

SPORTS GOVERNANCE OBSERVER 2015

The legitimacy crisis in international sports governance

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Arnout Geeraert



Play the Game

SPORTS GOVERNANCE OBSERVER 2015

THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS IN
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS GOVERNANCE

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Executive summary

This report presents the **Sports Governance Observer**, a benchmarking tool for good governance in international sports federations based on basic good governance criteria, and its application to the **35 Olympic international sports federations**. The report was commissioned by Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies and executed by Dr. Arnout Geeraert as a co-operation project between Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies and the University of Leuven.

The report consists of three main parts.

The first part briefly explores the origins of this report. These are to be found in the Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations (AGGIS) project, which received financial support in 2012-2013 from the European Commission's Preparatory Actions in the field of sport. The project produced a checklist of good governance elements for international sports federations. This report elaborates this checklist into a practical benchmarking tool with a scoring system.

The second part presents an in-depth study of the governance of 35 Olympic sports federations. This study uses the data collected within the framework of the application of the Sports Governance Observer survey to the 35 Olympic federations. The study explores how corruption, unsatisfied internal stakeholders, and a (perceived) lack of effectiveness have led to a crisis in the legitimacy of international sports federation, which may lead to instability and disorder in international sports governance. The study demonstrates that legitimacy crises are caused, first and foremost, by flawed institutional design; in particular, by a lack of robust control mechanisms that allow both member federations and external actors to control international sports federations. The main findings regarding the five categories of control mechanisms identified in academic literature are:

1. Screening and selection mechanisms

- Only four federations (11%) have a nominations committee in place that performs integrity and professional checks.
- A majority of 19 federations (54%) announce the candidates standing for election one month or less before the elections take place. 32 federations (91%) announce candidates standing for elections less than 2 months before they take place.
- In only one federation, candidates are obliged to provide their manifesto.

2. Monitoring and reporting requirements

- Only eight federations (23%) publish the agenda and minutes of its general assembly on their website.
- Only four federations (11%) publish governing body decisions on their website and (sometimes) explain the rationale behind key decisions.

- Only six federations (17%) publish annual general activity reports on their websites that include information on assets, accounts, revenue, sponsoring, and events.
- Only eight federations (23%) publish (basic) reports of their standing committees online.
- None of the federations publishes reports on remuneration, including per diem payments and bonuses, of its board members and senior officials.
- A minority of 12 federations (35%) publishes externally audited annual financial reports on its website.

3. Administrative procedures

- For the 32 federations for which data was available, a majority of 18 federations (56%) was found to have a code of ethics that includes crucial components such as the prohibition of bribery and procedures covering the offer or receipt of gifts.
- A minority of six (17%) federations have clear conflict of interest rules in place that include disclosure requirements and the duty to abstain from voting in particular cases, and define appropriate thresholds. Seven (20%) federations do not have conflict of interest rules in place at all.
- In 18 of the 29 federations for which data was available (62%), the governing body selects the host. Importantly, in none of the federations, the selection of host candidates takes place according to a transparent and objectively reproducible process, in which bidding dossiers are reviewed independently and assigned a score on the basis of pre-established criteria.
- In a majority of 23 federations (66%), the chairman/woman of the athletes' commission is a member of the decision-making body. However, in only eight federations (23%), athletes elect the chairman/woman of the athletes' commission.

4. Institutional checks

- 12 federations (34%) do not have an ethics committee in place. Moreover, in only five federations (14%), the ethics committee is robust, meaning that it is independent from the governing body and has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative.
- Only six federations (17%) have an internal audit committee that has a clearly defined role and has the authority to oversee the internal audit and assesses the quality of the internal control system.
- A minority of eight federations (23%) have an independent committee in place that allows national federations, club, players, or official directly affected by a decision-making body decision to appeal that decision.

5. Elections

- In 23 federations (66%), elections take place according to clear and objective procedures and secret ballots are used.


- None of the federations has rules in place that limit the terms of office of the president to two terms of four years and governing body members to two terms of four years. However, 11 federations (31%) have some form of limitation in place.

