'Beb' Bakhuys (born 16 April 1909 in Pekanlongan – died 7 July 1982 in The Hague), who played in the 1934 football World Cup, provides an excellent example of this geopolitical relationship. In a foreign-born approach, Bakhuys becomes classified as a *migrant* footballer in the Dutch national football team as he was born in the Dutch East Indies; currently the Republic of Indonesia. However, at the time of Bakhuys' birth, the Dutch East Indies were a colony under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Moreover, as both of his parents originated from the Netherlands, Bakhuys was – seemingly automatic – granted Dutch citizenship upon birth (Immerzeel 2016; Verkammen 1999), as Dutch citizenship is primarily acquired through the technique of *jus sanguinis*. Because Beb Bakhuys was (only) in the possession of Dutch citizenship, he is determined as a *national* instead of a *migrant* in the contextual-nationality approach.

A somewhat similar story can be recorded for the foreign-born footballers in the 1966 Portuguese football team roster. This team consisted of four football players who originated from the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique, including the great Eusébio. Although these four footballers are classified as *migrants* in a foreign-born approach, they are defined as *nationals* in the contextual-nationality approach as these players had no choice but to compete for the national football team of the metropolis (Portugal). In the case of Portuguese Mozambique, in particular, it was the 'Indigenous People's Rule', introduced by Portuguese dictator Antonio Salazar, that enabled these four exceptional Mozambique-born footballers – like other *migrants* in the wider society of Portugal – to acquire an '"assimilated" status for culturally "Europeanised" Africans from Portugal's colonial territories' (Darby 2007a, 498). Because of this legal status in Portuguese citizenship law, and due to the fact that Mozambique like most (former) colonies did not have its own national football team,[14] these African footballers were eligible to represent Portugal in international football (Mamdani 1996; O'Laughlin 2000; de Sousa Santos 2006). Even though the Netherlands and Indonesia, just like Portugal and Mozambique, are now separate sovereign countries, footballers born in the (former) colonies who played for the national football team of the colonial empire, as national representatives of that country, made sense at the time.

Much like Beb Bakhuys' *genuine* ancestral link with the Netherlands, many footballers who have been defined as *migrants* by a foreign-born approach have been selected for a national football team based on (grand)parental descent. Throughout the history of international football, both national football federation and football players have (actively) used the 'right of the blood' to claim a player's eligibility for a national football team. Algeria and the Republic of Ireland are well-known examples of countries that have selected, and continue to select, foreign-born footballers for their national football teams based on the nationality of one of their parent(s)/grandparent(s). The Republic of Ireland has, in particular during the era of coach Jack Charlton (1986–

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[14] The national football team of Mozambique was founded in 1976, a year after the country officially gain its independence from Portugal (in June 1975).

1995), exploited the so-called 'granny rule'. Most famous in this regard is England-born striker Tony Cascarino who represented the Republic of Ireland on an alleged blood connection to the country through his mother's grandfather. However, he revealed in his autobiography – published after his active career as a footballer – that his mother had been adopted and that he therefore, strictly speaking, was not eligible to play for the Republic of Ireland's national football team. After all, there was no *genuine* blood connection between him and the Irish nation. Following a fierce public debate over Cascarino's nationality, the Football Association of Ireland stated that Cascarino has always been eligible to play for the Republic of Ireland, as 'since 1991, any child of a person adopted by an Irish citizen also qualifies for Irish citizenship' (Curtis 2000; Hassan and McCue 2013; Legge 2016). In addition to Irish citizenship, Cascarino was also eligible to represent either Scotland or Italy in international football based on his (grand)parental heritage (Legge 2015). Because descent is, and has been, one of the key techniques to acquire citizenship in most (West) European states (Bosniak 2006; Joppke 2010; Shachar 2009), football players who decide to represent the country of one of their parent(s)/grandparent(s) should be considered *nationals* rather than *migrants*.

The proposed alternative approach to counting *migrants* defines a *migrant* footballer by taking into account the international state boundaries at the time of the respective football World Cup edition. This alternative approach thus explains both the redrawing of international borders and the emergence and disappearance of states over time. In addition, this alternative approach recognises the complexity created by geopolitical relationships, such as colonialism, by observing the then-prevailing citizenship regulations of ruling states (Özden et al. 2011). Since most countries offer citizenship on the basis of parental heritage, in addition to being born in the country (Bosniak 2006; Joppke 2010; Shachar 2009), and because a consanguinity makes a footballer eligible under FIFA's regulations to play for a national football team (FIFA 2020, 74–80; Hall 2012), foreign-born players with a *genuine* blood connection to the country should be considered *nationals* rather than *migrants*. Because of such a historical contextualisation, many footballers who were

defined as *migrants* in a traditional foreign-born approach are reclassified as *nationals* in the contextual-nationality approach. The result is a more accurate and nuanced picture of the volume of and changes in the numbers of *migrant* footballers in national football teams throughout the history of the football World Cup.

Creating the database

I have created a database of all footballers who ever participated in the football World Cup, c. 1930–2018. The database contains biographical details of football players about the country they played international football for, their date of birth, and their place and country of birth; the most important information for the purposes of the studies making up this dissertation. In addition, information about the nationalities of the father, mother, grandfather(s) and grandmother(s) is included to determine whether footballers would have been eligible for citizenship of another country based on their descent. If the (grand)parental heritage of foreign-born players matched the national football team they represented, these footballers were labelled *nationals* in the contextual-nationality approach, regardless the country they represented in international football.[15] With regard to the eligibility of football players, a special note should be made on the peculiar situation of the British 'home nations' as all the four countries have their own representative national football team. Since all people, in this case footballers from the United Kingdom, who are born within the juridical borders of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland acquire British citizenship at birth, they are (theoretically) eligible to play for one of the listed national football teams in international football, as they meet the conditions set by FIFA's eligibility regulations. This can become problematic when football players are representing a country with which they have little to no (*genuine*) connection. To overcome this potential problem, the four 'home nations' have 'agreed to a remove [of] the residency clause, and

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[15] This is done because it is (virtually) impossible to trace all national laws and policies on citizenship for the countries participating in the football World Cup, and to place these (changing) regulations in their historical and geopolitical context.

therefore British citizens may only represent one of the four nations if they or their parents or grandparents were born on the relevant territory' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 331 – brackets added). Furthermore, the database takes into account players' professional football careers in order to rule out any uncertainties surrounding a *genuine* link between the player and the country he represents. This has been done because a footballer may become eligible for a state's citizenship, and as a consequence for its respective national football team, on the basis of residency in a country (*jus domicilii*). This was indeed the case with Brazilian-born Diego Costa, who chose to represent Spain in international football because of his seven-year stint in Spain's LaLiga (Jenson 2016; see Chapter 1).

Most of the biographical data about footballers comes from personal Wikipedia webpages.[16] In the event that a footballer was foreign-born, possibly making him [*sic*] a *migrant* player, the information on the Wikipedia pages was cross-referenced with information from (inter)national newspapers and well-known football magazines. In addition, reliable data on the genealogy of football players was often more difficult to find, because most (grand)parents themselves are not or were not (internationally) known. This type of data was, therefore, only added to the database when a football player was foreign-born or when I was reasonably certain of a family's migration background. In total, the database contains 10.137 cases. These cases are not all unique because different footballers have competed at multiple editions of the football World Cup, with some players even representing more than one national football team over time (Hall 2012; Holmes and Storey 2011).

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[16] While the reliability of the information on Wikipedia pages can – and should – be questioned, I have used this source when building the database. This was done because the necessary biographical data on footballers was arguably fairly straightforward, although it appeared to be not easily accessible through other, perhaps more reliable, online football databases such as www.transfermarkt.co.uk and www.footballdatabase.eu. In addition, the necessary historical biographical data on footballers was not available from some commercial players in the world of global sports data. Conversations on the use of Wikipedia as main source to build a database around were held with experts in the field, such as Dr. Raffaele Poli from the CIES Football Observatory and Robin van Helden from GraceNote Global Sports Data.

Furthermore, information about the birthplace of footballers was missing in about 5% of the cases. In these cases, it has been assumed that the football player represented his country of birth in international football (Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011).

A foreign-born approach

The use of a foreign-born proxy when counting *migrant* footballers resulted in 996 *migrant* football players out of 10.137 cases. This means that, on average, per edition of the football World Cup, almost 10% of the players can be considered a *migrant*. Figure 2.1 shows the relative numbers of *migrant* footballers per football World Cup edition, counted using a foreign-born approach. At first glance, the evolution of the number of *migrant* footballers per edition of the football World Cup seems rather arbitrary, with clear peaks and troughs between subsequent editions. Looking at segments of the outcomes and relating the number of *migrants* in subsequent football World Cup editions, some interesting observations can be made, providing a more nuanced picture of the (changing) presence of *migrant* footballers at the football World Cup over time.

It is, for example, interesting to see that over the first eight years of the football World Cup – referring to the editions of 1930, 1934 and 1938 – the percentage of *migrant* footballers increases rather steeply, from 5,5% in 1930 to more than 12% of the selected players in 1938. Particularly, the 1938 football World Cup stands out in that the percentage of *migrant* football players of that edition even exceeds the 2014 edition of the football World Cup, which is widely regarded as the most migratory edition in the history of the football World Cup (so far) (Hafner 2014; Robinson 2014).[17] This outcome can be partly explained by the fact that during these early editions FIFA had no regulations regarding the eligibility of football players to play for national football teams (Hall 2012; Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; see Chapter 1). Therefore, it,

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[17] It is striking that when using a foreign-born proxy, the percentage of *migrant* footballers in the 2014 edition is also surpassed by several earlier editions of the football World Cup; 1954, 1962, 1970, 1982 and 1990.

Figure 2.1. Percentages of a foreign-born approach to counting *migrant* football players at the football World Cup, c. 1930–2018

PERCENTAGES MIGRANT FOOTBALL PLAYERS AT THE FOOTBALL WORLD CUP, C. 1930–2018. A FOREIGN-BORN APPROACH [#996, N=10.137]

was not uncommon for players to represent multiple countries throughout their professional football career, as Raimundo Orsi and Luis Monti did. Both were Argentine-born footballers who, thanks to their Italian roots, were allowed to compete for either one of these national football teams at an edition of the football World Cup, both representing Argentina in 1930 and Italy in 1934 (Doidge 2015; Foot 2006; Van Campenhout 2017).

In the period after the Second World War and up to the 1990s, the number of *migrant* football players shows great differences between the different editions of the football World Cup, leaving no room for a clear trend. The fluctuations in the number of *migrant* footballers can roughly be explained by the national football teams that qualified for the respective editions of the football World Cup (FIFA 2007). For example, because the national football teams of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia failed to qualify for the 1978 football World Cup, the number of *migrant* footballers in this particular edition is clearly lower than in the years when one or all of these national football teams qualified. In 1982, these three (former) states qualified for the football World Cup, as a result of which almost 13% of the footballers at this football World Cup are *migrants* (figure 2.1).[18] As explained before, these dissolved states quite heavily affect the number of *migrant* footballers as many of their football players are labelled as a *migrant* in a foreign-born approach, when in fact they were born in vanished provinces of former larger empires that no longer exist. From the mid-1990s onwards, a steady, increasing trend in the number of *migrant* footballers seems to appear in this traditional, foreign-born approach to counting (football) *migrants*.

The contextual-nationality approach

Approaching the data in an alternative way, based on a historical contextualisation that emphasises citizenship in addition to the place of

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[18] The national football team of New Zealand also managed to qualify for the 1982 football World Cup with 11 foreign-born players in their selection. Most of them were British-born.

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birth-criterion, leads to 'only' 250 cases of *migrant* football players in all editions of the football World Cup. Table 2.1, showing the *absolute* and *relative* numbers of *migrant* footballers derived from both approaches, illustrates that the average number of *migrant* footballers drops from about 10% in a foreign-born approach to less than 3% in the contextual-nationality approach. This means that the number of *migrant* footballers in the history of the football World Cup differs by more than two-thirds (more than 68%) between the two approaches, illustrating the need to clearly define and use the term *migrant* (Özden et al. 2011, 18; Vamplew 2016).

Taking into account the geopolitical changes that have occurred over time in counting *migrants* clearly leads to reduced peaks and troughs in the number of *migrant* footballers between subsequent editions of the football World Cup. Moreover, these figures are more similar compared to *general* patterns and trends in international migration (figure 2.2). Again, the differences in the number of *migrant* footballers in successive football World Cups stem mainly from the national football teams that managed to qualify for this international sporting event.[19]

In addition, the presence of *migrant* footballers in the selection of a national football team appears to be closely related to a country's history of migration, arguably reflecting the openness of national legislations and policies on citizenship and naturalisation (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). Australia, Canada and the United States, as mentioned previously, are countries well-known for their quite welcoming policies towards *migrant*s. Because of this, it is relatively easy for *migrants* to successfully naturalise as *formal* citizens in one of these countries, thereby qualifying to represent their *adopted* country in international football. The outcomes of national citizenship and naturalisation legislation and policies are, arguably, reflected in the number of *migrant* footballers in the respective national football teams over time. As mentioned, countries like Japan and South Korea have stricter legislation regarding naturalisation and, partly because of this,

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[19] However, the presence or absence of specific national football teams in the football World Cup editions does not affect the comparability of the two approaches used to count *migrant* footballers, as the outcomes are derived from the same data.

Table 2.1. Number of *migrant* football players per edition of the football World Cup according to the two approaches

Football World Cup edition	No. of football players	No. of migrant players foreign-born	Percentage of migrant players foreign-born	No. of migrant players context-nationality	Percentage of migrant players context-nationality
1930	241	14	5,81	7	2,90
1934	341	27	7,92	9	2,64
1938	318	39	12,26	11	3,46
1942					
1946					
1950	282	25	8,87	13	4,61
1954	350	42	12,00	7	2,00
1958	352	27	7,67	2	0,57
1962	352	43	12,22	5	1,42
1966	352	20	5,68	2	0,57
1970	349	41	11,75	7	2,01
1974	352	30	8,52	15	4,26
1978	352	8	2,27	2	0,57
1982	525	66	12,57	16	3,05
1986	527	43	8,16	14	2,66
1990	530	73	13,77	6	1,13
1994	528	46	8,71	13	2,46
1998	705	63	8,94	14	1,99
2002	736	71	9,65	18	2,45
2006	737	71	9,63	19	2,58
2010	736	78	10,60	23	3,13
2014	736	85	11,55	23	3,13
2018	736	84	11,41	24	3,26
Total number/ Average %	**10.137**	**996**	**9,84**	**250**	**2,47**

Figure 2.2. Outcomes of the two approaches to counting *migrant* football players, related to trends in international migration

only a handful of foreign-born footballers have been selected for their national football teams.

If we look again at the first three editions of the football World Cup (1930, 1934 and 1938), the numbers of *migrant* footballers are significantly lower compared to the outcomes of a foreign-born proxy. Although football players were (relatively) free to decide which country they wanted to represent in these early editions of the football World Cup, it seems that most of the selected footballers for the football World Cup are either born in the country they represented and/or their connection with country was based on descent. With percentages between 3 and 3,5, it seems that only a few players lacked a *genuine* connection to the country they represented as they were also classified as a *migrant* in the contextual-nationality approach (table 2.1, figure 2.2). Because most football players obtained citizenship of the country they represented through on one of the two main birthright citizenship techniques (*jus soli* or *jus sanguinis*), the eligibility regulations introduced by FIFA basically reflected what was already happening in international football. However, the eligibility rules gave FIFA (a sense of) more control over the player selection of national football teams and the (possible) nationality switches of football players in international football (Hall 2012; Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014).

In the second segment, between the Second World War and the 1990s, the context-nationality approach shows again a significantly reduced trend in the number of *migrant* footballers compared to the traditional, foreign-born approach. The differences between the highs and lows in the number of *migrant* footballers within the context-nationality approach are however less extreme than the peaks and throughs within a foreign-born approach; the relative numbers roughly oscillate between the 0,5% and 2% with only two outliers of just over 4% in the 1950 and 1974 football World Cup. In 1950, 7 out of the 19 selected footballers for the United States national football team are *migrants* footballers. These players presumably migrated – either alone or with their families – from Europe to the 'promised land' because of the disruptions caused by the Second World War. Australia's qualification to the 1974 football World Cup increased the number of *migrant* footballers for that edition as 17 of

their 22 selected players were *migrants* to the country. Most of them were born in either England or Scotland (joint part of the Commonwealth of Nations), or originated from (former-)Yugoslavia. When these numbers of football *migrants* are compared with the *general* patterns and trends in international migration, they appear on average to be around the same level (Zlotnik 1999, 42). From the mid-1990s onwards, the *relative* number (percentages) of *migrant* footballers in the context-nationality approach has remained fairly stable over time and even seems to mirror the *general* patterns and trends in international migration (figure 2.2).

While the *absolute* number of *migrant* footballers has increased in both approaches, to varying degrees, over the history of the football World Cup, the *relative* number of *migrant* footballers differs significantly between the two approaches. These different patterns and trends in the numbers resulting from the use of the two approaches to counting *migrant*s are shown in figure 2.2. To be able to compare the results of both approaches with the changes in the numbers of *migrant*s worldwide, a trendline reflecting the *relative* number of international *migrants* has been added to figure 2.2 (Migration Policy Institute 2017).

The superiority of the context-nationality approach

The context-nationality approach to counting *migrant* footballers aims to fill a gap in both mainstream migration research and sports history, and in international football in particular. By counting the number of *migrant* footballers in two different ways, it has become possible to challenge the common belief that there has been an increase in the number of footballers representing a country other than their country of birth during recent editions of the football World Cup. By analysing the data, a more nuanced picture is given of the historical development of the number of *migrant* football players at the football World Cup (c. 1930–2018) from two perspectives. In addition, the two approaches to counting *migrant* footballers have made it possible to identify patterns, trends and possible outliers in migration data, and to compare the data on *migrant* footballers over time (Day and Vamplew 2015; Vamplew 2015).

The two approaches to counting *migrant* footballers further illustrate that critically engaging with the intricacies of counting and mapping international migration is crucial (Bilsborrow et al. 1997; Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011; Parsons et al. 2007). Since a difference in conceptualisation of the term *migrant* will yield different results, it is of great importance to clearly define and explain the conceptualisation of the term *migrant* in (historical) studies on international migration. Furthermore, when counting (football) *migrants*, a foreign-born approach seems to lead to an overestimation of the number of *migrant* footballers, especially from a historical comparative perspective. By taking into account (historical) changes in geopolitical contexts, such as international borders, colonial relations and citizenship complexities, the proposed context-nationality approach, arguably, provides a more accurate and realistic estimate of the number of *migrant* footballers than an approach that relies solely on a foreign-born proxy. As a result, the contextual-nationality approach helps to gain a better understanding of the changing patterns and trends of (football) migration (Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011). The influence of historical contextualisation is, for example, reflected in the discrepancy between the international *migrant* averages of both approaches. While the use of a foreign-born proxy resulted in an average of almost 10% *migrant* footballers per football World Cup edition (c. 1930–2018), the use of the contextual-nationality approach resulted in an average of approximately 3% football *migrants*.

In my view, because of the superiority of the contextual-nationality approach, information and data on national histories of citizenship should always be taken into account when counting (football) *migrants* – if this type of information is available – in mainstream migration research, studies in history, and in sport sciences. The historical patterns and trends arising from the number of *migrant* footballers at the football World Cup, using the contextual-nationality approach, seem to reflect to a large extent the *general* patterns and trends in international migration. This implies that the presence of *migrant* footballers in national football teams at the football World Cup is historically nothing new and corresponds to broader patterns and trends in international migration, of

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which migratory movements of football players in the context of association football can be considered a part (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Taylor 2006).

In the context of these conclusions, it is important to note some limitations of this study, most of which relate to the database in terms of the design and quality of the data. These aspects had a clear influence on the analysis and interpretation of the data, the outcomes of the number of *migrant* football players in both approaches and, as a result, on the main take-away message of this study (Vamplew 2015).

First, the database is (highly) selective as it only includes football players who have been selected for their national football team, and it only concerns the national football teams who have managed to qualify for an edition of the football World Cup; an event that only takes place once every four years. Due to the qualification process to compete at the football World Cup, which has changed over time from 'by invitation' to its current format (FIFA 2007), the composition of national football teams participating in the football World Cup can differ enormously per edition. This is a crucial limitation for this study, as the national football teams that qualify for the football World Cup provide the cases in the database and, in terms of their national history of migration and citizenship regimes, have a huge influence on the number of *migrant* footballers present on the different editions of the football World Cup. Moreover, due to inconsistencies regarding which national football teams qualify for the football World Cup, it is difficult to historically compare the number of *migrant* footballers, especially to detect a trend or to identify outliers in the presence of *migrant* footballers at the football World Cup. There is only one national football team that has managed to qualify for all editions of the football World Cup (c. 1930–2018): Brazil. However, the Brazilians have never included a foreign-born player in their national football team roster for the football World Cup. Please note that this limitation does not affect the comparability between the two approaches – which was the main aim of this chapter – as the context of the comparison remains similar, as both approaches 'work with' the same data derived from the different editions of the football World Cup.

Second, the amount and quality of biographical information available about football players varies widely per national football team and over time, and its coverage is not universal. More detailed data is available on high-profile football players and better performing national football teams than on what could be considered outliers in international football, especially in terms of reliable data on the nationalities of the parents/grandparents of representative football players (Özden et al. 2011, 13). In addition, more and increasingly accurate data is available on the national football teams that participated in the later editions of the football World Cup compared to the earlier editions. This of course relates to the increased availability of data on football in general.

Third, it should be borne in mind that the number of national football teams participating in the football World Cup has increased over time, just as the number of football players allowed in the selection of national football teams has increased from 22 players in the period from 1930 to 1994 to 23 footballers from 1998 onwards (table 2.2). Since these changes have led to more football players taking part in the more recent editions of the football World Cup, this will most likely also lead to an increase in the *absolute* number of *migrant* football players in the long run. For that reason, especially the *relative* (percentage-wise) number of *migrant* footballers – that is the number of *migrant* football players compared to the total number of footballers in the respective edition of the football World Cup – is interesting to investigate.

Table 2.2. Changes in the amount of national football teams and increases in the maximum number of selection players throughout the history of the football World Cup, c. 1930-Future

Period	Number of participating national football teams	Maximum number of football players in the selection of national football teams
1930 – 1938	16 national football teams	22 football players
1942 – 1946	*No World Cup: World War II*	*No World Cup: World War II*
1950 – 1978	16 national football teams	22 football players
1982 – 1994	24 national football teams	22 football players
1998 – 2022	32 national football teams	23 football players
2022 – Future	48 national football teams	23 football players

CHAPTER 3

HAS THE FOOTBALL WORLD CUP BECOME MORE MIGRATORY?

Other than minor changes, this chapter is a reflection of an article published as:

Van Campenhout, Gijs, Jacco van Sterkenburg, and Gijsbert Oonk. 2019. 'Has the World Cup Become More Migratory? A Comparative History of Foreign-Born Players in National Football Teams, c. 1930-2018'. *Comparative Migration Studies 7* (22): 1–30.

3 Has the football World Cup become more migratory?

Introduction

At the 2018 (men's) football World Cup in Russia, 84 football players competed for national football teams other than their country of birth; the second highest *absolute* number of foreign-born footballers in the history of the football World Cup, just after the 2014 edition (see Chapter 2).[20] During the 2018 football World Cup, the Moroccan national football team selected the most foreign-born players, with three quarters (seventeen out of twenty-three) of their national representatives being born outside Morocco's territorial borders. Interestingly, this African country could even field an entirely European-born team (Kuper 2018; Storey 2020; Van Campenhout and Oonk 2018). When it comes to national football teams, which (arguably) represent its respective nation, the presence of foreign-born players is somewhat paradoxical and a challenge to the spirits of FIFA's international football competitions between, more or less, homogenous (sporting) nations (Bairner 2001; Holmes and Storey 2011; Keys 2006).

At present, academic work and media journalists often claim that foreign-born players on national football teams have become more common (Maguire and Pearton 2000; Goldblatt 2014). It seems that countries are increasingly represented by players who have with only a *vague* connection to the countries whose jerseys they wear, fuelling debates about the representativeness of national football teams and questioning the belonging to the nation of these foreign-born players. However, systematically gathered figures to support and historically legitimise claims that the football World Cup has become more migratory *over time* is lacking, even at FIFA. The question therefore is whether the

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[20] Foreign-born footballers are football players who represent another national football team than the national football team of the country in which they are born. The notion of foreign-born also involves football players who migrated to a country at a young age, and who are practically raised, schooled and trained in the country they represent in international football.

claims that national football teams are increasingly selecting foreign-born footballers are legitimate. So far, such claims have only been empirically tested for the Olympics, leading Joost Jansen and Godfried Engbersen (2017, 1) to conclude that 'the Olympic Games indeed have not become inherently more migratory' throughout its history. The lack of similar research on national football teams is surprising, because especially in the field of international football – with the football World Cup as a textbook example – migratory processes are well documented, visible to the public and (sometimes) fiercely debated in national media and by the general public (Holmes and Storey 2011; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Maguire and Falcous 2011). The purpose of this chapter is to provide some historical clarity on the *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born footballers in national football teams throughout the history of the football World Cup, c. 1930-2018. To answer the question whether the football World Cup has become more migratory over time, I will analyse the selections of a selected number of national football teams that competed at the football World Cup between 1930 and 2018. The findings will be related to patterns and trends in international migration, national (im)migration histories, and (historic) citizenship regimes of the selected countries to gain more insight in the processes of this *specific*, often overlooked, form of (im)migration.

