

# Professional football clubs As long as it adds value

Urban regimes and decision making processes. A case study



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## Preface

This master thesis is written as graduation assignment for the Master Leisure Studies (Tilburg University). This research is not carried out on behalf of any company or institution.

The process of this thesis was a memorable and educational experience for me. My long-standing interest for football, in combination with my attention for urban processes and developments, has formed the topic of this thesis. During this thesis the knowledge acquired from the courses of the Master Leisure Studies was very useful to place the gained information in the right context. Thereby, it was pleasant to ascertain that the Master Leisure Studies has many interfaces with my finished preliminary education Real Estate Studies. A positive feeling prevails and I can look back with a lot of pleasure on the period I performed this thesis.

Furthermore, I want to thank a few people. Without their efforts, I would not have been able to accomplish this research to a successful whole. Firstly, I pay tribute to Hans Mommaas, my mentor during this thesis. His expertise and experience were very instructive and contributing to the process and content of this research. Furthermore, I pay homage to Nienke van Boom for her advice during especially the first and last period of this thesis. I appreciate her critical but meaningful feedback. And third I want to thank Luc van Baest for his methodological advice at the start of this research. Moreover, my gratitude goes out to Jim Murray, who was willing to advice in the field of English language. Of course, I want to praise all the respondents who were willing to tell their story concerning the cases of Haarlem and Maastricht. It was very interesting to speak with every single person and I appreciate their openness concerning the both rather sensitive cases. Finally, I want to thank my parents for providing me the opportunity to study the Master Leisure Studies.

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## Summary

### Introduction

The support of professional football clubs in the Netherlands have cost public bodies more than one billion euros during the years following the turn of the century. This raised the question: What are the reasons for governments to invest in the clubs? And why do they take so much responsibility for the clubs their mismanagement. Before elaborating on these questions another question raised: Who actually do invest in the football clubs? Many scholars (Stone, 1989; Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999; Dowding, 2001) impute this to the phenomenon of urban regimes. Urban regimes are a combination of public- and private parties who are willing to cooperate in order to influence the decision making processes of local governments (Stone, 1989). Other scholars (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986; Elkin, 1987; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994) argue that the composition of characteristics of an urban regime can explain why local governments do support the existence of a local football club or not. The characteristics of the urban regime combined with the background aspects of a city should provide a better understanding of the support of local governments and led to the following research question:

*What is the influence of the composition of urban regimes with regard to the decision of local governments whether or not to support the existence of local professional football clubs?*

The research design elaborates on the main research question in order to get a clear understanding concerning the processes around and within urban regimes and their impact on the decision making processes:

1. What are urban regimes?
2. What processes influence the composition and development of the urban regime?
3. How can we typify the relationship between the different parties within urban regimes?
4. How can we link the relationship between the forms and types of urban regimes and the decision of local governments to either support, or not local professional football clubs?

An extension of the, up to this study, limited information concerning urban regimes around professional football clubs contributed to the scientific relevance of this research. On the other hand there was also a social relevance since professional football clubs can use the outcomes of this thesis in order to understand the ideals of the local private-public sector.



## Literature overview

In the conceptual model, the influence on decision making processes was divided in to five parts. The outer circle of the model is the context of the decision making process. The context has an indirect effect on every part of the process. In the centre of the model the characteristics of the urban regime directly influence the decision making process. These characteristics are influenced by the three properties composition, agenda-setting, and resources.

Context around decision making processes can be drawn apart in economical background and social background (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1993; Savitch & Kantor, 2002; DiGaetano & Strom 2003). Furthermore, with regards to professional football clubs, prehistory city and club, popularity of football, and the image of the stadium play a role around the process. The purpose, motivation, quality of coalition and the relation with the environment (Stoker & Mossberger, 1994) determine which type of underlying interests the urban regime has to support the professional football club. The composition of the regime is important since it demonstrates which parties and sectors are dominant and therefore affects the interests of the urban regime. The agenda of the regime determines which topics are classified as relevant. As a consequence, the agenda indicates whether the regime meddles in the discussion around the decision making process or not. The resources of a regime determine whether a purpose can be reached (Stone, 2001). Resources therefore can be influential in what goals the regime sets, but also in the decision of the admission of possible new parties in the regime.

Based on the literature and the conceptual model, the following questions were formulated in order to structure the qualitative research:

- How did the decision making process in Haarlem and Maastricht evolve?
- Was there a regime active in both cities?
- If there was a regime, was it the only regime or were there more active regimes in the particular cities?
- In the case of multiple regimes, was it the dominating regime which influenced the decision making process with regard to the support of HFC Haarlem and MVV?
- How was the influencing urban regime in Haarlem and Maastricht composed?
- Which agenda was dominating the urban regimes in both Haarlem and Maastricht?
- Which resources were inserted in order to influence the decision making process in both cases?
- How did the different aspects of context influence the urban regime and the decision making processes in Haarlem and Maastricht?



- What is the relationship between the composition, agenda, and resources of the regime and the decision whether to support the existence of the professional football club in Haarlem and Maastricht?

## Methodology

In order to gain information concerning decision making processes around professional football clubs a comparative case study was performed. The two cases of Haarlem and Maastricht were quite similar with only one big difference. In Haarlem the municipality decided to not support football club HFC Haarlem whilst in Maastricht football club MVV was rescued due to the support of the municipality. To gain more in-depth information there was chosen to perform a qualitative research. This qualitative approach did, besides answers on the influence of the properties composition, agenda-setting, resources, and context, also provide a better image of the relationships and discourses around urban regimes and decision making processes with regard to professional football clubs.

A desk research was performed to gain a general image of the cases in Haarlem and Maastricht. The internal part of the desk research concentrated on the intern resources of both the municipalities and the football clubs. An external research was conducted by using resources such as databases, the internet, and official statistics. The desk research gained the basis information for the research and provided useful information concerning dates and parties who were involved in the process. This information could be used as starting point for the interviews.

The interviews were conducted with people and parties from different sectors around the regimes. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003) this leads to a better analysis of the decision making process. The snowball sample method was used since it was not clear which persons were relevant to interview. The snowball sample method starts with interviewing a respondent and on the basis of the information from the interview, new possible respondents are approached. By starting with multiple respondents during the first phase of the interview, there was less chance of passing over relevant persons. However, it was still important to keep verifying the relevance of the new recommended respondents and to remain critical to the information gained from the interviews. The interviewed persons were approached by telephone, e-mail, and social medium LinkedIn. The interviews took place in an environment where the respondent felt comfortable. The interviews were semi-structured. A topic guide formed the basis for the interviews, but the semi-structured approached left room for flexibility. The data gained from the interviews was structured in a data matrix, whereby each main topic (composition, agenda, resources, and context) had its own matrix.





Thereby, firstly the respondents from Maastricht were displayed in the respondents row, followed by the interviewees from the Haarlem case. Hereafter, the data was analysed in a broader perspective.

## **Conclusion and recommendations**

First the sub questions were reciprocated. This ultimately contributed to the answer on the main research question.

### ***What are urban regimes?***

According to Stoker and Mossberger (1994) urban regimes are a constitution of the public sector, the private sector, the community, and officials which are willing to cooperate in order to influence decision making processes of the government. This was emphasized by the case of Maastricht, where parties from different sectors cooperated in order to persuade the politics in the city to support the football club MVV. The regime in Maastricht proved that even in a rather hopeless situation the decision making process can be influenced by a good mixture of participants. However, the case of Haarlem demonstrated that urban regimes do not always have to involve many parties. In Haarlem only two parties (one private, one public) formed the urban regime.

### ***What processes influence the composition and development of the urban regime?***

The composition, agenda-setting, and resources of the urban regime combined with the context of the city do influence the composition and development of the urban regime. In Haarlem a lack of a good mixture, an agenda which focussed on projects without a relation with HFC Haarlem, and a regime which did not have or was not willing to use their resources to help the club contributed to the bankruptcy of the club. In Maastricht, a diverse mixture of people from both the private- and public sector (MVV fans) with a large amount of different types of resources, in combination with an agenda where MVV could help to reach their purposes, caused that the politics in Maastricht became more enthusiastic to help MVV. However, the context in both cases played a great role. In Haarlem, the inhabitants are not chauvinistic nor did HFC Haarlem have a good reputation in the city. This caused that there was less pressure on the regime to support HFC Haarlem. In Maastricht on the other hand, MVV always has been very important for the citizens of the city. As a consequence, business people often feel they have to help to rescue MVV. However, the past in Maastricht also caused that the municipality was not eager to help since they already had invested a lot of money in MVV the decade before the process. It is hard to determine which of the four aspects had the most influence, but in both cases the context played a serious role through the whole process.



### ***How can we typify the relationship between the different parties within urban regimes?***

Trust was found as a very important aspect of the relationship between and around the different parties of the urban regimes in Haarlem and Maastricht. In Haarlem the municipality trusted real estate developer Fortress too long whilst the group of initiators in Maastricht had to put a lot effort in restoring the trust between the municipality and people committed to MVV. Furthermore, the cases in Haarlem and Maastricht demonstrated that the relationships between the parties within and around a regime is mainly business.

### ***How can we link the relationship between the forms and types of urban regimes and the decision of local governments to either support or not local professional football clubs?***

There is no clear connection between the type of regime and the decision to support the professional football club. Furthermore, all the types of urban regimes of Stoker and Mossberger (1994) can be present in one regime. The public parties in a regime seem always have to have an instrumental interest when they support professional football clubs. In Maastricht a real estate project around the stadium of MVV was important for the municipality and in Haarlem the municipality was no longer interested in HFC Haarlem after the location of the old stadium could no longer be used for developing residences in the future. However, the most important relationship between the forms and types of urban regimes and the decision to either or not support can be found in the non football related purposes of the regimes. The urban regimes use the support of the football club to achieve their symbolic, instrumental, or organic purposes. The possible rescue of the professional football club is of secondary importance.

### ***Answering the general research question***

### ***What is the influence of the composition of urban regimes with regard to the decision of local governments whether or not to support the existence of local professional football clubs?***

The aspects composition, agenda, resources and context certainly do influence the decision making processes with regard to professional football clubs. However, the biggest influence is whether the urban regimes can use the professional football club to achieve their purposes. The football club is of secondary importance and sometimes, such as in the case of Maastricht, even is supported to prevent that other purposes become negatively affected by the bankruptcy of the football club. The local government always seems to be decisive, which causes that there always is the condition that there have to be instrumental (real estate) benefits to cover the costs of the support of the football club. This also means that, unless the private sector is willing and able to grant financial resources to the professional football club, the urban regime is, even in the best



combination of composition, agenda, and resources, always depending on the instrumental interest of the public bodies.

### *Discussion and recommendations*

The research contributes to science as it provides new information concerning urban regimes with regard to decision making processes around professional football clubs. The used typology of Stoker and Mossberger (1994) classified urban regimes in three different types. However, the qualitative research demonstrated that characteristics from all three the types can be present in one regime. Besides, it is still not clear what the amount of influence of all the aspects in this research is. A quantitative research may provide a better understanding of which aspect has the most influence around the decision making processes. This may help all the related parties to prevent cases such as in Haarlem and Maastricht and can provide a better understanding of how important the historical context, composition, agenda, and resources really are. Furthermore, the aspect of trust is interesting to elaborate on in the future. How large is the role of trust around decision making processes and why are certain parties trusted while others are not? This is still a difficult phenomenon, but rather important to understand since it provides a new insight in the amount of influence the aspects around urban regimes have. In addition, future research also might investigate cases with football clubs from higher leagues, other countries, and larger or smaller cities. This provides a broader view on decision making processes around professional football clubs.

With regards to the social relevance, this research provides a better image of how parties related to the urban regimes and football clubs do act and handle around the decision making processes. It can help in anticipating situations such as in Haarlem and Maastricht. The clubs have to monitor what their position in the city is and wonder whether the private- and public sector have an interest in their existence. Furthermore, they have to develop a solid relationship with the business sector in order to not be dependent on the municipality, or create a win-win situation for both the club and the local government. For parties such as the municipality it is important to understand what the consequence of, for instance, a real estate project around a football stadium is. If the football club can have impact on their project, it is advisable to think of alternatives in order to get not involved in a possible bankruptcy.

### *Revision of the conceptual model*

In the end, the qualitative research led to a revised model. The difference with the former model is the addition of the aspect 'theme of sports' and its interaction with the characteristics of the urban regime. The qualitative research demonstrated that the urban regime has to have an interest in sports, and in particular professional football clubs, to support the club. The existence of



the football club has to contribute to the achievement of the purposes of the regime. Therefore, it was important to add this aspect in the model. Furthermore, the model was unaltered. However, the outer circle which symbolized the context seemed to have a rather influential role during the qualitative research.



## 1. Introduction

During the last 15 years a large number of Dutch professional football clubs have been confronted with financial problems. In both Dutch professional football leagues many clubs have been faced with virtual bankruptcy, four of which HFC Haarlem, RBC Roosendaal, AGOVV Apeldoorn and SC Veendam do not exist anymore. The Weekly magazine 'De groene Amsterdammer' researched the financial circumstances of professional football clubs and concluded that every single professional football club in the Netherlands has received financial support from the local governments and municipalities (De groene Amsterdammer, 2011b). The total amount of support provided by these local bodies has risen to one billion euros. Furthermore, this amount is excluding investments made by private investors.

In the past, the traditional form of government aid was that money was paid directly to the clubs, however a change in Dutch law in 2002 outlawed this practice. The law was further supported by the publication of a report which contained guidelines for providing state aid to professional football (Ministerie van binnenlandse zaken en koninklijksrelaties, 2004).

In 2011 the European Union announced a preliminary inquiry concerning the impermissible state aid of four Dutch football clubs (Volkskrant, 2011). If these suspicions are well founded, both the clubs and the local governments risk fines (so far have never been issued). Nonetheless, local governments still continue to contribute to support the existence of professional football clubs in the Netherlands.

### 1.1. Problem definition

Dutch professional football clubs suffer from financial problems and local governments devise various constructions to help the local professional teams. However, what are the reasons for the government to invest in the clubs? Why do they take so much responsibility and do they condone the mismanagement of the professional football clubs? Many scholars link this behaviour to the phenomenon of urban regimes.

Urban regimes are the constitution of both private- and public parties from different sectors who are willing to cooperate and try to influence the local government (Stone, 1989). According to Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999), sports policy by local governments seems likely to play an increasingly significant role in the activities of these urban regimes. Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) concluded this after a case study of the city of Sheffield in the UK. This city in the industrial north of England, decided to create a new 'sport city' identity which emerged from the interests within the urban regime. Case studies, such as Sheffield, emphasize that not only the public sector is involved in the decision making process with regard to sports, and thus football, but that local non-



public parties, such as private businesses and pressure groups also play their role in the decision making process (Dowding, 2001). The informal relationships between these parties, whereby they intend to cooperate, are used in order to make and carry out governing decisions (Stone, 1989). The interests of this urban regime decide whether they support or disapprove a proposal of the local government. Therefore, this collaboration of different sectors and parties can influence the decision making process positively, but also negatively. As a consequence, the position of an urban regime can determine whether a local government decides to support the rescue of a professional football club or not. This is ratified by the fact that urban regime theory has been the most influential element in order to gain a possible perspective on the reasons why policy making works as it has in the last two decades (Imbroscio, 1998). As a result, the questions raised above should not only focus on the local government as such, but on the workings and processes around urban regimes in particular. Various scholars (Elkin, 1987; Fainstein & Fainstein, 1986; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994) have focussed their attention on the divergent types of urban regimes and according to their findings, the type of urban regime often can indicate the characteristics of the regime and thus, have effect on their behaviour. In other words, the type of urban regime and their composition can explain why local governments support the existence of a local professional football club or not. Hence, the focus on the urban regimes, instead of the local government, has to result in a framework which should be able to assess the implication between urban regimes and the decision to support professional football clubs. In order to get a complete understanding of this, it is not only important to concentrate on the characteristics of the urban regime, but to combine them with the relevant background aspects. This approach aims to facilitate an overall picture of the influence of urban regimes regarding professional football clubs. Hence, this leads to the central problem of this research:

*What is the influence of the composition of urban regimes with regard to the decision of local governments whether or not to support the existence of local professional football clubs?*

In this research design, this main research question is further elaborated on the basis of the following question:

1. What are urban regimes?
2. What processes influence the composition and development of the urban regime?
3. How can we typify the relationship between the different parties within urban regimes?
4. How can we link the relationship between the forms and types of urban regimes and the decision of local governments to either support, or not local professional football clubs?



## **1.2. Aim of the study**

The aim of this study is to obtain a better understanding of the influence of urban regimes on the decision making process of local governments whether or not to support the existence of professional football clubs. The focus will be on the dominating regime of municipalities with an urban character which have had the problem of financially unhealthy professional football clubs. By drawing on previous research this study aims to show the influence of the core factors on the position of the urban regime. Furthermore, the relationship between the public- and private sectors and their influence on the decision making processes will be explored. The outcomes of this theoretical part will be included in a qualitative research. This qualitative case study is necessary in order to ameliorate the understanding of the processes within urban regimes and to certify the standpoints of regimes in cities with similar characteristics but a divergent decision. These opinions play a certain role in the decision making process of local governments with regard to the support of professional football clubs.

## **1.3. Relevance of the study**

The relevance of this study is two-fold. On the one hand it has a scientific relevance and on the other hand there is a social interest. The scientific relevance can be explained by the fact that previous research on the relationship between urban regimes and professional football clubs is limited. The outcomes of this research conduce to the knowledge of how sport policy is influenced by public-private coalitions, how these coalitions work, and how the different agendas are adapted. This provides a better understanding of how decision making processes are influenced and how policy making functions. As for the social relevance, these studies contribute to the understanding of the needs and reasons of local parties whether or not to invest in professional football clubs. This enables the professional football clubs to understand how to anticipate the ideals of the local public- and private sector. This may help them to improve their relationship which can help them to survive during economic downturns.

## **1.4. Outline of the study**

This research is divided into five parts. The first chapter addressed the introduction which led to the central research question of this thesis. Hereafter, the second part contains the theoretical section, which emanates from previous urban regime literature. Subsequently the methodology for the qualitative research will be discussed, whereby the research cases are explained and the



different research methods are described. This methodology is followed by the results of the qualitative research and the conclusion and recommendations are the last part of this research.





## 2. Theoretical framework

In order to gain a better understanding about sport and urban policies around cities which host a professional football club, several essential aspects must first be explained. Firstly, the reasons to use sports in urban policies will be established. Why do local governments invest in professional clubs and what is the catalyst for this decision? This will lead to the broad terms urban regime theory and urban regimes. Then, there will be a clear explanation about the characteristics and different types of these regimes, followed by the core prosperities of urban regimes and the influence on the decision making process. In addition, a conceptual framework, derived from the findings of the theoretical part, will be displayed. This theoretical part will close with an enumeration of the specific research questions for the qualitative case study.