These findings demonstrate that the majority of the 35 Olympic international sports federations do not have an institutional design implemented that allows their constituents to monitor and sanction decision-making body members. Therefore, senior sports officials are not sufficiently incentivised to act in accordance with their constituents' interests.

In order to remedy the status quo, **the third part of this report** presents both the Sports Governance Observer and the benchmarking of the 35 Olympic sports federations on the basis of the tool. Introducing the **SGO index** as a measure of good governance, this part exposes the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 35 federations in relation to good governance.

It shows that the SGO index¹ of the 35 federations combined is 45.4% with 26 federations (74%) scoring less than 50% (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Sports Governance Observer 2015 scores



¹ The SGO index indicates to what degree the federations comply with the 36 indicators constituted in the four governance dimensions: transparency, democratic process, checks and balances, and solidarity. Consequently, a federation getting the highest possible score (5) on all included indicators in this survey would achieve an SGO index of 100%.

In general, the federations score weak to moderate on the four dimensions of good governance upon which the Sports Governance Observer is based, namely **transparency, democratic process, checks and balances, and solidarity** (see table 1).

Table 1: SGO Index and SGO scores – all 35 federations

All 35 federations		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.99	49.6%
Democratic process	2.81	45.2%
Checks and balances	2.68	42.0%
Solidarity	2.79	44.9%
Overall		45.4%

It must be stressed that the SGO index reflects the presence of **basic criteria of good governance**. Medium-size federations should be expected to have an SGO index close to 75%, while large federations should achieve a score higher than 75%. While having a high SGO index does not rule out the occurrence of corruption, it can be expected that the absence of basic criteria of good governance increases the likelihood of opportunistic and unethical behaviour.

Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies invites everyone with an interest in sports governance, including (senior) sports and governmental officials, to contribute to developing the Sports Governance Observer further in order to increase its robustness, validity and reliability.²

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Part I. Background and introduction

1. The AGGIS Project and the Sports Governance Observer tool

1.1 Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations (AGGIS)

In 2012-2013, Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies cooperated with six European Universities (Loughborough University, Utrecht University, University of Leuven, German Sport University Cologne, IDHEAP Lausanne, and Ljubljana University) and the European Journalism Centre on the topic of good governance in international sports organisations. The co-operation took place under the framework the Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations (AGGIS) project, which received financial support from the European Commission's Preparatory Actions in the field of sport.

The project aimed to identify guidelines, stimulate the debate and analyse the state of affairs with regard to good governance in international sports organisations. Its outcomes have been published in a final report (Alm, 2013). One of the key features of this report is the Sports Governance Observer, a checklist of elements that the experts deemed vital for good governance in international sports federations (see AGGIS group, 2013).

1.2 The Sports Governance Observer

After the funding period of the AGGIS project, Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies decided to continue its efforts on the subject of good governance. It engaged in a project with the University of Leuven with the aim and view of elaborating the Sports Governance Observer from a checklist into a practical benchmarking tool with a scoring system that can be used to assess the degree of good governance in international sports federations. In addition, the aim was to test the tool on a large group of federations. The results of these efforts are presented in this report.

1.3 Aims and scope of the report

The main aim of this report is to stimulate debate and disseminate good practice on the issue of good governance in international sport. Everyone with an interest in sports governance, including (senior) sports and governmental officials, is invited to contribute to developing the Sports Governance Observer further in order to increase its robustness, validity and reliability.

This report is divided in three main parts. After this introductory section, the second part of the report presents an in-depth study of the governance of 35 Olympic sports federations. This study analyses the raw data collected within the framework of the Sports Governance Observer survey. This adds to objectivity of the research. Indeed, the methodology that underpins the Sports Governance Observer (i.e., constructing composite indicators) is associated with making subjective choices and, therefore, the choice was made to also include in this report an analysis on the basis of the unprocessed data of the 35 federations. The third part comprises both the Sports Governance Observer tool and the results of its application on the 35 Olympic sports federations.