The first part of this article outlines a conceptual framework based on studies in the fields of international migration, sports history and sociological works on football. Based on broader patterns and trends in international migration, a classification on national (im)migration histories is used, which is then related to a generalisation of national citizenship regimes. We later use this classification to explain changes in the *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born players throughout the history of the football World Cup and within the selected national football teams. In the second part, we clarify the setup of our dataset, and explain the conceptualisation and analysis of (developments in) the *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born footballers. Part three of this chapter addresses the empirical findings by presenting the (changes in) *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born football players throughout the history of the football World Cup and relating these outcomes to the theoretical framework as

presented in part one. This chapter concludes by answering the question of whether the football World Cup has become more migratory over time.

(Im)Migration histories

It could be argued that international migration, being a central dynamic within globalisation, has increased because of the (relative) openness of national borders (Carens 2013; Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014, 5). Trends in international migration show that, despite a clear increase in the absolute number of international migrants throughout the 19th, 20th and the 21st century, the relative number of people migrating has remained fairly stable; between the two and four per cent of the total world population (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Zlotnik 1999, see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). However, large differences in migration exist between regions in the world and migration does not take place everywhere at the same speed or independently of other processes of globalisation (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). Perhaps contradicting the popular images of the *crisis* of refugees and asylum seekers, international migrants are increasingly highly skilled, making them globally employable. In particular, the mobility of this elite group of migrants – existing of IT professionals, academics, diplomats, health professionals and professional athletes such as football players – has increased in *intensity* and *composition* (Kerr et al. 2016; Lucassen and Smit 2015).

Because not all countries have witnessed similar processes of international migration – in terms of both immigration and emigration – within the same time frames, differences have arisen in countries' histories of migration (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Czaika and de Haas 2014; Flahaux and de Haas 2016). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Americas (North and South) encountered 'waves of immigrants', the vast majority of whom came from (continental) Europe (Goebel 2016; Pew Research Center 2015). After this period of transatlantic migration, international migration declined worldwide due to emerging ideologies of nationalism and, as a result, the implementation of stricter national policies on immigration and naturalisation (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). After the Second World War, especially since the 1960s, international migration increased (again). From then on, three

types of migration histories can be distinguished based on the historical trends in countries' *im*migration; *countries of immigration, latecomers to immigration* and *nations of immigrants* (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014).

First, most West European countries – such as Belgium, England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland – are considered 'countries of immigration' (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014, 13); despite the fact that the countries themselves may see this differently. While most of these countries experienced periods of *emi*gration before the 1960s, the flow of migrants has reversed due to (i) general improvements in the living conditions in these countries, (ii) processes of decolonisation, and (iii) changes in national legislations, policies and ideologies on immigration and naturalisation (Flahaux and de Haas 2016). For example, the active recruitment of 'guest workers' by a number of national governments at the time helped to reverse the migratory flows in these respective countries.

Second, countries such as Italy and Spain, as well as South Korea, have long been *exporters* of migrants. It was only during the last decades of the 20th century that these countries 'made the transition from countries of emigration to countries of net immigration' (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014, 20). Therefore, these countries are considered to be 'latecomers to immigration'. Thirdly, the (ongoing) attractiveness of traditional countries of settlement, like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States has made them into 'nations of immigrants' (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). Because of their, generally, open attitude towards foreigners, immigrants have become an active part of their historical consciousness and national identity. Moreover, the diversity of 'their current people are the result of histories of large-scale immigration' (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014, 14). However, this in no way means that the countries within this category have always had welcoming immigration- and naturalisation policies. These countries have also witnessed fluctuations in the openness of their national policies and ideologies towards immigrants, let alone that immigrants have always been able to apply for citizenship in one of these countries (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014).

Following Jansen and Engbersen (2017, 3), a fourth category has been added to the classification of James Hollifield, Philip Martin and Pia Orrenius to address the migration histories of countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay; 'former countries of immigration'. Before and during the 1960s, the South American continent was one of the most important immigration destinations, especially for (South) Europeans (Goebel, 2016). Over time, however, these countries witnessed a reversed trend of the aforementioned 'latecomers to immigration'. Immigration to these South American countries has gradually decreased and seems to have been replaced by an outflow of people, mainly to 'countries of immigration' and 'nations of immigrants'.[21]

When classifying countries according to their migration history, it was emphasised that the intensity and direction of international migration has historically been subject to change. Based on the (im)migration histories outlined, I wonder whether these patterns in immigration are reflected in the selections of national football teams throughout the history of the football World Cup. I expect that foreign-born footballers have historically been present within the national football teams of 'nations of immigrants', while an increase in the *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born players is expected within representative football teams of 'countries of immigration' after the 1960s.

Citizenship regimes and FIFA's eligibility regulations

Historically, citizenship as status – legal state membership – is attributed to a person at birth through either one of the two birthright technique: (1) *jus soli* (literally, the right of the soil), which grants citizenship on the basis of birth within the juridical territory of a state, and (2) *jus sanguinis* (literally, right of blood), which grants citizenship on the basis of a citizen's descent such as (grand)parents. While United States' citizenship is mainly acquired through being born within the United States or in

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[21] Classifying these South American countries as 'former countries of immigration' does by no means mean that these countries do not witness any form of immigration anymore. Most of these countries, especially certain geographical areas within them, are still dealing with an inflow of foreigners.

territories under its jurisdiction, German citizenship is primarily acquired through parental heritage. Children born outside of Germany to a German parent(s) are therefore eligible for German citizenship (Bosniak 2006; Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2010; Shachar 2009). However, there is a 'clear process of convergence between countries with *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* traditions' (Vink and De Groot 2010b, 715 – emphasis added), which means that most (West-European) countries today grant citizenship along both policies – under national specific conditions. In addition to these birthright techniques, citizenship can also be obtained later in life through naturalisation, which is mainly done by marrying a native citizen (*jus matrimonii*) or residing in a country (*jus domicilii*) (see Chapter 1). Naturalisations are often preceded by national specific conditions, such as a minimum number of years of residence in a country, an income criterion, and/or a proof of language proficiency.[22] However, the naturalisation requirements immigrants need to meet to acquire a state's citizenship differ, and historically have differed, between countries – and also have changed within countries over time – creating a global imbalance in terms of citizenship opportunities for *migrants* (Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018; Vink and De Groot 2010b).

While it was quite common until the mid-1960s for footballers to represent another country than their country of birth in international – famous examples are Argentina-born Alfredo Di Stéfano who played for Argentina and Spain, and the Hungarian Ferenc Puskás who represented Hungary and Spain – this changed (slowly) from 1962 when FIFA introduced their eligibility regulations. These regulations were intended to ensure that national football teams would remain a symbol of nationalism (Hall 2012). The basic rule states that 'any person holding a permanent nationality that is not dependent on residence in a certain country is eligible to play for the representative teams of the association

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[22] Most of the selected countries (see the paragraph 'methodology' in this Chapter) employ a 5 years residency requirement. Differences between countries exist as, for example, Brazil requires 4 years of residency, immigrants who want to naturalise as an Italian must live there for at least 3 years, while the Argentinian government uses a waiting period of only 2 years. For more information, see: http://globalcit.eu/acquisition-citizenship.

of that country' (FIFA 2020, 74). In a response to the growing trend of nationality changes especially by players with dual nationality, FIFA introduced additional eligibility rules in 2004 that required a 'clear connection' between footballers and the country they represented in international football (Hall 2012, 195).[23] Despite these additional rules, football players' connection with the national football team they represent increasingly appear to be based on (grand)parental heritage, their longstanding loyalty to a football club in a national competition (which effectively relates to residency) or through marriage, rather than being based on their place of birth (Holmes and Storey 2011). Some authors even argue that we are witnessing a 'marketisation of citizenship' due to the increasing involvement of national governments in granting (just-in-time fast-tracked) citizenship to talented athletes, including footballers (Shachar 2011; 2018; Shachar and Hirschl 2014).

While FIFA determines who is eligible under what conditions to play for a national football team, they have no say in national citizenship procedures. National governments remain the only institutions that can legally grant citizenship to individuals (Hall 2012; Holmes and Storey 2011). The (im)migration histories of countries, with their differences between countries and changes over time in citizenship laws and policies, therefore influence the *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born players within national football teams and, as a result, impact the diversity of the football World Cup.

Methodology

While transfers of football players in club football are (historically) careful monitored and documented by official bodies and the media, accurate figures on foreign-born footballers in national football teams are

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[23] The additional requirements on eligibility set by FIFA that players must meet to represent another country are: 'a) He was born on the territory of the relevant association; b) His biological mother or biological father was born on the territory of the relevant association; c) His grandmother or grandfather was born on the territory of the relevant association; d) He has lived continuously on the territory of the relevant association for at least two years' (FIFA 2020, 75).

lacking, especially before the mid-1960s (Hafner 2014). FIFA only then started to – little by little – keep track of footballers' movements between national football teams (Hall 2012). To overcome this lack, a database has been created consisting all footballers who ever competed for a national football team in the football World Cup (c.1930-2018). This has resulted in a database of 10.137 footballers, of which 997 football players are classified as foreign-born (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018). The database contains biographical data of the footballers in terms of the country they represented as an international football player, their date of birth, and their place and country of birth; a combination of these data can indicate changes in (sporting) nationality or international 'movements' (Özden et al. 2011). Moreover, the database contains the nationalities of parents and grandparents – if it was possible to find out – which makes it possible to trace a football player's eligibility to play for a national football team along his bloodline.[24] But even with this detailed biographical data, it remains difficult to accurately measure this specific type of international migration as the 'reason, timing and nature of an athlete's move' remains unknown (Horowitz and McDaniel 2015, 39). Moreover, in the context of international football, in most cases football players do not literally move across borders as possessing citizenship of a state is sufficient to be eligible to represent the respective country. It is therefore that most studies on international migration rely on foreign-born data (Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011). In this chapter, I will also use a foreign-born approach to *migrant* football players while remaining aware of the limitations of this approach, on which I have critically reflected in Chapter 2 (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018). Furthermore, as each state determines and modifies its citizenship requirements, different options for obtaining citizenship have emerged within countries. As a result, over time, the (foreign-born) population of countries has diversified (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to

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[24] Nationalities of (grand)parents were searched for when a football player's country of birth differed from the national football team he represented or when a football player's (bloodline) connection with other countries were known to the principal researcher.

discuss in depth the different typologies of foreign-born person's, specifically football players.

For this chapter, a dataset was created from the full database based on fifteen national football teams, resulting in a dataset consisting of 4.761 football players – 301 of them are classified as foreign-born – which are analysed.[25] The fifteen national football teams selected represent the countries of (in alphabetical order) Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, England, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, and Uruguay. The motivation for the selection of these countries, and their respective national football teams, is threefold:

1. The selected countries have different types of (im)migration histories, covering the distinction between 'countries of immigration' (Belgium, England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland), 'latecomers to immigration' (Italy, South Korea, and Spain), 'nations of immigrants' (United States), and 'former countries of immigration' (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay).

2. The selected countries apply – and have applied – different national laws and policies on citizenship and naturalisation, either based on the techniques of *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis* (or a combination of both acquisition techniques).

3. The selected countries have qualified at least ten times for the football World Cup. While this criterion provides some historical continuity in terms of participation, it unconsciously leads to a focus on football's global centres as most of the selected national football teams originate from Europe and South America.

The presence of foreign-born players in national football teams is described in terms of *volume*, referring to the *absolute* number of football players who competed for a national football team other than their country of birth at the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018). In addition to

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[25] Not all cases in the dataset are unique, as several footballers have played for the same national football team at multiple, often consecutive, edition of the football World Cup (see Chapter 2).

the *absolute* numbers of foreign-born players, the *relative* numbers of foreign-born footballers are also mapped. For the latter, the number refers to the percentage of foreign-born players on the team rosters of the selected national football teams and, relatedly, at the respective edition of the football World Cup. The distinction between *absolute* and *relative* numbers is relevant since it is only possible to speak of a growing intensity of foreign-born footballers in national football teams over time when these players are taken as a relative share of the 'other', native football players in the selections of national football teams as well as at the respective edition of the football World Cup (Czaika and de Haas 2014). Furthermore, in 156 of the 4.761 cases (just over 3%), information about the exact birthplace of football players is missing. Fortunately, their country of birth was known and traceable for me. Moreover, since the vast majority of football players has represented their country of birth in international football, these 156 football players are considered as *nationals* (Dumont and Lemaître 2005).

With the notion of diversity, this chapter focuses on what Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas (2014, 291) call 'immigration diversification': the assumption that foreign-born footballers have come from 'an increasingly geographically distant and diverse array of origin countries'. By adopting a 'destination country perspective', this chapter aims to highlight the diversification of immigration patterns of foreign-born footballers within the rosters of the fifteen selected national football teams. To measure the diversity among foreign-born football players, I, like other social scientists, use the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-index (HHI). The HHI calculates 'the sum of squares of the proportion of each immigrant population (IM_i) as a share of the total immigrant population (M)': Diversity (D) = $1 - \sum_{i=1} \left(\frac{IM_i}{M}\right)^2$ (Jansen and Engbersen 2017, 7). Diversity-values (D-values) are generally between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating that the countries of birth of football players, within the selection of a national football team, are relatively 'scattered' and, therefore, more diverse (Czaika and de Haas 2014). However, in the sample of this study, most D-values are however exact 0 or 1. This means that either national football teams have not selected any foreign-born players (1) – all footballers were born in the country they represented –

or, in the case of 0, that foreign-born footballer(s) in a national football team originate from a one other country. The D-values of foreign-born footballers have been calculated for three editions of the football World Cup: 1934, 1962 and 2014.[26] These football World Cup editions were selected because (i) they are spread out over a long time and can therefore illustrate how diversity in a national football team – arguably reflecting the demographics of its respective country – has developed over time; either remaining (fairly) stable or change substantially (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001; Taylor 2006), and (ii) makes it possible to compare football-related diversity results with changes in immigration diversification and relate to typologies of (im)migration histories (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014; Jansen and Engbersen 2017).

Has the football World Cup become more migratory?

This section presents the results of the empirical analysis. It starts with the historical changes in the *volume* of foreign-born footballers throughout the history of the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018) are shown. Based on these insights, the diversity of foreign-born players, in terms of their country of birth, within their representative national football teams is discussed for three editions of the football World Cup: 1934, 1962 and 2014.

Increased numbers of foreign-born footballers

It can be argued that the football World Cup has generally become more migratory over the course of history. While table 3.1 shows an ebb and flow-pattern in the *volume* of foreign-born players throughout the history of the football World Cup, the overall trend in the number of foreign-born

[26] The 1934 football World Cup was chosen because this was one of the first editions and the (*absolute* and *relative*) number of foreign-born footballers at this event was, relatively, high. The 1962 football World Cup is being analysed because of the (re)expansion of international migration and the introduction of FIFA's eligibility regulations. The 2014 edition of the football World Cup is being analysed because it shows the highest number of foreign-born footballers in its history and because it is one of the latest editions.

footballers appears to be upward for the fifteen selected national football teams, especially since the mid-1990s. At an average of just over 6%, the *volume* of foreign-born footballers, within the sample of the fifteen national football teams, at the football World Cup seems to be significantly higher than the steadily increasing trend in international migration; historically oscillating between the two and four percent (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Zlotnik 1999; Chapter 2).

Based on the wavy line showing the *volume* of foreign-born players in the history of the football World Cup (table 3.1), three periods of (im)migration can be distinguished. First, during the earliest editions of the football World Cup (1930-1938), it was not uncommon for football players to represent a different national football team than the one of their country of birth, as the percentages above 7,5% indicate. With more than 16% of footballers being foreign-born, the 1938 football World Cup stands out. This outlier is partly explained by the presence of nine Austrian-born footballers in the selection of the German Empire (present-day Germany). However, these nine players were forced to represent Germany instead of their country of birth as a result of Austria's *Anschluss* to Hitler's German Empire just three months before the start of the 1938 football World Cup (Van Campenhout and Oonk 2021). Because of these 'overnight' changes in territory and jurisdiction, Austria's national football team was withdrawn from this edition of the football World Cup, leaving the Austrian footballers with no choice but to play for the country they all of a sudden seemed to belong: Germany.[27]

Second, after the Second World War, the number of foreign-born players at the football World Cup in the period 1950-1962 fell to an average of about 6%. This flattening in numbers (*absolute* and *relative*) can be seen as a consequence of the interwar period which was characterised by a decline in international labour migration 'partly because of economic stagnation and crisis, and partly because of increased hostility towards immigrants in many countries' (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014, 96). In addition, FIFA introduced their eligibility

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[27] If these nine Austrian footballers are treated as 'nationals' instead of 'foreign-born', the average share of foreign-born footballers at the 1938 football World Cup drops to 10,8%.

Table 3.1. Absolute and relative numbers of foreign-born football players within the fifteen selected national football teams per football World Cup, 1930-2018

Football World Cup	Total # of Footballers	# Foreign-born Footballers	% Foreign-born Footballers
1930	131	11	8,40%
1934	233	19	8,15%
1938	176	29	16,48%
1942			
1946			
1950	194	11	5,67%
1954	218	16	7,34%
1958	154	4	2,60%
1962	198	11	5,56%
1966	220	5	2,27%
1970	176	4	2,27%
1974	154	2	1,30%
1978	198	6	3,03%
1982	176	9	5,11%
1986	242	6	2,48%
1990	266	10	3,76%
1994	264	14	5,30%
1998	264	25	9,47%
2002	299	26	8,70%
2006	299	26	8,70%
2010	299	22	7,36%
2014	322	27	8,39%
2018	278	18	6,47%
Totals	4761	301	6,32%

[Due to World War II there were no football World Cups held in 1942 and 1946]

regulations in 1962 that restricted players' freedom of choice in national football teams (Hall 2012; Holmes and Storey 2011). While these regulations were mainly a recognition of what was already happening in international football, the eligibility regulations have arguably contributed to a further decline in the number of foreign-born players on national football teams that participated in the football World Cup; up to a maximum of 3% in subsequent editions. It was not until the 1980s that the number of foreign-born footballers returned to a level comparable to that of just after the Second World War.

Third, a (steady) increase in the number of foreign-born players at the football World Cup can be seen since the mid to late 1990s. While the relative share of foreign-born footballers nearly doubled between the 1994 and 1998 editions – from nearly 6% in 1994 to more than 10% in 1998 – the percentages of foreign-born footballers generally remains above 8%. This upward trend is in line with liberalisation processes that have relaxed national citizenship regimes in many Western countries since the 1980s, and appears to resemble migratory patterns in the Olympics (Jansen and Engbersen 2017; Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018). Interestingly, the 2018 football World Cup shows a slight decline in the percentage of foreign-born players to almost 6,5%, while a further growth in the number of foreign-born footballers in the selected national football teams was expected based on patterns and trends in international migration. Overall, the *relative* number of foreign-born footballers appears to have more or less stabilised around increased migration rates, which fluctuate between 6,5% and 9% per edition of the football World Cup.

By relating the *volume* of foreign-born footballers to countries' histories of migration, it becomes quite clear why 'countries of immigration' have historically been selecting foreign-born players (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). However, there are significant differences in the presence of foreign-born players among national football teams *within* this classification, mainly due to differences in citizenship regimes used historically (Brubaker 1992; Weil 2009). While France and Sweden, for example, fall into the same category of migration histories – with both countries have had an

immigration percentage of over 10% since the mid-1990s – France's national football team has selected far more foreign-born players (62) than Sweden (2) (table 3.2). While France, on the one hand, has a colonial history and historically French citizenship could be acquired on the basis of *jus soli*, it has been able to compose its national football team's roster from a territorially large pool of (foreign-born) football players – as have other former colonial empires such as England and the Netherlands (Dubois 2010; Taylor 2006). Sweden, on the other hand, lacks a colonial history and, moreover, Swedish nationality is historically attributed by descent (*jus sanguinis*). In addition, around the 2000s, many citizenship regimes in Western European countries opened up to foreigners. It became easier – if not possible at all – for foreigners, including football players, to apply for citizenship on the basis of either territorial considerations (*jus soli*), affiliation (*jus sanguinis*), or through naturalisation (*jus domicilii* or *jus matrimonii*) (Vink and De Groot 2010b; Chapter 1).

Further, from the 1960s onwards, economic developments in Western Europe have turned most former countries of emigrants into 'countries of immigration'. In many West European countries, the recruitment of foreign labour led to marked increases in the number of immigrants within their population. While these guest workers were expected to return to their home countries over time, the liberalisation of national citizenship regimes allowed them to legally apply for citizenship in many European countries (Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018). These demographic changes became especially noticeable in national football teams of 'countries of immigration' when the children of these immigrants turned out to be talented football players and were selected to represent the country. The 2014 national football team of Switzerland is a key example in this regard, as 65% of their selected players have a migration background (Afonso 2004). In a similar vein, qualification for the football World Cup of a 'nations of immigrants', specifically the United States, immediately increases the number of foreign-born footballers at that particular edition. As 'immigration is part of the founding national ideal' (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014, ix), the selection of foreign-born players for the US national football team has a long history. In fact,

Table 3.2. Numbers of foreign-born footballers per selected national football team at the football World Cup (1930-2108)

National Football Team	# Selected Footballers	# Foreign-born Footballers	% Foreign-born Footballers
Nations of Immigrants			
United States of America	212	48	22,64%
Countries of Immigration			
Belgium	283	10	3,53%
England	335	11	3,28% *1
France	329	62	18,84%
Germany	423	55	13,00% *2
The Netherlands	223	16	7,17%
Sweden	267	2	0,75%
Switzerland	246	35	14,23%
Latecomers to Immigration			
Italy	400	20	5,00%
Spain	335	15	4,48%
South Korea	223	7	3,14%
Former Countries of Immigration			
Argentina	377	5	1,33%
Brazil	465	0	0,00%
Mexico	353	10	2,83%
Uruguay	290	6	2,07%

*1 England's percentage of foreign-born footballers is rather low, when compared with France, which partly derives from differences in national citizenship regimes.

*2 In the case of foreign-born footballers in the national football team of Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West-Germany) is taken as its forerunner. Players born in East-Germany were considered as foreign-born which, partly, explains Germany's high percentage of foreign-born footballers.

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at nearly 23%, the average proportion of foreign-born players on the US national football team exceeds their *relative* national immigration number (table 3.2) (Pew Research Center 2015; United Nations 2017).

European 'latecomers to immigration', Italy and Spain, have historically selected a small number of foreign-born players; generally, one or two per football World Cup edition they qualified for. Interestingly, most of their foreign-born players originate from South American countries, especially Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, as the citizenship regimes of Italy and Spain are based on *jus sanguinis*, football players born on the South American continent to families with Italian or Spanish roots can (relatively easily) acquire citizenship of the respective country, making them eligible to play for this country's national football team. Notably within Italy's national football team, Argentina-born players seem to be ubiquitous throughout history with Luis Felipe Monti (1934), Humberto Maschio (1962), and Mauro Camoranesi (2014) being some examples (Doidge 2015; Foot 2006; S. Martin 2004). South Korea, another 'latecomer to immigration', has only selected a few foreign-born players throughout its football World Cup history. Because the South Korean government values the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of its population, it is (relatively) difficult for foreigners to acquire Korean citizenship through naturalisation. However, the Korean government has made its naturalisation processes more flexible since 2011, especially for highly skilled migrants such as talented athletes (Choi 2018). Frankfurt-born Cha Du-ri, from a Korean family, is so far the only foreign-born footballer to represent South Korea at the football World Cup (in 2002 and 2010, see Chapter 2). The other five foreign-born players who represented South Korea (in the 1954 football World Cup) were officially born in North Korea. Despite changing (political) views on immigrants and naturalisations in Korea, the selection of foreign-born players in South Korea's national football team is still unique (Choi 2018).