### 2.1. Sports and urban policies

In the Netherlands, local governments have invested enormous amounts of public money in professional football clubs. As mentioned in the introduction, the European Union has started several investigations with regards to possible state aid to professional football clubs. Notwithstanding the high fines for state aid, these local governments keep devising different constructions to help the football clubs. However, what are the reasons that these municipalities keep supporting these clubs? Why would local governments risk high fines, negative critique from the local inhabitants, and lose their reputation due to wrong publicity as a result of their investment of public money? Several researchers have explored the relationship between sports and urban policies in the past. Keating (1997) argues that sport is used as a symptom of competition on a regional, national, or even international level. This was confirmed in the case of Sheffield in the United Kingdom (Henry & Paramio-Salcines, 1999). Furthermore, Keating (1997) states that the city of Cleveland (United States) used sport as economic development and as a catalyst for tourism. This is also one of the five reasons Hannigan (1998) mentioned in his book 'Fantasy City'. Hannigan (1998) provides many of the same arguments as Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) in the Sheffield case. They all argue that cities use sport in order to gain media attention, which should improve the image of the city. Thus, sport is used as a form of marketing. Furthermore, the economic impact is considered as eminent by cities that use sports to express. It should attract external investors and developers will invest in the city more easily. This economical effect is also notable in the creation of jobs the investment in professional sport clubs by municipalities accelerates, and the rise in capita per person (Hannigan, 1998). Moreover, they mention civic pride and excitement as social reasons for public investment. Professional sport clubs do create cohesion among the inhabitants (when the team performs well) and it leads to more recreational sport participation. Nevertheless, it must be noticed that the



aforementioned scholars do not agree with every possible result of investment in professional clubs with public money. However, many cities believe in the consequences and these are the arguments they often use to approve their investments. Why do municipalities believe in these arguments? Is it sincere or is it a persuasion technique? Hajer (1989) investigated the case of Amsterdam, the city in the Netherlands which drastically changed policy in the 1970's following the appointment of the new Mayor Van Thijn. In the 1970's Amsterdam focussed on the relation with the inhabitants, participation, urban renewal and 'collective consumption'. However, the arrival of Mayor Van Thijn made economic development the most important issue. To achieve this economic development he had to recover investor confidence. He did this on the one hand by convincing them to reduce urban problems, and on the other hand he paid more attention to the wishes of the business sector. According to Hajer (1989), the people and institutions that agreed with this new policy, unwittingly formed a new so-called discourse-coalition. Both parties from the private and public sector worked on projects which followed the policy of the new mayor and should lead to better economic times. The most important was, however, the fact that a combination of people and sectors cooperated to support the policy of the new mayor by, for instance, introducing a new slogan for the city, which meant a discourse in the urban policy. According to Hajer (1989), this discourse-coalition is a group of social actors that through a system of positions and practices develops, structures and maintains their joint interpretation of reality. Thus, with regard to sport policy and the decision for investment in professional clubs, municipalities might not emphasize on the importance of professional sports on their own, this might be the opinion of a group of parties from different sectors in the city or municipality. Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) confirmed this by arguing that it seems plausible that sport and sports policy play increasingly significant roles in the activities of urban regimes de-industrializing contexts. In the Netherlands, where a lot of municipalities have invested in professional football clubs, they suffer from a slow de-industrialization (Ministerie van economische zaken, 2005). Hajer (1989) used the term discourse-coalition, whilst Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) and Keating (1997) prefer to use the term urban regime. Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) stated: "Urban regime theorists represent a more substantial attempt to explain the political and economic context of decision in the city, in part because they seek to go beyond the explanation simply of growth strategies, acknowledging that other forms of strategy may be dominant in different context (pp. 642). As a consequence, urban regime theory can be used to explain why municipalities invest (or not) in professional football clubs since these decisions are often complex and sometimes, even controversial, rather than a straightforward growth strategy. In order to obtain a thorough understanding of the urban regime theory and urban regimes it is essential to first find out what these terms imply.



## 2.2. Urban regimes

The urban regime theory assumes “that the effectiveness of local government depends greatly on the cooperation of nongovernmental actors and on the combination of state capacity with nongovernmental resources” (Stoker & Mossberger, pp. 197, 1994). Stone (1989; 2001; 2005) agrees with this statement, since he argues that governmental resources are inadequate to solve every public policy issue on their own. However, according to Mossberger and Stoker (2001) regime theory is “more a concept or a model rather than a theory as it has a limited ability to explain or predict variation in regime formation, maintenance or change” (pp. 811). Meanwhile, the urban regime concept was developed to delineate reciprocity at an urban level where the focus was on economic development policy within cities. Nonetheless, it has been proved that it can also be used for regional coalition building, sexual orientation politics and urban education policy (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). As a consequence, it may be assumed that the urban regime concept is also applicable to the subject of this thesis, urban sports policy.

With regards to the constitution of urban regimes in Europe, four groups which participate in the regime can be distinguished (Stoker & Mossberger, 1994). There are, as well as in the United States, the elected members of government and the business sector. Though, the European urban regimes can also consist of community interest such as minorities and labour organizations, technical and professional officials. Notwithstanding this community interest is not inconceivable in the United States, although in Europe, their position is stronger and more influential. In the Netherlands these officials can be, for example, calculators for the different political parties, advisors of the elected members or working for the Provincial states. Accordingly urban regimes can be classified as a group of parties from different sectors which are willing to cooperate and thereby according to Stone (1989), trying to influence decisions of the local government. With regard to professional football clubs, an urban regime is present when there are governmental and nongovernmental actors who influence the decision whether to support the existence of the professional football club or not. Here it must also be noted, that these regimes can be pro but also strongly against the decision to support the football club and that in some cities there is no regime whatsoever, according to Stone (in Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). In the negative case, the regime becomes an anti-regime, with the aim to prevent supporting the decision. The regime tries to achieve this by blocking the exercise of power by any political coalition (Imbroscio, 1998). The implementation of an anti regime will be elaborated upon further in this research.

Urban regimes are structured by the relationship between market forces and political control (Dowding, 2001). As a consequence, urban regimes continue to be a difficult concept, since public-private ratio's and power relations within and around urban regimes differ across the world. This has



effect on the composition and processes of urban regimes and makes it difficult to create a concept which is applicable to every situation. In the American system, politicians for example, are often financially supported by the private sector in order to be able to run a successful election campaign. As a result, the business sector in the United States has a rather influential voice within the urban regimes. In spite of the fact that prevalence of the private sector in the European context is considerably smaller, Le Galès (2000) argues that the role of the business sector in Europe is rising too. Nevertheless, not every urban regime will experience predominance or rise of the business sector since urban regimes can be divided in different types with different characteristics and thus consist of different parties. Thereby, it is important to notice that cities also have to deal with smaller urban regimes, such as regimes of the different neighbourhoods. These regimes determine which issues are important for an area or neighbourhood of a city instead of interfering with the general urban policy. Nevertheless, this study will focus on the dominating urban regime, since it can be assumed that main regimes interfere with big issues such as support of the professional football club of the city.

#### **2.2.1. Forms of urban regimes**

Many urban regime theorists have endeavoured to conceive a typology which suggests the variations in the different forms of regimes (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Stoker & Mossberger, 1994). Here they define the characteristics and the cohesion between the different elements. Their intention was, with regard to the different types of urban regimes, to develop a regime framework which was applicable to cross-national cases. It is of importance to discuss the different characteristics within the types of regime since this provides a first substantial image of the constitution which is applicable to the situation of the football cases. The type of regime might be the determining factor in the decision making process of the local governments, and therefore is relevant to research.

Scholars Stoker and Mossberger (1994) developed a typology of urban regimes which took the significance of cross-national terms into consideration and is therefore applicable to Europe and the Netherlands. By identifying five crucial factors which are applicable to any nation, three regime types which identify the general purpose of the urban regime have been established. Primary, purpose of the urban regime is considered as one of the characteristics. What does the urban regime wants to achieve? Stoker and Mossberger (1994) distinguish this aim in preservation of current community, realization of short-term projects and a transformation in ideology or image of the city. The reasons why participants of the feel they have to be active in the regime are divided in tangible results (e.g. career making or gaining public support), local dependency (businesses want to influence



development of the city since their company is depending on the local market) and expressive politics (the participants show that they really stand for something with regard to the community). Thirdly, a common sense of purpose must be established within the urban regime. This characteristic is classified in three mechanisms whereby the method of selective incentives is one of them. This method indicates that incentives are used, in a material or non-material way in order to abate the feeling of participants that it has no value to act in the urban regime as an individual body. In some urban regimes a bonus and punishment regulation is used, such as in the case of Atlanta (Stone, 1989). Furthermore, a shared cohesion with the locality of the city can be a reason to form a common sense of purpose. This cohesion emanates from a strong identity and commitment with the city and a strong awareness of civic community. Moreover, a strategic use of symbols and language by politicians can create a common purpose. Hajer (1989) defines this as a character of discourse-coalitions in his article about the political reorientation of Amsterdam at the commencement of the 1980's. Another qualification of the urban regimes is, according to Stoker and Mossberger (1994), the quality of the coalition. Here, political communion is relevant where the different parties within an urban regime share the same goals and have the same interest. In this scenario, there are little contradictions and political issues which accelerate the coalition building process. A different form is political partnership and as with political communion, the coherence between the parties is also quite high. However there are issues when the different sectors do not agree which makes it a lot more difficult to form urban regimes. As a consequence, sacrifices from all the sides have to be made in order to come to an 'agreement'. Nevertheless, the most anfractuous quality of coalition is competitive agreement because in this type of agreement the consistency is low. The different parties have different ideologies and sometimes participants are only involved because they have the feeling they have to. Local economic adversity and the sentiment of little influence outside the urban regime are also good examples of this personal pressure. Stoker and Mossberger's (1994) last characteristic of the different urban regime types, which has more impact on cross-national cities than cities within the same country, describes the relationship with the wider political environment. This relation can be measured within a locality, but also on a non local perspective. On local level, regimes with an exclusive orientation form a coalition which is able to select parties which share the same purposes. In doing so, they deny policy concerns and exclude certain parties which do not share their opinion or views. This is in contradiction with urban regimes which have an inclusive orientation. These regimes obey the public opinion and participation, which is necessary in order to gain popular support. The level of taking advantage of nonlocal political resources and the reliance on nonlocal cooperation determines whether an urban regime remains dependent or independent in their relationships with non local parties. Dependency often expresses in, for instance, more influence in the urban regime from non local participants. In the case of professional football clubs



this may be an investor from the Middle-East with an intention or promise to invest in a club if the municipality relieves the debts.

The above mentioned subdivisions of the characteristics all influence the others within the urban regime. The figure below shows the division Stoker and Mossberger (1994) established between the cross-national urban regimes:

Defining characteristics	Regime types		
	<i>Organic</i>	<i>Instrumental</i>	<i>Symbolic</i>
<b>Purpose</b>	Maintenance of status quo	Project realization	Redirection of ideology or image
<b>Main motivation of participant</b>	Local dependency	Tangible results	Expressive politics
<b>Basis for sense of common purpose</b>	Tradition and social cohesion	Selective incentives	Strategic use of symbols
<b>Quality of coalition (congruence of interest)</b>	Political communion	Political partnership	Competitive agreement
<b>Relationship with environment:</b>			
• <b>Local</b>	Exclusive orientation	Exclusive orientation	Inclusive orientation
• <b>Nonlocal</b>	Independent	Dependent	Dependent

**Figure 1:** A typology of urban regimes (Stoker & Mossberger, pp. 199, 1994)

### 2.2.2. Types of regimes around professional football clubs

Organic regimes are traditional and many of the citizens are committed to and believe in their local football club. There would be outrage should the club become bankrupt as this would shake this traditional belief since the social cohesion of citizens in the cities of these regimes often takes place around the football games of their local club. This is emphasized by Back, Crabbe, and Solomos (2001) who state that “the football stadium provides one context in which local identity can be ritually defined, regardless of the changes taking place in its immediate environment and patterns of migration” (pp. 43). Thereby, the participants involved in the regime may not only recognize the importance of the football club for the maintenance of cohesion and tradition in the city. A lack of support for the existence of the professional football club may also cause less influence for the participants and a decline of trust by the inhabitants in the city and its regime. This can be considered as critical since the parties in an organic regime are mostly dependant on the local market. Therefore



the existence of the professional football club is important for both the aim and the motivation of the participants of regimes with an organic nature.

At first glance the instrumental characteristics do not seem to fit with the decision making process of professional football clubs. Supporting a club as municipality is not a tangible result since the only result is the continued existence of the football club. However, the existence of the professional football club stimulates activity around the stadium. Local retailers can benefit from the supporters walking towards the stadium at match time and the stadium can be used as an attraction for industries and parties to invest in the area around the venue. According to Newman and Tual (2002) the development of the Stade de France in Paris for the World Cup in 1998 led to a positive regeneration of the neighbourhood around the stadium. Whilst the industrial area Plaine-Saint-Denis struggled to obtain interest from either public or private sectors during the 1990's, the football stadium's positive image after the World Cup was so successful that potential investors started to associate themselves with the stadium and the neighbourhood. This led to a regime committed to the neighbourhood who contributed to a flourishing area which no longer suffered from the lack of interest by the public and private sector. As a result, it can be assumed that the stadium acted as an incentive for potential regime participants. The case researched by Newman and Tual (2002) shows that football stadiums, and thus the existence of a professional football club in a city, can lead to tangible results and pull parties into a regime with an instrumental nature.

The symbolic regime in addition, which wants to create an often new image and be competitive, might use the professional football club as a notice or bill board in order to promote the city as a sportive city. The case of Sheffield (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999) is a good example of a situation where the urban regime used sports as a marketing tool. Furthermore, sports, and football in particular, has always been used by politicians and business to gain popularity amongst the population or to create a culture of evasion (L'Etang, 2006). Everyone can picture the images of swaying politicians during major sporting events. Inhabitants have the feeling they live in a vibrant city and the politicians express themselves as proponent of sports. Hence, both politicians and private parties use the support of the local professional football club as a tool to express themselves. With regard to professional football clubs, statements about the importance of the existence of the club and the presence at matches of the football team can be used as an expression of the importance of sports in the city. Without realizing tangible results, professional football clubs can help improving their reputation and turn themselves into people of distinction. These expressions can also lead to a common purpose. When several politicians or private parties emphasize the importance of the existence of the professional football club, it can help to accelerate the processes of new sport policies and contribute to shape the general public platform. In urban regimes with a symbolic nature, the expression of the importance of the football club can contribute to the



development of a common purpose. Besides, the symbolic regime has an inclusive orientation. This means they appreciate the public opinion, which in the case of football clubs can be considered as the opinion of the football supporters, for instance. Therefore, it can be assumed that urban regimes, which want the local professional football club stay remain in existence, can also have a symbolic nature.

Of course it is worthy to note that of course not every regime contains the exact characteristics belonging to the three types of regimes and it would be naive to assume that. However, these three types of regime give an adequate image and direction of how regimes can use professional football clubs in order to achieve their aims and purposes. As a consequence, it is not only interesting to understand whether these types of regime do support the existence of the football club, but also to comprehend the underlying interests and aims of the different forms of regimes. This leads to the following expectations:

***Expectation 1: Urban regimes with an organic nature which support the existence of the local professional football club can be expected to have an underlying interest of maintaining the traditional environment of which the regime is part of.***

***Expectation 2: Urban regimes with an instrumental nature which support the existence of the local professional football club can be expected to have the aim to realize tangible projects via the existence of the football club.***

***Expectation 3: Urban regimes with a symbolic nature which support the existence of the local professional football club can be expected to have an underlying interest of an image change for the city.***

### **2.3. What is going on in the regime?**

As previously mentioned, urban regimes in Europe can be distinguished as certain types and are classified by specific characteristics. These different distinctive types are of relevance since they provide an indication of the ideals the regimes have. However, this research has not only the aim to investigate the sort of regimes that act around the decision of the existence of professional football clubs. This inquiry is also interested in the underlying process around the decision making process. Therefore, it is significant to probe the processes and core properties within the urban regime, in order to gain an image of the most influential phenomena on the constitution/type of the urban





regime, which, after all, for a large part determines which decision will be made by the local government.

Every urban regime differs from the other, due to, for instance, the composition of participants or the context. Mossberger and Stoker (2001), state that alongside the input of parties from different sectors, such as governmental parties and private businesses, the operation of an urban regime depends on several aspects. These factors; composition, agendas and resources are the core properties of the urban regime, according to Mossberger and Stoker (2001). Thereby, they all influence each other, which in turn affect the characteristics of the urban regime, in general, significantly. As a consequence, the processes of composition, agenda setting, and gained resources are linked to each other. Therefore, it is important to discuss these processes and appropriately consider their influences. These properties might be rather influential in the characteristics of the urban regime and subsequently, the decision making process.

#### **2.3.1. Composition of the regime**

Urban regimes differ due to, for example, the ratios between private and public sector and the purposes of the regime. Within an urban regime the private sector has different interests than those of the public sector. The private sector attempts to obtain influence on the policy-agenda, and thus gain ascendancy on the decision-making process, whereas the local government tend to socialize conflicts which should result in a more democratic discussion and dissolution of social problems (Stone, 1989). Furthermore, the business sector aligns on the policy agenda in order to amplify the power ratio with more private propositions (Berger, 2001). As a consequence, a stress field between public and private issues might occur since the different sectors have dissimilar interests and concerns. Furthermore, Dowding et al. (1999) identified eight features which have to be present in a successful urban regime. Three of these elements are composition related. In the first place, cross-sectional boundaries must not be taken into account. Thus, ideologies and ideas from all sectors have to be considered. Furthermore, it is of importance that these urban regimes emanate from personal interests, which indicates that the policy regime is not nourished by formal structures of the government. Thirdly, intense leadership is demanded. This leadership should be able to form coalitions which conventionally are not sequacious, whereby it may be competent to link the agenda of the regime, which will be discussed in the next paragraph, with a heterogeneous political contemplation.

As previously mentioned, the composition of the distinguished types of regimes is not binding and can differ per case. "The exact composition of regimes will vary because the institutional resources available and the division of those resources will vary from one city (and/or country) to the



next” (Mossberger & Stoker, pp. 813, 2001). The exact composition of the urban regimes is, however, of enormous importance for the ranging processes within the urban regime. Pressure groups, for example, can have an important impact on the urban regime. According to Stoker and Mossberger (1994) these groups are mostly present in progressive regimes. Progressive parties have ideological goals which are related to environmentalism, historic preservation or opportunities for the poor. Furthermore, they have values about the growth of a city. When this belief in values leads to a desire for a change in the growth policy, whereby the focus changes to the obstruction of power of any political coalition, the progressive regime becomes an anti regime. However, to achieve this, the progressive regime must conciliate the different political interests of coalition aspects, renegotiate collaboration with the private sector that agree with their growth objectives, and regulate dissensions surrounding the current political leader (DeLeon, 1992).