Part II. Study: The legitimacy crisis in international sports governance³

1. Introduction

When international sports federations (ISFs) emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, few actors questioned their legitimacy. On the contrary, there was a clear need for global regulators for sport: increased international competition required clear and consistent rules. Over the years, ISFs' functional importance has continued to increase. ISFs proved extremely useful: they possess functional qualities and expertise. Most notably, they provide order and structure to the complex sporting world through regulations, licenses, policies, and so on. Yet transformations in international sports governance have led to a more commercialised setting, in which ISFs struggle to maintain their legitimacy. Corruption, unsatisfied internal stakeholders, and a perceived lack of effectiveness have led stakeholders to contest ISFs' legitimacy.

This study argues that three forms of ISFs' legitimacy are under threat, namely output legitimacy, procedural legitimacy, and structural legitimacy. Because they fail to reflect affected audiences' expectations, ISFs develop legitimacy deficits in these three dimensions. Aware that their legitimacy is under threat, ISFs engage in three practices in order to (re-)claim and sustain legitimacy: self-legitimation, horizontal legitimation, which involves engaging in partnerships with political actors, and institutional reform. These legitimation efforts have however failed to fully address legitimacy gaps. In certain ISFs, this has led to severe legitimacy crises because they face disempowerment, which may lead to instability and disorder in international sports governance.

The study demonstrates that legitimacy crises are caused, first and foremost, by flawed institutional design. It introduces the so-called Principal-Agent model in order to analyse ISFs' organisational structures. In order to reclaim legitimacy, ISFs must engage in thorough institutional reforms and install a number of robust control mechanisms that allow for monitoring and sanctioning senior sports officials' behaviour.

This study continues as follows. The second section of this chapter explores how transformations in international sports governance have caused legitimacy gaps and crises in relation to ISFs. The third section lays out the methodology of the study. It introduces the Principal-Agent model to test the hypothesis that the institutional design of ISFs is flawed. The fourth section applies the Principal-Agent model in order to analyse the institutional design of ISFs. The analysis relies on data collected from the 35 Olympic ISFs. The final sections summarises the findings and makes a number of policy recommendations.

³ This study is to be regarded as a working paper. If at all possible, please quote more final versions of the study.

2. Background

2.1 Transformations in international sports governance

At the turn of the twentieth century, international competition spurred the need to centralise sports governance and to unify rules, paving the way for the first ISFs. The creation and success of the modern Olympic Games, for instance, increased international competition (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008, p. 64). The international sport governance system that soon crystallised can generally be described as a hierarchical network running from the global to continental, national, and local levels. In broad terms, for a single sport, an international federation stands at the top of a vertical chain of command (Geeraert, 2016a).

ISFs were able to consolidate their monopolies as global regulating bodies for their respective sports because they fulfilled the need for consistent rules. Because the public sector has long regarded sport a cultural and, above all, amateur activity, international sports governance has also remained largely private in nature. The sports world claims that the regulation of sport is best kept private (Chappelet, 2010). This has not prevented politics from co-opting sport (Jackson and Haigh, 2009). In recent years, this symbiosis has become particularly visible in the politics and policies of the so-called emerging countries, which tend to see sport mega-events as “proxies for integration and influence” (Cornelissen, 2010, p. 3015). The instrumentalisation of sport by politics is said to have led, at times, to improper influence and the concentration of power in ISFs, inducing the corrosion of the ethical character of international sports governance (Voy and Deeter, 1992; Weinreich, 2014a).

Even though they have allowed politics to influence their policies and decisions, autonomy from formal regulatory public interference is an obsession for ISFs (Geeraert, Mrkonjic and Chappelet, 2014). Modern sport’s construction is, in essence, rooted in classic liberalism, namely in the concept of freedom of association (Szymanski, 2006). Autonomy is therefore a deeply ingrained and cherished principle in the sports world. It is an essential part of ISFs’ belief system; a doctrine that they aim to spread among political institutions and stakeholders in order to keep the governance of international sport strictly private. Remarkably, however, the sports world has never formulated a clear definition or justification of the autonomy of sport (cf. IOC, 2008, p. 1). Autonomy is a concept that is deliberately kept vague in order to function as a *passe-partout* to justify self-governance. Yet in the past two decades, many facets of ISFs’ self-governance have come under increasing pressure. The commercialisation of sport can be cited as a direct cause of this trend.