In contrast to the 'latecomers to immigration', South American countries in particular have experienced a change in the flows of international migration quite recently; from *im*migration towards *e*migration (Goebel 2016). However, a 'curling over' effect of this migratory changes is barely recognisable in the rosters of the national

football teams of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Two reasons can be distinguished for the absence of this effect. First, these countries have recently been transformed into 'countries of emigration', meaning that their diaspora is not (yet) large (and widespread) in number. The chances of recruiting from a pool of foreign-born footballers, who are eligible due to filiation, is therefore, relatively small. Mexico is the exception, however, as the country has experience net *emigration* in the past, particularly to the United States. The Mexican football federation has recently begun to adopt the 'diaspora-method' to select foreign-born football players based on descent for their representative football team (Helms 2018; Pew Research Center 2015). Second, in addition to nationalist sentiments related to international football, the low number of foreign-born players in these national football teams reflects the stereotype of the exceptional football skills of South American footballers (de Vasconcellos Ribeiro and Dimeo 2009). Argentina and Uruguay, for example, each selected one Spanish-born player in 1930, and their 2010, 2014 and 2018 football World Cup included only one foreign-born player.[28] Within the intermediate editions of the football World Cup, the total number of foreign-born players selected by Argentina and Uruguay was limited to a maximum of two. In addition, five-time World Cup winner Brazil has never selected a foreign-born player in any of their twenty-one football World Cup rosters.

Immigration diversification in national football teams

Table 3.3 presents the *diversity* values of the fifteen selected national football teams for the football World Cup editions of 1934, 1962 and 2014. A general impression indicates that, from an immigration perspective, the football World Cup has been diversified throughout its history. For the selected football World Cups, the average D-value has increased from 0.881 in 1934 to 0.930 in 2014; an increase of more than 5% in the countries of birth of the foreign-born football players. This

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[28] For the football World Cup editions of 2010, 2014 and 2018, Argentina selected France-born striker Gonzalo Higuaín, while Fernando Muslera (born in Argentina) defended the goal for the national football team of Uruguay.

increase in diversity over time reflects broader patterns and trends in international migration (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Czaika and de Haas 2014; Jansen and Engbersen 2017). Interestingly, the overall D-value of 0.800 for the 1962 edition is lower than the one of 1934 (0.881). This dip can mainly be explained by the implementation of more restrictive citizenship regimes, especially in 'countries of immigration' and 'nations of immigrants', in the aftermath of the Second World War (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). In addition, international football – like other forms of international sport – increasingly became a symbolic marker of nationalism where the selection of foreign-born players did not fit well with that discourse (Bairner 2001; Holmes and Storey 2011). This despite the fact that the selection of some foreign-born players was perfectly in line with national citizenship regimes based on *jus sanguinis* and furthermore complied with FIFA's eligibility regulations.

Table 3.3. Diversity amongst foreign-born football players in the selected national football teams

	1934 (*n*=19)	1962 (*n*=11)	2014 (*n*=27)
Argentina	0,000	1,000	0,000
Belgium	1,000	*NQ*	0,000
Brazil	1,000	1,000	1,000
England	*NQ*	1,000	0,000
France	0,625	*NQ*	0,500
Germany	1,000	0,000	0,444
Italy	0,320	0,500	0,500
Mexico	*NQ*	1,000	0,000
Netherlands	0,000	*NQ*	0,667
South Korea	*NQ*	*NQ*	1,000
Spain	0,000	0,750	0,000
Sweden	1,000	*NQ*	*NQ*
Switzerland	1,000	0,000	0,500
United States	0,735	*NQ*	0,560
Uruguay	*NQ*	1,000	0,000
All 15 Countries	0,881	0,800	0,930

The strokes in figure 3.1 display the 'movements' of foreign-born players from their country of origin (on the left side) to the national football team they represented at that particular edition of the football World Cup (on the right side).[29] The number within each arrow represents the *absolute* number of (foreign-born) players that 'moved' between the interconnected countries/national football teams. A comparison of the flows of foreign-born footballers across these three editions of the football World Cup points to the involvement of a greater number of countries of origin in this particular form of migration; 11 countries of origin in 1934, 7 in 1962, and 17 in 2014.[30] This *immigration diversification* of national football teams seems to match the general tendencies of the *globalisation of migration* as 'immigration countries tend to receive migrants from an increasingly diverse array of source countries' (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014, 16).

Nuancing these general observations about the increased *diversification* of foreign-born footballers, based on typologies of migration histories, indicates the impact of 'nations of immigrants' such as the United States in this regard. Looking at the countries from which the foreign-born players in the US national football team of 1934 and 2014 originate, the pattern seems rather scattered, including countries of birth from all over Europe such as England, Scotland, Germany, Norway and Sweden (figure 3.1). However, by focussing on the foreign-born players who have 'moved' to national football teams within the 'countries of immigration' or 'latecomers to immigration' categories, these 'moves' appear to be more in line with established migration networks. In most cases, foreign-born footballers compete for countries historically linked to their country of birth such, as former colonies, befriended states or neighbouring countries. These 'movements' seem to happen mainly because of a certain degree of cultural similarity between the countries

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[29] As territorial borders have changed over time, a small table is added to figure 3.1 to illustrate relevant border changes.

[30] The countries of origin are related to the current political, territorial borders, irrespective of the political conditions at the time of the respective football World Cup (see Chapter 2). Moreover, in 2014 there are eighteen sending options if you include the category NONE, which relates to the rather unique case of Rio Mavuba who was *born at sea* (see Fontanini 2007).

**Figure 3.1.** *Immigration* diversification of the selected national football teams at the 1934, 1962, and 2014 football World Cup. The strokes in this figure display the 'movements' of foreign-born players from their country of origin (on the left side) to the national football team they represented in the football World Cup (on the right side). The number displayed on the lines, near the countries of origin, present the *absolute* number of football players that 'moved' between the countries for that particular edition of the football World Cup. Moreover, the thicker a stroke, the more football players have moved from a particular country of origin to the same representative national football team.

FIFA World Cup 2014

Football World Cup	Country of Birth	Current Official Country
1934	Dutch East Indies	Indonesia
1934	French Algeria	Algeria
1934	England	United Kingdom
	Scotland	
1934	German Empire	Germany
1962	East Prusia	
2014	East Germany	
2014	SFR Yugoslavia	Kosovo
		North Macedonia

and because the chances of obtaining citizenship in countries like these are generally better for (im)migrant footballers (Holmes and Storey 2011; Taylor 2006). In other words, the countries of origin of foreign-born players in national football teams are not random or part of a free market of choice, but are often guided or constrained by colonial relations, specific migration histories, local and international legislation and national traditions. The (ethnic) diversity within the 1998 national football team of France is, for example, often regarded as a vivid reminder of French (colonial) migration history (Dubois 2010; Storey 2020).

The importance of established migration networks for foreign-born footballers can also be highlighted when looking at the 'countries of origin' of foreign-born players who represented Italy. At the football World Cups of 1934, 1962 and 2014, eleven out of the total of fourteen foreign-born footballers in Italy's national football team were born in either Argentina or Brazil (nearly 80% of their total number of selected foreign-born players). This high share of South American born footballers competing for Italy is closely related, as mentioned above, to the waves of emigration that brought Italians to the South American continent in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Goebel 2016). As a result, the different national football competitions in South America around the mid-1920s had no shortage of top footballers with Italian roots (S. Martin 2004). In order to exploit this pool of (football) talent, the Italian government introduced a joint citizenship in the mid-1920s, whereby 'the sons of Italians born abroad considered Italians' (Martin, 2004, p. 195). Thus, despite the fact that many of them were born on the South American continent, the Italian government regarded these players as 'Italians abroad' because they had 'Italian "blood", Italian surnames and Italian relatives' (Foot 2006, 427). Moreover, since these Argentine-born Italians were immediately eligible to play for the Italian national football team after obtaining Italian citizenship, it was quite common for the Italian football federation to seek out and select the best football players from their South American diaspora.

It is clear that foreign-born footballers originate from an increasingly diverse pool of countries, matching the so-called *globalisation of migration* (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014, 16). However, as the

majority of these 'movements' seem to be guided by historical relations between countries, the *immigration diversification* remains quite limited. A true *diversification* of foreign-born footballers in terms of 'countries of origin' is mainly related to 'nations of immigrants' such as the United States.

Conclusions and discussions

To challenge the common belief that the football World Cup has become more migratory over time, this chapter provides a historical overview of the *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born footballers from fifteen national football teams that participated at least ten times in the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018). Based on a dataset consisting of 4.761 football players, of which 301 were classified as foreign-born, the outcomes indicate that the presence of foreign-born players in national football teams at the football World Cup has indeed increased over time. Moreover, the range of countries of birth from which foreign-born footballers originate has diversified over time. These findings lead to the conclusion that the football World Cup has become more migratory, in terms of *volume* and *diversity*, throughout history. Particularly in recent decades, there is a clear overall upward trend in both *absolute* and *relative* numbers of foreign-born football players at the football World Cup.

The increases in the numbers of foreign-born players competing at the football World Cup are, however, not that 'astonishingly' as often implicated in public debates. Most peaks and throughs in the number of foreign-born players at the football World Cup can largely be seen as a reflection of broader patterns and trends in international migration (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Jansen and Engbersen 2017). Moreover, when historically contextualising the data on this particular group of *migrants*, it can be argued that the presence of foreign-born players in national football teams is nothing new as even in the 1930s countries were represented by foreign-born players in international football. The *volume* of foreign-born players, and the ebb and flow movements within this, seems to be closely connected to a country's history of (im)migration and

(changing) citizenship regimes (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014; Jansen and Engbersen 2017). Moreover, the *volume* (and *diversity*) of foreign-born players in the football World Cup appears to a largely depend on the national football teams that qualify for the football World Cup.

From an *immigration perspective*, the developments in the *diversity* of foreign-born players at the football World Cup seem to reflect the general tendencies of a *globalisation of migration*: Foreign-born footballers seem to originate from a wider, more *diverse*, range of countries in the latest editions of the football World Cup (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). Although the *diversification* of footballer's countries of origin has increased, these 'new' countries involved are not at random. The flow of foreign-born players between 'countries of origin' and 'representative national football teams' seems to be *limited*, as the majority of foreign-born footballers represents a country that is part of the established migration network of his country of birth (Bakewell et al. 2016; Findlay and Li 1998; see Chapter 4). In other words, the selection of foreign-born players is guided, or restricted, by historical relationship between (pairs of) countries.

As indicate above, it is important to emphasise that not all countries are, and have been, confronted with comparable migration processes at the same time. There are major differences between countries in terms of a country's migration history – I distinguished between 'nations of immigrants', 'countries of immigration', 'latecomers to immigration', and 'former countries of immigration' (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014; Jansen and Engbersen 2017) – which can be, partly, related to (changes in) national citizenship regimes (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Czaika and de Haas 2014). Understanding the techniques to acquire citizenship are important in counting foreign-born players as the possession of a country's citizenship makes a football player eligible to play for the national football team of its respective country. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, the data on foreign-born football players indicate that most of them were eligible to compete for their *adopted* national football team because they acquired citizenship through descent or because they successfully met the naturalisation conditions of a country.

The different routes to citizenship have, unintentionally, created a divergence between (naturalised) citizens as a foreign-born person can have acquired citizenship upon his [*sic*] birth through descent, he [*sic*] can be born in another country within an immigrant family and can later in life be naturalised through his parental heritage, or he [*sic*] migrated to a country and naturalised as a citizen because he married a citizens or by using his right of residency to become a citizen (see Chapter 1). According to Nira Yuval-Davis (2006, 207), these 'layers of people's citizenship' surround the 'question of who "belongs" and who does not, and what are the minimum common grounds – in terms of origin, culture and normative behaviour – that are required to signify belonging'. Although the foreign-born players discussed in this chapter were all legitimately entitled to represent the national football team they played for, their selection could have sparked (*moral*) public debates about the representativeness of the national football team. Moreover, increases in the number (and diversity) of foreign-born players within a national football team could symbolise a decoupling of *formal* and *moral* citizenship (Schinkel 2010; see Chapter 5).

As each research has its limitations, I want to point out some limitations of the dataset used for this study. The framing of the dataset – the selection of the fifteen countries / national football teams, within the context of the football World Cup – provides a somewhat blurred perspective on the *volume* and *diversity* of foreign-born players. It should be kept in mind that the football World Cup is a quadrennial event for which qualification is difficult, especially for less developed (football) countries, leading to gaps in the data. Because of this, providing a complete pattern of the development of foreign-born footballers in the football World Cup – let alone in international football – is therefore impossible. Further, the amount and quality of available (biographical) data on football players differs greatly per national football team as well as over time. There is more (detailed) data available on high-profile footballers and on better performing national football teams. Moreover, more and more accurate data is available on players participating in the later editions of the football World Cup. This, obviously, has to do with the general increase in the availability of data on football. However, a

thorough search has revealed a lot of detailed data about footballers and national football teams in even the earliest editions of the football World Cup. Based on this data, it has been possible to produce, what I belief to be, a reliable picture of this specific aspect of the history of the football World Cup.

Despite the limitations of this study in terms of data availability and selectivity of the national football teams, it has provided new insights into global migration patterns using the context of the football World Cup. Taking on a historical comparative perspective on foreign-born footballers has challenged the common belief that the football World Cup has become more migratory over time.

CHAPTER 4

THE DIVERSIFICATION OF NATIONAL FOOTBALL TEAMS

Other than minor changes, this chapter is a reflection of an article published as:

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4 The diversification of national football teams

Introduction

The diversity, especially the 'Africanness', of the victorious 2018 French (men's) national football team became the subject of public and political debate in ways that were both positive and not so (Beydoun 2018; Kuper 2018; see Chapter 6). An overview of the roster of this French national football team reveals its multiculturality as 19 out of the 23 players had a *genuine* link with a country other than France. Fourteen national representatives of France were related to an African country, two of whom were actually born on the African continent (Storey 2020); Steve Mandanda (Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo) and Samuel Umtiti (Cameroon). Furthermore, at the 2018 football World Cup, 84 out of the 736 footballers (more than 11%) represented a national football team other than of their country of birth (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018; Chapter 2). Of these 84 foreign-born players, no fewer than 29 footballers were born on French soil (almost 35%). Therefore, in addition to selecting players with a migration background for their representative football team, France has also 'lost' a number of France-born players to other national football teams. As the (extreme) example of France illustrates, national football teams seem to be increasingly represented by players originating from other, often more varied, nationalistic and cultural backgrounds than before (Dubois 2010; Maguire and Pearton 2000; Storey 2020; Chapter 3).

Although migration affects both sending and receiving areas, relatively little attention is paid to the causes and consequences of migration on the latter (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). A dominant focus on the diversification of destinations (immigration diversification; see Chapter 3) has not only skewed 'research towards the causes and consequences of migration only in the destination areas, but more fundamentally, such research introduces a scientific bias when it only includes those who migrate' (Bakewell 2014, 305). Opposing migratory movements (emigration diversification), and the causes and

consequences of migration for countries of origin, have remained underexposed while they are, arguably, just as important in studying diversification. Moreover, most research on football migration has been conducted within the context of association football, especially focussing on the period after the Bosman ruling in 1995 (Elliot and Harris 2015; Maguire and Falcous 2011; Maguire and Pearton 2000; Poli 2010).[31] While some articles touch upon the causes and consequences of player migration within the context of international football, the aforementioned focus has led to an under-representation of research on foreign-born players in national football teams, as well as a lack of historical depth in research on this particular form of 'player movement' (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018; Chapter 2).

The specificity of this form of football migration lies in the fact that foreign-born players do not necessarily have to 'migrate' to the country they represent in international football. While some foreign-born players move to the country they represent in international football – for various reasons such as their parent's migration or because of an international transfer in club football – others do not cross international borders in this respect. Instead, these foreign-born football players use their citizenship to become eligibility to play for a country other than the one in which they were born (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Shachar 2011). Through the use of national citizenship regimes, and in accordance with FIFA's regulations on player eligibility, many foreign-born players have (strategically) changed their (sporting) nationality and national allegiance to another country, especially to one of the countries of origin of their parents, without having to migrate to the respective country (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018; Storey 2020). Despite the increasing ubiquity of foreign-born players in national football teams, the dynamics and underlying structures have

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[31] The Bosman ruling was a decision by the European Court of Justice that allowed footballer players within the European Union to switch between football clubs at the end of their contract without a new football club having to pay a transfer fee. This decision gave professional football players more agency regarding their labour. Moreover, this decision relaxed the rules regarding the presence of foreign(-born) footballers in national football competitions (Duval and Van Rompuy 2016).

remained under-researched. This chapter therefore aims to gain a better understanding of this phenomenon.

This chapter first discusses the historical diversification of the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018). Second, the idea of *migration corridors* is used as an organisational framework that helps explain the (increasing) diversification of national football teams in this context. Third, the method section discusses the used dataset on foreign-born players in the football World Cup (see Chapter 2), which is followed by an analysis of 'movements' and choices in citizenship by foreign-born players in the context of the different *migration corridors*. The results focus on the historical development and sustainment of (specific) migration corridors, based on some telling examples.

Diversification of the football World Cup

A good way to study processes of diversification in the football World Cup is to take both an *immigration*– and an *emigration perspective* regarding the presence of foreign-born players within the selections of national football teams. *Immigration diversification*, the main approach in studying diversification in international migration studies, takes the 'diversification in origins of immigrants' as its starting point (Czaika and de Haas 2014, 288; Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). In the case of foreign-born footballers, this means studying the diversification in their countries of birth as their destination country is reflected in the national football team they represent. On the contrary, *emigration diversification* focuses on the 'destinations of emigrants' departing from one country (Czaika and de Haas 2014, 288–89). In the context of the football World Cup, this means that the focus is on outgoing movements of footballers, indicating that (*sending*) countries have 'lost' native players to other representative football teams. The latter perspective shows the geographical spread of footballers departing from a certain country towards an increasing range of national football teams. Both forms of *migration diversification* can, in the case of foreign-born football players, be characterised by changes in (sporting) nationality.

According to the body of literature on international migration, *migrants* seem to originate from 'an increasingly geographically distant and diverse array of origin countries' (*immigration diversification)* (Czaika and de Haas 2014, 291). Similar patterns of change can be observed for the selection of foreign-born players in national football teams when studying the history of the football World Cup (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2019; Chapter 3), as well as for other international sporting events such as the Olympics (Jansen and Engbersen 2017). The selections of national football teams have become more diverse over time through the inclusion of (foreign-born) players who 'originate from a wider, more diverse, range of countries in the latest editions [of the football World Cup]' (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2019, 20 – brackets added; Chapter 3). However, other sports migration scholars have argued against a truly greater diversification of foreign(-born) athletes in international sports. Most of them see these particular migratory processes primarily as a reflection of patterns and trends in international migration, which have mainly 'led to a quantitative reinforcement of older [migration] channels' (Poli 2010, 499 – brackets added; Taylor 2006). Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg and Oonk (2019, 20 – brackets added; see Chapter 3) also acknowledge this by stating that 'although the diversification of "countries of origin" increases, these "newly" involved countries are not at random, [... instead] the selection of foreign-born players is guided – or restricted – by historical relationships between [pairs of] countries'.

Despite these patterned movements, major differences exist between national football teams with regard to the selection of foreign-born players (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2019; Chapter 3). These differences seem to be closely related to underlying migration structures such as (historical) differences in migration policies, citizenship regimes and naturalisation conditions between countries (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014; Vink 2017). For example, it is relatively easy for football players who can demonstrate a *genuine* link with a country through the nationality of one of their (grand)parents to obtain citizenship of that country. In addition, players may also be eligible for citizenship if they meet national-specific naturalisation conditions,

such as a residency requirement (Hall 2012; Storey 2020; Chapter 1). Moreover, as citizenship requirements are established and adapted by national governments, there are imbalances in the possibilities for people, and therefore for football players, to obtain citizenship (Hall 2012; Vink 2017; Chapter 1). These imbalances directly affect the diversification in (certain) national football teams, and as a result the football World Cup, as the main principle of FIFA's eligibility criteria relates to a generalised version of citizenship acquisition (Chapter 1); 'holding a permanent nationality that is not dependent on residence in a certain country' (FIFA 2020, 74). As a result, countries with strict regulations around immigration and naturalisation, such as the current policies of the United States of America, are one step behind countries with less restrictive migration regimes (Hall 2012; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). Moreover, it can be argued that FIFA's eligibility regulations have 'created loopholes that players and national governing bodies have been willing to exploit' (Hassan, McCullough, and Moreland 2009, 747), allowing for 'the emergence of "passport players"' (Hall 2012, 191): (talented) football players who have not *genuine* link with a country are offered citizenship, which makes them eligible to play for that country's national football team. Despite the possibilities of such (sporting) nationality changes, the presence of 'passport players' within national football teams has remained relatively rare. Most foreign-born footballers, as well as foreign-born athletes in other international sports, have changed their (sporting) nationality along family lines or in accordance with the naturalisation conditions of a country (Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018; Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2019).

Migration corridors

This chapter uses the idea of *migration corridors* to gain a better understanding of the dynamics and complexity of the presence of foreign-born players in national football teams at the football World Cup. Although *migration corridors* are not empirical phenomena in and of themselves, they can become identifiable through the use of empirical

data. In this study, following Jørgen Carling and Dominique Jolivet (2016, 19 – emphasis in original), *migration corridors* are used as '*frames for observation'* and analytical structures, as they can exist 'independent of the *level* of activity within them: they can be empty, or nearly so'. This means that *migration corridors* can be studied even when it is assumed that there is no (clearly observable) flow of *migrants* between (pairs of) countries, for example when only a small number of people migrate from one country to another, such as a migrant exchange between Columbia and Iceland (Carling and Jolivet 2016). Moreover, the notion of corridors leaves the direction of movement open. So, while migratory movements within a specific corridor may empirically seem to be a one-way street, it still remains possible to study bidirectional movements within a *migration corridor* from both *immigration* and *emigration perspectives* (Carling and Jolivet 2016).

Based on the migration history of countries and patterns and trends in international migration, *migration corridors* can be characterised by specific historically determined relations, for example colonial relationships, labour migrations, or (cultural) similarities due to geographical proximity (Bakewell, Kubal, and Pereira 2016; De Haas 2010). In the context of football migration, and following Matthew Taylor (2006, 30), 'much of the movement of footballers across national and continental borders ... is actually based on established systems and networks. The story is of the adaptation of existing patterns rather than any radical breach with the past'. This may also apply to processes of citizenship changes by foreign-born players in international football, where changing (sporting) nationality may not be random but part of the same process of following historically established migration paths and networks.

One distinctive adaptation to existing patterns of citizenship choices by foreign-born players is what Joost Jansen, Gijsbert Oonk and Godfried Engbersen (2018) refer to as 'reverberative causation'. According to these authors, 'reverberative causation' is the process which 'causes contemporary migration patterns to be the echo or reversal of migration flows by which they were preceded' (Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018, 8). The ubiquity of players originating from former French (African)

colonies in the French national football team at the 2018 football World Cup football, for example, illustrates that the team of national representatives of France can be considered as an echo of earlier migration flows to France. On the contrary, there seems to be a growing tendency, especially amongst smaller football nations, to reverse the main direction of preceding migration movements. Such reversals of national migration patterns seems to take place mainly between former colonies and 'the coloniser', with the former (finally) trying to take advantage of latter. In the context of international football, this process can be illustrated by the selection of French-born players in the current rosters of the national football teams of Algeria, Morocco and Senegal. Moreover, the migration flows characterised by guest workers appear to be reversing in the context of international football as an increasing number of German-born Turkish footballers and Dutch-born Moroccan players decide to play for the national football teams of their parents/grandparents; Turkey and Morocco respectively (Kuper 2018; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019).

Methodology: from concept to data and back again

While (the history of) football migration is carefully watched and documented in the context of association football, the presence of foreign-born players in national football teams has remained relatively understudied. To overcome this, a database was created on the footballers who participated at the football World Cup over time. The database is built around biographical details of the footballers, such as their place and country of birth and ancestry, and, like most studies on international migration, primarily relies on foreign-born data (Dumont and Lemaître 2005; Özden et al. 2011). Even though a foreign-born proxy has its limitations when measuring diversity, it has proven to be the most reliable and practical way to create a historical overview of the diversification of societies, and as a result, of the assumed increase in diversity within national football teams (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018; see Chapter 2).

For the purpose of this chapter, the dataset of 996 foreign-born players has been derived from the larger database on all participants in football World Cup: 10.137 footballers between 1930 and 2018 (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018; Chapter 2). As this chapter aims to explore the relevance of *migration corridors* for a better understanding of the increased diversification in national football teams at the football World Cup, the five national football teams with the highest number of foreign-born players in their football World Cup rosters are selected (*immigration diversification*), as well as the five countries that had 'lost' the greatest number of native players to other national football teams (*emigration diversification*). This resulted in ten different countries and their representative football teams; from an *immigration* perspective, the selection included Algeria, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Switzerland and the United States of America, and from an *emigration perspective* the selection included, Argentina, Brazil, England, France and (West) Germany. The Netherlands has been added to this selection as eleventh case because of the country's migration history and the researcher's interest and background knowledge about Dutch society.