It can be assumed that the kind of parties involved in the urban regime are significantly relevant and have, with regard to the qualitative research, to be taken into account and comprehensively analyzed.

### **2.3.2. Influencing the agenda**

The policy agenda in cities determines which issues are considered as important enough to be discussed. “At the centre of agenda-setting theory is the simple yet powerful notion of issue presence or absence on agendas. Issues appearing on agendas receive attention and are defined, debated, and resolved” (Berger, pp. 112, 2001). Thus, the participants in the urban regime try to influence the different agendas with their input. Therefore, the participants around the agenda setting do not only modify the agenda (setting) in general, they also influence the formation of policies, definitions, alternatives, and outcomes (Gandy, 1982). However, not only the policy agenda determines which topics can be contemplated as momentous. The media agenda and the public agenda influence the policy agenda, and vice versa (Berger, 2001). According to Berger the business sectors “develop their own agenda of policy issues and then activate channels of influence directed to specific media-public-policy agendas to achieve favourable outcomes” (pp. 97). However, he also concludes that the influence on media agendas is of less importance than the influence on the policy-agenda of the local government. It must be noticed that the different agendas above are not the general agenda of the urban regime, and that the importance of each agenda depends on the composition and interests of the regime. The regimes’ agenda occurs from the different issues the participants focus their attention on. In the cases where there is support for the existence of the professional football club, the football club should normally be the identified topic. In general, the participants within the urban regime still should have the same purposes to be successful. With



respect to the decision making process of the support of professional football clubs, it is decisive to have a solid urban regime in order to make the support decision positive. A lack of close relationships within the regime will lead to doubts about the support or may even lead to the development of an anti-regime. Furthermore, urban regimes have to have a characteristic agenda according to Dowding et al (1999). This agenda has to be focussed on a long-term basis and has to survive elections and change in leadership which has been derived from ideologies instead of the personal values of the participants of the urban regime. Likewise, the policy agenda may assemble the interest of the community and the concerns of the institutions, which should lead to a decrease of the tension between the private- and public sector. According to Dowding et al. (1999) this last point is especially applicable in Europe. These requirements for a successful regime are very interesting for this research. A lack of one or more of these requirements within the agenda setting process might be a reason not to support the professional football club.

According to Hajer (1989) an analysis of the structure of verbal- and non verbal proceedings and practices which affect what is thought, understood, and said, what can be said with influence and how this happens around the urban regime, can lead to an explanation why certain assumptions gain trust and why other suppositions are out-dated and irrelevant. In other words, an analysis of the different proceedings of all the parties in an urban regime can explain why for instance, an urban regime decides to take the financial problems of a professional football club into account. It provides an overview of the reasons why an urban regime admits to an attitude towards a specific subject. The analysis of 'what is been said and done' seems to play an important role in the analysis of urban regimes, and must be taken into consideration during the qualitative research.

### **2.3.3. Resources**


Despite the different approaches and factors, it is still not completely clear why certain issues are taken into account whilst others are not. Actors can have the intention to influence the different agendas but when they are not interesting for the incumbent regime, their propositions and additions will not be considered. Furthermore, the discursive practices of Hajer (1989) are generally considered to only be applicable to pull parties to the regime which contributes to raise the importance of a certain issue or project and whereby other disagreeing stakeholders are ignored. However, there must be a reason why the parties within the urban regime which run the new discursive campaign can permit it to take control and to preclude former or potential partners. According to Stone (2001), a significant authority emanates from the resources the parties deliver. The agenda of the urban regime cannot be maintained without the right resources and parties which deliver them.



Resources are more or less the foundation for urban regimes. If governments could govern and invest without the help of external resources, urban regimes would probably be of less importance for them. Without resources, which may vary from financial contributions to practical knowledge, the purposes of an urban regime cannot be reached (Stone, 2001). Dowding et al. (1999) believe that the urban regime has to implicate external resources in order to establish a better relationship between private-and public sector and to be beneficial (knowledge and skills) for the state. They even argue that this is one of the eight crucial features for a successful regime. Since the discussion of the purposes of the urban regime is an ongoing process, the demand for resources also alters occasionally. As a consequence, resources can be powerful at one moment and/or irrelevant when the aims of the regime change. This resource related process does influence the composition and the characteristics of the regime. When there is an agenda focussed on leisure, other resources and parties are needed than within an urban regime which emphasizes on the demand for housing. Stone (2001) states, with regard to regime formation, “actors must, as a way of establishing and updating the identifying agenda, take on the task of framing purposes, including giving them concrete details and link them to actors who can obtain resources to act on significant policy purposes” (pp.23). However when, for example, a very wealthy private party presents its capital in order to become part of the urban regime, the urban regime and thus, the local government too, have to give merit to the private party and fulfil its requirements. These claims might be the introduction of an agenda point within the urban regime. In the case of professional football clubs, a wealthy real estate developer (who is fan of the local football club) might offer his capital in order to redevelop the infrastructure around the stadium of the club. A postulation from its sight might be the remission of the debts of the club, such as in the case of football club Vitesse in Arnhem (Voetbal International, 2013). In addition, Davies (2002) states that “those with resources are most likely to be able to convince others” due to the fact that it is “a form of *power over* because they hold the key to opportunity and thus to preference formation” (pp. 7). Stone (2001) confirms this by arguing that resources are not only important to respond to the agenda, but also to form the agenda. Nevertheless, parties and their resources also can suspend their participation upon the agenda setting. When there are no issues of their interest and their resources are not big enough to create an over powering authority, they might decide to not accede to the regime. Resources, therefore, can be very useful if a party wants to develop co-partnership within the regime. As a result of this necessity, resources can influence the identifying agenda, the composition and the regime in general, but vice versa can also be the case.

Resources, in combination with composition and agenda-setting seem to have a significant influence on the type of urban regime. These three core properties all affect the other two qualities and therefore are an ongoing process. The following figure summarizes their relationship:





**Figure 2:** *The relationship between the three core properties*

In this model all the concepts are equally important, whereby the combination of the three forms the heart of the triangle. This is the combination which influences (and is influenced by) the characteristics of the urban regime. However, notwithstanding the importance of the influence of the three core properties, the context of the city where the regime is part of cannot be denied.

## 2.4. Context

The urban regime core properties all influence each other. Nevertheless, “the character of an urban regime depends, in large part, on the political-economical context in which it operates” (DiGaetano & Klemanski, pp. 58, 1993). The context of an urban regime can be distinguished by several aspects. Savitch and Kantor (2002), for instance, divide context into local market and democratic conditions. Local market (wealth of a city’s fiscal resource and the mobility of local capital) and democratic conditions (stronger civic participation, such as a high election turnout, and ward-style representation, which measures the amount of inclusive orientation) influence the resource mobilization and bargaining of urban regimes, according to Kilburn (2004). Subsequently, these processes form the basis for regime formation and policy implementation and thus, the decision making process of local governments with respect to the support of the existence of professional football clubs. However, DiGaetano and Strom (2003) classify the context of an urban regime in three different concepts, respectively market forces and economic structures; national, regional, and international governing arrangements; and population migrations and demographic structures as the influencing forms of context. Hence, a combination of economical, social, and political backgrounds forms the context of a city. Besides, it is argued that “economic globalization has made cities more vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of the international economy, compelling

them to compete vigorously for infusion of business investment by offering various sorts of subsidies to firms and development interest” (DiGaetano and Strom, pp. 367, 2003). Cities have become involved in highly competitive systems wherein they struggle to stay in the top-tier of cities. They believe that cities can be classified in new economic cities, cities with mixed economies, and cities with an old industrial economy. The new economic cities offer financial and cultural centres which draws highly skilled employees and investors. In contrary, the old industrial cities have an enormous disadvantage and struggle to draw investors, businesses and developers to their city. As a consequence, investing in, for instance, the stadium of a professional football club might be one of the only opportunities to attract real estate developers to these ‘old fashioned’ cities. Therefore, the economical context can be very important with regard to the decision making process. Cities which are already developed to the latest standards might feel less inclined to help a small, non-performing football club than those cities which are, more or less, desperate. Thus, factors such as unemployment, housing prices, labour sectors, and the sizes of the businesses can have an enormous impact on the decision making process of municipalities since these figures can provide a comparable overview with regard to competitive cities. DiGaetano and Strom (2003) also mention the importance of state restructuring. However, this is focussed on the differences between different countries, which can have impact on the urban governance of comparable cities within different countries. Though, this does not seem to be influential in the case of the decision making processes in the Netherlands, since the different cases have the same state structure. However, the increasing authority of the European Union on policies of the members of this alliance might have influence in the way that municipalities can have different opinions with regard to this form of state restructuring.

At the same time, in the case of decision making process concerning the support of the existence of professional football clubs, it is also relevant to take into account the context which is rather specific for professional football clubs. The popularity of sports and football in particular in a city can definitely have an impact on urban regimes and local government, for instance. The prehistory of the relationship of the urban regime or the local government with the professional football club may also be of importance for the urban regime. Furthermore, the professional football clubs venue can also play a certain role. The image of the stadium might influence on the attendance numbers and sympathy/commitment for the club. All these factors influence the popularity and the relationship between urban regime and club. An unpleasant or deteriorating stadium may create a negative relationship as networking receptions often take place around occasions such as football games. Despite the fact that little research concerning these issues has been conducted, it might be assumed that these quite particular aspects certainly influence the context of the urban regime. Thereby, these issues, and the context forms of the scholars mentioned above may already have had



influence on former elections of the local government, as politicians might have already shared their opinion about these affairs. Thus the decision making process might be influenced by the aforementioned aspects of context in both an indirect and a direct manner. This research will focus on the following facets of context; social background, economical background, football popularity, image of the stadium, and the prehistory between city and the club. It is relevant for this research to set these circumstances, since the aspects of context and their influence needs to be investigated in an appropriate way, as the context can be crucial for the basis of the urban regime and the development of a type of regime but also on the decision making process.


## **2.5. The decision making process**

The processes within the urban regime in this research are related to the decision making process of the existence of professional football clubs. Hereby, the decision making process determines whether the local government offers help to the existence of professional football clubs. However, what encompasses this possible support? Since official state aid is illegal, the decision making process has to include difficult constructions in order to provide justifiable ministrations. According to weekly magazine *De groene Amsterdammer* (2011a), the government may, for instance, decide to adopt the stadium on behalf of the club, which ensures a short-term injection of a large sum of money, and abates the costs for such things as heating and electricity etc. In exchange the government has access to a social venue for the city and every term receives a rental rate from the football club. Another tactic is to lend a sum of money to the professional football club in order to help the professional football club through the short-term wretched financial times. When the club becomes financially healthy again, the repayment can take place. Furthermore, the latest trend is to involve the professional football clubs in social projects. This initiative is supported by the Dutch football association (KNVB) and prepared in an official plan (Stichting meer dan voetbal, 2010). To sum up, support of the professional football club by local governments is a very broad concept and differs per case.

## **2.6. Conceptual model**

The above mentioned literature in conjunction with the central issue, leads to a conceptual model. In this model relationships between the different aspects in this survey are displayed. This model will be the guidance for the qualitative research that will be conducted. The conceptual model is displayed below;





**Figure 3:** Conceptual model

The model shown above is a very straightforward model. Since conceptual frameworks with regard to crucial decisions are scarce, the qualitative research which will be conducted should provide a better understanding and more extensive version of this model. The three core properties (composition, agenda-setting, resources) are still rated as equal, for instance, while during the qualitative research a better understanding of the relationships might emerge. The three core properties are all both dependently and independently influenced by the context of the city. Therefore context encircles the whole process of this model. This indicates the importance of context within this research and emphasizes the importance of investigating the context of the cases appropriately. Furthermore, the three core properties influence and are influenced by the type of urban regime. This type determines which purposes the regime pursues, and thus which interest the regime has, which therefore is decisive in the decision making process.

## 2.7. Qualitative case study

A qualitative case study concerning the cities of Haarlem and Maastricht will be performed, in order to answer the core problem of this research: “What is the influence of the composition of urban regimes with regard to the decision of local governments whether or not to rescue the



existence of local professional football clubs?” The literature and the model above have raised some questions which should explain the processes and influences around the dominating urban regimes of the case studies, but also should lead to a better understanding of the types of urban regimes and their influence on the decision making process. It can be assumed that composition, agenda-setting, and resources directly are very influential on the type of urban regime, and subsequently on the decision making process. In addition, context will influence the decision making process in both a direct and indirect way. However, previous literature has not investigated the differences in the levels of influence of these core properties and the influence of the different types of urban regimes on the decision making process with regard to the existence of professional football clubs. The specific research questions are presented below and form the central problem of the qualitative research. These questions aim to provide the data which is necessary to elucidate the complex processes. Furthermore, the data aims to enrich the understanding of the ambiguities concerning the relationships within the urban regimes, its influences, and hence the decision making process.

- How did the decision making process in Haarlem and Maastricht evolve?
- Was there a regime active in both cities?
- If there was a regime, was it the only regime or were there more active regimes in the particular cities?
- In the case of multiple regimes, was it the dominating regime which influenced the decision making process with regard to the support of HFC Haarlem and MVV?
- How was the influencing urban regime in Haarlem and Maastricht composed?
- Which agenda was dominating the urban regimes in both Haarlem and Maastricht?
- Which resources were inserted in order to influence the decision making process in both cases?
- How did the different aspects of context influence the urban regime and the decision making processes in Haarlem and Maastricht?
- What is the relationship between the composition, agenda, and resources of the regime and the decision whether to support the existence of the professional football club in Haarlem and Maastricht?



### 3. Methodology

The theory from the previous chapter will be included in a qualitative research with regard to the decision making process of the existence of professional football clubs in the Netherlands. This chapter will discuss the methods which were used in order to find answers on the sub questions derived from the theory chapter.

#### 3.1. A comparative case study of the decision making processes in Haarlem and Maastricht

To gain a varied and significant perspective on urban regimes around professional football clubs it was preferred to research two cases with similar circumstances. However these cases are distinguished by one important difference. In the case of the city of Haarlem, the local government decided to not support the football club HFC Haarlem and the club went bankrupt in January 2010. In Maastricht on the other hand, the municipality decided in May 2010 to purchase the stadium of MVV Maastricht and remitted a subordinated loan. The total costs were 3.6 million euros. Thus, one club went bankrupt and the other one succeeded in confronting the financial problems. This is striking, since the two clubs en municipalities are rather comparable. The cities of Haarlem and Maastricht have a population size which can be defined as a medium-sized city in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the results of both clubs were rather equal the last decades since they both played at the second level. Moreover, with respect to the town council, similarities could be found as well. The amount of available seats was the same, and in both cases the social-democrats (PvdA) were the biggest party. In the case of Maastricht the Christian-democrats (CDA), hereby, occupied the same amount of seats. Nevertheless, the amount of spectators displayed some difference. The attendance in Haarlem is about one third of the visitors in Maastricht. Yet, it is also intriguing that the stadium occupancy rate of the two clubs does not diverge significantly, since the capacity of the stadium in Maastricht is three times greater than that in Haarlem. The background variable attendance and the influence on the independent variables composition, agenda-setting, resources, and context had to be thoroughly investigated by exploring why the amount of supporters was not higher (or lower). This analysis was performed by asking the respondents of interviews about their vision and experience concerning the amount of supporters in the stadium. This analysis with respondents from the different parties should did provide an understanding of why people do or do not visit a match in both Maastricht and Haarlem, and why there were differences in the amount of visitors with regard to the two football clubs. In general, excluding the amount of visitors, the background variables showed parity. Equality was important in order to create a situation where the background variables were constant. This improved the reliability of the independent variables (composition, agenda-setting, resources, and



context) on the type of urban regime. If the background variables would not have been uniform and the influence of the independent variables on the type of regime therefore might have fluctuated, the main conclusion of around professional football clubs and decision making processes would have been less reliable.

### **3.2. A qualitative approach**

Qualitative research was preferred since the explanations of urban regimes and the process around the regimes are quite complex. Furthermore, the major purpose of this research was to understand the influence of the type of regime on the decision making process. According to Richie and Lewis (2003) qualitative research therefore is sufficient. Quantitative research would have provide more respondents, but in order to gain more in-depth information with persons who were part of the urban regime or closely involved in the process of the decision for support in the two cases, qualitative research is requisite. In this way, not only answers about the influence of composition, agenda-setting, resources, and context of urban regimes could be examined, but also a more distinct research concerning the relationships and discourses around the urban regimes and the decision making processes of professional football clubs could be conducted. A desk-research was performed to gain a general image about the situation and participants of the two cases. Semi-structured interviews were used to ensure that every relevant issue was discussed. These semi-structured interviews also provided the opportunity to gain insight into interesting subjects that emerged during the interviews or to gain more detailed answers on certain topics.

### **3.3. Desk research**

In order to gain the basic information for this qualitative case study, a desk research was conducted. This desk research was performed internally and externally. Intern research focussed on the intern resources of the municipalities and the football clubs such as reports of council meetings. External research on the other side concentrated on resources such as internet, databases, and official statistics. Hereby, a media research could be consulted to create a general image of the regimes, clubs and the situation around the decision making process of the two cases. This took place in an external way by using available documents such as newspapers or football magazines. Hereby a lot of information regards certain persons or parties who were related to the urban regime of the decision making process, was retrieved from the internet. This internet research helped in finding dates, research reports and other relevant documents concerning, for instance, the political parties which were involved in the process. Furthermore, council documents and records of the court of auditors were consulted. Both the municipality of Haarlem and Maastricht host an online database



with all the reports of council meetings, notes of the board of mayor and alderman, and commission pieces.

### **3.4. Interviews**

The interviews were conducted with persons from different parties and sectors of the urban regimes, whereby the snowball sampling method (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) was used. Diversity from the different sides leads to a better analysis of the process (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003), and the snowball method is recommended since it was not clear in both cases which participants and people were important to gain information from. However, it was still of importance to approach multiple persons during the first phase of the interviews. Firstly focussing on one particular respondent (snowball) could have led the research in the wrong direction since this first respondent might have provided non-relevant information and/or recommended to speak with the wrong persons. Therefore, it was crucial to concentrate on multiple inputs at the start of the interview process. During the interviews, respondents came up with new important parties for this research which in turn led to new multiple inputs. In some cases respondents also advised to speak with people who had already been interviewed. However, the data gained (size of snowballs) increased during the research process. Nevertheless, it was decisive to keep verifying the relevance of new respondents and to remain critical of the information which was gained during the snowball sampling method. Firstly on the snowball method, people from the football clubs, councillors of the municipality, people from private parties and other interesting stakeholders, which were emanated from the desk research, were approached for an interview. Other relevant parties were contacted if this was indispensable, according to the data from the first respondents. The total number of interviewed people was thirteen. Hereby, one respondent did not have time for a meeting and responded via e-mail. Another person preferred to be interviewed by telephone.