The origins of the commercialisation of sport can be traced to the period after the Second World War, when more individual leisure time led to both more opportunities to practice (organised) sport and an increased consumption of sport (Andreff, 2008). The development of radio and, later on, television broadcasting even allowed for remote consumption of sport events. Television broadcasting boosted the popularity of certain sports and fuelled the global popularity of related sport events. However, the enormous commercial impact of sports broadcasting only hit when a privatisation wave broke up public broadcasting monopolies in Europe during the 1980s. Together with these evolutions, the development of cable, satellite and digital television and the internet boosted the demand for sports

broadcasting from the 1990s on, resulting in more valuable broadcasting deals for sporting events (Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Andreff and Bourg, 2006; Szymanski, 2006). Against this background, the largest ISFs have increasingly realised the business potential of their sporting events. Since the mid-1980s, they have marketed their events more effectively, selling exclusive marketing rights – mostly through agencies – for vast sums of money (Tomlinson, 2005; Chappelet and Kübler-Mabott, 2008). In this light, ISFs have also benefited from the revenue generated by the Olympic Games, which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) redistributes among associated federations (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabott, 2008).

The commercialisation of sport has put the autonomy of ISFs under increased pressure. Reasons for this are fourfold:

- Firstly, the increase in revenue has incentivised opportunistic senior sports officials to behave unethically. A number of officials have engaged in racketeering, wire fraud, money laundering, and taking bribes.
- Secondly, as sport emerged from its initial amateur status and governance challenges became more complex, the impact of ISFs' policies and decisions on public and private actors and society at large increased accordingly. This has resulted in affected actors undertaking actions to increase their influence on the governance of international sport (Geeraert, 2016b).
- Thirdly, sport is increasingly infiltrated by (international) criminal activities.
- Fourthly, a trend towards 'gigantism' in relation to large sporting events has raised questions regarding sustainability (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008, p. 80; Geeraert, 2016c).

These issues, and the general failure of ISFs to provide adequate solutions, have put the *legitimacy* of ISFs to govern sport autonomously at an international level under severe stress.

2.2 The legitimacy crisis in international sports governance

According to Zaum, "[a]n institution is legitimate if its power is justified in terms of moral and socially embedded beliefs, and if those subject to its rule recognise that it should be obeyed" (Zaum, 2013, p. 9). This definition reflects the meaning of legitimacy as "a social status that can adhere to an actor or action" and which is "recognized as good, proper, or commendable by a group of others" (Coleman, 2007, p. 20). It also highlights the importance of specific audiences in judging whether an institution is legitimate. Yet for a given institution to lack *legitimacy* is not the same as lacking *support* from affected audiences. Indeed, in order to be legitimate, an institution must be *perceived* as legitimate (Frost, 2013, p. 27). When an institution's practices and objectives fail to reflect affected audiences' moral and socially embedded beliefs, it develops a *legitimacy deficit* (Zaum, 2013, p. 7). Affected audiences perceive the institution as illegitimate, and this may give rise to a *legitimacy crisis*.

when legitimacy “declines to the point where the actor or institution must either adapt [...] or face disempowerment” (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 158).

Recently, a number of ISFs have developed severe legitimacy deficits. In certain cases, these even gave rise to legitimacy crises. In order to assess these deficits, this section relies on Zaum (2013), who distinguishes three different forms of legitimacy, namely *output legitimacy*, *procedural legitimacy*, and *structural legitimacy*. ISF’s legitimacy deficits are especially situated in the former two dimensions. Their structural legitimacy, though challenged by internal stakeholders, remains largely uncontested by political actors.