As Taylor (2006) argued, the diversification of national football teams is not random, but takes place along the lines of historically established migration patterns or *migration corridors*. As mentioned, this does not mean that football players who change their (sporting) nationality literally move through a *migration corridor* – after all, they often do not migrate to their adopted country bust *just* adopt its nationality (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). However, it does mean that these historically constituted corridors can have an impact on football players' nationality changes. The selection of *migration corridors* in this study was guided by academic literature on national migration histories (Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014), patterns and trends in international migration (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Czaika and de Haas 2014), and international transfer networks present in association football (Maguire and Pearton 2000; Poli 2010; Taylor 2006). These theoretically substantiated insights have led to the following three partly overlapping types of *migration corridors*, which are named after the main 'migration relationship' between pairs of countries:

1. *Colonial migration corridors*: Historically evolved and sustained corridors based on migration movements of people between coloniser and colonies;
2. *Geographical proximity migration corridors: Migration corridors* created by geographical proximity between (neighbouring) countries;
3. *Guest worker migration corridors:* Corridors formed by migratory movements of people between countries, mainly caused by labour shortages in one country and a surplus of workers in another.

Results: the evolvement and sustainment of (football) migration corridors

The results section looks at the eleven selected national football teams/countries through the lens of the three *migration corridors*. In the context of *colonial migration corridors*, the historical relationships between France and Algeria, England and Jamaica, the Netherlands and Suriname, and Brazil and Portugal are studied in more depth. In the context of *geographical proximity migration corridors*, the historical movements of football players between England and the other (three) British home nations, England and the Republic of Ireland, and Switzerland and the former-Yugoslavian states are discussed. In the *guest worker migration corridors*, focuses on the development and sustainment of player exchanges between Argentina and Italy, Germany and Turkey, and the Netherlands and Morocco.

Colonial migration corridors

From an *immigration perspective*, the national football team of France has selected the highest number of foreign-born players (61 players), who originate from the most diverse countries (19 different countries) of all national football teams in the history of the football World Cup (table 4.1). The majority of these 61 foreign-born players were born in a former colony of France such as (French) Algeria, (French) Morocco and Senegal, or moved to 'metropolitan' France from France 'd'outre-mer' (overseas

France, mostly relics of French colonial empire) such as Guadeloupe, Martinique and New Caledonia (Dubois 2010). As these overseas French territories are administratively part of France, people born in these countries automatically acquire French citizenship upon birth. The national football team of France, in particular, made use of their colonial connections in the 1930s, as evidenced by the selection of nine (French) Algerian-born players during this period.

While France's national football team has continued to select players born in former colonies well after the collapse of French colonialism in the 1960s, the main direction of player movements appears to have reversed over time. This process, whereby French-born players come to represent the national football team of one of its former colonies, seems to have emerged around the 1980s with the inclusion of Nourredine Kourichi and Ali Fergani in the national football team of Algeria. The reversal of player movements in the case of France really took off after the 2000s, when the national football federations of Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia (all former French colonies) expanded their scope to include footballers from their national diasporas (Kuper 2018). Today, it are mainly the national football teams of former colonies that seem to make use of pre-existing migratory paths. This observation reflects a change in the main direction of player movements, indicating both the development and sustainment of historically established (colonial) migration corridors (figure 4.1). The best examples of such a reversal are undoubtedly to be found in the last two football World Cup selections of the Algerian national football team, with 16 French-born players in 2010 and 17 of them in 2014 (table 4.1). In total, France has 'lost' 114 French-born footballers to 14 different national football teams throughout the history of the World Cup football (table 4.2).

As with the French national football team, the diversification of the national football team of England (11 players selected from five different countries of origin) and the Netherlands (16 players selected from six different countries of origin) can mainly be seen as a legacy of their colonial pasts (table 4.1). Despite this, and unlike France, England has only included eleven foreign-born players in their national football team

Table 4.1. *Immigration* diversification of foreign-born players within the eleven selected national football teams

Destination National Football Team	Country of Birth	Football World Cup	# Players
Algeria (41 foreign-born players selected from 3 different countries of birth)	England	1986	1
	France	1982, 1986, 2010, 2014	38
	Tunisia	1982, 1986	2
Argentina (5 foreign-born players selected from 3 different countries of birth)	France	2010, 2014, 2018	3
	Paraguay	1934	1
	Spain	1930	1
Brazil (No foreign-born players selected from 0 different countries of birth)	Brazil never included a football player who was born in another country in their selection for the football World Cup		
England (11 foreign-born players selected from 5 different countries of birth)	Australia	1990	1
	Canada	2002, 2006	2
	Jersey	1998	1
	Jamaica	1986, 1990, 2014, 2018	4
	Singapore	1982, 1986, 1990	3
France (61 foreign-born players selected from 19 different countries of birth)	Argentina	1966	2
	Austria	1938	1
	Born at sea	2014	1
	Cameroon	2006, 2018	2
	(French) Algeria	1930, 1934, 1938, 1954, 1958, 1978, 1982, 1986	15
	(French) Guiana	1938, 2006, 2010	3
	(French) Morocco	1954, 1958, 1978, 1982	4
	French Sudan	1982, 1986	2
	Germany	1934, 1938	4
	Ghana	1998, 2002	2
	Guadeloupe	1978, 1982, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2018	7
	Luxembourg	1938	1
	Martinique	1954, 1978, 1982	3

	New Caledonia	1998	1
	Senegal	1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014	5
	Spain	1986	1
	Switzerland	1934, 1938	2
	Uruguay	1938	1
	Zaire	2002, 2006, 2010, 2018	4
(West) Germany (55 foreign-born players selected from 11 different countries of birth)	Austria	1938	9
	Belgium	1974	1
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2010	1
	Brazil	2010	1
	Czechoslovakia	1966, 1970	2
	East Germany	1986, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018	21
	Ghana	2002, 2006	2
	Poland	1954, 1966, 1970, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014	12
	Romania	1954	1
	Russia	1962, 1966, 1970	3
	Switzerland	2002, 2006	2
The Netherlands (16 foreign-born players selected from 6 different countries of birth)	Australia	1990	1
	Canada	1990, 2014	2
	Dutch East Indies / Indonesia	1934	1
	Portugal	2014	1
	Suriname	1990, 1994, 1998, 2010	10
	Switzerland	2014	1
Portugal (25 foreign-born players selected from 9 different countries of birth)	Angola	2014, 2018	2
	Brazil	2006, 2010, 2014, 2018	6
	Canada	2010	1
	Cape Verde	2010, 2014, 2018	3
	France	2002, 2006, 2018	5
	Germany	2018	1
	Guinea-Bissau	2014	1
	(Portuguese) Mozambique	1966, 2002	5
	Venezuela	2010	1

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Republic of Ireland (44 foreign-born players selected from 5 different countries of birth)	England	1990, 1994, 2002	36
	Italy	1990, 1994	2
	Northern Ireland	1994	1
	Scotland	1990, 1994	4
	Wales	1990	1
Switzerland (33 foreign-born players selected from 11 different countries of birth)	Argentina	1994	1
	Cameroon	2018	3
	Cape Verde	2010, 2014, 2018	3
	Colombia	1938	1
	France	1950, 1954, 1962, 1994	6
	Germany	1938, 1950	4
	Ivory Coast	2006, 2014, 2018	1
	Kosovo	2006, 2010, 2014, 2018	8
	Macedonia	2006, 2014, 2018	4
	Soviet Union	1938	1
	Zaire	2010	1
United States of America (48 foreign-born players selected from 20 different countries of birth)	Argentina	2002, 2006	2
	Belgium	1950	1
	Brazil	2010	1
	Colombia	2002	1
	El Salvador	1994	1
	England	1930, 1934, 1950	3
	Germany	1934, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2014	8
	Greece	1994	1
	Haiti	1950	1
	Italy	1950	1
	Martinique	1998, 2002	2
	Netherlands	1994, 1998, 2002	3
	Norway	1934, 2014	2
	Poland	1950	1
	Scotland	1930, 1934, 1950, 2010	10
	Serbia	1998	1
	South Africa	1994, 1998	2
	Sweden	1934	1
	Switzerland	1998, 2002	2
	Uruguay	1990, 1994, 1998	4

Figure 4.1. Colonial migration corridors

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
during their participations in the football World Cup. With four representations by two players, England's 'busiest' inbound colonial *migration corridor* comes from Jamaica (*immigration perspective*), the country where John Barnes and Raheem Sterling were born. Although Barnes and Sterling were born in Jamaica, they actually grew up in England since they moved there at the age of 12 and 2 respectively (Shennan 2012; Sterling 2018). As these two Jamaican-born players were raised and schooled in England, they acquired British citizenship at adulthood and therefore should not be regarded as 'passport players' or as players who 'changed citizenship'. It can further be argued that, in terms of quantity, England has rarely used its (former) overseas colonies to bolster its football World Cup teams; perhaps the pool of native England players was considered better than the eligible football talents overseas. However, beyond the scope of their representative football

Table 4.2. *Emigration* diversification of foreign-born players who were born in one of the eleven selected countries

Country of Birth	Destination National Football Team	Football World Cup	# Players
Algeria (15 players 'lost' to 1 national football team)	France	1930, 1934, 1938, 1954, 1958, 1978, 1982, 1986	15
Argentina (41 players 'lost' to 11 other national football teams)	Bolivia	1950, 1994	5
	Chile	2010	1
	France	1966	2
	Italy	1934, 1962, 2006, 2014	9
	Mexico	2002, 2006, 2010	3
	Paraguay	1986, 1998, 2006, 2010	8
	Peru	1978, 1982	2
	Spain	1962, 1978, 1998, 2006	4
	Switzerland	1994	1
	United States	2002, 2006	2
	Uruguay	1954, 2010, 2014, 2018	4
Brazil (30 players 'lost' to 13 different national football teams)	Belgium	1998	1
	Costa Rica	1990	1
	Croatia	2014	2
	Germany	2010	1
	Italy	1934, 1962, 2014	4
	Japan	1998, 2002, 2006, 2010	4
	Mexico	2006	1
	Poland	2018	1
	Portugal	2010, 2014, 2018	6
	Russia	2018	1
	Spain	2006, 2014, 2018	4
	Tunisia	1998, 2002, 2006	3
	United States	2010	1
England (87 players 'lost' to 17 different national football teams)	Algeria	1986	1
	Australia	1974	6
	Belgium	1938	2

	Canada	1986	1
	Egypt	2018	1
	Ghana	2014	1
	Italy	1974, 2006	2
	Jamaica	1998	7
	New Zealand	1982, 2010	10
	Nigeria	1994, 2002	2
	Northern Ireland	1982, 1986	2
	Republic of Ireland	1990, 1994	36
	Scotland	1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1998, 2002	8
	Spain	1934	1
	Trinidad and Tobago	2006	3
	Turkey	2002	1
	United States	1930, 1934, 1950	3
France (114 players 'lost' to 14 different national football teams)	Algeria	1982, 1986, 2010, 2014	38
	Argentina	2010, 2014, 2018	3
	Belgium	1970	1
	Cameroon	1998, 2002, 2010, 2014	7
	Denmark	2002	1
	Ghana	2010, 2014	3
	Ivory Coast	2006, 2010, 2014	8
	Morocco	1998, 2018	9
	Portugal	2002, 2006, 2018	5
	Senegal	2002, 2018	10
	Sweden	2002, 2006	2
	Switzerland	1950, 1954, 1962, 1994	6
	Togo	2006	4
	Tunisia	2002, 2006, 2018	17
(West) Germany (56 players 'lost' to 21 different national football teams)	Australia	1974	1
	Austria	1982	1
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2014	3
	Cameroon	2010, 2014	4

	Canada	1986	1
	Croatia	1998, 2002, 2006	9
	France	1934, 1938	4
	Ghana	2006, 2010, 2014	3
	Greece	1994, 2014	2
	Iran	2006, 2014	2
	Israel	1970	1
	Italy	1938	1
	New Zealand	2010	1
	Nigeria	2018	1
	Portugal	2018	1
	SFR Yugoslavia	1990, 1998	2
	South Korea	2002, 2010	2
	Spain	2002	1
	Switzerland	1938, 1950	4
	Turkey	2002	4
	United States	1934, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2014	8
The Netherlands (12 players 'lost' to 4 different national football teams)	Ghana	2010	1
	Nigeria	2018	2
	Morocco	1998, 2018	6
	United States	1994, 1998, 2002	3
Portugal (1 player 'lost' to 1 national football team)	The Netherlands	2014	1
Republic of Ireland (None players 'lost' to another national football team)	Republic of Ireland never 'lost' a native football player to another national football team within the World Cup football		
Switzerland (14 players 'lost' to 8 different national football teams)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2014	1
	Croatia	2014, 2018	2
	France	1934, 1938	2
	Germany	2002, 2006	2
	Italy	1998	1
	Serbia	2010, 2018	3

	The Netherlands	2014	1
	United States	1998, 2002	2
United States of America	Iran	2014	1
(5 players 'lost' to 4	Japan	2014, 2018	2
different national	Mexico	2014	1
football teams)	Norway	1998	1

team at the football World Cup, the English have included both Jamaican-born players and 'British-born sons of a large immigrant population from Jamaica' (Maguire and Pearton 2000, 185). Conversely, from an *emigration perspective*, England has 'lost' 87 players to 17 different national football teams. Due to the historic size of the British Empire, over 90% of the 'lost' British-born players represented one of England's former colonies at the football World Cup, most notably New Zealand (ten players), Jamaica (seven players) and Australia (six players) (table 4.2).

To select the best football players for its national football team, the Dutch Football Association could, quite easily include Surinamese players in its selection, as there were specific regulations to obtain Dutch citizenship for persons born in Suriname and persons of Surinamese descent (Van Amersfoort and Van Niekerk 2006). However, the flow of *migrants* from Suriname to the Netherlands was characterised by a drastic increase in the 1970s, mainly due to the independence of Suriname from the Netherlands in 1975, and the consequences of these movements only became visible later in the selection of the Dutch national football team. Although most Surinamese players have effectively grown up in the Netherlands, the selection of three Surinam-born players for the Dutch national football team at the 1990 football World Cup (Aaron Winter, Henk Fräser and Stanley Menzo), two Surinamese footballers (Aaron Winter and Ulrich van Gobbel) at the 1994 football World Cup, and four players born in Suriname at the football World Cup of 1998 (Aaron Winter, Edgar Davids, Clarence Seedorf and Jimmy Floyd Hasselbaink) can still be regarded as echoes of the main directional movements between the Netherlands and Suriname (table 4.1). Although invisible in the foreign-born data, Surinamese influences on Dutch football have been present since the late1980s, exemplified by players such as Ruud Gullit, Frank Rijkaard and a little later Patrick

Kluivert; footballers of Surinamese descent who were born in the Netherlands (Carmichael 2017). The national football team of Suriname has, however, benefitted far less from the sustainment of this *colonial migration corridor* between the Netherlands and Suriname (figure 4.1).[32] To overcome this, an amendment to Surinamese citizenship legislation, a so-called 'sport passport', has been introduced in November 2019, allowing athletes with a Surinamese father, mother, grandfather or grandmother to represent Suriname in international sport without giving up their Dutch citizenship (ANP 2019; NOS 2019).

The national football team of Brazil has never included a foreign-born footballer in their 'Seleção' for the football World Cup, despite being a primary destination for Portuguese citizens due to historical colonial ties (table 4.1) (Engbersen, Snel, and Esteves 2016). Conversely, reverse movements of football players along the same (old) *colonial migration corridor*, from Brazil to Portugal, have become common both in association football and within Portugal's national football team (table 4.1) (Nolasco 2019). With the inclusion of at least one Brazilian-born player on their national football team at each of the last four football World Cups, Portugal has clearly used this historically beaten track to their advantage (figure 4.1). The combination of cultural, religious and linguistic proximity between Brazil and Portugal, and the fact that Portuguese naturalisation processes have remained relatively simple for Brazilians (Engbersen, Snel, and Esteves 2016, 215–16), have arguably contributed to the sustainment of this particular *(colonial) migration corridor* for Brazilian-born footballers. In addition, since the Brazilians are known as world-class footballers, making the selection of the Brazilian national football team is arguably one of the hardest things to achieve for Brazilian-born footballers. Changing one's (sporting) nationality can therefore become an interesting alternative in a person's quest to compete at the highest level possible in international football: the football World Cup (de Vasconcellos Ribeiro and Dimeo 2009). The best known Portuguese-Brazilian footballers who have taken this beaten path are Deco and Pepe (Nolasco 2019). In addition to the selection of

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[32] As the national football team of Suriname never managed to qualify for the football World Cup, the country remains absent as a destination national football team in table 4.2.

Brazilian-born players, Portugal has also benefitted from some of their other (former) colonies in recruiting players for its national football team, especially players born in Cape Verde and (Portuguese) Mozambique (table 4.1).

Geographical proximity migration corridors

Geographical proximity has also guided migratory movements between pairs of countries. The bi-directional movements of football players between the neighbouring four *British home nations* (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) are of particular interest in this regard, especially as these countries are linked by British citizenship (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). As a result, football players born in one of the four *home nations* possess the same citizenship, theoretically making them eligible to represent either one of the four national football teams. To overcome (overt) battle for British-born football talent, the four *home nations* 'have agreed to a remove [of] the residency clause, and therefore British citizens may only represent one of the four nations if they or their parents or grandparents were born on the relevant territory' (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014, 331 – brackets added). The *immigration diversification* data shows that England's national football team has never selected a player born in any of the other three British *home nations* for any of its football World Cup campaigns (table 4.1). However, this does not mean that England have never selected a player born in any of the other three *home nations* outside the context of the football World Cup, as the examples of Scottish-born John Bain (a single appearance in 1877), and the Welshmen Frederick Green (a performance in 1876) and Rob Jones (six games between 1992 and 1996) illustrate (Smith 2016). From an *emigration perspective*, the national football teams of Northern Ireland (two players) and Scotland (eight players) have selected England-born players who arguably supported the sustainment of these 'neighbouring' *migration corridor*. There are, however, 'no player losses' within the England–Wales corridor in either direction in the football World Cup context, mainly because the Wales national football team only qualified once for the football World Cup, in 1958 (figure 4.2(a)).

In addition to these British migration corridors, the number of England-born players who competed for the national football team of the Republic of Ireland during the football World Cup catches the eye (although it is questionable whether these 'movements' should be categorised within a *colonial* or *geographically proximity migration corridor*). The 36 England-born players selected for the Irish national football team, in just three editions of the football World Cup (1990, 1994 and 2002), can be explained by the fact that the coaches at the time, Jack Charlton (between 1986 and 1995) and Mick McCarthy (between 1996 and 2002), were English themselves and partly because of this actively tapped into the Irish (football) diaspora of professional footballers in the English Premier League (Holmes and Storey 2011) (figure 4.2(b)).

Through the selection of 33 foreign-born players, the national football team of Switzerland seems to confirm its country's reputation as a 'country of immigration' with a foreign national population of over 20% (Hess 2014; Hollifield, Martin, and Orrenius 2014). These 33 foreign-born players originated from 11 different countries, as diverse as the South American continent (Argentina and Colombia), African states (like Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast and Zaire), and neighbouring countries such as Germany, France, Macedonia and Kosovo (table 4.1). The Swiss national football team seems to have benefitted most from countries geographically proximate to them, as evidenced by the inclusion French and German-born players in the 1950s and 1960s. More recently, especially since the mid-2000s, the selection of footballers born in one of the former Yugoslavian countries, such as Kosovo and North Macedonia, constitutes a large proportion of the foreign-born players within the Swiss national football team (figure 4.2(c)). Like most foreign-born players from ex-Yugoslavia, Xherdan Shaqiri emigrated with his parents to Switzerland at a young age (4 years) when the civil wars broke out in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Shaqiri 2018). In addition to the inclusion of foreign-born players, there are other so-called 'Secondos' in the Swiss national football team: footballers who were born in Switzerland and who are the offspring of immigrants to Switzerland (Hess 2014). Haris Seferović, Granit Xhaka and Ricardo Rodríguez are

Figure 4.2. Geographical proximity migration corridors
(a) England – the other (three) British home nations
(b) England – the Republic of Ireland
(c) Switzerland – (former) Yugoslavian states

(a)

(b)

(c)

some of the abundant examples that currently represent the Swiss in international football.

In terms of *emigration diversification*, the destination national football teams (eight different) to which the 14 Swiss-born players have 'moved' are mainly neighbouring countries such as France (two players), Italy (one player), Germany (two players) and several Balkan states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (one player), Croatia (two players) and Serbia (three players) (table 4.2, figure 4.2(c)). While the main directional movement of migrants has been towards Switzerland, explained by the political unrest in the Balkans in the 1990s, Swiss-born footballers of Yugoslav descent began to 'move' in reverse along the same migration corridors following the installation of the independent states. Moreover, as soon as FIFA recognised the national football teams of these newly formed countries, several Swiss-born Yugoslavs tried to apply for citizenship of one of these new states – mainly along bloodline – because they saw an opportunity to represent their ethnic 'home' country in international football (Brentin 2013). One of them was Ivan Rakitić, who chose to represent his parents' country of Croatia in 2007, despite having represented Switzerland in all youth categories in international football (Rakitić 2017).

Guest worker migration corridors

As a result of demographic and economic changes in large parts of Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many (South) Europeans migrated to the South American continent in search of work. Many Italian labour *migrants* moved to Argentina because of 'the relative short cultural and religious distance that separated Italy from Latin America' (Goebel 2016, 7). They most likely did not leave Italy with the intention of settling permanently in Argentina. Despite that these movements created a *migration corridor* between the two countries, not a single Italian-born player has ever played for the Argentinian national football team in the context of the football World Cup (table 4.1, figure 4.3).

Studying the Argentina–Italy (football) *migration corridor* from an *emigration perspective* shows that Argentina has 'lost' nine native football

Figure 4.3. Guest worker migration corridors

players to the national football team of Italy (table 4.2). Five of these Argentine-Italians, called *Oriundi*, even won the football World Cup with their adoptive country Italy (in 1934 and 2006). In the 1934 football World Cup, Italy triumphed with the help of four Argentina-born players – Luis Monti, Raimundo Orsi, Enrique Guaita and Attilio Demaría – who were personally persuaded by Italian leader Benito Mussolini to compete for Italy's national football team, partly because of their top-class performances at Italian football clubs (Doidge 2015; Foot 2006; S. Martin 2004; Van Campenhout 2017). Mauro Camoranesi was the last Argentina-born Italian to lift the football World Cup trophy in 2006 after obtaining dual Argentine-Italian citizenship in 2003, for which he qualified through his great-grandfather Luigi who had emigrated to Argentina in 1873 (Scragg 2018).

In the aftermath of the Second World War, most Western European countries started to recruit temporary labour 'to speed up the reconstruction and to compensate in part for wartime manpower losses' (Castles 1986, 761–62), in either a spontaneous or systematic way. The

active recruitment of guest workers by national governments stimulated the movement of (mainly low-skilled) workers from countries such as Turkey (mainly to Germany) and Morocco (mainly to the Netherlands), creating *guest worker migration corridors* between these pairs of countries. As with the Italian immigrants to Argentina, these guest workers were expected to return home after the temporary peaks in labour were over. However, as many of them found permanent employment in their *adopted* country, they decided to stay (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). Since migration legislations and policies in Germany and the Netherlands allow for chain migration, including the possibility for guest workers to acquire *formal* German/Dutch citizenship, these *guest worker migration corridors* have been maintained by the movements of families and loved ones of Turkish and Moroccan guest workers (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; GLOBALCIT 2017). As a result of German legislation and policies on migration and citizenship, almost 3 million people of Turkish ethnicity today live as German citizens or have dual citizenship; the German-Turkish community is the largest immigrant population in the country (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019). With just over 400.000 in number, 170.000 of whom are first-generation migrants, people of Moroccan descent are one of the largest immigrant groups in Dutch society (Statline 2019).

The *guest worker migration corridor* between Germany and Turkey has persisted in the context of the football World Cup, but predominantly with a reverse direction of movement; illustrated by the four German-born ethnic Turks who represented Turkey at the 2002 football World Cup (table 4.2). Although many more German-born Turkish footballers have chosen to compete for the Turkish national football team over time, they have not represented the country at the football World Cup. On the contrary, despite the number of first-generation Turkish *migrants* in Germany, not a single Turkish-born footballer has competed for the German national football team at the football World Cup (table 4.1, figure 4.3). However, as a result of the immigration of Turkish guest workers, many of today's talented football players in German elite football have a Turkish migration background. Although these football players are born and raised in Germany, attended German schools, and often represented

Germany at different youth levels, they have yet to decide on their national allegiance in international football: Germany or Turkey (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019). Several German-born ethnic Turks have made such a decision in favour of the German national football team and have represented Germany in international football, the most notable of which are Mesut Özil and İlkay Gündoğan (see Chapter 5).