The potential respondents were approached by different methods. Telephone, e-mail and social medium LinkedIn was found to be appropriate resources to explain the research, its process and request respondents' cooperation. LinkedIn proved rather useful since multiple respondents were only attainable via this channel as phone numbers and/or e-mail addresses were often not available. After the respondents did agree with the interview request, the interviews were conducted in an environment where the respondent felt comfortable. This is important since the respondent has to have the feeling that he or she is in control (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Therefore, in every case the respondent was asked to suggest a location. Several interviews took place in public areas, while most interviews were performed at the company of the respondents or the fraction room of the



political party the respondent was active for. Hereby, an audio-recorder was used to ensure that the interviewer could concentrate fully to achieve the highest standard of interview.

### 3.5. A mixed group

To gain a varied and objective picture of the processes around the decision making process it was in both cases relevant to interview people with different backgrounds and interests. As a consequence, the interviewed group was a mixed group including councillors, entrepreneurs, members of the football clubs, a journalist, and creditors. The table below provides an overview of these people.

	Name	Link with decision making process
Haarlem	Jeroen Fritz	Councillor for the social democrats (PvdA)
	Pieter Hooft	Interim-manager of HFC Haarlem
	Cees-Jan Pen	Councillor for the Christian democrats (CDA)
	Beer Wentink	Member of financial commission of HFC Haarlem
	Pieter-Anne Wever	Chairman of the supporters club of HFC Haarlem
Maastricht	Anonymous	Councillor who voted against support of MVV
	Anonymous	Creditor of MVV
	Anonymous	Member 'initiatiefgroep MVV'
	Josje Godwin	Councillor for the social democrats (PvdA)
	Paul Penders	Former MVV player, and entrepreneur in Maastricht
	Paul Rinkens	Member of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV'
	Roel Wiche	Journalist for regional newspapers Dagblad de Limburger and Limburgs Dagblad
	Luc Winants	Alderman of sports

**Figure 4:** In alphabetical order a list of the interviewees

To gain suitable answers on the sub questions of this research the interviews were semi-structured. By creating a topic-guide (attached in Appendix A) all the relevant issues were addressed, while there was still room for flexibility. This was important in order to pursue interesting issues which emerge during the interview (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Possible questions to gain answers on the research questions are also shown in Appendix A. The results from the interviews were structured by creating a conceptual index. By sorting the themes of the topic-guide into a smaller number of main



categories, it was easier to label the results from the interviews. Hereby, it was crucial to not remove the provided information from its context. The labels were categorized with regard to the four variables composition, agenda, resources, and context. A subdivision of the specific aspects of the variables was made in order to distinguish proceedings in time chapters, to divide different parts of the variable, and to facilitate the labelling. The variable of context, for instance, could be subdivided in to the different aspects mentioned in the conceptual framework. Hereafter, the data was classified in a thematic matrix in Microsoft Excel, whereby each main topic had its own matrix. The respondents were sorted at the top of the matrix and the topics classified on the left side. The labelled data from the respondents from both cases were displayed in one matrix. In order to create an ordered matrix, firstly the respondents from Maastricht were displayed in the row of the respondents, followed by the interviewees of the Haarlem case. This did provide variable related matrixes which easily could be used to compare the differences and agreements between the respondents and the cases. Appendix B shows an example of how the matrix was classified. At this point the data was compared and elaborated in to descriptive accounts. In the last stage the data was finally analysed in a broader context.



## 4. Results

This section will reflect the findings of the qualitative research and possible outcomes are compared to the theoretical framework. Firstly the case of Haarlem will be discussed, followed by the case of Maastricht. Hereby, firstly the social and economical background of the cities will be displayed, followed by a description of the football clubs. Subsequently the incitement and outcomes of the decision making process and the active urban regime are discussed. Hereafter the results concerning the factors composition, agenda, and resources, and the separate amount of influence of each element on the decision making process will be addressed as well. Finally, an insight on the influence of the historical context on the process will be provided and each case will be finished with a short summary of the findings. The summary of the case of Maastricht will also discuss the comparison between the two cases.

### 4.1. Haarlem

#### 4.1.1. The city of Haarlem

In order to develop a clear image of the city where HFC Haarlem was settled and the social and economical context where the regime in Haarlem was active in, it is important to first outline the background situation of Haarlem.

With a population of approximately 153.000 in 2013 (Gemeente Haarlem, 2013), Haarlem can be described as a medium-sized city in the Netherlands. This population size did not explicitly increase or decrease the last decades, since approximately 149.000 people lived in Haarlem already in 1990. 26.2 percent of the population in 2013 is of foreign origin and the ratio male-female is 48.8 percent against 51.2 percent. The inhabitants in Haarlem are relatively young since the biggest part of the population is aged between 20 and 44 years (35.6 percent), followed by the age group 45 to 64 years (26.5 percent). Despite the young people, the member of the financial committee of HFC Haarlem described Haarlem as a sleeping city. This can be explained by the 65.600 people who live in Haarlem are working in elsewhere in the Netherlands (Gemeente Haarlem, 2005b). Only 29.600 inhabitants of Haarlem actually worked in Haarlem in 2005. The rest of the working population commutes between Haarlem and their work location. 20.300 people of this group work in the Dutch capital Amsterdam, which is just twenty kilometres away. Besides young and vital, Haarlem also has rather intelligent inhabitants. In 2011, 37 percent of the population of Haarlem aged between 15 and 64 years old had a higher educational level (Gemeente Haarlem, 2011). The average in the Netherlands is 28 percent. The amount of people with a lower- and middle educational level was in both cases lower than the average in the Netherlands. The on average high educated inhabitants



cause that the city of Haarlem can be classified as relatively safe. The 'AD misdaadmeter' demonstrates every year that Haarlem is one of the safest large municipalities in the Netherlands. The 'AD misdaadmeter' is an annual research of a national newspaper (Algemeen Dagblad), in corporation with the Dutch social-cultural organisation (SCP), concerning the safety and crime rates in municipalities. In the last publication (2013) Haarlem finished 63rd, whereas almost all other municipalities with comparable populations, finished above them (Algemeen Dagblad, 2013). This means there was more criminality in those other municipalities than in the municipality of Haarlem in 2012. Notwithstanding the high educational levels and the rather safe environment the inhabitants of Haarlem live in, Haarlem cannot, according to the former chairman of the supporters club of HFC Haarlem, be classified as an elitist city. *"We have enough working-class quarters. The complete east side of the city consists of working-class quarters. Haarlem-Zuid, the Schalkwijk and Noord also have their popular neighbourhoods, so I do not think there is any connection"*. With regard to the feelings of the inhabitants of Haarlem, the councillor of the social democrats (PvdA) stated that: *"People do feel proud to be an inhabitant of Haarlem. But they are not that proud as people from Groningen feel 'Gronings' or people from the province of Limburg feel they are 'Limburger'. It is much more a feeling of the broader north wing of the 'Randstad'. Amsterdam, Haarlem that is the area the people feel as home but not especially within the municipality of Haarlem"*. Furthermore, the town council of Haarlem contains 39 seats. During the last local elections in 2010 (four months after the bankruptcy of HFC Haarlem) the voter turnout was 53.0 percent (Kiesraad, 2013). This was slightly below the average turnout in the Netherlands (54.1 percent) but slightly above the average turnout of the province of Noord-Holland which Haarlem is part of (52.8 percent).

### *Economical background*

The social background part showed that many inhabitants of Haarlem work in the Amsterdam region. The region around the Dutch capital offers a lot of employment which results in an average unemployment rate of 4.7% in Haarlem in the period between 2009 and 2011 (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2013a), which is below the average unemployment rate of 5.2 % in the Netherlands during this period. The inhabitants of Haarlem working in the city are often operating in the public sector (government, education, health care). This sector contains more than 32 percent of the jobs in Haarlem (Gemeente Haarlem, 2012a). Furthermore, business services (21.4 percent) and wholesale and retail (18.7 percent) are the sectors which offer the most employment opportunities. However, the private sector mainly consists of small companies. One of the councillors argued: *"We do have a business area. But this is occupied by mostly small and medium sized businesses. There is a big pharmaceutical company situated in Haarlem, but this is the subsidiary of an American company"*. This is in contradiction with the past when big industrial companies were situated in Haarlem.





*“There was Stork, Figuee, there was HIN, and that kind of companies. But they all went away. We do not have the leading industry of half a century ago, anymore”* (member of the financial committee of HFC Haarlem). The absence of big industrial companies does not affect the average income of the inhabitants of Haarlem. With an average full time annual income of 31.900 euros per working inhabitant in 2010, the population of Haarlem has a higher average income than the average in the Netherlands, which was 29.800 euros in the same year (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2013b). The low level of unemployment and the high incomes presumably contribute to a housing market which expresses on average, higher housing prices than in the rest of the Netherlands. The average housing value in 2010 was 255.000 euros. This was 13.000 euros higher than the average housing value in the Netherlands (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2012). According to the councillor of the social democrats (PvdA) this is also the result of the environment of the city. *“I mean we win prices for best shopping city, best residential town, and whatever. It is a city to live in instead of a city to work”*.

#### **4.1.2. Football club HFC Haarlem**

It was important to find out the history of HFC Haarlem in order to understand the characteristics of the club. HFC Haarlem was, before they went bankrupt, after Sparta from Rotterdam the oldest Dutch football club performing at a professional level. The club was founded in 1889 and HFC Haarlem participated in the professional leagues since the introduction of professional football in the Netherlands in 1954. The 1980's were the successful years of the club. They qualified for the Uefa cup tournament and performed in the Dutch Eredivisie for almost the whole decade. After their relegation in 1990 they never managed to promote back to the highest level. Their only peak during the years before their bankruptcy was the period title in 2006, which meant qualification for the promotion/relegation play-offs.

HFC Haarlem had the reputation of being an elite club. The interim president in the months before the process and member of HFC Haarlem since 1957 said: *“I have been approved by a balloting committee to become member of the club. Children with a father working at a printing house or as a detective were immediately approved. I had to wait for two weeks since my father worked for a bakery”*. The stadium of HFC Haarlem was located in the northern part of the city. In this area lived many citizens from the working class. *“These people supported EDO, another football club in Haarlem, which played professional football until 1971. EDO was the working class club and their rivalry with middle class club HFC Haarlem stayed alive after their decline to the amateur level”*, according to the chairman of the supporters club of HFC Haarlem.



The attendances at the home matches of HFC Haarlem always lagged behind other clubs. There was a capacity of 3.442 visitors in the stadium. The last twenty years the average amount of spectators never reached above 2000, however. This problem of a low attendance already was an issue during the successful years of the club. A member of the financial committee of HFC Haarlem, who played more than 500 games for the club and helped to find investors during the last months before the bankruptcy, indicated that even during the successful 1980's, when the club had outstanding players such as Ruud Gullit, Arthur Numan, and Piet Keur, on average no more than 3000 people visited the home games.

#### **4.1.3. Motives for the decision making process**

An intelligent, vital, and safe environment, a good economic situation and a historical club with an elitist reputation formed the background of the decision making process. However, where did it go wrong for HFC Haarlem?

The plans for a new HFC Haarlem stadium dated from the late 1990's (Rekenkamercommissie Haarlem, 2010). This modern multifunctional venue with a capacity of 8000 visitors should have been built in the Eastern part of the city of Haarlem, near the train station 'Haarlem Spaarnwoude'. The plans for this stadium were considerably serious since the municipality of Haarlem and the real estate developer concluded both a letter of intent and a construction agreement. Thereby, the final design of the stadium was approved by the city council. However, the initiator (Imca Vastgoed B.V.) was taken over by another real estate developer (Maeyveld B.V.). Subsequently, an acquisition of Maeyveld B.V. followed in 2007. The new owner, 'Fortress projectontwikkeling B.V.', had no trust in a profitable development of 'Stadion Oostpoort' and decided to withdraw from the project. As a consequence, HFC Haarlem faced immediate financial problems in the beginning of 2009. This was, inter alia, caused by two large sponsors who withdrew after the abolition of the new stadium. Furthermore, the club had adjusted their budget to the incomes which should emanate from the new stadium the upcoming years. In January 2009, HFC Haarlem inquired the municipality of Haarlem to grant the club an emergency loan of 450.000 euros. This was accepted by the town council due to the efforts of HFC Haarlem for the maintenance of their stadium facilities the years before, which actually was the task, as owners of the stadium, of the municipality. Nevertheless, during the fall of 2009 HFC Haarlem again was in financial problems and requested the town council to confer a loan of 300.000 euros. However, the town council considered their financial gifts to improve the quality of the stadium, in the periods before, as the maximum they could execute in order to help the club. The suggestion of a councillor to decrease the problems of the club, by remitting the income taxes for the months November and December in 2009, was rejected by the majority of the council as well.



Furthermore, an accepted motion within the council during the same meeting of November 5, 2009, underlined the opinion of the town council that the football club was responsible for its own financial problems. Thus, the town council was not willing to help the club with the acute financial problems and HFC Haarlem had to solve their problems by finding new sponsors or private investors. After this decision and the lack of interest of private parties in the club, HFC Haarlem was forced to request for a suspension of payment claims in the beginning of January, 2010. During the weeks thereafter HFC Haarlem still did not manage to solve their financial problems and went bankrupt on January 25, 2010.

#### 4.1.4. The urban regime in Haarlem

HFC Haarlem did have an elitist reputation and the municipality decided to not support the club when it seemed the club would go bankrupt. The fatal financial problems were caused by the cancellation of the new stadium. However, what were the actual reasons to cancel the stadium? And how were the relationship within the regime?

##### *Composition*

The theory of Dowding (2001) showed that the relationship between market force and political control structures the urban regime. This theory was confirmed in Haarlem by the relationship between the municipality and real estate developer Fortress. Since Fortress is a company which is situated in Rotterdam, their connection with the city of Haarlem was strictly pragmatic. Real estate developer Fortress participated in several projects in Haarlem and the municipality of Haarlem offered the developer an advance of seventeen million euros in 2008, in order to continue with the projects during the financial crisis (Rekenkamercommissie Haarlem, 2012). This made their relationship rather intense. The advance was granted after the private party decided to cancel the development of the new stadium, despite the fact that this was viewed as a swindle by the municipality. However, after the transaction, the municipality was now rather depending on the real estate developer, according to Jeroen Fritz, councillor of the social democrats (PvdA). This turned Fortress into an influential party in Haarlem. Local political parties even wondered whether the municipality of Haarlem was equal to Fortress (Haarlems dagblad, 2011). The theory of Stoker and Mossberger (1994) classifies the dependency on a nonlocal party as a characteristic of an instrumental or a symbolic regime type. One of the councillors also argued that, with the exception of some small businesses in the city, there was no solid collaboration between the municipality and other sectors or parties from Haarlem. *“Haarlem has a good reputation as a city to live in and the unemployment rate is still quite good, notwithstanding the crisis. Companies settle in*



*Haarlem for those reasons instead of per se feeling attracted to Haarlem*". This is in contrast with the period there was contact with the initiator of the new stadium of HFC Haarlem, Erik de Vlieger. The owner of Imca Vastgoed B.V. was born in Haarlem and a supporter of HFC Haarlem. However, during the crucial period prior to the bankruptcy, Erik de Vlieger was not able to intervene since he was under supervision of Justice. *"I spoke with him. But he could not do anything. He had no access to his money"* (former chairman of the supporters club). His personal problems were also the reason Erik de Vlieger had to sell his company to Maeyveld B.V.. As a consequence, he more or less disappeared from the urban regime in Haarlem.

### *Agenda*

The importance of a topic for the urban regime determines whether it will receive attention on the agenda of the regime, according to the theory of Berger (2001). Until one year before the bankruptcy of HFC Haarlem the new stadium was an important project on the agenda of Fortress and the municipality. However, Fortress withdrew from the project because they argued that they could not develop the stadium in a profitable manner (Rekenkamercommissie Haarlem, 2012). Some respondents thought there were other reasons: *"There was the stadium and some other projects, such as the post office. Those other projects were much more important for the politics in Haarlem"* (member of the financial committee of HFC Haarlem). This was caused by the advance of seventeen million euros the municipality granted to real estate developer Fortress. According to a councillor of the Christian democrats (CDA), the municipality of Haarlem only facilitated the development of the new stadium since the location of the old stadium was a great opportunity for housing development. This statement corresponds with two other respondents who argued that after the cancellation of the new stadium, the municipality did not cooperate with HFC Haarlem with regard to the redevelopment of the old stadium. This is in accordance with the instrumental characteristics project realization (purpose) and tangible results (motivation of participant) of Stoker & Mossberger (1994). Thereby, four of the respondents in Haarlem stated that culture was much more important for the municipality of Haarlem than sports, since the municipality of Haarlem invested between 80 and 100 million euros in music venues the years before and after the decision making process of HFC Haarlem. Furthermore, the respondents mentioned housing problems, the town centre, and residential areas as important on the agenda of the municipality.

In March 2009, the town council decided to investigate the financial position of the football club HFC Haarlem, in order to analyse whether it was rational to invest in the maintenance of the HFC Haarlem stadium. In November 2009, eight months later, was the first meeting of the council where the situation of HFC Haarlem was discussed again. Councillors accused the alderman of sports (Maarten Divendal) of not providing the information of the financial position results earlier



(Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). Divendal reacted and argued that no councillor ever asked for the results of the report. During this council meeting, the decision was taken not provide a loan of 300.000 euros since the club was responsible for their own financial problems. Furthermore, councillors were concerned about their former decision in spring 2009 to invest in the stadium facilities as they were anxious they had invested money in the stadium of a club which may not be in existence for very long. This was more important for the town council than being worried about a possible loss of HFC Haarlem for the city of Haarlem. The pointing fingers of blame and the concerns about wasting public money indicated that the possible bankruptcy of the club seemed to be of secondary importance and not relevant on the agenda. In addition the decision making process was five months before the town council elections. A councillor argued that this was an issue for the councillors as well: *"You do not make voters enthusiastic in Haarlem with HFC Haarlem"*.

Two respondents mentioned that the lack of interest of the town council for HFC Haarlem was also a result of too little critique and pressure on the municipality from the citizens of Haarlem and the club. *"We believed too much that it would turn out alright in the end. We should have thumped the table. I mean at other clubs four hundred by drugs influenced idiots are standing in front of the town hall, whereby the military police has to intervene. In Haarlem fifty neat supporters joined the council meeting"* (former chairman of the supporters club).