Output legitimacy

Firstly, *output legitimacy* refers to beliefs about an institution’s effectiveness to produce desired outcomes and promote shared goals. ISFs have largely failed to adequately deal with an increasing number of governance challenges that came with the commercialisation and the resulting complexity of the sports world. Almost inevitably, the commercialisation of sport has been at the basis of significant failures of governance (Henry and Lee, 2004).

These failures are not unique to sport. They reflect the challenges modern public governance faces in the light of an increasingly complex society and include both too little and too much regulation, flawed policy designs, (political) gridlocks and cooperation failures (cf. Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters, 2001). For instance, ISFs have largely been unable to unilaterally deal with transnational governance issues, such as doping, match-fixing and criminal networks targeting sports (Houlihan, 1999; Bakadiababu, 2001; Hill, 2010). In addition, the potential positive effects of large sporting events on local populations are undermined by the lack of sustainability requirements for host countries (Geeraert, 2016c). Finally, due to the increased commercial and economic significance of sports, activities of ISFs fall within the scope of and often breach economic laws at different levels (Parrish, 2003; Parrish and McArdle, 2004). Such failures of governance in sport have prompted the debate for more public oversight and control over the sports world. Public authorities at different levels have been contesting, competing, and cooperating with ISFs (Houlihan, 1999; Henry and Lee, 2004; Croci and Forster, 2004; Chappelet, 2010; Geeraert, 2016b).

Procedural legitimacy

Secondly, *procedural legitimacy* pertains beliefs about whether or not an institution’s internal workings conform to generally accepted procedures. Sports governance is characterised by a hierarchical pyramid structure that runs from the global to continental, national, and local levels (Geeraert, 2016a). As a general rule, an ISF stands at the top of a vertical chain of command for each individual sport. Usually, continental sport federations are housed under the global federation. National federations, in turn, are housed beneath the continental federations. At the lowest end of the chain are clubs (when the sport in question is a team sport) and athletes who take part in the competitions. They must conform to the rules adopted at the top end of the pyramid.

As sport transitioned from its initial amateur status and governance challenges became more complex, ISFs increasingly adopted more (diverse) tasks on behalf of their internal

stakeholders (Geeraert, 2016b). For instance, ISFs issue rules that determine the conditions for athlete transfers between clubs; the conditions clubs and athletes must fulfil to enter competition; the modalities surrounding competition; doping use; and the redistribution of revenue. Sport organisations can sanction athletes, clubs, and national federations for breaching these rules through their disciplinary bodies. Directly affected by and cognizant of the augmented powers of ISFs, internal stakeholders, have responded to the organisations' increasing reach. Athletes, clubs, and national federations have voiced grievances about their lack of participation and decision-making power in the policy processes of ISFs. In certain cases, this has resulted in the emancipation of international sport organisation's internal stakeholders (Holt 2006; García, 2007; Thibault et al., 2010). Yet the danger exists that the most powerful stakeholders are favoured to the detriment of those that have less clout but are nevertheless equally affected by the policies devised by ISFs (Geeraert, 2016b).

The issue that most severely challenges ISFs' procedural legitimacy, however, is corruption. A range of high-profile ethical scandals spurred public attention for corruption within ISFs. These scandals seem to point to unfair, opaque and unaccountable internal (voting) procedures, including regarding the awarding of sport events. The most notable examples of corruption are the 2002 Olympic Winter Games bid scandal, which involved allegations of bribery used to win the rights to host the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City (Mallon, 2000), and the litany of corruption-related indictments enveloping FIFA, the governing body of football (Jennings, 2006; Weinreich, 2014b). On 27 May 2015, US authorities indicted fourteen officials on racketeering, wire fraud, and money laundering charges. Seven current FIFA officials (including one FIFA Vice-President) were arrested by the Swiss authorities at the request of the US Department of Justice on suspicion of receiving \$150 million in bribes in return for media and marketing rights during FIFA related events in North and South America. US and Swiss authorities subsequently initiated separate criminal investigations into the awarding of the 2018 and 2022 football World Cup hosting rights to Russia and Qatar, respectively (Gibson, 2015).