The Dutch experience of guest workers from Morocco seems to largely mirror that of Germany, as not a single Moroccan-born player has represented the Dutch national football team at a football World Cup. Again, as in Germany, there have been several Dutch-born Moroccans who have represented the Netherlands in the football World Cup, such as Khalid Boulahrouz and Ibrahim Affelay, and clearly even more Dutch-born ethnic Moroccan players beyond the context of this event. However, the main direction of the 'movements' of football players within the *guest worker migration corridor* the Netherlands–Morocco can be seen as a reversal of the historical movements of Moroccan guest workers. This reverse migration process is illustrated by the six Moroccans born in the Netherlands who defended Morocco's colours in the 1998 and 2018 football World Cup (table 4.2, figure 4.3). Since the Morocco's national football federation decided in 2010 to make active use of the Moroccan diaspora, something that was possible because the main technique of acquiring Moroccan citizenship is based on descent (GLOBALCIT 2017), the national football team of Morocco consists of a relatively large number foreign-born players. The Moroccan national football team had the most diverse selection at the most recent edition of the football World Cup, as their 23-headed roster included 17 foreign-born players originating from six different countries. Five of them were Dutch-born – Mbark Boussoufa, Karim El Ahmadi, Hakim Ziyech, and the brothers Nordin and Sofyan Amrabat – all of whom were all eligible to represent Morocco because of their Moroccan families (Kuper 2018).

Conclusions

This study shows that while foreign-born players in the football World Cup originate from a wider, more diverse range of countries over time,

most of these 'movements', or 'nationality changes, are guided by underlying migratory structures, such as national legislations and policies on migration and citizenship and historical relations between countries. Using the idea of *migration corridors*, this chapter illustrates how the selection of foreign-born players within national football teams can largely be seen an echoing and/or reversing preceding flows of *migrants* between pairs of countries. So, the diversification of national football teams seems to be closely related to an (intensified) (re)use, or rediscovering, of existing, historically established (football) *migration corridors* between pairs of countries.

To critically reflect on the structures underlying nationality changes of footballers, a theoretically informed typology of three partly overlapping (football) *migration corridors* was distinguished based on historical and existing relationships between pairs of countries: *colonial*, *geographical proximity* and *guest worker*. More often than within the other types of *migration corridors*, the nationality changes of the players within the studied (football) *colonial migration corridors* appeared to be bidirectional over time. Within the *colonial migration corridors* between African and (West) European countries, for example, the selection of foreign-born footballers in (West) European national football teams mainly seemed to reflect, often with a slight delay, trends in international migration based on colonial relationships. Whereas former colonial empires like France, England and the Netherlands, selected foreign-born players from 'their' colonial talent pools, these selections (slowly) stopped after these former colonies became independent and FIFA allowed these national football teams to play in international football competitions. As a result of decolonisation, many *colonial (football) migration corridors* are now witnessing a reversal of preceding migration movements as national football federations from former colonies, such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, select the best possible football players from their national diaspora. Both the echo of preceding trends in international migration and the reversal of the main direction of movements within these *colonial migration corridors* can be related to what Jansen, Oonk and Engbersen (2018) have coined 'reverberative causation'. Within the *guest worker migration corridors,* all nationality

changes of foreign-born players showed a reversed pattern of the historical main direction of migration. While German-born Turks and Dutch-born Moroccans, for example, have competed for the national football teams of Turkey and Morocco respectively, not a single first-generation migrant footballer from either of these countries has managed to represent Germany or the Netherlands at the football World Cup. In the same vein, reverse 'movements', in terms of nationality changes, seem to continue to characterise the maintenance of (football) *migration corridors* based on *geographical proximity*. For instance, quite a few German- and British-born players have chosen to represent the country of birth of (one of their) immigrant parents or grandparents in international football, making a (sporting) nationality choice that goes against the main direction of migration within these corridors.

In conclusion, I believe that this study contributes to the knowledge base on the diversification of international football, in particular through its historical depth and the insights it provides into underlying structures and patterns of nationality changes. At the same time, I acknowledge that the findings in this chapter should be considered in the light of some limitations. To conclude this chapter, I would therefore like to make some of these limitations explicit and make some suggestions for future research. First, this chapter only discusses the most prominent (football) *migration corridors* derived from the literature and connected to the data on foreign-born football players. The three distinguished *migration corridors* allows for a better understanding of the complexities around 'movements' and nationality changes of foreign-born football players in international football. However, the explorative character of this study also means that some other less common and nuanced mechanisms underlying changes in football player's (sporting) nationality have not been discussed. This includes some interesting, specific, historical relationships between countries such as the relationship between Germany and the United States. As table 4.1 shows, many German-born footballers have competed for the national football team of the United States, especially in (recent) editions of the football World Cup. This can be explained by a combination of (historical) events, including the post-Second World War situation in which American servicemen lived for

some time in Germany. Some of these men had children with a German woman, who were called up to play for the US national football team later in life which they were eligible for through fatherly-descent. In addition, the (coincidental) appointment of a German coach (Jürgen Klinsmann) to the US national football team had an impact on the diversification of its selection for the 2014 football World Cup as Klinsmann included four German-born players based on their ancestry. Future research is needed to further explore the effects of such specific historical events and situations on nationality changes among footballers.

Second, the study is limited to the national football teams that competed at the football World Cup (see Chapter 2). This raises questions of how these findings may apply to both the broader context of international football and in relation to other international sports and/or sporting events. Future research can say more about that, but we do know that comparable studies on the Olympics have come to similar conclusions (Jansen 2020; Jansen and Engbersen 2017; Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018). Moreover, Taylor (2006, 8) noted that the migration of (professional) footballers also reflects complex established links between 'sets of countries – linkages that have deep social, cultural and historical roots'. Finally, within the *colonial migration corridors*, the findings show that recent nationality changes of football players can be considered as a reverse of the main directional migratory movements within this corridor. This, however, does not mean that the national football teams of former colonial empires are still not benefitting from their colonial past. It is clear that many of the current players on the national football teams of France, England and the Netherlands – to name a few – have a *genuine* link with one of their country's former colonies, despite not being born there (Storey 2020). It would therefore be interesting to gain more insight in the experiences and motivations of second and third-generation *migrants* football players, who are eligible to two or more (sporting) nationalities, in their decision to represent one of 'their' countries in such a nationalistic sporting context (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019; Seiberth and Thiel 2021).

CHAPTER 5

THEORISING ON THE DESERVEDNESS OF MIGRANTS IN INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL

Other than minor changes, this chapter is a reflection of an article published as:

5 Theorising on the deservedness of migrants in international football

'I have two hearts, one German and one Turkish'

For years, the talented (now former) Arsenal-midfielder Mesut Özil was one of the key players in Germany's national football team.[33] Özil, born, raised and schooled in the German city of Gelsenkirchen as a third-generation Turkish immigrant,[34] is a practicing Muslim who recites from the Quran when he enters the field (Merkel 2014) and considers himself to be a blend of both of his cultures: 'Whilst I grew up in Germany, my family background has its roots firmly based in Turkey. I have two hearts, one German and one Turkish' (Özil 2018, section I/III Meeting President Erdogan, para. 1). Because Özil is a German-born of Turkish descent, he was eligible to play for both national football teams. After long considerations with his family, being torn back and forth between the two countries, he finally decided to represent Germany in international football (Özil 2017). What is more, to make this possible, he had to legally renounce his Turkish passport, which can arguably be considered as an ultimate act of *formally* distancing himself from Turkey while simultaneously expressing his *formal* – and arguably *moral* – belonging to Germany. Soon after, probably also because of the high societal status of the German national football team, Özil was regarded as one of Germany's 'model minorities' (Kalman-Lamb 2013). To illustrate, Özil won a so-called Bambi Award[35] in the category 'Integration' in 2010 (M. Martin 2010; Özil 2017; 2018), and was publicly voted *German* footballer of the year five times between 2011 and 2016 (Freemantle 2018).

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[33] On 27 January 2021, Mesut Özil left Arsenal after 7,5 seasons to join Turkish club Fenerbahçe.

[34] While Özil's father grew up in Germany, his ancestors originate from Devrek, located in the province of Zonguldak in Turkey (Özil 2017).

[35] The Bambi Awards are Germany's most important media prizes and have been awarded to 'people with vision and creativity, whose outstanding successes and achievements have been reported in the media' (M. Martin 2010).

Yet, the public take on Mesut Özil radically changed from a 'German Bambi' to an imagined 'Turkish grey wolf' when he, together with his German-Turkish teammate Ilkay Gündogan, posed for the media with Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan a month before the start of the 2018 football World Cup (Freemantle 2018; Hirsch 2018). Suddenly, Özil's *Germanness* became the subject of major national dispute. Where many Germans saw in Özil's action 'support for an increasingly autocratic ruler' (Freemantle 2018), for Özil (2018) it was a matter of paying respect to highest office of his family's country. Things, however, really came to a head after Germany's early knock-out in the group stage of the 2018 football World Cup when, especially, Özil, one of the stars of the team, became the convenient scapegoat for the disappointing results of the entire *Mannschaft* (Hirsch 2018; Özil 2018). While football connoisseurs only seemed to comment on Özil's football performances, the criticisms in the public debate went beyond this and also focused on his cultural allegiance with Turkey and the Turkish nation. Due to all controversies surrounding him, Özil resigned from the German national football team on 22 July 2018 by posting a three-parted statement, in English, on his Instagram and Twitter (figure 5.1). In this statement, Özil marked out the precariousness of national belonging by claiming 'I am German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose' (Özil 2018, section III/III DFB, para. 3).[36]

Özil's statement is a most interesting case to question not only who belongs to which nation, but also who deserves to represent the nation in international football. In this context, the notion of deserve does not necessarily point to a player's football qualities per se. For in many ways, this deserving question seems a no-brainer for the average football fan as the answer would be the best players of the nation, obviously. To answer that question, it is of importance to verify which players are considered the best in terms of football capabilities, which is and will obviously be a

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[36] Although this statement received a lot of media coverage, Özil's remark is certainly not unique. There have been other football players and athletes in other international sports who have said similar things. For example, in 2011, French striker Karim Benzema, who has Algerian roots said that 'basically, if I score, I'm French. And if I don't score or there are problems, I'm Arab' (Rosenthal and Conrad 2014, para. 5).

Figure 5.1. Mesut Özil's statement on his resignation from Germany's national football team

I / III MEETING PRESIDENT ERDOGAN

The past couple of weeks have given me time to reflect, and time to think over the events of the last few months. Consequently, I want to share my thoughts and feelings about what has happened.

Like many people, my ancestry traces back to more than one country. Whilst I grew up in Germany, my family background has its roots firmly based in Turkey. I have two hearts, one German and one Turkish. During my childhood, my mother taught me to always be respectful and to never forget where I came from, and these are still values that I think about to this day.

In May, I met President Erdogan in London, during a charitable and educational event. We first met in 2010 after he and Angela Merkel watched the Germany vs. Turkey match together in Berlin. Since then, our paths have crossed a lot of times around the globe. I'm aware that the picture of us caused a huge response in the German media, and whilst some people may accuse me of lying or being deceitful, the picture we took had no political intentions. As I said, my mother has never let me lose sight of my ancestry, heritage and family traditions. For me, having a picture with President Erdogan wasn't about politics or elections, it was about me respecting the highest office of my family's country. My job is a football player and not a politician, and our meeting was not an endorsement of any policies. In fact, we spoke about the same topic that we do every time we have met - football - as he too was a player in his youth.

Although the German media have portrayed something different, the truth is that not meeting with the President would have been disrespecting the roots of my ancestors, who I know would be proud of where I am today. For me, it didn't matter who was President, it mattered that it was the President. Having respect for political office is a view that I'm sure both the Queen and Prime Minister Theresa May share when they too hosted Erdogan in London. Whether it had been the Turkish or the German President, my actions would've been no different.

I get that this may be hard to understand, as in most cultures the political leader cannot be thought of as being separate from the person. But in this case, it is different. Whatever the outcome would've been in this previous election, or the election before that, I would have still taken the picture.

II / III MEDIA & SPONSORS

I know that I am a footballer who has played in arguably the three toughest leagues in the world. I've been fortunate to receive great support from my teammates and coaching staff whilst playing in the Bundesliga, La Liga and the Premier League. And in addition, throughout my career, I've learnt to deal with the media.

A lot of people talk about my performances - many applaud and many criticise. If a newspaper or pundit finds fault in a game I play in, then I can accept this - I'm not a perfect footballer and this often motivates me to work and train harder. But what I can't accept, are German media outlets repeatedly blaming my dual-heritage and a simple picture for a bad World Cup on behalf of an entire squad.

Certain German newspapers are using my background and photo with President Erdogan as right-wing propaganda to further their political cause. Why else did they use pictures and headlines with my name as a direct explanation for defeat in Russia? They didn't criticise my performances, they didn't criticise the team's performances, they just criticised my Turkish ancestry and respect for my upbringing. This crosses a personal line that should never be crossed, as newspapers try to turn the nation of Germany against me.

What I also find disappointing are the double standards that the media has. Lothar Matthaus (an honorary German national team captain) met with another world leader a few days back, and received almost no media criticism. Despite his role with the DFB (German national team), they have not asked him to publicly explain his actions and he continues to represent the players of Germany without any reprimand. If the media felt that I should have been left of the World Cup squad, then surely he should be stripped of his honorary captaincy? Does my Turkish heritage make me a more worthy target?

I've always thought that a 'partnership' infers support, both in the good times and also during tougher situations. Recently, I planned to visit my former school Berger-Feld in Gelsenkirchen, Germany, along with two of my charitable partners. I funded a project for one year where immigrant children, children from poor families and any other children can play football together and learn social rules for life. However, days before we were scheduled to go, I was abandoned by my so-called 'partners', who no longer wanted to work with me at this time. To add to this, the school told my management that they no longer wanted me to be there at this time, as they "feared the media" due to my picture with President Erdogan, especially with the "right-wing party in Gelsenkirchen on the rise". In all honesty, this really hurt. Despite being a student of theirs back when I was younger, I was made to feel unwanted and unworthy of their time.

In addition to this, I was renounced by another partner. As they are also a sponsor of the DFB, I was asked to take part in promotional videos for the World Cup. Yet after my picture with President Erdogan, they took me out of the campaigns and cancelled all promotional activities that were scheduled. For them, it was no longer good to be seen with me and called the situation 'crisis management'. This is all ironic because a German Ministry declared their products have illegal and unauthorized software devices in them, which puts customers at risk. Hundreds of thousands of their products are getting recalled. Whilst I was being criticised and asked to justify my actions by the DFB, there was no such official and public explanation demanded of the DFB sponsor. Why? Am I right in thinking this is worse than a picture with the President of my family's country? What does the DFB have to say about all this?

As I said before, 'partners' should stick with you in all situations. Adidas, Beats and BigShoe have been extremely loyal and amazing to work with in this time. They rise above the nonsense created by the German press and media, and we carry out our projects in a professional manner that I really enjoy being part of. During the World Cup, I worked with BigShoe and helped get 23 young children life-changing surgeries in Russia, which I have also done previously in Brazil and Africa. This for me is the most important thing that I do as a football player, yet the newspapers find no space to raise awareness about this sort of thing. For them, me being booed or taking a picture with a President is more significant then helping children get surgeries worldwide. They too have a platform to raise awareness and funds, but choose not to do so.

5

III / III DFB

Arguably the issue that has frustrated me the most over the past couple of months has been the mistreatment from the DFB, and in particular the DFB President Reinhard Grindel. After my picture with President Erdogan I was asked by Joachim Low to cut short my holiday and go to Berlin and give a joint statement to end all the talk and set the record straight. Whilst I attempted to explain to Grindel my heritage, ancestry and therefore reasoning behind the photo, he was far more interested in speaking about his own political views and belittling my opinion. Whilst his actions were patronising, we came to agree that the best thing to do was to concentrate on football and the upcoming World Cup. This is why I did not attend the DFB media day during the World Cup preparations. I knew journalists discussing politics and not football would just attack me, even though the whole issue was deemed to be over by Oliver Bierhoff in a TV interview he did before the Saudi Arabia game in Leverkusen.

During this time, I also met with the President of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Unlike Grindel, President Steinmeier was professional and actually was interested in what I had to say about my family, my heritage and my decisions. I remember that the meeting was only between myself, Ilkay and President Steinmeier, with Grindel being upset that he wasn't allowed inside to boost his own political agenda. I agreed with President Steinmeier that we would release a joint statement about the matter, in another attempt to move forward and focus on football. But Grindel was upset that it wasn't his team releasing the first statement, annoyed that Steinmeier's press office had to take lead on this matter.

Since the end of the World Cup, Grindel has come under much pressure regarding his decisions before the tournament started, and rightly so. Recently, he has publicly said I should once again explain my actions and puts me at fault for the poor team results in Russia, despite telling me it was over in Berlin. **I am speaking now not for Grindel, but because I want to.** I will no longer stand for being a scapegoat for his incompetence and inability to do his job properly. I know that he wanted me out the team after the picture, and publicised his view on Twitter without any thinking or consultation, but Joachim Low and Oliver Bierhoff stood up for me and backed me. In the eyes of Grindel and his supporters, I am German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose. This is because despite paying taxes in Germany, donating facilities to German schools and winning the World Cup with Germany in 2014, I am still not accepted into society. I am treated as being 'different'. I received the 'Bambi Award' in 2010 as an example of successful integration to German society, I received a 'Silver Laurel Leaf' in 2014 from the Federal Republic of Germany, and I was a 'German Football Ambassador' in 2015. But clearly, I am not German…? Are there criteria for being fully German that I do not fit? My friend Lukas Podolski and Miroslav Klose are never referred to as German-Polish, so why am I German-Turkish? Is it because it is Turkey? Is it because I'm a Muslim? I think here lays an important issue. By being referred to as German-Turkish, it is already distinguishing people who have family from more than one country. I was born and educated in Germany, so why don't people accept that I am German?

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Grindel's opinions can be found elsewhere too. I was called by **Bernd Holzhauer (a German politician) a "goat-f*ker" because of my picture with President Erdogan and my Turkish background. Furthermore, Werner Steer (Chief of German Theatre) told me to "piss off to Anatolia", a place in Turkey where many immigrants are based. As I have said before, criticising and abusing me because of family ancestry is a disgraceful line to cross, and using discrimination as a tool for political propaganda is something that should immediately result in the resignation of those disrespectful individuals. These people have used my picture with President Erdogan as an opportunity to express their previously hidden racist tendencies, and this is dangerous for society. They are no better than the German fan who told me after the game against Sweden "Ozil, verpiss Dich Du scheiss Türkensau. Türkenschwein hau ab", or in English "Ozil, fk off you Turkish s*t, piss of you Turkish pig".** I don't want to even discuss the hate mail, threatening phone calls and comments on social media that my family and I have received. They all represent a Germany of the past, a Germany not open to new cultures, and a Germany that I am not proud of. I am confident that many proud Germans who embrace an open society would agree with me.

To you, Reinhard Grindel, I am disappointed but not surprised by your actions. In 2004 whilst you were a German member of Parliament, you claimed that "multiculturalism is in reality a myth [and] a lifelong lie" whilst you voted against legislation for dual-nationalities and punishments for bribery, as well as saying that Islamic culture has become too ingrained in many German cities. This is unforgivable and unforgettable.

The treatment I have received from the DFB and many others makes me no longer want to wear the German national team shirt. I feel unwanted and think that what I have achieved since my international debut in 2009 has been forgotten. People with racially discriminative backgrounds should not be allowed to work in the largest football federation in the world that has many players from dual-heritage families. Attitudes like theirs simply do not reflect the players they supposedly represent.

It is with a heavy heart and after much consideration that because of recent events, I will no longer be playing for Germany at international level whilst I have this feeling of racism and disrespect. I used to wear the German shirt with such pride and excitement, but now I don't. This decision has been extremely difficult to make because I have always given everything for my teammates, the coaching staff and the good people of Germany. But when high-ranking DFB officials treat me as they did, disrespect my Turkish roots and selfishly turn me into political propaganda, then enough is enough. That is not why I play football, and I will not sit back and do nothing about it. Racism should never, ever be accepted.

Mesut Özil

5

big topic of debate, and it requires verifying which football players are (*formally*) eligible to play for which national football team. But, as Özil's example clarifies, this is not where it stops. The question of deserving also seems to be a *moral* issue*.* Players with dual citizenship or footballers with a migration background, seem to bear the extra burden of having to prove to unquestionably belong to the nation, to be the model-citizen, at the risk of being seen as untrustworthy or even a traitor if not.

Using Özil's case as an example, this chapter aims to understand who, under what conditions, are accepted as national representatives in international football and are recognised as (*conditionally* and *temporally*) belonging to the nation. To this end, the first part of the chapter sketches the regulations and its implications of national representation in international football, and how this complicates debates on national belonging of players with a migration background. In the second part, as a prelude to the discussion of *moral* belonging to the nation, the established–outsider model of Elias and Scotson (1994 – original from 1965) in introduced. Critically engaging with this model, sheds light on the power dynamics between the established and outsiders in the representation of the nation in international football. In the third part of the chapter, the establish-outsider framework is extended to discuss the dynamic *moral* negotiations around the acceptance and recognition of players with a migration background. The chapter ends by going back to the main character of the plot, Mesut Özil, and reflect upon, with the theoretical insights gained, how this painful rupture, in which there seem to be no winners, only losers, could have happened, and maybe could be prevented in the future.

'Who did I want to play for if the possibility ever came about?'

It has been argued in the literature that one of the reasons why the issue of national belonging in international football is so sensitive is because international sporting competitions, such as the Olympic Games and the football World Cup, have become a 'magnifying lens through which critical elaborations of the idea of the nation come to the fore' (Mauro

2020, 5). The competition between countries, including the coinciding performativity of cheering for 'your' country, with all its theatrical elements of a stadium, flag-waving, winners and losers, provides (temporarily) 'a uniquely effective medium for inculcating national feelings' (Hobsbawm 1992, 143) and for one's patriotic place attachment, one's topophilia (Van Houtum and Van Dam 2002). As Alan Bairner (2001, 17 – brackets added) argues: 'It [international sports] provides a form of symbolic action which states the case for the nation itself'. Moreover, it emphasises the enduring relevance of Eric Hobsbawm's (1992, 143 – brackets added) observations that 'sportsmen [*sic*] representing their nation or state' in international sports are 'primary expressions of their imagined communities', and that 'the imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people'. The national make-believe show that international football allows for, is a seductive phantasy-reality that comfortably borders and orders the at times chaotic world, even if it is only temporal, and creates an amusing and carnavelesque feeling of seemingly innocent togetherness (Van Houtum 2010; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). It makes the imagined community (Anderson 2006 – original from 1983), the 'we' of the nation, feel 'real' (Hobsbawm 1992), at least for some time, provided of course that the national football team performs well, as the ecstasy of national togetherness works best on success (Van Houtum 2010).

But who is included in this 'we'? Who or what determines the *formal* borders of the nation? It seems that within the nationalistic context of international football these borders are of an inflexible, dichotomic nature. Fluidity in terms of multiple nationality does not seem to exist in this context. It really is either-or: 'one can either be Dutch or Surinamese, or French or Moroccan, but not both' (Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001, 10). The eligibility regulations of FIFA to play for a representative team forces footballers with dual nationality to *choose* a national football team (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; FIFA 2020; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019). Having dual nationality, also Özil (2017, 42) had to address this issue and struggled to make his decision: 'Who did I want to play for if the possibility ever came about? For the German national side or the

Turkish one? It wasn't a decision I made in a couple of minutes, just in passing'. Deciding on one's (sporting) nationality is often hard for players with dual nationality, because it feels like choosing between 'your' countries. Moreover, it is a permanent decisions that fundamentally shapes a player's entire career in professional football (Özil 2017, 42), and one that will upset people regardless of the outcome. Özil experienced the impact of this *forced* decision first-hand after he chose in favour of Germany and, against his will, 'publicly became a bone of contention between Germany and Turkey' (Özil 2017, 46).