### Resources

The first point of attention for HFC Haarlem was finances. According to one of the representatives of HFC Haarlem, the club needed 400.000 euros to finish the season 2009/2010. In order to fill the shortages, the business networks of the people of HFC Haarlem were approached. Most business relationships were established wealthy people from Haarlem but also real estate brokers and friends of the authoritative of HFC Haarlem. However, for many of the approached parties the policy of the club in the past made them apprehensive to invest in HFC Haarlem during the crucial period before the bankruptcy. A group of supporters and old players of the club managed to collect nearly 100.000 euros from fundraising activities focussed in and around the local citizens of Haarlem. However, this was 300.000 euro less than needed to survive since both the possible private investors and municipality refused to help out. According to the former chairman of the supporters club this was a consequence of the past. *"People are insulted. People went to the club with money, but they were sent away. They said we are willing to invest but then we want participation in the club. That was not possible. Mino Raiola (football player agent) left the board in the early 1990's since he pleaded for renewal. But the old jerks of the board did not think it was a good idea to do something extra"*. One of the reasons for the municipality to not help finding or granting financial resources was politics. One of the representatives of HFC Haarlem stated *"We had bad luck with the*



*upcoming elections. The consequence of these elections was that both the aldermen and the councillors did not move for HFC Haarlem anymore*". This is in accordance with one of the councillors who argued, as mentioned before, that voters are not gained by promoting with HFC Haarlem.

On long-term HFC Haarlem not only needed financial resources, the board of HFC Haarlem needed a structural metamorphosis. The boards of HFC Haarlem had the reputation of being old-fashioned and apprehensive to introduce new initiatives and visions. According to the interim chairman, who before the function of chairman was part of the board of members (the highest department of the club), the board of HFC Haarlem regularly failed in providing information about finances, plans for the new stadium, or possible new investors to the board of members, the years before the bankruptcy. This was a failure of the board of HFC Haarlem but also, according to the interim president, the board of members also failed in executing their monitoring task. He stated: *"The board of members should have been more decisive. But it fits with the club HFC Haarlem; avoiding conflicts"*. One of the councillors of the municipality of Haarlem argued: *"The problem was not only money. It was also a matter of knowledge and professionalism"*. The lack of professionalism and the attitude towards people within and outside the club did not only lead to financial problems, it also led to a negative posture from the outsiders towards the club at the moment HFC Haarlem needed their help desperately.

#### **4.1.5. Historical context**

The urban regime in Haarlem clearly had no interest in supporting HFC Haarlem. Furthermore, many potential investors did not want to support due to the elitist reputation of the club. However, was the reputation of being an elite club the reason why HFC Haarlem lacked in finding financial resources, or were there other reasons which explained the unpopularity of the club?

#### *Relationship between club and the city*

The elitist reputation of HFC Haarlem, as discussed above in the HFC Haarlem paragraph, still had effect on the relationship between the city and the club. According to the interim chairman of HFC Haarlem, this elitist way of thinking was still embedded in the club. The same person stated that the relationship with amateur clubs in Haarlem had been nugatory in the past since there was no clear communication between HFC Haarlem and the amateur clubs. However, the last fifteen years has seen a slight improvement in the relationship with the amateur clubs. People of HFC Haarlem went to the amateur clubs to explain their actions with regard to the attraction of talented amateur players to their club. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient to abate all the aversion. He also argued:



*"We once had a board which did not want to talk with the local newspaper 'Haarlems Dagblad' anymore. They found that the newspaper wrote too negative about the club". Furthermore, HFC Haarlem never strived to strengthen the bond with the inhabitants and businesses of the city. "During the 1980's HFC Haarlem always survived on one big sponsor; Mita, a Japanese company which produced copy machines. But next to this single big sponsor, they never invested in customer loyalty. Supporters have tried to set up actions with the old cinema at the 'Grote markt', in the past. It was all arranged. When people showed their purchased cinema ticket at the HFC Haarlem stadium before a match, they would receive a reduction for the game of HFC Haarlem. And vice versa with a ticket of a game of HFC Haarlem people would get a reduction for a cinema ticket. The board of HFC Haarlem only did need to agree. But they refused it. They told us they needed no more attendance since they could survive with one big sponsor" (Chairman of the supporters club of HFC Haarlem). Three of the respondents argued the support for the club in the city was scarce. "The popularity of HFC Haarlem goes back to moments in my experience" (representative of HFC Haarlem). One respondent stated that HFC Haarlem was more popular outside than inside the city of Haarlem.*

### *Stadium image*

The stadium of HFC Haarlem was one of the crucial factors for the financial problems of the club. Both supporters and management of HFC Haarlem felt that without a new stadium or a redevelopment of the old stadium the club would not survive in the future. The stadium image was also one of the reasons of the unpopularity of the club in the city. All of the respondents agreed that the condition of the old stadium of HFC Haarlem was far below professional level. One of the councillors: *"It was not attractive to visit a match every week. And when you would invite some business relations, it would be nice if they would not have to stand in the wind and rain during the match".* The stadium just could not offer an attractive evening for possible business relations, which also had a negative effect on the reputation of the club in the city. *"I have visited the business club of HFC Haarlem. But the average Hoofdklasser (until 2010 the highest amateur level in the Netherlands) managed the business club better. I have been to Rijnsburg in the bollenstreek, at Lisse, IJsselmeervogels, Spakenburg. If you see how it works there and then compare it to ours, well that is terrible"* (former chairman of the supporters club). One of the respondents also stated that the lack of maintenance of the stadium played a role since people had to pay twenty-five Dutch guilders for a dirty seat on the main stand.

### *Popularity of football*

HFC Haarlem was a football club with one of the lowest average attendances in professional football in the Netherlands. Clubs from much smaller cities had much higher attendance than that of





HFC Haarlem (Voetbal international, 2012). Cambuur based in Leeuwarden (population: approx. 96.000 – attendance: 4000-8000), FC Den Bosch based in Den Bosch (population: approx. 141.000 – attendance: 3800-4000), Fortuna Sittard based in Sittard (population: approx. 94.000 – attendance: 3300), and Go Ahead Eagles based in Deventer (population: approx – attendance 4500) are examples of the attendance differences with HFC Haarlem the years before their bankruptcy. The former chairman of the supporters club stated: *“The official numbers of HFC Haarlem were between 1500 and 1800 supporters per match. But often the real attendance was not even nearly these numbers”*. Two respondents stated that they did not have the feeling football was unpopular in Haarlem. One of them mentioned that a lack of local pride decreased the popularity of HFC Haarlem. Another respondent argued that during European Championships and World Cups and on Sunday’s when Feyenoord or Ajax played, all the pubs which broadcasted live football were and are completely crowded. Therefore it seems that it is not football which was unpopular, but it was HFC Haarlem which was not admired in the city.

### *Competition of HFC Haarlem*

The interest in the live matches of bigger football teams indicates already one of the big competitors of HFC Haarlem. Three respondents mentioned that Ajax, based in Amsterdam, was Haarlem’s biggest competitor. *“Most people in Haarlem support Ajax”* stated one of the councillors. Furthermore, the club had to compete with rival Telstar, based in Velzen and clubs such as AZ Alkmaar and FC Volendam located north of Haarlem. Even the amateur clubs south of Haarlem were mentioned as competition. Amateur clubs such as FC Lisse, Rijnsburgse Boys, Quick Boys and VV Katwijk are famous for their fanatical supporters and high attendances which easily can compete with the number of supporters in the Jupiler League. *“As a consequence, the supporters of HFC Haarlem really had to come from the region Haarlem”* (councillor of PvdA). The councillor of the Christian democrats stated: *“There are already enough clubs in the region”*.

The competition of HFC Haarlem was not only football related but other sport clubs competed with the football club as well. According to one of the councillors, the municipality invested in sports where they felt the city of Haarlem was good at. The municipalities’ sport agenda showed that the five top sports the municipality of Haarlem focuses on are baseball, softball, judo, badminton, and gymnastics (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010a). The social projects of HFC Haarlem are mentioned in the sport agenda but football is not classified as a primary sport in Haarlem. Thus, HFC Haarlem also competed with the five primary sports since the municipality of Haarlem invested in the facilities of these sports. As a result, they wanted these preferred sports to become more popular. In 2005, for instance, the municipality of Haarlem decided to invest 6.6 million euros in the restructuring of the ‘Pim Mulier sportpark’ (Gemeente Haarlem, 2005a). A stadium used for baseball





and softball, completed in 2010. Furthermore, the interim president of HFC Haarlem argued that the attendance numbers of HFC Haarlem are not higher than the attendance figures of baseball club Kinheim.

#### *The popularity of sports in Haarlem*

11.1 percent (more than 43 million euros) of the municipality of Haarlem's budget for the period 2013-2017 is reserved for the segment 'youth, education, and sports' (Gemeente Haarlem, 2012b). Hereby, 10.69 million euros is budgeted for sport. Within the segment youth, education, and sport, sport is the only sector which has a lower budget than in 2011. The investments of the municipality are all budgeted for recreational sports or accommodations. Exactly nil euros are budgeted for top sports. Besides, it was also mentioned twice that in the past, Haarlem had a professional club in every sport. One of the representatives of HFC Haarlem stated: *"All the top sports have almost disappeared. We started with everything. We had volleyball, we had football, next to Kinheim we had another baseball club and we had basketball on the highest level. They all have been champions of their sport, but in Haarlem nothing is left"*. Culture on the other hand has a budget of almost 26 million euros for the year 2013. Three respondents mentioned that Haarlem is a cultural city rather than a sports city. One of the councillors stated: *"It is preferred to invest in culture because Haarlem has a good cultural name within the Netherlands. We have a couple museums, pop stages, when you connect your name with those, it immediately is good advertising"*. The program budget of the municipality of Haarlem describes culture as an integral part of the economy and the business climate of the city of Haarlem (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010b). According to the sports agenda (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010a), 67 percent of the inhabitants played sports on a regular basis in 2007. This equates to a minimum of once per month according to the Dutch standard for healthy exercise (NNGB). As a comparison, the average sport participation in the Netherlands was 65 percent in 2007. The aim of the municipality of Haarlem is to increase their average to 70 percent in 2012. As no new version of the Haarlem sports agenda has yet been published, it is not clear whether this target has been achieved. However, concerning recreational sports participation Haarlem scored a little bit higher than the average in 2007, already.

#### **4.1.6. The Haarlem case summarized**

Haarlem is a, for Dutch standards, medium-sized city. The population can be described as young and highly educated. Furthermore, the city is compared to other medium-sized cities rather safe and a large amount of the labour force performs their job in Amsterdam. The inhabitant of Haarlem is not chauvinistic and is more proud of being an inhabitant of the area surrounding



Amsterdam than being a citizen of Haarlem. Besides a good social environment, the economy is flourishing too. Haarlem has a low unemployment rate and the average income and housing prices are higher than the average in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, less large companies are settled in Haarlem. Most companies are middle and small businesses.

HFC Haarlem was one of the oldest professional clubs in the Netherlands and had the reputation of being an elitist club. The 1980's were the best years of the club and after relegation in the beginning of the 1990's the club never managed to promote back again to the highest level. The municipality of Haarlem was owner of the clubs venue but, rather strictly, limited their endeavours for the maintenance of the stadium. Furthermore, the municipality facilitated the construction of a new stadium but did not invest in the new stadium. Their main persuasive to facilitate was the location of the old stadium, which after demolition could be used to develop residential space. When the new stadium of HFC Haarlem was cancelled, the club immediately faced financial problems. Firstly, the club went to the municipality but the town council decided to only provide money for the maintenance of the old stadium. A second attempt in the fall of 2009 did not entice the town council to provide money either. The town council found that a professional football club should be able to regulate their own finances. Thereafter, the club approached private parties and the supporters collected money from the inhabitants of Haarlem. Nevertheless the club went bankrupt since potential investors were not willing to help the club. This was, inter alia, a result of an elitist attitude of the club towards those same potential investors in the past.

The urban regime around the decision making process consisted of only two parties; the municipality of Haarlem, and real estate developer Fortress. The municipality was rather depending on the developer since they granted the external party a loan of approximately 17 million euros. As a consequence, the agenda of the regime was also determined by the real estate developer. This resulted in a cancellation of the stadium since Fortress had no longer interest in developing the new venue. They were more interested in, more profitable, other projects in the city. The municipality was not content with this decision, but their 80 to 100 million euros investment in cultural projects, whilst there were no investments in sport projects, demonstrated their priorities. This was also the result of too less pressure on the agenda of the regime. Thus, the regime was not willing to invest in sports and HFC Haarlem in particular, but money recruitment by the supporters and the board of HFC Haarlem did not yield a lot either.

This was the result of a poor understanding between the club and the city in the past and due to the elitist reputation and former HFC Haarlem boards' negative attitude towards new ideas and suggestions. Besides, due to the worse condition of their stadium, HFC Haarlem has always attracted fewer visitors to their matches than other clubs in their league, even if these clubs played in less inhabited municipalities than Haarlem. However, this was also a result of the enormous



competition the club faced. Clubs such as Ajax and AZ, and big amateur clubs in their surroundings made it hard to attract people from the region around Haarlem to the stadium. Besides, the municipality of Haarlem always focussed on other sports than football in their policies. Football was not one of the top five sports the municipality was willing to invest in. Despite these small investments in other sports, the municipality of Haarlem cannot be classified as sports city. Many of the professional sport clubs have gone bankrupt in the past. Thereby Haarlem presents itself as a cultural city and cooperates with, for instance, Amsterdam in order to attract tourists to their museums. This cultural minded thinking resulted in the investment of nearly 100 million euros in different pop stages.

To conclude, the bankruptcy of HFC Haarlem was not only the result of an urban regime which was more interested in other projects than the new stadium of the club, the context of the process played also an important role. The past between the club and the city caused that the possible bankruptcy of HFC Haarlem was not important at all for the citizens of Haarlem.

## 4.2. Maastricht

### 4.2.1. The city of Maastricht

In 2010, approximately 118.500 people lived in Maastricht. This was a decline of four thousand inhabitants compared to a decade before (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2010). 48.1 percent of these residents were of the male gender. The biggest group of people had an age between 20 and 44 years (34.8 percent). Followed by the group between 45 and 64, which was 28.4 percent of the population of Maastricht. Furthermore, the oldest group (65 years and older) was still 18.1 percent. Of all the people living in the municipality of Maastricht in 2010, 23.7 percent were from ethnic minorities. A councillor of the social democrats (PvdA) stated that the original inhabitants of Maastricht, who were born and raised in the city, are often very chauvinistic. *“If you ask other people in the southern part of the province of Limburg, than we are chauvinistic and arrogant. However, inter alia, the establishment of the university caused an enormous change of the composition of the population. More people born outside Maastricht are now living here. But I think, with regard to population, it is one of the most varied cities in the southern part of the Netherlands”*. According to a journalist of a regional newspaper, Maastricht was one of the most dangerous cities in the Netherlands in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. *“There really were abuses in Maastricht. Maastricht was the city with the highest infant mortality. The neighbourhood around the factory of Sphinx was the poorest neighbourhood in the country”*. Despite the advent of a university, a teaching hospital, and a couple of European (education) institutions, Maastricht is still one of the most criminal cities in



the Netherlands. Maastricht finished as fourth in the 'AD Misdaadmeter' of 2012. Only the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Eindhoven can be classified as less safe cities. This while, with regard to population size, Maastricht is only the 22<sup>nd</sup> municipality in the Netherlands (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2013). Furthermore, according to a member of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV', Maastricht is the unhealthiest region in the Netherlands. *"We have the most inhabitants with an unhealthy lifestyle. The teaching hospital is performing a research among 10.000 inhabitants concerning diabetes type 2. This research lasts for ten years and is the biggest medical research ever performed, worldwide"*. Thus, it might be assumed that Maastricht is an unsafe and unhealthy city. Nevertheless, still 43.5 percent of the inhabitants had a higher educational level in 2010, which is an enormous increase compared to 2004, when this was only 33.0 percent (Gemeente Maastricht, 2013b). It also has more than the average amount of higher educated inhabitants in the Netherlands (28 percent). Both the amount of inhabitants with a lower educational level and a secondary educational level decreased with a couple of percent in Maastricht between 2004 and 2010. With regard to voter turnout during the last local elections, Maastricht scores lower than the average in both the province of Limburg and the Netherlands (Kiesraad, 2013). 49.4 percent of the people in Maastricht went to the ballot box, whilst this was 53.8 percent in the whole province. In the Netherlands the average voter turnout was even higher (54.1 percent). According to the theory of Savitch and Kantor (2002) a low voter turnout should encourage an exclusive orientation of the urban regime. This is in accordance with the characteristics of the organic and symbolic regime types of Stoker and Mossberger (1994).

### *Economical background*

The social background displayed the changing environment in Maastricht. More and more inhabitants were not born in the city of Maastricht. The university and hospital are important for the city since they pull higher educated people to the city. Thereby, it caused that 38.5 percent of the working people in Maastricht is active in the public administration, education, and health care (Gemeente Maastricht, 2013c). This is by far the biggest segment in Maastricht. The second section (trade and hotel & catering industry) encompasses only 21.2 percent of the labour force. Another 17.0 percent works for financial institutions and in the business services. A former player of MVV and now entrepreneur in Maastricht stated: *"Maastricht was really an industrial city in the past. There were a couple of local industries. Enci, Sphinx, Mosa, but those companies all globalised. Nowadays, it is mainly small and medium business. And Q-park. That is quite a large company"*. Two respondents mentioned that Maastricht can be classified as a tourist city. This corresponds with the amount of nights people stayed in accommodations in Maastricht. As already mentioned, with regards to population size, Maastricht is the 22<sup>nd</sup> municipality in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, Maastricht was the fourth city, with regard to hotel stays in 2010 (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2013). More



people stayed in Maastricht than in the, for instance, much bigger city of Utrecht, which is located in the popular 'randstad' area. Though, the unemployment rate in Maastricht was rather high between 2009 and 2011 (7.5 percent). This is far above the average of 5.4 percent in the Netherlands, during the same period (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2013a). The people who work full-time for a whole year earn almost three thousand euros less (27.200) than the average in the Netherlands. However, the difference with the housing prices is much bigger. The average price in Maastricht was 205.000 euros in 2010. This is well below the average housing price in the Netherlands, which was 242.000 euros (Centraal bureau voor de statistiek, 2012). As a consequence, it seems that the demand for residences in Maastricht cannot be classified as really high.