It could be argued that to organise international sport competitions, like the football World Cup, solely around the principles of (legal) nationality, is principally sustaining a rigid 'inter-state world view' (Mauro 2020, 2); something that Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2003, 576) refer to as 'methodological nationalism' and John Agnew (1994) has referred to as 'the territorial trap' (see Chapter 1). FIFA's eligibility regulations are not only insensitive to the general growth of internationalisation, but also seem to camouflage that, per edition of the football World Cup since 1930, on average almost 10% of the football players can be counted as 'foreign-born' (Van Campenhout, Van Sterkenburg, and Oonk 2018, 1079; Chapter 2); meaning these players compete for a different national football team than the one of their country of birth. For example, the 2018 Moroccan national football team's 23-headed selection consisted of 17 foreign-born players (74%), with the majority of these players born in European countries such as France and the Netherlands (Van Campenhout and Van Sterkenburg 2019; Chapter 4). Moreover, a review of the 2018 victorious 'French national football team's roster reveals its multiculturality, as 19 out of the 23 players had a "*genuine* connection" with a country other than France' (Van Campenhout and Van Sterkenburg 2019, 2 – emphasis added; Chapter 4); most of them with roots in one of France its former African colonies. In a similar vein, England's prospect players such as Declan Rice (Republic of Ireland), Callum Hudson-Odoi (Ghana), Dele Alli (Nigeria) and James Tarkowski (Poland) all have a *genuine* migration background and could therefore have opted to pledge their sporting allegiance to another country (Ronay 2019). The strategic implication of the increasing

number of (young) footballers with dual nationality is, as can be expected, that national football federations increasingly attempt to select talented prospects as young as possible and to secure their (sporting) nationality by letting them play in an A-status match for their national football team (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019).

The consequence of this nationalised perspective on international football is that the decision on national deservedness then is not only a sportive one, but by and large also a political one. And is made to depend on *formal* regulations as well as on a range of arbitrary and invisible *moral* norms and (cultural) markers, which are socially constructed by the established 'insiders', that 'outsiders' have to accumulate (Hage 1998; Jansen 2020; Loyal 2011; Monforte, Bassel, and Khan 2019; Pratsinakis 2018; Skey 2011). To this power struggle in defining insiders from outsiders, this chapter now turns to.

5

'I am still not accepted into society. I am treated as being "different"'

In their canonical work *The Established and the Outsiders*, Elias and Scotson (1994 – original from 1965) studied the uneven balance of power between dominant ('established') and subordinate ('outsider') group(s) within a community near the English city of Leicester in the 1960s. They found that the power ratio between the established and outsiders was based on the notable distinction in 'length of residence' in the area; the former being (long-term) residents, while the latter being relatively new to the area (Black 2016; Dunning and Hughes 2014; Hughes and Goodwin 2016; Pratsinakis 2018). In addition, Elias and Scotson pointed to the importance of understanding the mutual entanglement processes between natives and newcomers, and argued, drawing on Elias' earlier figurational approach, that human relationships should be seen as interdependent and in a constant state of flux and transformation (Dunning and Hughes 2014; Hughes and Goodwin 2016; Loyal 2011). Borders between people, as recent literature in border studies has also made clear, are not to be seen as fixed and permanent lines, but as discursive power struggles, with room for interpretation, negotiation and

hence also as a window of opportunity (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019). Borders, orders and Others should therefore be seen as processes, rather than ends, and hence as verbs rather than nouns: b/order*ing* and other*ing* (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002).

Despite, or maybe even because, of its rather straightforward dichotomy between the established and outsiders (Bloyce and Murphy 2007), the established-outsider model has proven to be a conductive framework to analyse processes of (everyday) 'b/ordering' and 'othering' (Black 2016; Pratsinakis 2018; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). The established-outsider framework has been used to study a wide range of social phenomena, also within sport studies, to illustrate unequal power balances related to processes of globalisation (Maguire and Falcous 2011), race relations (Black 2016; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019), gender inequality (Liston 2005; Black and Fielding-Lloyd 2019), and (national) identities (Engh, Agergaard, and Maguire 2013; Jansen 2020).

Key to the model is the explanation of processes of domination and discrimination, which together continuously (re)construct the differential in the power ratio between groups (Loyal 2011). The most powerful groups are able to (re)construct 'understandings of self that posit them as having superior human value' (Engh, Agergaard, and Maguire 2013, 783), thereby (implicitly) defining the characteristics of those outsider groups. The dominant position is mainly maintained by the social cohesion of the established group and is expressed through subtle or not so subtle acts of exclusion – for example setting (invisible) norms of standard behaviour (Duemmler 2015) – and forms of shame and stigma – such as daily gossip and (public) humiliation – directed at different outsider groups. Often such acts of 'othering' can be seen as a reaction of people belonging to the dominant group to subjective feelings of threat from (national) outsiders (Pratsinakis 2018; Skey 2010; 2011). It is through everyday 'b/ordering and othering' practices such as these that the dominant group (re)constructs the boundaries of belonging.

Still, in today's world, the determination of who is 'we' and who are 'they' and who are 'in' and 'out' seems to be dominantly bordered along

national lines (Yuval-Davis 2011; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019). It is not that national identities can (if they ever could) only or foremost be grounded on a supposedly naturally existing world of mutually exclusive nation-states (Skey 2010; 2011; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003), but what matters here is that national identities are still thought to dominate the conditions of belonging to a nation (Skey 2010): nations are imagined and therefore real communities. A nation is, as Benedict Anderson (2006, 6 – original from 1983) famously put it, 'imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'. The thus socially constructed cultural boundary-markers are prescribed as the national normality, as real and existing model norms and tested among the newcomers (for example through citizenship exams) (Duemmler 2015; Skey 2010). Newcomers, such as foreign-born footballers, in their turn, precisely because the conditions of national belonging are 'continuously negotiated, since social actors engage in struggles over social categories and distinctions' (Duemmler 2015, 4), may 'negotiate their position by presenting and adapting their behaviour in particular ways in order to gain access to established domains' (Black 2016, 984). Interestingly, as Elias (1978) had pointed out earlier in his writings, an everyday indication of power struggles on belonging and representation is self-identification. How and when personal pronouns – such as 'I', 'you', 'he', she', 'we' and 'they' – are used can be giveaways of figurative acts of b/ordering and othering (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002).

In his letter of resignation, Özil (2018, section III/III DFB, para. 3) implicitly refers to his experiences with the power struggles between (ethnic) groups within German society by arguing – explicitly using personal pronouns to illustrate the power figurations – that 'I am still not accepted into society' and it feels that 'I am treated as being 'different''. Özil wonders whether his family's country (Turkey) or the fact that he is a practising Muslim might be reasons to *Other* him from the German nation. Moreover, Özil (2018, section III/III, para. 3) seems to be surprised that his position in German society has changed over time and that he has recently been positioned as an outsider to the German nation

by proclaiming: 'I was born and educated in Germany, so why don't people accept that I am German?'

What these statements on national belonging illustrate is the inability of (individual) outsiders – even those who previously had the power to negotiate their position into established domains such as Özil – to become or remain accepted and recognised as *fully* belonging to the nation. Some outsiders might, depending on the *situational conditions*, be accepted as 'established-outsiders', yet in other contexts or for other people, some of their personal characteristics will still mark them as outsiders to the imagined (comm)unity of the nation (Black 2016; Dunning and Hughes 2014; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019). Or as Michael Skey (2010, 718 – brackets added) has argued, we 'must attend to the different ways in which membership categories are contextually negotiated and transformed over time, [and] we must also acknowledge the degree to which distinctions continue to be drawn between different groups, with some seen to be more national than others'. So, what Özil's case alludes to, is that there seems to be a crucial difference between *formal* and *moral* citizenship that can vary over time as well over different kinds of outsider groups that needs to be studied further (Schinkel 2017; Chapter 1), an insight that could further enrich the established-outsider approach.

'I had to ask myself what I was, or what I wanted to be, on paper at least'

In a *formal* sense citizenship can be regarded as a political relationship between an individual and a state in which a citizen has certain duties and obligations to a state and in return enjoys certain rights within the legal borders of that state (Bosniak 2006; Joppke 2010). In terms of power figurations, it is the government of a state that decides on a country's laws and policies on citizenship, and therefore holds the power to grant citizenship to individuals (Iorwerth, Hardman, and Jones 2014). '*Formal* citizenship', according to Ghassan Hage (1998, 50), 'can reflect a practical mode of national belonging'. However, this only occurs 'in the ideal situation where the *formal* decision to include a person as a citizen

reflects a general communal will' (Hage 1998, 50 – emphasis added). Besides the *formal* aspect, citizenship suggests that citizens of the same state are members of the aforementioned (imagined), socially constructed, political community: the nation. This idea of an imagined-and-therefore-real nation reflects the *moral* aspect of citizenship which can be seen as a personal and collective form of identification with people who perceive themselves as part of the same group. And imagined communities will then often be communities of value in which some members are considered to be of higher value and more deserving of membership than others (Schinkel 2017; Skey 2011; see Chapter 1).

In a similar vein, Hage (1998, 51) analytically distinguishes between *institutional-political* national acceptance of belonging, referring to legal state membership, and *practical-cultural* national acceptance of belonging with regard to derivatives of the nation, such as (practical) nationality. Where the former refers to the power of the state to legally accept and recognise outsiders as belonging to the state – related to *formal* citizenship –, the latter can be understood as – in line with Pierre Bourdieu's (1986) notion of social and cultural capital (see also Kalm 2020) – 'the sum of accumulated nationally sanctified and valued social and physical cultural styles and dispositions (national culture) adopted by individuals and groups, as well as valued characteristics (national types and national character) within a national field: looks, accent, demeanour, taste, nationally valued social and cultural preferences and behaviour, etc.' (Hage 1998, 53) – related to *moral* citizenship.

The idea of *moral* citizenship brought forward here is helpful in making clear that, to use the words of Joost Jansen (2020, 102 – emphasis added), '*formal* citizenship alone is often not a sufficient prerequisite for immigrants, or even the children of immigrants, to be recognised as fully "integrated" members of the (national) society'. Being born on a state's territorial soil seems to be an insufficient criterium then for second, third, or even fourth generation immigrants to be accepted as fully belonging to its respective nation (Jansen 2020). So, while *formal* 'recognition and acknowledgment of one's rights and one's belonging become pivotal for the final grounding of one's belonging' (Kryżanowski and Wodak 2008, 104), '"citizenship" in a highly *moralized* sense has become a marker to

identify membership of society' (Schinkel 2017, 197 – emphasis added). It also implies, that using the notion of citizenship simply as a synonym or in association with national belonging would thus not do justice to capture this *moral* aspect and the inherent 'subtleties of the *differential modalities of national belonging* as they are experienced within society' (Hage 1998, 51 – emphasis in original). Both aspects of national acceptance of belonging, *formal* and *moral*, are thus important in understanding power figurations between the established and outsiders.

Because German citizenship legislation *formally* did not (yet) allow dual nationality, and Özil stood on the brink of an international football career, 'I [Özil] had to ask myself what I was, or what I wanted to be, on paper at least' (Özil 2017, 42 – brackets added). By renouncing his Turkish passport in order to acquire a German one, thereby choosing for Germany's national football team, Özil (2017, 44) *formally* expressed his (national) belonging to the German state. Özil's decision on his *formal* and sporting nationality was, according to himself, 'not an explicit rejection of Turkey. Just because I'd chosen to play for Germany didn't mean that Turkey wasn't close to my heart. I wasn't shutting myself off from Turkey and its people' (Özil 2017, 47). Özil changed his (sporting) nationality mainly because FIFA's eligibility regulations forced him to make a decision between his two countries (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019): 'I had to make the decision about whether I wanted to play for Germany or Turkey. Logically I had to opt for one or the other; there was no way around it' (Özil 2017, 50). This in itself is not necessarily a problem. However, as shown, it is precisely the *moral* aspect of national belonging that has become pivotal in the whole discussion on Özil's *Germanness*, and which ultimately caused the rupture between him, as a native German, and his performances for the German national football team.

Özil's case is by no means an exception, but rather the rule. Many football players with a migration background are, or have been, subject to public value judgments regarding their eligibility and loyalty to the nation they represent in international football (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019). In the eyes of Özil (2018, II/III Media & Sponsors, para. 3), several German newspapers crossed a personal line ('one that should never be crossed') when 'they didn't critique my

performances, they didn't criticise the team's performances, they just criticised my Turkish ancestry and respect for my upbringing'. Moreover, by repeatedly asking questions directed at specific *practical-cultural* markers of belonging, such as loyalty, pride and affection, the media – as both part and representative of the established – seem to tacitly *other* the players with a migration background by border*ing* an imaginary of the 'true' nation (Pratsinakis 2018; Skey 2010). As a result of these mutual processes of b/ordering and othering (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002), footballers with a migration background must constantly prove their loyalty to the nation – something native players never have to do – and show that they deserve to be accepted and recognised as part of the nation (Hage 1998; Pratsinakis 2018).

'Are there criteria for being fully German that I do not fit?'

The increasing discrepancy between *formal* and *moral* citizenship can be indicative of 'the crucial link between recognition and belonging and the unequal relations of power that exist in the attribution and acceptance of identity claims' (Skey 2010, 718–19). In recent debates, in processes of marking out *insiders* from *outsiders*, particular attention is paid 'to the continuing power of gendered, racist and classist categories to define who counts as truly national' (Jansen 2020, 100), resulting in 'powerful distinctions between different social groups within the nation' (Skey 2011, 2). Whether outsiders are seen as *genuine* nationals, or even national representatives, 'remains largely dependent on the judgements and (re)actions of others' (Skey 2010, 719). Moreover, while certain outsiders are 'able to position themselves (and are recognised) as unconditionally belonging to the nation' (Skey 2010, 718; Hage 1998), the societal position a person is assigned seems to largely depend 'on various markers of difference and sameness, most notably those of race, ethnicity, culture, nation and religion' (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019, 208). As the markers of difference and sameness differ per country, differences in hierarchies of national belonging exist between countries. While in Germany, for example, the (German) Turks are arguably at the bottom of such a hierarchy (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij

2019), this dubious honour seems to fall to (British) Asians in Great Britain (Clarke 2020).

As not all outsiders or outsider groups have the power to accumulate enough (but when is enough?) national cultural capital, rankings of national belonging can also change over time. As a result, constantly shifting hierarchies of national belonging can be observed, ranking different immigrant groups in relation to the dominant one (Clarke 2020; Skey 2011). For example, while the (Dutch) Surinamese were placed low in terms of belonging to Dutch society in the 1970s/1980s, they have arguably moved up in this hierarchy due to an increased recognition of the colonial linkages between the two countries (Van Amersfoort and Van Niekerk 2006). In terms of ethnicity and nationality, although this is not uncontested, the (Dutch) Surinamese are now dominantly seen as more *genuine* Dutch than (Dutch) Moroccans and (Dutch) Turks, indicating a re-ordering within the hierarchy of national belonging in the Netherlands over time (Van Amersfoort and Van Niekerk 2006; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019). Further, in most (West) European countries, non-western immigrants are often 'less accepted and their categorization as culturally different burdens their interaction with the dominant society on many occasions' (Pratsinakis 2018, 15).

'Even in German elite football', according to Klaus Seiberth, Ansgar Thiel and Ramón Spaaij (2019, 788), 'the treatment of German national players with a Turkish background also appears to still be different compared to members of other immigrant groups'. Özil (2018) also explicitly addresses the existence of a hierarchy of national belonging among outsiders when he complains about the fact that 'he is still labelled as a "German Turk" even though he has been playing for Germany since the age of 17' (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019, 788), while his foreign-born former-national teammates Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski have never been referred to as 'German Poles' (Özil 2018, III/III DFB, para. 3; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019). Apparently, indeed, not all markers of national belonging are practically acquirable for every outsider or outsider group(s) at every moment or in any situation.

In today's (international) football, in Western Europe but also elsewhere, clear acts of othering seem to mainly happen to players whose

race/ethnicity – as easily identifiable markers – differs from that of the dominant group. Besides German-Turkish players like Mesut Özil, similar forms of othering have been targeted at black German football players, most of whom have roots that can be traced back to different African countries, such as Gerald Asamoah (Ghana), David Odonkor (Ghana), and Patrick Owomoyela (Nigeria). It was, in particular, Hamburg-born Owomoyela who in 2006 became subject of right-wing backlash as a calendar was produced showing 'the national shirt with Owomoyela's squad number on it and the slogan: "White: not just the colour of the shirt! For a real National team!"' (Merkel 2014, 246). Although biologically informed racism is 'officially' accepted to be not accepted, and other 'hidden forms of racial/ethnic hierarchies and in/exclusion' such as references to nationhood or religion have become 'more "accepted"' (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019, 198), the case of Owomoyela implies that race/ethnicity still remains one of the distinctive markers in determining who is 'in' or 'out'; perhaps even a more distinguishing marker than one's *formal* citizenship.

'You can definitely belong to two cultures. And you can certainly be proud of two cultures'

Let's come to a conclusion. Born in Germany as a child of second-generation Turkish immigrants, and since the age of seventeen only in the possession of *formal* German citizenship, Mesut Özil felt he was *morally* excluded from the German nation after *die Mannschaft's* dramatic performance at 2018 football World Cup. Özil's resignation is a good example of the widespread tendency to portray the complex issues of citizenship and national identity in dichotomies: an 'us *versus* them', and a 'here *versus* there'. Yet, Özil's exemplary painful rupture has made it clear that international football should come to terms with recognising that feelings and experiences of national belonging of football players with a migration background are – at the very least – dual in the sense that they identify with both their country of birth and the country of their family in most cases: 'You can definitely belong to two cultures. And you can certainly be proud of two cultures' (Özil 2017, 51). In addition, Özil's

recent public performances outside of football, especially posing with the Turkish leader Erdoğan which in itself may indeed be seen as politically clumsy given Erdoğan's spiteful anti-western and autocratic leadership, did not necessarily have to backlash on his affiliation with the German national football team. That it did, and to this extent, is telling for the power of *moral* deservedness for outsiders in the social construction of imagined communities.

Deservedness to represent the nation seems to depend on the accumulated national cultural capital by football players with a migration background and the relentless demonstrations of their loyalty, pride, and affection that would mark them as being 'in', as 'one of us'. Moreover, since the established have the power to (re)construct and maintain the borders of national belonging, they are also powerful in deciding who *morally* deserves to belong to the nation. Obviously, as both the established and outsiders are a constitutive part of the power balance determining national belonging (Pratsinakis 2018), then, arguably, both have the ability to, at least to a certain degree, and also the potential to change the borders of national belonging. What, however, then should be kept in mind is that Özil, like many other, especially non-Western, immigrants, will never be able to fully meet the current prevailing conditions of Germany's national belonging, which seem to be biased towards Western, Christian and White characteristics (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019). This highlights the conditional and temporal character of national belonging. It is for this reason that many individuals belonging to the second, or even third or fourth generation of non-western immigrants in their country of birth find that 'their presence and acceptance as legitimate members of the nation remains contested' (Kyeremeh 2020, 1137). As a result, the acceptance and recognition of players with a migration background will then crucially be a matter of *moral* deservedness, in the sense that their (national) belonging lasts as long as their performance on the field and in public is on (or above) the expected (invisible) norms set by the established: Only 'if 'we' win…'.

What Özil's intriguing as well as most smarting case, above all, thus marks out is the fragility of national belonging for multiple generations and naturalised *migrants*, even for football players who have been

selected, accepted and recognised as national representatives in international football. I would, therefore, argue that more research is needed towards the power (re)figurations of the (invisible) norms of national belonging, and how these norms are experienced in practice by (various) outsiders and between different outsider groups. Further, I would be in favour of loosening the bounds of (sporting) nationality and to allow for more flexibility and interchangeability of football players in the context of international football. The current rather fixed eligibility regulations for players to play for representative teams are out of touch with the growth in international migration, the diversification of societies and the increasing acceptance of dual citizenship. In this respect, it would be worthwhile to investigate to what extent international football could become (more) like association football, where footballers of different origins are, in most instances, accepted and (*morally*) recognised as 'one of us', as representatives of 'their' football club.

Mesut Özil has played for various teams in his life, including clubs who are competitors of each other in either domestic and international leagues, such as FC Schalke 04, Werder Bremen, Real Madrid CF, Arsenal FC and Fenerbahçe SK. Barely ever did he have to show his undivided *formal* and *moral* belonging to the clubs he represented to the extent that he had to do for his selection for the German national football team.[37] Never were there discussions on Özil's assumed *Schalkeness*, or whether he would be an Arsenal' Gunner, or anything like it. Whether the team Özil played for won or lost, they would be in it together, as a team. Maybe, it is time, to rethink if 'we' really win as a national football team, when the battle is not only or no longer an 'us *versus* them', 'our national football team *versus* the other national football team', but is also an 'us *versus* us' within our national football team.

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[37] On 21 October 2020, Mesut Özil placed a statement on his Twitter expressing his disappointment of not being registered as an Arsenal player for the Premier League season in which he literally pledges his loyalty and allegiance to the club he loves, Arsenal (Özil 2020, para. 1).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND
DISCUSSIONS

6 Conclusions and discussions

Introduction

On 16 July 2018, the day after the 2018 football World Cup final, the Jordanian cartoonist Mahmoud Al-Rifai published a caricature on the victory of the French national football team. The cartoon 'France World Cup Winners' (figure 6.1) displays three distinct components: (i) the territorial outline of France in its distinctive national colours red, white and blue, (ii) a rubber boat with seemingly African refugees (recognisable by the orange life vests), and (iii) two hands insinuating the transmission of the FIFA World Cup trophy; a dark skinned hand lifts the trophy out of the rubber boat while a white hand – originating from the white part of territorial France – reaches towards it (Oonk 2019).

The cartoon implies that France has won the football World Cup because of the French representatives with an African migration background in its national football team.[38] Moreover, this caricature lines up with broader societal debates in France around the diversity, in particular the *Africanness*, of the national representatives in France its national football team during the last football World Cup (Beydoun 2018; Njororai Simiyu 2021). Khaled Beydoun (2018, para. 2 – brackets added), a leading scholar on Islamophobia, stated in one of his articles for the

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[38] Mahmoud Al-Rifai's cartoon was met with both praise and criticism. The latter sometimes took on violent forms towards the cartoonist causing him to feel obliged to respond publicly. In a video posted on the pan-African digital media platform *This is Africa* on 20 July 2018, Al-Rifai explicitly argues that he was not attacking France with his cartoon. He explicitly recognises that France has welcomed a lot of immigrants and, by doing so, has given them an opportunity to start a new life. So, that some of these, mainly second generation, immigrants are now representing France in international football is something Al-Rifai considers to be a positive thing. When, however, in the media or in politics there is spoken of criminal offences committed by people from a minority ethnic background, these individuals are often reduced to their origin (mainly African) or their religion (mostly Muslim). Then their *Frenchness* seems to disappear. Al-Rifai also makes an appeal, according to Gijsbert Oonk (2019, 21), 'to consider citizens-with-a-migration-background as citizens always – not only when they are winning'. For the video by Mahmoud Al-Rifai: https://twitter.com/thisisafricatia/status/1020374264699072512.

Figure 6.1. 'France World Cup Winners', a cartoon by Mahmoud Al-Rifai

6

online platform *The Undefeated* that 'a review of this team's roster, perhaps the most talented since the [World Cup winning] 1998 side, reveals that it is as much African as it is French'. All selected footballers are *formal* French citizens but fourteen of the twenty-three players also have a *genuine* link with at least one African country.[39] As is shown in this dissertation, the link between – the majority of – these football players and France is predominantly a reflection of the country's colonial past (Oonk 2019; Storey 2020).

The multi-ethnic makeup of the French national football team has been, due to the volume and visibility of French representatives with an African migration background, derisively viewed in the media and by (a portion of) the public as *an African team* (Beydoun 2018; Storey 2020).

[39] Whereas Khaled Beydoun (2018) argues that twelve of the football players in the victorious French national football team have a *genuine* connection with one or more countries on the African continent, I – based on the historical overview (Chapter 2) – identified fourteen French representatives with such a link.

In particular, 'the Frenchness of Kylian Mbappé, Pogba and others, many of whom grew up in the often-stigmatised *banlieues* of Paris, is elided as they are seen pejoratively as "not French", "not French enough" or not "really French"' by supporters and official representatives of the far right (Storey 2020, 135 – emphasis in original). The controversies around the *Frenchness* of these players and, as a consequence, the representativeness of the French national football team, re-instigated societal debates in France about (im)migration, citizenship and national belonging. These societal debates seem to fit within 'a wider socio-political context in which non-white French citizens are depicted as being not really French and are regarded with persistent suspicion and hostility' (Storey 2020, 136).

The controversies and uneasiness surrounding the 2018 national football team of France are illustrative of the central issues in this study. The aim of this dissertation was to examine how migration in international football shapes and challenges notions of citizenship and national belonging, and how understandings of these concepts are reconfigured in debates on the eligibility of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background throughout the history of the football World Cup, c. 1930-2018. To be more precise, this research was set up to gain a better understanding of the (increasing) discrepancy between *formal* citizenship and football players eligibility on the one hand, and *moral*, normative ideals of citizenship and belonging to the nation on the other hand. The central question that guided this research is: *How and why has the number of foreign-born football players in the football World Cup changed over time (c. 1930-2018), and how does a diverse football team of national representatives shape and challenge understandings of migration, citizenship and national belonging?*

Migrations, *formal* citizenship and FIFA's player eligibility regulations

To examine the commonly held assumption that the football World Cup has become more migratory, I took on a systematic and historically comparative approach to the presence of foreign-born players – and

footballers with a migration background – in the football World Cup. Systematic, here means two things. First, the studies in this dissertation use the strengths of quantitative analyses (Day and Vamplew 2015; Vamplew 2015), in combination with the use of some high-profile cases, to gain a better understanding of migration, citizenship and national belonging in the historical context of the football World Cup. This was done by creating a historical overview of the 10.137 football players who ever participated in the football World Cup between 1930 and 2018. Within this database, created through a generalisation of legal techniques to acquire *formal* citizenship – *jus soli, jus sanguinis, jus domicilii* and *jus matrimonii* – the number of foreign-born players and of footballers with a migration background were counted (Chapter 2). Based on the historical overview of cases, I then examined some illustrative, mediagenic examples such as Diego Costa (Chapter 1), Mesut Özil (Chapter 5) and the national representatives of France (Chapter 6) to illustrate the often contradictory meanings and paradoxical understandings that prevail in society around the selection of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background as national representatives in international football. Second, the studies in this dissertation are systematic as they have tried to emphasise the theoretical interplay between sociological concepts that showed some *natural* overlap: migration, citizenship and national belonging. While in each chapter one of these concepts took centre stage, the other two concepts were always influential in the wider processes relating to the concept on the spot.

Empirically, this dissertation shows that, from a historical perspective on migration, many national football federations have been selecting foreign-born players – and footballers with a migration background – to represent their country in international football (Chapters 2 and 3). The presence of foreign-born players in (certain) national football teams during the football World Cup is, therefore, nothing new but mainly seems to reflect the inflows of migrant groups in a society over time. Moreover, notwithstanding a number of empirical limitations – some of which I will address further in this chapter –, when critically comparing the fluctuations in the (relative) volumes of foreign-born players in the

football World Cup with trends and patterns in international migration, differences between the means over time of both numbers stand out. Whereas, since the first edition of the football World Cup in 1930, the share of foreign-born football players – as a percentage of all competing players in the football World Cup – has fluctuated between 6% and 12% (c. 1930–2018), the percentages of international migrants oscillated between two and four per cent (Czaika and de Haas 2014; Zlotnik 1999). The deviation between the proportion of foreign-born players as a share of the total number of football players who competed in the football World Cup and the proportion of *migrants* as a share of the total world population seems logical. Football players are highly-skilled individuals who, because of their specific skills and rare talents, are globally employable which makes them highly mobile (Kerr et al. 2016; Lucassen and Smit 2015; Shachar 2011). International football, with the football World Cup (c. 1930-2018) as its apex, can therefore be seen as a space of migration par excellence. Further, there seems to be an upward trend in the volume of foreign-born players in the football World Cup, in particular since the mid-1990s, diverging from the more steadily increases in international migration (Chapter 2). In addition, as international migrations 'have become increasingly asymmetric and skewed along several dimensions, especially as [highly] skilled migration has become a greater force globally' (Kerr et al. 2016, 85 – brackets added; Czaika and de Haas 2014), this trend seems to be reflected in an increased diversity of foreign-born players in some national football teams.

Together, these observations imply that, throughout its history, the football World Cup has become more migratory – at least from an *immigration perspective*. This corresponds with what Raffaele Poli (2007, 646) refers to as the 'de-ethnicization of the nation': a process that, according to him, is part of the 'denationalisation of sport'. Moreover, reflecting what Poli (2007, 646) emphasises 'that contemporary changes regarding the concept of the nation-state and national identities in sport are inscribed in a nonlinear historical process', this dissertation demonstrates the necessity and importance of historical nuances in these kinds of debates. The increases in the volume and diversity of foreign-

born players in the football World Cup should, first and foremost, be considered as a (belated) reflection or echo of national precedent migration flows such as imperial/colonial legacies and guest workers (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). The omnipresence of foreign-born players in (certain) national football teams, therefore, seems to be primarily 'based on [historically] established systems and networks. The story is of the adaptation of existing [migration] patterns rather than any radical breach with the past' (Taylor 2006, 30 – brackets added; Czaika and de Haas 2014).

As international migration does not seem to have an equal and uniform influence on states and nations around the globe (Czaika and de Haas 2014), differences between national football teams in terms of the number and diversity of foreign-born players can be observed. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 explain that the presence of foreign-born players in national football teams is not, and never has been, at random or solely based on a player's football capabilities and talent. These migrations mainly depend on historical, geopolitical relationships between countries. National (im)migration histories (Chapter 3) and historically established *migration corridors* between (pairs of) countries (Chapter 4) seem to guide or restrict the possible movements of players to certain, non-native national football teams via conditions of national citizenship laws and policies. However, foreign-born players do not literally have to move across national boundaries in order to become eligible to compete for another, non-native national football team. In most instances, foreign-born national representatives just took on another, or an extra, (sporting) nationality as FIFA's regulations around player eligibility are based on holding *formal* citizenship of the country a footballer wishes to represent (FIFA 2020). The ease with which a foreign-born footballer is able to obtain a(n extra) nationality depends, to a large extent, on (historical developments in) national citizenship laws and policies of the country at stake. This implies a close interplay between migration and national citizenship regimes as both seem to shape and are shaped by one another. The volume and diversity of foreign-born players in the football World Cup, and changes therein, should therefore, from an institutional point of view, be considered as outcomes of historically complex interplays

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between international migration, national citizenship laws and policies, and FIFA's eligibility criteria.

The volume and diversity of foreign-born players in national football teams, however, does not reveal anything about how foreign-born football players have taken on, or are willing to take on, another or extra (sporting) nationality. Michael Holmes and David Storey (2011) suggest that there is a range of motivations underlying a player's switch in (sporting) nationality. Although these motivations are far more complex than how it is sketched here, they are often boiled down to a binary distinction between, on the one hand, players 'playing for a country they have a clear link to, through growing up there or having a family connection back to it' or, on the other hand, 'cases of fast-tracked citizenship spurred by sporting prowess' (Storey 2020, 135; Holmes and Storey 2011). While some foreign-born players may be motivated by a clear cultural affinity to compete for another, non-native national football team, for others their decision to do so seems to be 'more pragmatic based around career enhancement' (Storey 2020, 132). Players from the latter category are often perceived as using their (sporting) citizenship as an instrument: strategically mobilising it in an attempt to boost their football career (Holmes and Storey 2011; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019; Storey 2020). While instrumental-strategic uses of citizenship by foreign-born players or footballers with a migration background might be dubious from the 'core norm that citizenship must express a *genuine* link' (Bauböck 2019, 1020 – emphasis added), David Storey (2020, 139) rightfully argues that 'we need to be wary of seeing the choices players make as an all-or-nothing statement of identity or allegiance'; is it a naturalisation solely for sporting reasons or did a player acquire another, or extra, citizenship (*at* or *after* birth) well before their sporting talent became an issue?

The alleged strategic-instrumental approach to (fast-tracked) naturalisations of, often young, talented football players is, in the literature on citizenship, referred to as 'Olympic citizenship' – a strategy of national governments to grant, selectively and through accelerated processes, *formal* citizenship to migrants only because of the 'distinctive skills, talents, or abilities "encapsulated" in the recruited migrant

[him/]herself' (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 251 – brackets added) – and is associated with the marketisation of citizenship – referring to acts of 'placing a "for sale" tag on citizenship' by national governments (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 250; Shachar 2018; Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018). Critics of the commodification of citizenship, either through skills-based selective migration programs or through forms of marketisation, find the willingness of national governments to engage in these kind of processes puzzling as these developments in citizenship seem to (further) blur the boundaries of the nation, loosen the supposed *genuine* link between an individual and his/her national (imagined) community, and exacerbates global inequalities (Jansen 2020, 120–21; Shachar 2011; 2018; Shachar and Hirschl 2014).

It is not my intention to downplay the fact that some countries did and do strategically adapt their citizenship laws and policies with the aim of targeting highly-skilled migrants such as talented athletes and football players. There have been and most surely will be cases in which national governments on purpose offer (fast-tracked) citizenship to foreign-born athletes and football players in an attempt to enhance the chances of success for their country in international sporting competitions like the Olympic Games and the football World Cup; for now, most notably those of Qatar, Bahrein, Turkey and Russia (Jansen, Oonk, and Engbersen 2018; Reiche and Tinaz 2019). While such strategic modifications of citizenship can be considered paradoxical to the process of nation-building, when these new nationals are successful in international sports, or have a noticeable (preferably visible and measurable) contribution to international sporting success, their prestige contributes to a heightened sense of *their* nation; although this obviously is not self-evident (Bairner 2001; Hobsbawm 1992; Van Houtum 2010; Van Houtum and Van Dam 2002; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002). I neither deny the fact that football players, athletes and other (highly-skilled) migrants are actively on the lookout to strategically use their citizenship to advance their life situation. Most surely, football players with dual nationality like Hakim Ziyech (Bahara 2018; Elibol 2020), Declan Rice (Aluko 2019) and Aymeric Laporte (Lowe 2021) – to name but a few – have strategically used their (dual) citizenship in an attempt to maximise their international

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and professional football careers. It is, however, my conviction that pure citizenship-for-sale practices in international football will remain quite exceptional for the time being (Bauböck 2019). In the context of the football World Cup, up till now, all nationality changes can be perceived as expressions of a *genuine* link between the football player, the state and its respective nation (Chapter 2).

Moral citizenship and the deservedness of national belonging

With increases in the volume and diversity of foreign-born players in the football World Cup (Chapter 2), also the tone and ferocity in societal debates on the representativity of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background in national football teams seem to have changed. This is, for example, illustrated by the case on the French representatives with an African migration background at the beginning of this chapter. Whereas in the past no one – not even FIFA – seemed much to care about these issues, today it is major feature of media and political debate. Moreover, while *formal* citizenship was historically considered as representing a *genuine* link between an individual, the state and the nation – and is therefore the main principle of FIFA's eligibility regulations – it remains highly questionable whether the acquisition of *formal* citizenship *naturally* leads to a *genuine* link with the nation (Bauböck 2019; Bonikowski 2016). Because of this, much of the current media and public controversies seem to be based on existing (although invisible) normative ideals of the nation. As deservedness to represent the nation seems to depend on the accumulated national cultural capital, it remains questionable when (if ever) footballers with a migration background can be considered as truly and unquestionably part of the nation. Obviously, sensitive issues like these are 'both a reflection *of* and constitutive force *for* society' (Arnold 2021, 2 – emphasis in original; Van Campenhout and Van Houtum 2021, Chapter 5).

According to Nira Yuval-Davis (2006, 207 – brackets added), 'much of the contemporary debates on the politics of belonging surround that question of who "belongs" [to the nation] and who does not, and what are

the minimum common grounds – in terms of origin, culture and normative behaviour – that are required to signify belonging'. The (increasing) emphasis on the cultural conditions to determine belonging (to the nation) relates to Willem Schinkel's (2010, 265) *moralisation of citizenship* (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010, 697; Schinkel 2017, 199). In Chapter 5, I have, together with Henk van Houtum, questioned the alterations of *moral* citizenship in a detailed discussion of Mesut Özil's painful rupture with the German national football team. We reflected on how the public perception of Özil's *Germanness* and his position in German society changed in the run up to his decision to stop representing Germany in international football. Özil's resignation, and the controversies around it, is a good example of the widespread tendency to portray and (publicly) discuss complex and sensitive issues related to citizenship, the nation and national belonging in dichotomies: an 'us versus them', and a 'here versus there'. Yet, what Özil's case also illustrates is that the arena of international football should come to terms with recognising that feelings and experiences of national belonging of footballers with a migration background may be – at the very least – dual in the sense that they might consider themselves a blend of different national cultures (Bonikowski 2016; Özil 2017; 2018; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019; Van Campenhout and Van Houtum 2021).

What further became clear by a global analysis of media debates around Özil's *Germanness* and his social position in German society is how the public take on Özil's belonging to the German nation radically changed over time; 'from a "German Bambi" to an imagined "Turkish grey wolf"' (Van Campenhout and Van Houtum 2021, 1925; Chapter 5). In a similar vein, Joost Jansen and Michael Skey (2020, 1208 – emphasis added), in their study on media reports of the *Plastic Brits* debate in the context of the 2012 London Olympics, highlight 'the complex repertoire of *formal* and everyday markers used to define and manage national belonging; the conditional forms of recognition that are offered to those who demonstrate appropriate levels of commitment to and/or cultural affinity; and the varying ways in which athletes caught up in the Plastic Brits controversy sought to respond to and challenge processes of stigmatisation'. The (sometimes) radical changes in (media) references of

(some) foreign-born athletes and the ones with a migration background as 'one of us', illustrates the conditionality and temporality – and with it the fragility – of belonging to the nation. The cases of Özil (Chapter 5) and the French national football team (Chapter 6) demonstrate that similar processes of border*ing* the nation also take place in international football.

Because of the conditionality and temporality, national belonging should not be considered as 'a static phenomenon but rather as a set of processes that are central to the way in which human relationships are conducted. Individuals and groups are caught up in a continuing and dynamic dialectic of seeking and granting belonging' (Skrbiš, Baldasser, and Poynting 2007, 261–62), indicating there is a 'spectrum of "doing belonging"' (Skrbiš, Baldasser, and Poynting 2007, 261). Everyday power struggles to belong to the nation are about meeting an everchanging, although historically established, and rather homogenous image of the nation. Whether someone truly and unquestionably belongs to the nation seems to be based on (ongoing) expressions of enough (but when is enough?) everyday, rather banal (Billig 1995), markers that relate to characteristics such as nationality, race/ethnicity, gender, social class, religion, physical appearance, and cultural affinity (Bonikowski 2016; Skey 2011; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019). Özil's belonging to the German nation was, for example, continuously judged upon non-football related markers such as him being a (practicing) Muslim, his ability to speak other languages than German (or speaking German with an accent), and to his, arguably, non-stereotypical German physical appearance – the latter in this case is bluntly racism (Hage 1998; Simonsen 2018). Relatedly, in the context of the 'plastic Brits debates', Jansen and Skey (2020, 1203) observed that 'practical forms of belonging trump institutional forms in all cases', implying that what really matters in defining who belongs to the nation, and who not, relates to a range of everyday, banal markers of national belonging.

As belonging to the nation seems to depend on ongoing judgements of the display of normative, everyday markers, many second, third and even fourth generation migrants continue to experience that 'their presence and acceptance as legitimate members of the nation remains contested' (Kyeremeh 2020, 1137; Hage 1998; Jansen and Skey 2020; Simonsen

2018; Skey 2013). However, as the boundaries of the nation are based on discursive power struggles between in- and outsiders, there is room for interpretation, negotiation and hence a window of opportunity for some (groups of) migrants to position themselves as more belonging to the nation than other (groups of) migrants (Simonsen 2018; Skey 2013). For example, the French representatives with an African migration background in the 2018 French World Cup team were generally considered to be part of 'us' when they won the World Cup, whereas they were reduced to 'them' when the team lost. Therefore, a warning against too much optimism on the opportunities of people with a migration background to negotiate themselves into a position in which they – be it even temporarily – belong to the nation must be given, as the normative ideals bordering the nation are historically grounded and, therefore, rather persistent.

Limitations

In the context of the conclusions of this dissertation, I find it important to discuss some limitations of my studies. Although I have in each of the individual chapters explicitly indicated what I consider to be the main limitations of the respective studies, I here want to reflect in a more general sense on the aims of this dissertation. In this light, I wish to discuss what I see as the three most relevant limitations to my studies: (i) the selection of data, (ii) research methods, and (iii) intersectionality. In doing so, I also want to invite future researchers dealing with this topic and closely related issues to make use of, expand and critically reflect on the data, methods, methodologies and perspectives employed in this dissertation.

The first limitation I want to discuss relates to the selection of data that is analysed for the studies in this dissertation. The national football teams, and relatedly the football players, chosen for further historical examination are selected because of their presence in the football World Cup and their own intrinsic value in the context of migration, citizenship and national belonging. This means that this dissertation predominantly deals with representative football teams of countries from Europe, North-

and South America. Although, preferably, countries and related national football teams from the continents of Africa and Asia should be included in the analyses – in particular the national football teams of Algeria, Morocco and Qatar are interesting objects of study in the light of this dissertation –, the lack of football history of these countries in the football World Cup and restrictions in data availability prevented me from doing this. In this vein, I am glad to see that other scholars are focusing on these more peripheral football countries and their national football teams in an expansion of the issues under discussion in this dissertation (Adjaye 2010; Darby 2007b; Reiche and Tinaz 2019; Storey 2020; Velema 2016).

Further, women's international football – specifically the Women's football World Cup – has intentionally been left out of this study despite the fact of its impressive global advance. The reason for this is two folded: (i) the Women's football World Cup has a history of its own officially starting in 1991, and (ii) societal debates around foreign-born players or footballers with a migration background in women representative football teams seem to be, to the best of my knowledge, less common than in the men's game (for now). However, these reasons should not stop other researchers from looking into issues of migration, citizenship and national belonging in the context of women's (international) football. It is, therefore, good to see that in the last decades several academics have been publishing on these and closely related topics, filling the knowledge gap on women's (international) football; such as the special issue on '*Scandinavian women's football in a global world: Migration, management and mixed identity*' in the academic journal *Soccer and Society* (Agergaard et al. 2013), and an edited book by Sine Agergaard and Nina Clara Tiesler (2014) entitled '*Women, Soccer and Transnational Migration*'.

As a second limitation, I wish to address the limited range of perspectives on and the absence of qualitative methods to, in particular, be able to further nuance some of the normative issues surrounding aspects of *formal* and *moral* citizenship. While there are various actors in the field of international football who actively make claims to citizenship (Bloemraad 2018), none of them were given a direct voice in my studies. Most notably to me, the voices of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background have been absent. But also (inter)national

football federations, national governments, the (football) media and the public were not directly involved in this research. Until recently, and despite the current rise in scholarly attention to nationality changes in the context of international sport, only a few studies have been giving a direct voice to some of these actors in the field. For example, in a comparative study on naturalisations and related policies of foreign-born athletes in Qatar and Turkey, Danyel Reiche and Cem Tinaz (2019, 157) combined press and academic articles with semi-structured interviews with representatives of 'Qatari and Turkish sport authorities and athletes who were decision makers or actors in naturalisation processes in these two countries'. Based on their findings, the authors constructed a more detailed picture of the motivations of the different parties, the legal processes surrounding naturalisations of foreign-born athletes, and how the (sometimes fast-tracked) naturalisations of athletes relate to other naturalisations in the two countries.

In another study on the complexities of national representatives with dual nationality, affiliation and player identification, Klaus Seiberth, Ansgar Thiel and Ramón Spaaij (2019) examine the relationship between ethnic identity and the decision to play for a national football team by young football players of Turkish origin growing up in Germany. Based on interviews with ten football players possessing German-Turkish dual nationality, aged between 15 and 21 years, the authors find that the ethnic identification of these young football players with either one of the countries only plays a minor role in their decision. More often, their main motivations to represent either one of these national football teams seemed to be 'a career-phase-specific, temporary choice for a national football association, a coach or a specific national junior team' (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019, 800).

The findings in these two, rather explorative, studies illustrate that using qualitative approaches can expand on and nuance public controversies and criticisms on emotionally charged issues such as nationality changes in international sport. Moreover, it can provide better understandings of when, why and under which conditions athletes with a migration background are accepted (or not) as truly and unquestionably belonging to the nation they represent. By giving athletes

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who have, or had, to decide on their (sporting) nationality an active voice and listen to their personal (hi)stories, we can gain a better, more nuanced understanding of how such decision-making processes are experienced. Moreover, we can gain more knowledge about underlying motivations to represent a country in international sport and, ultimately, how such a decision influences the (sense of) belonging of athletes with dual nationality to either one of the nations involved. By looking more closely into the full (hi)stories of athletes with a migration background it could be analysed 'why and at which point of their careers they switched nationality, the extent to which they integrated into their new home countries, and how they were perceived by their new fellow citizens' (Reiche and Tinaz 2019, 16). Because of these potential insights, I agree with Alan Bairner (2015, 378) that 'much more of the type of data which this can produce is certainly needed'.

As a third limitation, I wish to look back on the everyday 'dirty work of boundary maintenance' (Crowley 1999 cited in Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Agergaard and Lenneis 2021, 3) of the nation. As argued, a bond with the nation is not anymore – if it was ever the case – solely based on, the rather static idea of, possessing *formal* citizenship. With the *moralisation* of citizenship, belonging to the nation should be considered as an ongoing, complex power struggle between the groups constructed as established and outsider(s) of the nation. It is a power struggle determining who belongs to the 'we'/'us' of the nation, and who does not (Simonsen 2018; Yuval-Davis 2006; 2011). Besides nationality, these struggles involve a range of other normative markers – most notably race/ethnicity, culture and religion – which play out in everyday practices; often referred to as 'banal nationalism' (Billig 1995; Hage 1998; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Fox 2018; Jansen and Skey 2020; Skey 2011; 2013; Skey and Antonsich 2017; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019).

Mechanisms of (situated) intersectionality can be used to further analyse the dynamics underlying the complex interrelations between some of the markers of belonging (or markers of difference) in an attempt to explain the border*ing* of the nation (Hylton 2012; 2018; Yuval-Davis 2015; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019, 26). The value of intersectionality in studying (national) belonging is, for example,

illustrated in an audience study on everyday football talk shows by Jacco van Sterkenburg, Rens Peeters and Noortje van Amsterdam (2019). The authors argue that constructions of racial/ethnic stereotypes and forms of everyday racisms are not only reproduced in daily conversations about football, but that understandings of race/ethnicity also seemed to intersect with other markers of difference like culture, nationality, social class and religion in (hegemonic) discourses people draw on (see also Bairner 2015). However, as 'the concepts of race, ethnicity, national and cultural identifications were constantly shifting and collapsing into each other' (Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019, 207), and because markers of belonging are used and interpreted differently in changing (historical) contexts, it remains challenging to unravel the complexities behind the boundary maintenance of the nation (Hylton 2018; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002; Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019).

Suggestions for future research

I would like to end this dissertation with some thoughts on how future research on migration, citizenship and national belonging might extend on the outcomes presented in the empirical studies. What the last chapter (Chapter 5) in this dissertation has shown is that more, and more nuanced, insights are needed into the *moral* aspects of citizenship. To overcome a further breach between types of nationals within society, we need to gain a better understanding of the power (re)figurations around the (invisible) norms of national belonging. Moreover, more knowledge is needed on how markers indicative of national norms and ideals are expressed and experienced in everyday practices by perceived 'Others' within national contexts. I, therefore, plea for more qualitative and intersectional-oriented studies on the everyday 'dirty work of boundary maintenance' (Crowley 1999 cited in Yuval-Davis 2006, 204; Agergaard and Lenneis 2021, 3) of the nation. This could, for example, be achieved by looking more closely into the full (family) (hi)stories of people with a migration background, by exploring the (extended) networks of *migrants* (Seiberth and Thiel 2021), or to question the subjective experiences of

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belonging to the nation of (young) people with dual nationality (Simonsen 2018). To me, studies on the interrelations between, on the one hand, the (sport/football) media and the public and, on the other hand, discourses on – imagined and historically framed – 'Others' within society might be able to nuance how established group(s) maintain national boundaries. Furthermore, such research can provide more detailed insights in the ongoing judgements about the (un)deservingness of *migrants'* belonging to the nation.