#### **4.2.2. MVV Maastricht**

Despite the beauty of the inner city of Maastricht and the tourists it attracts, Maastricht has to contend with several problems. The average inhabitant of Maastricht can be classified as unhealthy and the crime rate in Maastricht is rather high. Nevertheless, the original inhabitants of Maastricht are proud of their city. This chauvinistic attitude, in combination with the industrial past, contributes to the popularity of the football club MVV.

MVV was established in 1902 and as a consequence is still one of the oldest professional football clubs in the Netherlands. After the start of professional football in the Netherlands in 1954, MVV managed to stay in the highest league until 1976. Until their relegation in 2000 they played 36 seasons in the Eredivisie and they never performed more than two seasons in sequence at the second level. However, after the year 2000 they never have managed to promote back again. Nevertheless, they are still ranked 12th at the all-time Eredivisie ranking (before the start of the season 2012/2013; Voetbal International, 2012). One of the highlights of the club was the participation in the Intertoto cup in 1970. They won their group stage, but as there were no further rounds due to a lack of professionalism in those years, their European aspirations ended at that point. The decade in the Jupiler League before the decision making process in 2010 started rather wretched. The results were poor and MVV finished at the 18th place in 2004, which was the lowest place in professional football. The results improved a little bit the years after, which led to qualification in 2008 and 2009 for the promotion/relegation play-offs.

MVV originally can be considered as a working man's club which emanates from Maastricht its industrial past. The former stadium of MVV was until the early 1960's located near the factory of Sphinx, a company on the edge of the city which produces pottery. As a consequence, many of the workers were attached to MVV and during those days a game of MVV was almost the only entertainment they had. In addition, almost all the players of the club worked for the manufacturers.



The attendance during the matches of MVV has always been quite high. This led multiple times to an expansion of the old stadium and the capacity in the end was 18.000. This was also the starting capacity of the new stadium in the north of Maastricht. Nevertheless, the stadium capacity reduced in the decades after the opening, due to the dilapidated state of the venue, safety reasons and decreasing attendance numbers (MVV Maastricht, 2013).

#### 4.2.3. Motives for the decision making process

MVV can be considered as a popular club in Maastricht. Nonetheless, MVV faced enormous financial problems in 2010. A small reconstruction of the process is displayed below.

According to a former alderman of the municipality of Maastricht, the first signs of a weak financial situation of MVV emerged in the first half of 2009. *“There were moments the board of MVV, in total panic, visited my office. With the story they actually could no longer pay the wages”*. A couple of months later, during the fall of 2009, the members of the MVV supporters club were informed by players and staff of the club, whom indicated that their salaries were not paid, according to a member of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’. This was the second sign that the financial situation of MVV was rather grave. The months afterwards, thirteen people of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’ started to develop a project that should prevent future mismanagement. ‘Initiatiefgroep MVV’ was the collective noun of a group of people whom, in secret, wanted to help MVV by granting knowledge and experience. This expressed in a written plan. However, during the development of the plan they had no idea how serious the problems of MVV actually were. Nevertheless, they contacted the board of mayor and aldermen in the spring of 2010, with the message they were working on a plan for a restart of MVV (Gemeente Maastricht, 2010c). They were aware of the relationship between the municipality and MVV. Their relation was rather sensitive due to decision making processes in the past. However, the initiators required the municipality to solve a part of the financial problems, since the municipality was one of the largest creditors. Supporting MVV meant remission of a subordinated loan of 1.7 million, purchase of stadium ‘De Geusselt’ for 1.85 million, and a single contribution of 200.000 euros for the transition of MVV (Rekenkamer Maastricht, 2012). This was a difficult process since the municipality assisted MVV already a couple of times in the decade before. As a consequence, between and within fractions of the town council there was a lot of division. In May 2010 the situation went critical. *“We received a phone call from mayor Mans. Tomorrow they cannot pay anymore. It’s over”* (member of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’). From that point the group of initiators also started to develop a remediation plan for the smaller creditors. The group of initiators put a lot of effort in it in order to convince the different councillors, fractions, and creditors to support their plan. A councillor of the social democrats (PvdA) stated *“I know there was still one*



*person rather sceptic within our fraction one week before the decision making. We called a member of the 'initiatiefgroep' and said, 'the biggest part of the fraction is taking the same line, but one person still doubts'. They came again, explained everything again, and clarified all the financial figures again".* The effort of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' paid off since the town council agreed with their plan during the council meeting of May 26, 2010. 23 councillors voted for the plan, 11 councillors voted against, and one councillor refrained from voting in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest (Gemeente Maastricht, 2010b). There were some conditions for the support of MVV. On the one hand, the debts of the 180 creditors had to become remitted. On the other hand, the stadium had to become multifunctional, which meant not only used by football club MVV. Furthermore, the club had to include a social character in the future. Finally, MVV had to cooperate with the youth academies of Roda JC and Fortuna Sittard, and the members of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' had to form the new board of MVV.

#### **4.2.4. The urban regime in Maastricht**

The urban regime in Maastricht prevented a bankruptcy of MVV due to their efforts to develop a plan for the future and by convincing politicians to support the football club. As a consequence, the composition, agenda, and resources of the regime in Maastricht were important for the process.

##### *Composition*

The urban regime in Maastricht was rather diverse in composition. The eleven to fourteen initiators of the plan to help MVV were mostly people active in the private sector. *"It was a large mix. There was a former mayor. Business people, people from the banking sector, accountants, advertisers. It was a varied gamma of people with a realistic view on the world"* (member of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV'). This group was composed by the secretary and the chairman of the supporters club of MVV, who were concerned about the situation of the club. The people involved in the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' were people who felt attracted to the city of Maastricht and more or less were supporters of MVV. This was not striking since two respondents noticed that there was a lot of interest in MVV from the private sectors. According to one of the members of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV', 200 companies in Maastricht have a MVV heart and are interested in the city. Furthermore, two respondents mentioned that the initiators agreed MVV was served by new people in the board. A councillor of the PvdA, who knew the initiators already before they were developing a plan, stated: *"We agreed already long before it would not work with the present board because in Maastricht still dominates a small group who all know each other and cooperate". And it was really a fortress there.*





*That was unimaginable*". The people in the ruling board of MVV were people who were good friends or business partners with former MVV board members. Some of them were wealthy business people and rather influential in the city. However, in the spring of 2010 when the board of MVV withdrew from the club, there was space for a new impetus, according to a former alderman of sports. This promoted the relationship with the municipality. However, there was still a lot of tension between the municipality and MVV since the former boards had not contributed to a popular reputation of MVV within the town council. This was the result of two aspects. Firstly, there was the decision making process in 2003, when the town council decided not to help MVV. This was the start of heavy riots by supporters in front of the town hall. At the end of the evening councillors had to be transported in police vans in order to secure their safety. According to one of the councillors this still had impact on some people within the town council, but also on inhabitants of Maastricht. And secondly, it was the attitude of the former boards of MVV. A former MVV player and, nowadays, entrepreneur in Maastricht stated: *"MVV never organized something with or for former MVV players. They did not participate in the society of Maastricht. The former boards were not involved in the city"*. Nevertheless, MVV requested the municipality multiple times to help the club since the start of the 21st century (Rekenkamer Maastricht, 2012). Thus, the relationship between MVV and the municipality could be classified as abstemious. Nonetheless, due to the location of the stadium of MVV the municipality was unintentionally seriously involved in the process. This will be discussed more extensively in the agenda paragraph. With regards to the influence on the process, one of the respondents mentioned that the role of the mayor was very potent. Another respondent stated that Paul Rinkens (member of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV') had a great role in convincing the different fractions. A third respondent argued that the alderman of sports Luc Winants was of great value for the MVV's rescue since he was passionate and really felt that the club added value to the city. The composition of the regime changed a couple of months after the decision making process. Councillors blamed the alderman of sports of withholding information concerning the processes around the plan of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV'. During the council meeting of September 22, 2010, the alderman of Sports decided to resign as alderman (Gemeente Maastricht, 2010a). Furthermore, seven of the initiators of the rescue plan took seats on the board of MVV. Some members of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' left the group since they felt they accomplished their mission.

### *Agenda*

The agenda of the urban regime around the decision making process can be divided into two parts; the agenda of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' and the political agenda in Maastricht. The plan of the initiators displayed their focus on the social importance of the new policy of the club (Initiatiefgroep MVV, 2010). According to the plan, there should be more contact between MVV and





the population of Maastricht, whereby MVV should be accessible for everyone. One of the initiators of the plan argued: *"When the people of the plan met the first time, everybody had to clarify why he wanted to help MVV and what he wanted to achieve with the possible plan. The main comment was that we wanted to give something back to the city of Maastricht. We have something with the city, and we want to give something back since in life it is a matter of give-and-take. And that is possible via the football club MVV"*. The social and public interest of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' was rather important. *"The area around Maastricht is the unhealthiest region in the Netherlands. It has been proven that football players can play an exemplary role. They have an enormous impact on children but also on adults. So if you can contribute to this as a sport organisation that is great. By means of sport you can connect people* (again a member of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV'). Three other respondents also mentioned that the social interest was the most important factor for the initiators of the rescue plan. A journalist argued that the endeavour of the initiators all was based on a love for the city and for the club MVV. *"There was no double agenda. No commercial interest for their name or their company. Thereby it was all voluntary. None of the initiators now has a paid job at the club MVV. It's still unpaid work"*. The social perspective of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' corresponds with a couple characteristics of the organic regime type of Stoker and Mossberger (1994).

The municipality of Maastricht had completely different concerns with regard to the case of MVV. In 2003 the town council decided to not support MVV anymore. The private sector was now in charge to help the club with its financial problems (Rekenkamer Maastricht, 2012). Nevertheless, the town council again faced the financial problems of MVV in 2010. Many of the parties still had the intention to maintain the decision made in 2003. However, another problem occurred. The large project around the stadium of MVV, the so-called 'Geusselpark', is important for the municipality. In the urban vision of the municipality, the park around stadium the Geusselt is described as one of the pillars for urban renewal in Maastricht (Gemeente Maastricht, 2005). The municipality invests approximately 37 million euros in the development of the area. A new swimming pool, a new sports hall, the building of 400 apartments, 40.000 square meters of office space and a general upgrading of the park should modify the 'Geusselpark' and attract both residents and businesses (Gemeente Maastricht, 2011). Four respondents mentioned the area around the stadium as important. *"The complete urban development plan only could take place if there was a nice, vital area around the Geusselt. Therefore we needed a landmark which yields something. As a consequence, the stadium was from a real estate perspective of absolute necessity to stay occupied"* (former alderman of sports). One of the initiators of the rescue plan believed that the location of the stadium was crucial in the decision making process. He argued: *"No, I think that if the stadium was located somewhere else than in the Geusselt area, we never would have gained cooperation of the municipality for the restructuring"*. This was also a conclusion of the audit of the municipality of Maastricht (Rekenkamer



Maastricht, 2012). In addition, one of the councillors argued that the economical interest was the most important, whereby the rescue of the club MVV was a great incidental. The importance of the area around the stadium of MVV is in accordance with the instrumental characteristics of the theory of Stoker and Mossberger (1994). The statement of one of the councillors that the result of the decision making process was also the consequence of electoral motivations, fits also with those characteristics.

The role of the media was not striking in the process. A journalist, who followed the process around MVV, mentioned that newspapers published daily articles concerning the case in the days and weeks around the process. *“The media had an informing roll. The inhabitants and also, for instance, creditors were informed by the media. I do not think the press is used in order to make things happen. It was more a matter of keeping things away from the newspaper than using it to influence people”*. One of the councillors stated that the openness of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’ towards the press helped the acceptance amongst the inhabitants of Maastricht. *“Normally it can be restless among the inhabitants of the city the weeks after a process like this. That was not the case. The people understood why decisions were made”*.

### Resources

It has already been discussed that the initiators of the ‘new’ MVV agreed that the club needed new leaders in the future. The two original initiators approached other people with this opinion, according to one of the members of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’. Three other respondents argued that MVV needed (management) knowledge, a better network, and vision. Therefore the two original initiators approached people from different sectors and with different qualities. A former player of MVV and entrepreneur in Maastricht, nowadays, stated: *“The people of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’ had a great network, which is extremely important and said ‘we go for it’. They offered a great business plan. And that is where they have persuaded people with”*. In the plan the initiators also announced Q-park as a new sponsor for the upcoming seasons (Initiatiefgroep MVV, 2010). Ward Vleugels, one of the members of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’ is the founder of this parking lot company. The announcement of a new sponsor contributed to the faith in the plan and the vision for a ‘new’ MVV Maastricht.

Furthermore, which on short term was even more important, was the demand for the elimination of the debts of the club. The club faced a debt of more than five million euros (Rekenkamer Maastricht, 2012). However, according to the former alderman of sports the debts were more than six million euros and according to one of the members of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’, it was even more. The municipality of Maastricht purchased the stadium for 1.85 million euros and remitted a subordinated loan of 1.7 million euros. Besides, most of the creditors remitted the debts



of the club. One of the creditors stated in a phone call: *“I had no choice. When the club would have gone bankrupt I would not have received anything either. Now at least the club is saved”*. A journalist mentioned that there was a lot of pressure on these smaller creditors. *“When they would not have remitted the debts, they always would have had the reputation of the company which had let the club go bankrupt.”*

The plan with a clear vision and the possibility to disclose a new sponsor is in accordance with the theory of Davies (2002). As displayed in the theoretical framework he argued that “those with resources are most likely to be able to convince others” (pp. 7). This was also the strength of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’. They were experienced, had different knowledge levels and specialities and therefore knew what they were talking about. This convinced a lot of town council members. The financial resources granted by, for instance, the municipality, would not have been possible with the knowledge and vision of the former boards of MVV. The skills of ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’ members seems to have contributed significantly to the crucial support of the municipality during the decision making process.

#### 4.2.5. Historical Context

The urban regime in Maastricht was formed in order to rescue MVV. All the parties were MVV fans, and their experience and skills were used in order to achieve their non-football related goals via the support of MVV. However, was it only a matter of the right group at the right moment? Or did the history and context also play a role in the whole process?

#### *Relationship between club and city*

MVV has more or less a love-hate relationship with the city of Maastricht. As already mentioned MVV is really a traditional club. This emanates from the close relationship between MVV and the factories many of the inhabitants of Maastricht worked in, in the past. A journalist, who followed the decision making process around MVV, argued that MVV historically is enormously important for the city. Whereby adding *“MVV is a raw club, raw supporters”*. A councillor argued: *“It is an old people’s club. That played an important role in the process. Even in a negative way since there were supporters who really wanted to retain the old culture”*. The same councillor also mentioned that the importance of the club not always displays in attendances. *“The city comes to life when MVV is playing. When I am in the stadium, people keep texting me ‘how are they playing?’ or ‘what is the score?’ Thus even though the people are not always in the stadium it really lives”*. On the other hand, MVV always has had a rather difficult relationship with the politics in Maastricht. *“There is the mayor and aldermen, the town council, and the civil service. In the town council half of the*



*councillors are reluctant to the club MVV*” (One of the members of the ‘initiatiefgroep MVV’). This feeling is caused, as mentioned before, by the riots which occurred after the town council decided not to help MVV with their financial resources anymore, in 2003. Furthermore, many councillors satirize how much public money already went to a private football club, the last decade. An anonymous councillor mentioned that it was not the first time that there was an agreement of ‘the last time’. However, every time, three or four years later, MVV came back to the municipality with the request for support. Furthermore, the former boards of MVV turned their back on society. According to a former player of MVV and entrepreneur in Maastricht, MVV never used their hardcore business (football). *“They never went to, for instance, amateur clubs in order to discuss what should be ameliorated”*.

After the decision making process the relationship between MVV and the city of Maastricht has improved. Almost all the respondents mentioned that MVV now adds value to society. A journalist stated: *“MVV is much more involved in projects, in schools, in community work, in homes for the elderly. Anything you can think of in the city, you can find MVV back in a much more explicit manner”*.

### *Stadium image*

The stadium location played an important role in the process. The stadium is, as already discussed, located in a large park which the municipality of Maastricht wants to develop. Two of the respondents mentioned that the stadium of MVV is in good condition. One of them even classified the stadium as an eye catcher. This is caused by the prominent location of the stadium. When people approach Maastricht via the highway from the north, the stadium is one of the first buildings to appear. A former player of MVV, who is now an entrepreneur in Maastricht stated: *“It is a nice stadium. I mean not a superb stadium. But it is small and cosy”*. In a supporters research of the Dutch football association (KNVB) in 2011, the supporters of MVV were, together with the supporters of Cambuur Leeuwarden and Go Ahead Eagles, the most satisfied about the atmosphere in their own stadium (KNVB Expertise, 2011). If the stadium would have been rather outdated, in bad condition, and contributing to a bad atmosphere, the municipality might not have labelled the stadium as an important factor for the development of the ‘Geusselpark’.

### *Popularity of football in Maastricht*

All the respondents felt that football in one way or another is important for the inhabitants of Maastricht. Three respondents mentioned that football is a rather sensitive subject in the city. This expressed, for instance, in the riots after the decision in 2003. But also after a game of MVV when the supporters thought that it probably could be the last game of the club. *“Three thousand people*



*climbed over the fences. They took pieces from the grass as a relic, they demolished fences, just out of emotion. Because they thought MVV would cease to exist. We made a picture of a seventy year old woman, hanging onto the fences, crying with a rose in her hand"* (Journalist of regional newspaper). The popularity of football displayed in the work of the alderman of sports during the decision making process. *"I had to deal a lot with people from the lowest parts of society. People who were unemployed or were trained to become involved in society again. And always when I was talking to those people the conversation came down to MVV. It was so clear that those people were so looking forward to the games of MVV. For them it was such a great moment in the week and such a good connection with society"*.

MVV has always had a loyal audience. Even during the worst period of the club, when the club ended in the lowest regions of professional football, even 3000 spectators on average visited the games of MVV (Voetbal International, 2012). The years before the decision making process in 2010, between 5000 and 6000 people visited the matches. This was one of the highest averages in the Jupiler League. Only clubs like de Graafschap, Sparta and Cambuur Leeuwarden, which often played for the title, had higher attendances. The loyalty of the supporters was also mentioned by three of the respondents. *"I think MVV has the privilege of loyal supporters, even when they played on the bottom of the Jupiler league"* (former player of MVV, and entrepreneur in Maastricht).

#### *The competition of MVV*

MVV is the only professional sports club in Maastricht. An anonymous councillor stated: *"I do not think there is real competition. I mean every city wants to have a professional football club. And that is a tradition in Maastricht"*. The only competition MVV might have is the other two professional football clubs in the southern part of the province of Limburg; Fortuna Sittard and Roda JC. However, only one respondent mentioned the competition of those two clubs, while the rumours and opinions of a merger of the three clubs already plays a role in society for years. According to a journalist, MVV does not have to compete with clubs in Belgium or Germany either. *"There are people from Maastricht who visit matches of Standard Liège. However, that is only a very small number"*. One respondent argued there is no competition from any sport at all for MVV. The only big sporting event which is hosted in Maastricht is the start of the Amstel Gold Race. This is a cycling classic wherein the best cyclists in the world compete through the hills of the southern part of Limburg. However, this is only a single day event.