In the sport/football media and in reactions of the public, the acceptance of foreign-born players and footballers with a migration background as truly national representatives largely seem to be mediated by (sporting) performances (Van Sterkenburg 2013). These football players are considered to be (more like) 'one of us' only when their (sporting) performances are on (or above) the expected norms of the nation: Only 'if "we" win…'. This *if* is indicative of the conditionality and temporality of the acceptance of 'Others' as part of the national 'we'. In the context of international football, the fragility of national belonging becomes particularly clear when the national football team loses a game or, even worse, is knocked-out of a major international football tournament. Research has shown that when this happens, existing exclusionary and nationalist undercurrents in society can quickly rise to the surface (Skey 2015). Football players possessing markers of difference, most notably visible racial/ethnic differences, are quite often scapegoated in the (football) media, the latter being 'one of the key sites in reflecting and reinforcing understandings of [sensitive issues like] race, ethnicity and nation' (Van Sterkenburg 2013, 386 – brackets added; Hall 1997; Hylton 2018), for the bad results of the whole team. In an article for *The Conversation*, Rachel Anne Gillet (2021, para. 7) argues that scapegoating seems to be a manifestation of 'denial that players of colour belong to the nation. If the team is not "us", then "we" didn't lose. It wasn't the nation, or "my" people that failed, it was this interloper'. This, for example, happened after England's loss to Italy in the final of the UEFA Euro 2020 on 11 July 2021. The three young English players of colour, and with a migration background, who missed their penalty in the shootout – Bukayo Saka, Marcus Rashford and Jadon Sancho – became

victims of an ('unforgivable') outpour of (online) racist abuse (Gillet 2021; MacInnes and Duncan 2021). In cases like these, the sport/football media and reactions of (part of) the public seem to fall back on stereotypical, stigmatising and rather one-dimensional frames of the nation, nationality and national belonging (Bruce 2004; Van Sterkenburg 2013; Van Sterkenburg, Peeters, and Van Amsterdam 2019; Van Sterkenburg, De Heer, and Mashigo 2021). Moreover, in the process of blaming and victimising, these debates regularly move beyond on-field performances. By focussing on personal characteristics, these players were even further differentiated from the (imagined) norms and ideals of the nation, as the case of Mesut Özil clearly illustrates (Chapter 5). As a result, in the judgement processes on the (un)deservingness of football players with a migration background to play for the national football team, media representations of such players and the ways in which these mediated representations are interpreted and (re-)used by the public can be seen as acts border*ing* the nation. These issues deserve further research.

Another interesting avenue for future research that could expand on the outcomes of this dissertation relates to the contextual conditions under which football players with dual nationality have to make a choice which country they wish to represent in international football, or international sport more broadly. Making such a decision has, most certainly, a significant impact on a player's life as it might alter their ethnic (self-)identification, may influence their (opportunities for a) future professional career, and increasingly seems to cause a stir in (inter)national media (Holmes and Storey 2011; Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019; Storey 2020). Although we know about earlier nationality switches of high-profile football players, there is still relatively little known about the contextual circumstances in which footballers with dual nationality come to their decision – the same goes for many other sports at international level (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019; Seiberth and Thiel 2021). Interestingly, most dual nationals in international football are asked to make a decision for one national football team. In particular when two, or even more, national football federations simultaneously try to claim a player as one of *their* (future) national representatives. As this

mainly seems to happen when these football players are at a relative young age, it would be interesting to know at what age and 'at which point in their careers' (Reiche and Tinaz 2019, 16) most football players with a dual nationality (have to) make such a decision.

Because of the youthfulness of the football players who have to make such a decision, it means that their social identities are still in formation. This in particular makes issues of identity and belonging (to the nation) salient aspects in such decision making processes (Seiberth, Thiel, and Spaaij 2019; Simonsen 2018). Moreover, while we know from studies in the field of migration that the role of the family impacts the decision-making process in complex ways, it is somewhat anomalous that studies on the influence of the family on a sensitive choice like national representativity has been largely absent (Carter 2011); with a notable exception of Klaus Seiberth and Ansgar Thiel's (2021) recent study on the role of network actors within the decision-making process of players with dual nationality to compete for a national football team. It might, therefore, be interesting to know more about the actors, motivations and (institutional) mechanisms behind (some) decisions of dual nationals to represent a country in international football and other sports in international context: Who are the main actors involved in such a sensitive and emotional process? What is the (relative) power balance between the actors in play? How do each of these actors try to influence, or even steer, a player's decision to its own advantage? What motivations (emotional or strategic-instrumental) tend to be leading in such decisions, and why? Moreover, this kind of research should not only be focused on cases in national contexts of which we already know quite some things in this respect – mainly the Western/European countries and their representative football teams – but also on countries and their national football teams in the periphery. As James Montague (2014) describes in his novel *Thirty One Nil*, football's outsiders could also shine a light on, perhaps even a more detailed one, the contextual conditions under which football players with dual nationality have to make a choice which country they wish to represent in international football.

APPENDICES

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R

Dutch summary

Sport wordt door velen als een triviale bijzaak in het leven beschouwd. Toch zijn nationale sportteams, met name het nationale voetbalteam, in de meeste landen één van de weinige instellingen – misschien wel de enig overgeblevene – die de idealen van de staat en de natie lijken te weerspiegelen. Voetballers gekleed in het nationale tenue die poserend voor 'hun' vlag luidkeels het volkslied meezingen, sommigen met één hand op hun hart, worden gezien als de belichaming, trots en hoop van de (denkbeeldige) nationale gemeenschap. Het idee dat het representerende voetbalteam van een land, of een ander nationaal sportteam, de veronderstelde homogene en uniforme natie vertegenwoordigt als zijnde een natiestaat is allang geen realiteit meer – als dat al ooit het geval is geweest. Het aantal in het buitenland geboren voetballers en spelers met een migratieachtergrond dat een land vertegenwoordigt in het internationale voetbal is toegenomen. Tevens zijn de nationale representanten in de meeste nationale voetbalteams meer divers in termen van (duale) nationaliteit dan in het verleden. Is het nationale voetbalteam, zoals de titel van deze dissertatie bevraagd, een team bestaande uit *ware* nationale representanten?

Door de groeiende mobiliteit van mensen, de liberalisering van regels en beleid rondom burgerschap en de toegenomen argwaan ten opzichte van diversiteit, immigratie en integratie in de samenleving – althans in West-Europese en Noord-Amerikaanse landen – en veranderende opvattingen over burgerschap en nationale verbondenheid lijkt de *natuurlijk* veronderstelde correlatie tussen staat en natie af te brokkelen. Het bezitten van *formeel* staatsburgerschap lijkt de *morele* aanvaarding van een persoon als onderdeel van de nationale gemeenschap niet te garanderen. Vooral van voetballers in het bezit van een duale nationaliteit wordt (publiekelijk) afgevraagd of zij wel *ware* en *oprechte* nationale representanten kunnen zijn van 'hun' land tijdens internationale sportcompetities zoals het wereldkampioenschap voetbal. Van een toenemend deel van de voetballers met een duale nationaliteit – al dan niet geboren in ander land dan waarvoor ze in het internationale voetbal uitkomen – wordt de reden van selectie voor een nationaal

voetbalteam publiekelijk bediscussieerd. Dit gebeurt meestal in een dichotomie: een keuze tussen het hart en het hoofd. In het geval van het laatste wijst dit mogelijk op een meer instrumentele, strategische keuze voor een nationaal voetbalteam dan dat de keuze lijkt te zijn gebaseerd op gevoelens van het behoren tot een staat en haar natie.

Het multi-etnische, nationale voetbalteam van Frankrijk op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal van 2018 is een voorbeeld van deze maatschappelijke discussies (Hoofdstuk 6). Vanwege het aantal en de zichtbaarheid van de Franse vertegenwoordigers met een Afrikaanse migratieachtergrond is dit Franse nationale voetbalteam in de internationale media en door (een deel van) het publiek spottend beschreven als een *Afrikaans voetbalteam*. Daarbij werd vooral de *Fransheid* van in Frankrijk geboren spelers met een Afrikaanse migratieachtergrond, zoals sterspelers Kylian Mbappé en Paul Pogba, bediscussieerd in termen van *niet Frans*, *niet Frans genoeg* en *niet echt Frans* door aanhangers en politieke vertegenwoordigers van (extreem)rechtse partijen. Door de controverses rondom de representativiteit van het Franse nationale voetbalteam zijn de maatschappelijke debatten in Frankrijk over (im)migratie, burgerschap en nationale verbondenheid aangewakkerd. Deze debatten vinden plaats in een bredere, historisch gevormde, sociaal-politieke context waarin niet-blanke Franse burgers continu worden afgeschilderd als *niet echt Frans* en passen in een sociaal klimaat waarin personen met een migratieachtergrond in toenemende mate met achterdocht en vijandigheid worden bekeken.

De controverses en gevoelens van onbehagen rondom de representativiteit van het nationale voetbalelftal van Frankrijk ten tijde van het wereldkampioenschap voetbal 2018 zijn illustratief voor de centrale vraagstukken in dit onderzoek. Het doel van dit proefschrift is om, vanuit een institutionele context en door middel van een historisch comparatieve benadering, te onderzoeken hoe migraties de heersende opvattingen rondom burgerschap en nationale verbondenheid vormen, hervormen en blijven uitdagen. Daarbij is op een systematische en strategische bestudeerd hoe begrip van deze drie concepten (migratie, burgerschap en nationale verbondenheid) zijn gevormd en hervormd in

debatten over de geschiktheid van in het buitenland geboren spelers en degenen met een migratieachtergrond. Hierbij is de historische context van het wereldkampioenschap voetbal (ca. 1930-2018) gebruikt als een prisma. Kortom, dit proefschrift richt zich op het verkrijgen van meer inzicht in de (toenemende) discrepantie tussen *formeel*, juridisch burgerschap enerzijds, en (veranderende) *morele*, normatieve opvattingen rondom burgerschap en nationale verbondenheid anderzijds. De centrale vraag die aan dit onderzoek ten grondslag ligt is: *Hoe en waarom is het aantal in het buitenland geboren voetballers op het WK voetbal in de loop van de tijd veranderd (ca. 1930-2018), en waarom vormt en daagt een meer divers nationaal voetbalteam heersende opvattingen over migratie, burgerschap en nationale binding uit?*

De vragen 'wie mag de natie vertegenwoordigen in het internationale voetbal?' en 'wie verdient het om tot de natie te behoren?' vormen de rode draad in deze dissertatie. Het ter discussie stellen van het wijdverspreide idee dat landen steeds vaker worden vertegenwoordigd door nationale representanten die zijn geboren in een ander land, als mede de controverses en gevoelens van onbehagen die naar voren komen in discussies rondom migratie, burgerschap en nationale verbondenheid, zijn het startpunt van dit proefschrift. Terwijl mediaberichten suggereren dat (im)migranten en spelers uit nationale diaspora in toenemende mate het wereldkampioenschap voetbal beïnvloeden zijn deze aannames empirisch niet onderbouwd. Door een systematisch en historisch comparatieve benadering te gebruiken, probeer ik in dit proefschrift de aanwezigheid van in het buitenland geboren spelers op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal in kaart te brengen. Daarmee hoop ik bij te dragen aan de wetenschappelijke en maatschappelijke debatten over de *natuurlijke*, complexe, soms paradoxale, en in de loop van de tijd veranderende betekenis van en relaties tussen de begrippen migratie, burgerschap en nationale verbondenheid.

   Empirisch toont dit proefschrift aan dat de meeste nationale voetbalfederaties, al vanaf het eerste wereldkampioenschap voetbal in 1930, in het buitenland geboren voetbalspelers hebben geselecteerd om hun land te vertegenwoordigen tijdens het wereldkampioenschap

voetbal (Hoofdstukken 2 en 3). Dit betekent dat de aanwezigheid van in het buitenland geboren spelers in bepaalde nationale voetbalteams niets nieuws is. De selectie van in het buitenland geboren spelers weerspiegeld vooral de instroom van (bepaalde) migrantengroepen in een samenleving. Bij het kritisch vergelijken van fluctuaties in de (relatieve) aantallen van in het buitenland geboren spelers op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal met algemene trends en patronen in internationale migratie, vallen vooral de verschillen tussen de gemiddelde waardes op. Terwijl het aandeel van in het buitenland geboren voetballers sinds de eerste editie van het wereldkampioenschap voetbal tussen de 6% en 12% schommelt – als percentage van het aantal deelnemende spelers per editie van het wereldkampioenschap voetbal – fluctueert het percentage internationale migranten wereldwijd tussen de 2% en 4%. Het verschil tussen deze gemiddelde percentages is logisch aangezien voetballers vanwege hun specifieke vaardigheden en zeldzame talenten wereldwijd inzetbaar zijn, wat duidt op een hogere mobiliteit. Verder is er, met name sinds het midden van de jaren negentig, een opwaartse trend waar te nemen in het aantal van in het buitenland geboren spelers op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal die afwijkt van de meer gestage toename in de trends en patronen van internationale migratie (Hoofdstuk 2).

Naast een toename in het aantal migraties zijn de migratiebewegingen ook meer asymmetrisch geworden in de loop van de tijd. Deze scheefgroei in migratie is vooral te verklaren door de sterk groeiende mobiliteit van voornamelijk hooggeschoolde migranten; een migratietrend die ook tot uiting komt in de diversificatie aan landen van herkomst van de in het buitenland geboren voetballers op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal. Deze observatie impliceert dat migratie in de loop van de tijd een grotere invloed is gaan hebben op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal, althans vanuit een *im*migratieperspectief. Enige historische nuancering is geboden aangezien deze toenames vooral gezien moeten worden als (late) reflecties of echo's van (recent) historische nationale migratiestromen (Hoofdstuk 3 en Hoofdstuk 4). De veronderstelde alomtegenwoordigheid van in het buitenland geboren spelers in (bepaalde) nationale

voetbalteams blijkt vooral gerelateerd te zijn aan historisch gevestigde systemen en netwerken. Verschillen in aantallen en diversiteit van landen van herkomst van nationale representanten lijken eerder aanpassingen aan bestaande migratiepatronen te reflecteren dan dat ze een radicale breuk met het verleden weerspiegelen. Omdat migratie geen gelijke en uniforme invloed heeft, en heeft gehad, op staten en naties bestaan er grote verschillen in het volume en de diversiteit in landen van herkomst van in het buitenland geboren spelers tussen nationale voetbalteams. Ik laat in dit proefschrift zien dat de aanwezigheid van in het buitenland geboren spelers in nationale voetbalteams niet willekeurig is, en dat nooit is geweest, en ook niet uitsluitend is gebaseerd op de voetbalcapaciteiten van een voetballer. Migraties in het internationale voetbal zijn vooral te relateren aan historische, geopolitieke relaties tussen landen. Zo blijken nationale (im)migratiegeschiedenissen (Hoofdstuk 3) en historische migratiecorridors tussen landen (Hoofdstuk 4) ten grondslag te liggen aan specifieke migratiebewegingen, ook van voetballers.

In de context van het internationale voetbal hoeven in het buitenland geboren spelers zich echter niet letterlijk over landsgrenzen heen te bewegen om in aanmerking te komen voor een andere nationale voetbalploeg dan die van hun geboorteland. In de meeste gevallen is het aannemen van een andere, of een extra, (sportieve) legale nationaliteit voldoende om als nationale representant uit te mogen komen voor een ander land. De regelgeving van FIFA rondom het in aanmerking komen van een voetballer voor een nationaal voetbalteam is namelijk gebaseerd op het in bezit zijn van *formeel* staatsburgerschap. Het gemak waarmee een in het buitenland geboren voetballer een ander of extra burgerschap kan verkrijgen hangt daarom in grote mate af van (de historische ontwikkelingen in) nationale wetten en beleid op het gebied van staatsburgerschap. Door het nauwe samenspel tussen migratie- en nationale burgerschapsregimes kunnen, vanuit een institutioneel oogpunt, toenames in het aantal en de diversiteit in herkomstlanden van in het buitenland geboren spelers op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal worden gezien als een uitkomst van een complexe, historische wisselwerking tussen migratie, nationale staatsburgerschap en de FIFA regelgeving.

Met de toename in het volume en de diversiteit in herkomstlanden van in het buitenland geboren spelers op het wereldkampioenschap voetbal lijkt ook de aard en toon in het maatschappelijke debat rond de representativiteit nationale voetbalteams te zijn veranderd, zoals de Franse representanten met een Afrikaanse migratieachtergrond illustreren (Hoofdstuk 6). Terwijl *formeel* burgerschap van oudsher is beschouwd als een *ware* en *oprechte* band tussen een individu, de staat en de natie, blijft het de vraag of het verkrijgen van *formeel* burgerschap *natuurlijk* leidt tot een *oprechte* band. Veel van de huidige publieke controverse lijkt te zijn gebaseerd op (onzichtbare) normatieve idealen over de natie. Deze normatieve idealen stellen het verondersteld bestaan van een *ware* en *oprechte* band tussen (bepaalde) nationale representanten en 'hun' land ter discussie. Vanwege de conditionaliteit en tijdelijkheid van nationale verbondenheid blijft het echter de vraag wanneer nationale representanten met een migratieachtergrond nu *echt,* en ontegensprekelijk, een onderdeel zijn van de natie.

De toename in het volume en de diversiteit in de herkomstlanden van in het buitenland geboren spelers in nationale voetbalteams zegt echter niets over hoe, via welke juridische technieken burgerschap is verkregen en welke motivaties van in het buitenland geboren voetballers daaraan ten grondslag liggen. Alhoewel er een scala aan motivaties voor een (sportieve) nationaliteitswissel te bedenken is, worden de motieven van voetballers met een duale nationaliteit vaak gepresenteerd als een dichotomie. Enerzijds, zijn er voetballers die voor een land uitkomen waarmee ze een aantoonbare *oprechte* band hebben, bijvoorbeeld doordat ze in het land zijn opgegroeid of een familiaire binding hebben met de natie. Anderzijds kan het gaan om gevallen waarin *formeel* burgerschap is verkregen op basis van de sportieve capaciteiten van een persoon, wat overeen lijkt te komen met een meer pragmatisch, loopbaangericht besluit van de voetballer in kwestie. Voetballers behorende tot de laatste categorie lijken hun (sportieve) burgerschap te gebruiken als instrument om zichzelf strategisch te mobiliseren in een poging om hun voetbalcarrière van een boost te voorzien. Hoewel het instrumenteel-strategisch gebruik van burgerschap in de context van internationale sportrepresentatie heftige maatschappelijke discussies te

weeg brengt, dient er met enige voorzichtigheid omgegaan te worden om de keuze een land te vertegenwoordigen te zien als een alles-of-niets-verklaring van nationale identiteit of loyaliteit. Het is vaak onbekend of een dergelijke keuze voortkomt uit sportieve redenen of dat een atleet een andere of extra staatsburgerschap heeft verkregen lang voordat zijn of haar sporttalent zich uitte.

Maar wanneer behoort een nationaal representant met een migratieachtergrond *echt* en *oprecht* tot de natie? Zijn er minimale gemeenschappelijke gronden in termen van herkomst, cultuur en normatief gedrag die nodig zijn om tot de natie te horen? De (toenemende) nadruk op de normatieve idealen die bepalen of iemand wel of niet tot de natie behoort is een weerspiegeling van *moralisering* van burgerschap. In hoofdstuk 5 bediscussieer ik de veranderingen van *moreel* burgerschap kritisch, in termen van nationale verbondenheid, door middel van een gedetailleerde bespreking van de pijnlijke breuk tussen Mesut Özil en het Duitse nationale voetbalteam in 2018. De controverse rondom Özil's beslissing om Duitsland niet meer te vertegenwoordigen in het internationale voetbal is een sprekend, doch pijnlijk, voorbeeld van de wijdverspreide neiging om complexe en gevoelige kwesties met betrekking tot burgerschap en het behoren tot de natie te bediscussiëren in dichotomieën: 'wij tegen zij'. De analyse van de veranderde publieke perceptie op de *Duitsheid* van Özil en de verschuivingen van zijn sociale positie in de Duitse samenleving laten een radicale verandering zien in de acceptatie van een gearriveerde voetballer met een migratieachtergrond (Hoofdstuk 5); een verandering die het internationale voetbal overstijgt. Tevens illustreert deze casus dat het internationale voetbal een manier moet vinden om te erkennen dat nationale verbondenheid dynamisch is en dat voetballers met een duale nationaliteit zich tegelijkertijd met meerdere staten en naties kunnen identificeren.

Veranderingen in de publieke acceptatie van (sommige) in het buitenland geboren nationale representanten – als mede degenen met een migratieachtergrond – door de gevestigde orde als zijnde *één van ons* illustreert de conditionaliteit en tijdelijkheid, als mede de kwetsbaarheid, van nationale verbondenheid. De (on)mogelijkheid voor een persoon om

te voldoen aan de steeds veranderende normen van de natie laat zien dat 'bij de natie horen' voor *migranten* een (dagelijkse en ongelijke) machtsstrijd is. Beoordelingen of een persoon *oprecht* tot de natie behoort hangen vaak af van genoeg (maar wanneer is genoeg?) waargenomen alledaagse, banale uitingen in combinatie met persoonlijke karakteristieken zoals nationaliteit, etniciteit, geslacht, ras, sociale klasse, religie, uiterlijk en culturele affiniteit. Zo is de *Duitsheid* van Özil voortdurend mede beoordeeld op niet-voetbal gerelateerde kenmerken, zoals het feit dat hij een (praktiserende) moslim is, zijn vermogen om andere talen dan Duits te spreken (of Duits te spreken met een accent), en op zijn niet-stereotypische Duitse fysieke verschijning (Hoofdstuk 5).

Omdat het behoren tot de natie afhankelijk lijkt te zijn van het oordeel over het vertonen van nationale normatieve idealen, blijft de acceptatie van migranten van de tweede, derde en zelfs vierde generatie als *ware* en *oprechte* leden van de natie een twistpunt. Aangezien de grenzen van de natie zijn gebaseerd op een discursieve machtsstrijd tussen binnen- en buitenstaanders is er ruimte voor interpretatie en onderhandeling wat voor sommige (groepen) migranten een kans is om zichzelf te positioneren als *meer behorend* tot de natie. Er moet echter wel worden gewaakt voor te veel optimisme over de mogelijkheden van personen met een migratieachtergrond om een *stabiele* sociale positie in de samenleving te verkrijgen aangezien de normatieve idealen van de natie historisch zijn verankerd, wat het hardnekkig maakt ze te veranderen.

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About the author

Gijs van Campenhout (1986) holds a Bachelor's degree in Human Geography and Planning, and a Minor in Sociology on Social Issues and Policies, both obtained at the University of Groningen. In succession, Gijs studied for two Master degrees at the same university: a Research Master in Regional Studies, and an Educational Master in Geography. After graduation, he became a freelancer under the name of GeoCore, focussing on the development of educational materials in the field of geography. In 2013, Gijs (re)joined the Faculty of Spatial Sciences of the University of Groningen as an innovation lecturer, where he taught a range of substantive and methods courses in the bachelor studies of Human Geography and Planning. During his time as an innovation lecturer, Gijs obtained his University Teaching Qualification. In September 2016, he started working as a Ph.D. candidate within the *Sport and Nation* research project, which included teaching obligations in the field of (Global) History, at the Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. During his Ph.D., Gijs successfully followed both the Basic Training and the Advanced Training of the N.W. Posthumus Institute, as well as several training courses provided by the Erasmus Graduate School of Social Sciences and the Humanities. In November 2018, Gijs obtained an Erasmus+ grant with which he visited Loughborough University on a staff exchange. This staff exchange enabled him to expand his knowledge on nationalism studies and to increase his international network. In October 2020, Gijs successfully applied for a research grant of the Netherlands Institute of Sound and Vision to study how Dutch football commentators have given meaning to a diversifying Dutch national football team over time. Furthermore, Gijs has published several articles in international peer-reviewed journals such as *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, *Comparative Migration Studies* and the *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, together with Joost Jansen he has published a chapter in the *Research Handbook on Sports and Society,* and he has presented his work at international conferences. Currently, Gijs works as an Assistant Professor at the faculty of Geosciences of Utrecht University.

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Curriculum Vitae

Working experience

2021 – Present	Assistant Professor Geography, Youth and Education, Utrecht University
2016 – 2021	Ph.D. Candidate and Lecturer in History, Erasmus University Rotterdam
2013 – 2016	Innovation Lecturer Human Geography and Planning, University of Groningen
2012 – 2013	Owner of GeoCore, Self-employed

Education

2011 – 2012	Educational MSc. in Pre-Higher Education Teaching Certificate in Geography, University of Groningen
2008 – 2011	Research MSc. in Regional Studies - Spaces & Places, Analyses & Interventions, University of Groningen
2007 – 2008	Minor Sociology in Social Issues and Policies, University of Groningen
2005 – 2008	BSc. in Human Geography and Planning, University of Groningen

Additional training

2018 – 2021	Advanced Training, N.W. Posthumus Institute
2020	Method of 'con/text analysis' for interviews and other biographic data, Erasmus University Rotterdam
2016 – 2017	Basic Training, N.W. Posthumus Institute
2016	Making your research proposal work for you, Erasmus University Rotterdam
2016	Your personal PhD work-life balance: how to do less, but achieve more, Erasmus University Rotterdam
2016	Professionalism and integrity in research, Erasmus University Rotterdam

2013 – 2014	University Teaching Qualification, University of Groningen
2013 – 2014	Begeleiden van thesis studenten, University of Groningen
2013	Opstellen en analyseren van gesloten vragen, University of Groningen
2008 – 2009	Writing and publishing in English, University of Groningen

Academic publications

- **Van Campenhout, Gijs**, and Gijsbert Oonk (2021). 'Eligible to play, but not to belong to the nation? A short history of FIFA's player eligibility regulations and the sensitive issues of national identity'. *Football Legal*, 15, 91–97.

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