#### *The importance of sports in Maastricht*

The lack of professional sport clubs or events seems to be no coincidence. According to figures of the sports agenda of the municipality of Maastricht, 62 percent of the inhabitants in



Maastricht participate regularly in any form of sports (Gemeente Maastricht, 2013a). In comparable municipalities, with regard to population size, and on national level, 66 percent of the people practiced a sport on a regular basis in 2010. Besides, Maastricht reached a score of 50 percent on the Dutch standard for healthy exercise (NNGB). This is three percentage points below the average in the Netherlands (Gemeente Maastricht, 2013a). The amateur sports clubs are not playing on a high level either. *“The best amateur football club plays in the ‘tweede klasse’ (fourth amateur level), that is wretched for a city such as Maastricht”* (former player MVV and entrepreneur in Maastricht). Five of the six respondents mentioned the same reasons for the lack of a real sports climate in the city. They all argued that the Burgundian lifestyle of many people in Maastricht and in the region is a major reason. *“There are so many alternatives in this city”* (one of the members of the initiatiefgroep) and *“There is the saying in Maastricht, ‘place a beer tap on the Vrijthof and the square will fill up with people”* (Entrepreneur in Maastricht). A journalist added: *“In other cities, such as Kerkrade, visiting a football match is the only attraction you have there. Here in Maastricht sports is not holy. There are so many other events; it is really a tourist city”*. This is confirmed by the fact that Maastricht is one of the candidate cities to become cultural capital of Europe in 2018. The municipality of Maastricht invests 20 million euros just in order to gain the title of cultural capital of Europe (Stichting Maastricht culturele hoofdstad van Europa 2018, 2012). As a consequence, it seems that the municipality of Maastricht finds culture more important than sports.

#### **4.2.6. The Maastricht case summarized and compared with the case of Haarlem**

Maastricht is like Haarlem a medium-sized city in the Netherlands. The university and the academic hospital contribute to the increase of higher educated inhabitants in the city. However, Maastricht has to contend with high crime-rates and an unhealthy population. This is different to the city of Haarlem, where the young and high-educated citizens live in a rather safe environment. Nevertheless, the problems in Maastricht cannot motivate the inhabitants to influence the local elections on a large-scale. The voter turnout was much lower than in Haarlem and the Netherlands in general. However, the inhabitants are much more proud of their city than the citizens of Haarlem. The inhabitants of Maastricht can be classified as chauvinistic. The economy in Maastricht has drastically changed the last decades. The former industrial city has turned into a tourist city which is demonstrated in the high amount of hotel stays per year. Nevertheless, most citizens in Maastricht work in the public administration, education, or health care sector. This is comparable with Haarlem, but still the economy in Maastricht is not as flourishing as in Haarlem. In Maastricht the unemployment rate is higher than the average in the Netherlands, the average income is lower, and the average housing prices is also much lower than the national average. This is exactly the opposite



of the situation in Haarlem, where all the averages are above national average. As a consequence, both the social and economic situation in Maastricht can be considered as worse than in Haarlem.

The industrial past and the proud inhabitants contribute to the importance of MVV for the city. The club's stadium was located near one of the largest factories of the city until the early 1960's. Many players of MVV also worked in the factory. As a consequence, the club was really connected to the working class of Maastricht and MVV was the only distraction the citizens had during those days. This is in contradiction with the situation in Haarlem, where HFC Haarlem can be classified as an elitist club for the middle class with a poor relationship with the city of Haarlem. The only agreement the clubs have is their absence at the highest level of professional football, the decade before the decision making process.

The commotion around the decision making process in Maastricht started when a group of business people gathered after rumours of a possible bankruptcy of MVV. The participants all wanted to help MVV, with the condition that MVV should contribute something to society. They developed a plan for the future of MVV and approached the municipality of Maastricht to help rescuing the professional football club. The new group of private initiators desperately needed the municipality to solve a part of the financial problems of MVV. The enthusiasm of the initiators and their well-developed plan to rescue the club contributed to the final decision of the municipality to support MVV. However, despite the enormous efforts of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV', the municipality would not have supported the club when the stadium of MVV was not located in a prestigious and important real estate project. The municipality already invested a lot of money in the project and an unused stadium would decrease the value of the area. Thus, there was a substantial interest for the municipality to have a professional club which could perform as a catalyst of the area. They bought the stadium, which was not an option in the case of HFC Haarlem since the municipality of Haarlem was already owner of the complex of the club. Nevertheless, the instrumental interest of the municipality of Maastricht is comparable to the situation in Haarlem. Politics were interested in a new stadium for HFC Haarlem since the old location could be used to develop new residences. After real estate developer Fortress cancelled the new stadium, and thus the instrumental interest of the municipality disappeared, the politicians in Haarlem were not interested in HFC Haarlem anymore. In both cases, the instrumental interest was decisive in the decision either or not to support the professional football club.

The regime in Maastricht was composed of a varied group of people. Entrepreneurs, accountants, (former) politicians, advertisers, and banking people were willing to cooperate in order to rescue the football club MVV. The members of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' felt they had to give something back to Maastricht since the city provided them the opportunity to develop a successful career. However, they only were willing to support MVV if the rescue of MVV could add something to





society in the future. The initiators wanted to add something to society and their business experience, skills, and enthusiasm contributed to the decision of the municipality to support MVV. This situation was completely different compared to the case in Haarlem. The urban regime there was formed by the municipality and the rather influential real estate developer Fortress. As a consequence, an external party (Fortress is a business from Rotterdam) was more or less ruling in Haarlem inasmuch the municipality of Haarlem did not intensely cooperate with other private parties in Haarlem. The initiators of the plan to rescue MVV all had a connection with the city of Maastricht and can be considered as MVV fans. MVV was important on their agenda since they could achieve societal purposes via the rescue of MVV. Nevertheless, in Maastricht top sport is not an important agenda point. The municipality of Maastricht wants to become cultural capital of Europe in 2018 and urban renewal is another agenda point the municipality focuses on. In this urban renewal program the stadium area should become one of the pillars for the renewal in Maastricht. This is why the municipality had an interest in the rescue of MVV. In contradiction to Haarlem, a bankruptcy of the football club would lead to negative consequences for the municipality. Housing prices in the new area may decrease, the interest of investors may vanish, and the new sports area with a swimming pool and a sports hall would lose its driving factor. In Haarlem the interest in the club was lost since the new stadium was cancelled and sports were not an important topic on the regimes' agenda. The importance of a professional club was still there in Maastricht because the stadium was located in an interesting area for the municipality. Furthermore, the urban regime in Maastricht consisted of skilled and enthusiastic people who were experienced and had a big network. This contributed to the support of MVV since they were able to develop an interesting and feasible plan. This was not decisive for the decision making process but it contributed to the willingness of the politics in Maastricht to support MVV. However, MVV would have gone bankrupt if the municipality and the creditors would not have remitted the debts of the club. The total amount of these debts was five million euros. HFC Haarlem needed the same resources as MVV. First there was the short term issue of financial resources. In Haarlem were 400.000 euros needed to finish the 2009/2010 season. However, only 100.000 euros were collected, which led to the bankruptcy of the club. However, the situation of HFC Haarlem was caused by bad management skills in the past and the network of the board of Haarlem was too small or did not want to help the club. Thus, HFC Haarlem and MVV needed the same resources. However, in Maastricht there was a motivated regime which could offer these resources and was willing to help the club, whilst in Haarlem they did not have or did not want to grant these resources to the club.

The willingness of a group of initiators to develop a plan to rescue MVV not only emanates from their feeling to give the city something back but also due to the close relationship between MVV and the city. MVV is a people's club as a result of the close relationship with the industrial past.





This is different to the case of Haarlem, where HFC Haarlem never had a close relationship with the inhabitants. Many years the boards of HFC Haarlem employed a rather arrogant attitude towards supporters, potential investors, and the business sector in Haarlem. Despite the close relationship between the club and the citizens of Maastricht, the relationship between MVV and the municipality was like in Haarlem not intense. However, this was a consequence of the former decisions the municipality already had made in the past. Councillors were angry (multiple times public money to a football club) and still terrified (riots in 2003). This made the term MVV rather sensitive for the councillors. After the process the relationship with politics has improved since MVV shows commitment to society by being involved in different projects in the city. The relationship between the city and the stadium is already mentioned due to the location within an important real estate project. In contradiction to the case of Haarlem, the reputation of the stadium always has been good in Maastricht. The atmosphere in the stadium was rated as one of the best of the Jupiler league and the stadium attracts attention due to the location next to the highway at the north side of Maastricht. Furthermore, the image of the stadium did not seem to play an important role in the process, since the respondents did mention it neither in a positive or negative way. The amount of visitors during the matches of MVV also always has been good. The club had one of the highest average attendances in the Jupiler League the last decade. This is rather conflicting with HFC Haarlem, which had one of the lowest attendance averages. Football can be considered as a popular sport in both cities. However, in Maastricht this is also displayed in the amount of people that actually visit games of the local professional football club and in a lot of emotions during the worse period between 2002 and 2004. In several occasions the emotions ran high since a possible bankruptcy threatened the club. Thus, the popularity not always showed in a neat manner, but it indicated how important football, and in particular MVV, is for the inhabitants of Maastricht. Moreover, HFC Haarlem had to contend with a lot of competition from both professional football clubs in the region around Haarlem and other sport teams from the city of Haarlem. MVV has none of these problems. The two other professional clubs in their region are not successful either and the bigger football clubs across the border in Belgium are not visited very well by the inhabitants of Maastricht. Besides, there are no other successful sport teams settled in Maastricht. Thereby, similar to Haarlem, Maastricht is more a cultural/touristic city than a sports city and the population of Maastricht becomes more and more a mix with people born outside Maastricht. As a consequence, MVV is very important to retain the tradition of the city of Maastricht. Maastricht is a candidate for the European cultural capital of 2018, which indicates where the municipality focuses on. Furthermore, Maastricht is a rather Burgundian city where many events take place. This seems to have influence on the sport activities and interest of the inhabitants as well.



## 5. Conclusion and discussion

The results of the analyses help to provide an answer on the research question, which was formulated in the introduction. Thereby, the four sub questions, related to the theoretical aspect and the qualitative research, will be reciprocated. The reciprocation of these sub questions include the outcomes of the expectations derived from the theoretical framework. Finally, a discussion about the processes during the research and recommendations for future research and social application are displayed below.

### 5.1. Answering the sub questions

#### ***What are urban regimes?***

The first sub question had both a theoretical and a practical nature and covered the definition of urban regime. According to Stoker and Mossberger (1994), urban regimes are a constitution of the public sector, the private sector, the community, and officials, which are willing to collaborate in order to influence decision making processes of the government. In Maastricht, the regime was indeed quite varied. Accountants, entrepreneurs, bankers, advertisers, and (former) politicians formed the regime. The case of Maastricht also demonstrated that even in hopeless situations a good willing mixture of parties are able to influence decision making processes. The municipality had already invested a lot of money in MVV in the past and was not willing to help again. Notwithstanding the important role of the stadium in a large real estate project forced the political parties to agree with the rescue of MVV, their willingness to agree also increased due to the enthusiasm and the well-considered plan of the group of initiators. Furthermore, the case of Haarlem demonstrated that only two parties can form a regime. The municipality of Haarlem and real estate developer Fortress cooperated in multiple real estate projects in the city. However, due to a granted loan of approximately 17 million euros, the municipality was rather depending on the real estate developer. This caused that a voluntary cooperation turned into a compulsory collaboration. After a few years, one external party (Fortress) determined that the plans for a new HFC Haarlem stadium were immediately cancelled. As a consequence, one private party determined the development projects of the city of Haarlem for almost ten years. Urban regimes therefore not always have to be very complicated with a lot of involved parties.

#### ***What processes influence the composition and development of the urban regime?***

Mossberger and Stoker (2001) stated that the composition of parties, agenda, and resources influenced the general composition and development of the urban regime. These three aspects in combination with context, apart from the influence on the general composition, also affect each



other. However, Mossberger and Stoker (2001) did not distinguish the elements by their degree of influence.

The mixed composition of the regime in Maastricht and the fact that all the initiators supported MVV contributed to the development of the regime since the rescue of MVV became their primary purpose. In Haarlem only the municipality and Fortress were involved. Both parties were more interested in non sports related projects, which led to a cancellation of the development of the new stadium. The agenda of the regime also plays an important role in the decision making process around professional football clubs. The agenda of the different parties and sectors has to have an interest in the theme. Both Haarlem and Maastricht cannot be classified as top sport minded cities. Nevertheless, in the first instance, the municipality of HFC Haarlem was interested in a new stadium, whilst the urban regime in Maastricht had multiple benefits by supporting MVV as their agendas included topics which indirectly were related to the professional football club. The regime in Maastricht was clearly influenced by resources. The composition of the regime was based on the variation of resources which were demanded in order to rescue MVV. Business experience, management skills, and the network of the regime have all contributed to the development of a successful rescue plan. Enthusiasm and trust contributed to convince politicians to agree with the rescue plan. In Haarlem financial resources were demanded to rescue HFC Haarlem. However, both Fortress and the municipality did not want to invest in the club. As a consequence, a lack of capability to find financial resources, and a regime not willing to provide them, led to the bankruptcy of HFC Haarlem.

Thus, the three properties all have influence on the composition and development of the regime. However, context of the regime is perhaps the most important. The histories of the city and the club have an enormous impact on the mentality and attitude of the inhabitants. Maastricht is a former workers city and the club MVV was the only distraction the workers in Maastricht had in the past. As a consequence, MVV has always been something of which the citizens were proud of. The business sector in Maastricht has always kept this in mind and understands the importance of the club for the city. However, the club past (working roots) also impeded the decision making process since the municipality found they had already helped the club too much in the last decades. The history in combination with the proponents and opponents of the support developed the decision making process in to a delicate topic in the city. This is completely different compared to the case of Haarlem. The historical context induced that the possible bankruptcy of the club was a far less severe issue. The inhabitants in Haarlem are not as chauvinistic as in Maastricht and the club HFC Haarlem never played an important role in society. As a consequence, the pressure on the urban regime, or on possible helpful parties, was much less intense. The outcomes of the qualitative research demonstrated that context is a reflection of society. It determines what topics are relevant. The



context of an urban regime is therefore crucial as starting point. Still, it is difficult to determine how large the influence of every aspect of the core properties is. However, the cases of Haarlem and Maastricht demonstrated that the three prosperities of Stoker and Mossberger (2001) and context do influence the development of an urban regime.

### ***How can we typify the relationship between the different parties within urban regimes?***

The qualitative research indicated that the relationship between parties is often a matter of trust. Not only the selection of potential parties, such as in case of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV', was based on a trust in skills, but also the 17 million euros advanced payment from the municipality of Haarlem to real estate developer Fortress showed characteristics of trust. The supporters of Haarlem were disappointed in the municipality and mentioned that they had trusted the municipality for too long. Furthermore, the relationship between the municipality of Maastricht and MVV had been quite emotional in the past. As a result, the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' had to put a lot of effort into gaining trust from the municipality for their plan. However, trust seems to play such an important role, that the municipality of Maastricht, after they were convinced of their intentions and reliability, the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' requested to form the new board of MVV. Moreover, the relationship between parties within urban regimes is chiefly business. In Haarlem the new stadium of HFC Haarlem was cancelled rather quickly when the developer lost faith in a profitable realization of the project. This happened without any consultation and considerations concerning the supporters of HFC Haarlem, the municipality of Haarlem, and the opportunities the municipalities had offered their company with the other projects in the city. In Maastricht it was also mentioned that after the rescue of MVV, the relationship between the municipality and MVV deteriorated despite the fact that the appreciated members of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' now led the club. The relationship between different sectors within an urban regime seems to be intense until the purpose or their motivation to join the regime is achieved.

### ***How can we link the relationship between forms and types of urban regimes and the decision by local governments to either or not support local professional football clubs?***

In the case of decision making processes around football clubs in the Netherlands there is no clear connection between the type of urban regime and the positive decision to support the professional club. In Maastricht characteristics from all the types of regimes by Stoker and Mossberger (1994) were included in the urban regime, whilst the theory of Stoker and Mossberger linked urban regimes with one specific type. However, there seems to be a link between the type of characteristics and the public sector, since in both cities the municipality had only instrumental interest in the cases. In both situations, real estate development projects between the municipality



and the football clubs formed the connection. The loss of interest in HFC Haarlem was caused by the cancellation of the new stadium since the local government could no longer build residences on the location of the old stadium. In Maastricht the location of the stadium, in the middle of an important real estate project, was precisely the reason why the municipality became involved. Both official reports and respondents of the qualitative research mentioned that MVV would have gone bankrupt if the stadium was located somewhere else in the city. Furthermore, in the case of a negative decision the urban regime contains instrumental characteristics. The regime is only interested in the case if collaboration debouches into tangible results. Other reasons such as social interest or expression are irrelevant. There is also a connection in why different regimes do support a professional football club. In the case of Maastricht, the municipality had instrumental motives to support MVV, whilst the initiators of the rescue plan aimed to conserve the tradition and social cohesion of MVV (organic) and develop a new healthier image for Maastricht (symbolic). As a consequence, all the expectations concerning the reason why the types of regimes support a professional football club are confirmed by the case of Maastricht. All the regime types use the club to achieve their non football related purposes. The Haarlem case confirmed this since the municipality lost interest in HFC Haarlem as they could not achieve their instrumental aims through using the club. After the cancellation of the new stadium, HFC Haarlem submitted a new proposal to the municipality to re-develop the old stadium which was denied as the municipality was no longer interested due to a lack of own interest.

## 5.2. Answering the research question


***What is the influence of the composition of urban regimes with regard to the decision of local governments whether or not to support the existence of local professional football clubs?***

The aspects composition, agenda, resources and context certainly do influence the decision making processes with regards to professional football clubs. However, the most significant issue is whether there is an interaction between the purposes and interest of the regime and the theme professional football clubs. Urban regimes have one, or more, interests (organic, instrumental, symbolic), whereby real estate (instrumental) is a crucial factor for the public sector. When the interests of the regime do not fit with the theme sports, or in particular professional football clubs, or when the support of the professional football clubs does not contribute to reach their purposes, the regime will not support the professional football club. Thus, the football club is of secondary importance and is used as a tool to achieve a purpose or, such as in the case of Maastricht, in order to prevent that an interest or aim is hampered by the bankruptcy of the club. However, despite other interests of parties from the non-public sector, the decisive role of the local government causes the




condition that the costs of the support of a professional football club must be covered by the real estate benefits it yields. As a consequence, it seems that private parties only can incite the discussion around the decision making processes. Unless their own financial resources are capable of supporting a professional football club, they are always depending on the instrumental interest of the public bodies.

The models below provide an overview of the connection between sports and the urban regimes of the cases Haarlem and Maastricht.



**Figure 5:** The connection between sports and the urban regime in Haarlem



**Figure 6:** The connection between sports and the urban regime in Maastricht



### 5.3. Discussion and recommendations

Reflecting on this research, a positive feeling prevails. The contact with the respondents of the qualitative research was pleasant and no serious discomforts occurred during the research. Furthermore, this research led to more knowledge about urban regimes regarding the decision making processes around professional football clubs. This can be useful for future purposes. Nevertheless, indubitably, this thesis faced some critical comments during the research. It was regrettable that there was little literature available on the subject of urban regimes around professional football clubs. As a consequence, the used literature mainly focused on urban regimes in general or on urban regimes with regard to sports. However, urban regimes around, for instance, big sporting events or sport clubs in the United States do not always represent the rather specific issue professional football clubs. Nevertheless, regime theory seems to be suitable to use in order to research the processes around professional football clubs since the economical and political context definitely played a role. However, the used regime typology of Stoker and Mossberger (1994) is mainly based on clearly classified types of regimes. Despite the recognition of the characteristics of their typology, it turned out that regimes around professional football club can also include characteristics from all three types of regimes of Stoker and Mossberger. Besides, Stoker and Mossberger's typology chiefly focussed on the characteristics of regimes, whilst it also is interesting to understand how these different types (or a mixture thereof) use specific themes such as sport, health care or education to actually achieve their purposes and motivations. Stoker and Mossberger's types of regimes were useful, however it seems that their division of types is not applicable to urban regimes with regard to professional football clubs.

Moreover, it is still not clear what the actual amount of influence of all the core properties on the urban regime and the decision making process actually is. The historical context seems to be significantly influential since the history of the city and the club determines the position of the professional football club in society. As a consequence, the context determines how relevant the topic of the decision making process is for the city. However, it is not clear how crucial the historical context exactly is. Would MVV not have been supported if the club had had the reputation of an elitist club instead of a workers club? The support from the inhabitants probably would have been less, but the instrumental interest of the stadium would still exist for the municipality. A possible means to investigate this is by performing a quantitative research amongst parties related to the process. This is fascinating since in both the cases of Haarlem and Maastricht the historical context of the city, the history of the relationship between the football club and the municipality, and the cohesion between the club and the inhabitants came back through the whole research. Composition, agenda and resources were important too but the feeling that context played a greater role around



the processes still dominates. Moreover, composition, agenda, and resources are influential until the municipality has to make a decision. The three core properties can create support from the inhabitants and emphasize the importance of the club. However, the case in Maastricht displayed that without an instrumental interest for the municipality it seems that even the best combination of composition, agenda, and resources within an urban regime cannot influence the decision of the local government. This is a rather striking observation since former urban regime studies, especially in cases around American regimes, always believed in the power of the private sector.

Furthermore, during the qualitative research it turned out that trust played a significant role within the cases. The cases in Maastricht and Haarlem demonstrated that certain decisions around urban regimes are not always made in a rational manner. Thereby, the trust in other parties often proved to be ungrounded. It even put parties in a difficult situation. If the supporters of HFC Haarlem would not have trusted the municipality too long, they could have started earlier with other plans to save the club. Therefore it is interesting for future research to investigate the role of trust around urban regimes and on which it is based. Why was there nobody who intervened when the municipality of Haarlem granted a loan of 17 million euros to the real estate developer? Was this a result of a blind trust of all the councillors and officials in the developer? Or were there other interests within the regime?

Regarding the qualitative research, there are some recommendations for future research. The research focused on only two cases around clubs based in medium sized cities in the Netherlands. Both professional clubs played on the second level the decades before the decision making process. The outcomes of a possible future research with different sized cities and clubs which, for instance, always performed on the highest level and qualify for the European competitions regularly, may be different. Besides, it is enthralling whether urban regimes around cities which do express themselves as sport minded cities have the same arguments whether or not to support the professional clubs as cultural oriented cities like Haarlem and Maastricht. Furthermore, it is interesting whether cross-national comparisons lead to differences in the outcomes. Hereby, it must be taken into account that the relationships between the public and private sector can be different than in the Netherlands.

Besides the scientific relevance there is also a social relevance. The analysis of this research can provide the policy makers of professional football clubs and both the private and public sectors, an insight into how different parties think and act around these decision making processes. This can contribute to the anticipation on the situation of all the involved parties. All the sectors have to monitor their position with regard to the professional football club. When local governments develop real estate plans around a football stadium, like in Maastricht, they have to take into account that there is a football club involved in their plans. The presence of a football club in a project can have such an impact on the plans and budget of the project that it is recommended to develop





alternatives in order to prevent unwanted involvement in the bankruptcy of the club. For the clubs it is important to monitor what their position in the city is. Do the municipalities and private parties have any interest in their existence? The qualitative research demonstrated that the private parties have to take initiative to rescue or help the professional football club since municipalities only react when it is in their own interests to do so. As a consequence, it is important for professional football clubs to develop a solid relationship with the business sector. This may sound rather obvious, but the past has proven that professional football clubs still rely far too much on the municipality and that a negative relationship with the business sector, such as in the case of HFC Haarlem, can mean the end of the club. However, if the private sector in the city appears to be not willing or unable to grant financial resources, the football clubs have to try to create a win-win situation for the club and the municipality. A new stadium at a new location can, such as in the case of Haarlem, create instrumental interests for the local government. However, the case in Haarlem learned that it is important to make clear agreements instead of cooperating on a basis of trust. Good communication between parties contributes to a better understanding of each others positions, which may preclude the necessity of a decision making process. To be on good terms with other parties in the city and to maintain a clear communication proved to be rather important for urban regimes around decision making processes with regards to professional football clubs.


#### **5.4. A revision of the conceptual model**

In conclusion the qualitative research has led to a revised model. This model symbolizes the complex concept of urban regimes surrounding decision making processes around professional football clubs. This is important in order to clarify that decision making process around professional football clubs are all individual cases, even when the general circumstances look familiar. It also demonstrates that it is very hard to get a grip on the situation for all the parties involved in the process and that an intangible factor such as history plays a quite important role in the process. Moreover, the model can for, for instance the parties around the decision making processes, serve as a clear overview of the relevant aspects and their influence on decision making processes around professional football clubs.

In the centre of the model, the different aspects have influence on each other. The importance of sports depends on the aims and purposes of the regime. What does the regime want to achieve? Which values does the regime classify as important? And in what way can sports be used in order to accelerate these processes around the aims of the regime? The addition of sports in the model is different to the original model where the theme of sports was not included. However, during the qualitative research it became clear that the importance of sports for a regime definitely



has influence on the process. The urban regime has to have a feeling that sports, and in this research the existence of professional football clubs, can contribute to reach their goals. Besides, the goals and values of a regime are influenced by the three core properties composition, agenda, and resources. For instance, a regime in which the majority is mainly interested in sports will lean faster to use sports to achieve their goals than regimes which are less affiliated to sports. A sports minded regime will be more eager to put the financial problems of a professional football club on their agenda. This was the case in Maastricht where the members of the 'initiatiefgroep MVV' all worried about the possible bankruptcy of the club since they all were MVV supporters. Meanwhile, the characteristics of the urban regime can also influence the three core properties composition, agenda-setting, and resources. If the purposes of the regime do not meet with the financial problems of a professional football club, the regime will not put that problem on their agenda and will not search for resources to solve the problem of the football club. Thus, the decision making process is influenced by the characteristics of the regime, the extent to which sports can contribute to the achievement of the goals of the regime, and the ongoing process of the influence of the three core properties composition, agenda-setting, and resources on the regime. Meanwhile, all these factors are influenced by context. The economical and social background of a city affects the mentality and attitude of citizens, politicians, and entrepreneurs. The history of the city and the club determines the position of the professional football club in society. As a consequence, the context determines whether the football club starts the match around the decision making process with a home advantage or not.



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## Appendices

### Appendix A: Item list case study HFC Haarlem/MVV Maastricht

#### **Goals:**

- To understand the roles of the different parties within the urban regime.
- To gain knowledge about the factors that influenced the decision making process of the local government to either or not support the existence of the professional football club.
- To gain knowledge about the role of sports and football in particular within the city and the influence of this role on the decision making process, in order to understand why the club was important (or not) to the city.

#### **Introduction:**

- Introduce yourself
- Indicate occasion of the research and interview;
- Structure of the interview
- Indicate what respondent can expect:
- Confidentiality and anonymity
- Interview will be recorded
- Time the interview will take

#### **1. Personal Characteristics**

Objective: To get an idea of whom the respondent is.

- Age;
- Sector (public/private);
- Occupation during decision making process;
- Relation with decision making process;
- Position during the process;

#### **2. Composition of urban regime**

Objective: To determine the composition and relationships within the urban regime

- Parties of the urban regime during the decision making process



- Which parties are involved?
- Was respondent part?
- Ratio between public/private
- Influence of different parties
- Was there cohesion?

**Possible questions:**

Which parties were interested in the decision making process? Which parties were rather influential? What was your role during the process? How often there were meetings between private-and public parties? Were there parties who lost their interest in the decision making process after a while? How was the atmosphere between the different parties? Was the public or private sector most interested in the situation? Which parties cooperated? Were these parties committed to the football club?

- History urban regime
- Amount of fluctuation in composition
- Development in period before decision making process?

**Possible questions:**

Which parties were influential in the city in the years before the decision making process? Were they still influential around the process? Were they pro or con the support? Was there a lot of fluctuation with regard to the influential parties the years before the process?

- After decision making process
- Fluctuation
- Effect on the composition

**Possible questions:**

Do involved parties still interfere with the situation in the city? How is their reputation after the process? Are they still influential? Is there a lot of fluctuation of private parties who cooperated with the public sector?





### 3. Agenda of urban regime

Objective: To determine whether the agenda contributed to a successful regime.

- What were purposes of the involved parties?
- Was there a common aim?
- Did all participants agree/were all sectors involved?
- How long did this agenda exist?
- Differences with former agenda
- Who had critique/who promoted the agenda?
- Agenda in the media
- Which parties sought the media?
- Was there a leader with respect to the agenda?
- Did the role of the media influence the decision making process?
- Did it lead to more involvement or new angles?
- Was community involved?
- Which projects in the city were important?

### 4. Resources of urban regime

Objective: To gain understanding of the influence of resources on the decision making process.

- Demanded resources?
- Offered resources/by who?
- Influence of resources on decision making
- Change in resources in periods before decision making

#### **Possible questions:**

Which resources brought the involved parties in the process? How expressed the involved parties their resources? Which resources were necessary? Did these resources help to reach the goal, in the end?



## 5. Role of city circumstances

Objective: To determine the influence of the context of the city of the urban regime

- Economical background
- Interest of private parties
- Relationship public/private
- Relationship between club and city

### **Possible questions:**

Is the city a wealthy city? What are the core businesses of the city? How has the city developed the last decades? Are there a lot of foreign investors? Are private parties interested in the city or only in their own business? To what extent do the private parties feel affinity with the city? What was the last turn-out percentage in the city with respect to the national elections? What was the last turn-out percentage in the city with regard to the local elections? Was it the first time the government supported the club? Was there collaboration between club and city? Was there any collision between club and city in the past?

## 6. Role of football club in the city

Objective: To determine influence of the popularity of the football club. Did the popularity of the club/football have influence on the decision making process?

- Importance of football. Why/why not?
- How does/did that show?
- Identification with football. Why/why not?
- Importance of results. Why/why not?
- Image of the stadium

### **Possible questions:**

How do the people in the city feel about the club? Was the club important to the city? Did the club add something to the city? Did the club have faithful fans? How expressed this loyalty? Were the supporters mostly people from the city or also from outside? How important is football for the people? How does this express? What reputation had the stadium of the club? Did this lead to more/less visitors? Led the club to conversations



between the citizens? Was the decision making process a hot item in the city? How expressed this?

## 7. **Role of sports in the city**

Objective: To determine the importance of sports in the city

- Sport minded cities
- Other decision making processes concerning sport in the past
- Competition of football club with other sport teams

### **Possible questions:**

Is the city sport minded? How is the recreational sport participation? Have sports a prominent place in the city? Does the local government invest in sports? Does the city present itself with sports? How does this express? Are there certain sports which are more popular in the city? What was the experience of the city with decision making processes with regard to sport clubs? How did the inhabitants react to these decision making processes? What was the result of these processes? Is there competition with surrounding cities with regard to sports? Is there competition with other sport teams within in the city? Does this lead to less interest for the football club?

### **Ending:**

- Indicate the end of interview
- Thank for time and cooperation
- Explain further steps (will share results)



## Appendix B: Example of data matrix

Matrizen - Microsoft Excel										
I11										
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	<b>Composition of the urban regime</b> 11 Sectors involved	Anonymous councillor 1. Nou uuh overvegend private partijen.	Roel Viske 1. Maar een half jaar eerder is eigenlijk een soort van denkwerk opgestaan van supporters, mensen uit de zakenwereld, ook politici hebben zich ingezet.	Paul Penders 1. Van aan wel de gemeente een groot deel heeft weggenomen, maar dan nog heeft het bedrijfsleven hier het wel opgepakt.	Lus Vriants 1. Ve zaten daar vanuit een publiek-private samenwerking met een aantal partners. En ook die partners hadden er allemaal baat bij dat we een gezond gebied daar zouden creëren.	Josje Godwin 1. En zij hebben ons op een gegeven moment uuh, wij hadden op dat moment een verhouder die absoluut MVV fan was. En die ging helemaal voor het redden van MVV.	Paul Penders 1. Het was een hele grote mis. Er zat een es-burgemeester bij. Zakenmensen, mensen uit de bankwereld. Accountants. Pictuarmensen. Het was een divers gamma. Alleen maar private, buiten banken die inmiddels ook semi-overheid zijn. Maar het was een goede mis van mensen die realistisch in de wereld stonden.	Jeroen Fritz 1.	Cees-Jan Pen 1. En politiek speelt ook altijd een rol natuurlijk. 2. Maar ook iets te naïef achter projectontwikkelings lopen en hun mooie powerpoints geloven	Pieter Hooft 1. ... Ik had een driehoekje gemaakt, daar is de club, daar is de gemeente en dat is de projectontwikkelaar
2	12 Parties involved	1. Dat uuh dat uuh alleen MVV gered zou worden als de schuldeisers bereid waren uuh uuh afstand te doen van vorderingen	1. En die denk tank is toen in dat proces gestapt, en toen zijn er ook de contacten gelegd met de gemeente. 2. Dat waren aan de ene kant supporters, twee jongens van de supportersclub. Dat waren de voorzitter Paul Penders. Zakenlieden. Er zaten toen geloof ik een aantal politici in. Er zaten ook mensen vanuit de bankwereld in, ING. 3. Ze zijn vooral uit Maastricht of geleerd aan Maastricht. Niet allemaal geboren in Maastricht. 4. Maar dat was eigenlijk de enige oud-voetballer die er bij zat volgens mij. 5. Oud voetballer, of supporter of zakenlieden die altijd naar MVV zijn gaan kijken. 6. Als je het mij vraagt, is het gewoon dat de verhouder Lus Vriants die later ook is moeten aftraden hierdoor,	1. Dat zijn een paar mensen uit het bedrijfsleven geweest. Ik weet ook dat het een paar mensen zijn geweest uit de bankwereld. En een paar oud, ferente supporters. Die verhoor ook in het bedrijfsleven zaten en daar ook goede functies hadden. 2. En een verhouder, dat moet er bij gezegd worden, die een enorm voetbalhart had. 3. Ja Vard is een Maastrichtenaar. En Q-park is een Maastrichtse bedrijf. 4. De A2, de Geuzenkoninklijke, de enige die er belang bij zou kunnen hebben is Benoit Vezig.	1. En goed toen ik de namen van de ondernemers hoorde dacht ik dat is goed, dat is een nieuwe generatie ondernemers die nu opstaan. 2. Paul Penders en Vard Vriants, dat waren voor mij de 2 mannen. En ik wist ook dat mensen als Armand Cremers er achter zaten. Er zat een goede accountant, ik heb veel steun in had van Jan Mans. 3. Ik moet zeggen dat ik daar ook heel veel steun in had van Jan Mans. 4. En het gesprek was heel simpel. Eerste ondernemer, je krijgt nog een ton, of twee ton, of 50 duizend euro, die hebben we niet. Als jij die opent, dan gaat de club faliet. 5. Ja kijk dat zijn mensen geweest die allemaal een jeugd hebben gehad in Maastricht. Allemaal	1. En we zien ook dat met het huidige bestuur, het bestuur wat er toen zat dat dat niet gaat lukken want het ontkent ons vervelende en te weinig zakelijke benadering. En die zijn toen met een groep van 11 mensen, gecoördineerd vanuit de supporter zelf, zijn ze aan de slag gegaan om een plan van aanpak op te stellen. 2. We hebben Paul Penders vaak gesproken, we hebben Hub Pijpers vaak gesproken, en uuh Adriaans.	1. Er zijn twee mensen geweest van de supportersvereniging. De voorzitter en de secretaris. Die hebben het initiatief genomen om mensen individueel te bellen, te beraademen. Sommige hebben gezegd dat wil ik niet, die zijn toen afgehaakt, en uiteindelijk zijn er 13 mensen bij elkaar gekomen. En wat daar het interessante van was, de heft ikende elkaar en de heft niet.	1. Uuhm het is ook in het coalitieakkoord SP, PvdA, VVD vastgelegd dat het er zou komen. 2. Nou ja als allebelangrijke natuurlijk. HFC Haarlem. 3. Fortress, nou dat is een grote landelijke ontwikkelaar. 4. Dus er zijn veel een aantal kleine partijen betrokken geweest. uuh ook de zich echt ingezet hebben daarvoor. 5. maar er hebben zich nooit grote organisaties achter geschaard. 6. Hart voor Haarlem kwam ook vanuit de supportersvereniging voort en uuh die hebben ook uuh daar waren ook een aantal kleine bedrijfjes bij betrokken.	1. Dus geen grote financiers opstaan om zo'n club te redden.	1. En ik heb gedacht dat hi voor alle partijen op dat moment een goede kandidaat was. Ook voor Ajax want daar hadden we op dat moment een samenwerkingsverband mee. Gemeente Haarlem niet te vergeten.