Allegations of corruption or other forms of 'governance failures' are however not unique to the largest sport organisation. Three examples below can serve to illustrate how a number of smaller ISFs are affected by similar problems. Mexican Ruben Acosta allegedly got away with at least \$33 million in personal commissions in the last decade of his 24 years reign as president of the International Volleyball Federation (Hoy, 2005). Hassan Moustafa, the Egyptian President of the International Handball Federation, received over 300,000 euro in travel reimbursement without presenting receipts. He also established a salary raise (from a part-time fee of 30,000 Swiss Franc to an annual 500,000 Swiss Franc as a full-time employee) and his fellow board members (a 500 % increase) so that they receive more than the International Handball Federation's total development aid. Moreover, he allegedly secured a personal contract worth 602,000 euro with German sports marketing company Sportfive, which later acquired the IHF broadcasting rights (Ahl, 2009; 2010; 2013). Finally, in the International Weightlifting Federation, Hungarian Tamas Aján, who has been president for 15 years, failed to account for the disappearance of an estimated \$5 million of IOC grants from two Swiss bank accounts (Hartmann, 2013).

As a result of especially the high-profile ethical scandals in FIFA, public actors have increasingly started to express their discontent with ISFs' governance. National parliaments, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called upon ISFs, in particular FIFA, to improve their governance (Randall and Brady, 2011; UK Parliament, 2011; Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, 2012; European Parliament, 2013; European Parliament, 2015). Following the most recent FIFA corruption scandal, British Prime Minister David Cameron and Culture Secretary John Whittingdale called for reforms in FIFA (BBC, 2015).

Structural legitimacy

Thirdly, *structural legitimacy* refers to beliefs about whether or not an institution is "the right organisation for the job" (Sutchman, 1995, p. 582). Internal stakeholders have challenged the legitimacy of their respective ISFs' governing monopoly. In several sports, ISFs protect their governing monopoly in order to deny their members the right to take part in alternative sport events that are not officially sanctioned by the federation. Profitable, alternative competition formats outside ISFs' regulatory scope have nonetheless been proposed and have emerged in recent years. Most recently, the International Skating Union banned two Dutch speed skaters for life for participating in a profitable new competition in Dubai (Rossing, 2014). The most notable example of a (possible) breakaway competition has however occurred in football. In 1998, a private business group planned to set up a highly profitable European super league competition outside of FIFA and UEFA's structures (Holt, 2006, pp. 35-36). The plan was abandoned when UEFA agreed to reform its premier European club championship Champions League so that elite European clubs could gain more revenue. However, secession threats by elite European clubs continue to emerge from time to time.

ISFs' structural legitimacy has however been less challenged by public actors. Two reasons can be cited for this. Firstly, as already noted, ISFs and the IOC have successfully promoted the idea among political institutions that an autonomous sports movement is necessary for the proper organisation of sport (Geeraert, 2016a). The sports worlds' lobbying powers are determined by a number of (sport) specific features. Sport is very popular with politicians, who try to win votes by associating themselves with sporting events. Moreover, national sports federations often have strong ties with their national government, and ISFs can capitalise on this (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a). Finally, ISFs can capitalise on their regulatory powers in order to influence politics. Indeed, they important means of reprisal against national public authorities, which they can use in order to keep these authorities under control. ISFs can exact costs on a country by blocking it from participating in international competitions by suspending its national sport federation. Moreover, they can withdraw the privilege of hosting sporting events such as the World Cup or the Euro (Kędzior and Szczepanik, 2012, p. 212). Finally, acting contrary to the wishes of the IOC and ISFs may be detrimental for bids to host major events (García and Weatherill, 2012, p. 249). As already mentioned, hosting (large) sporting events has become increasingly important to national governments.

The second reason why public actors have not severely challenged ISFs' structural legitimacy is that ISFs' are, at least in principle, extremely useful organisations. The recognition of their functional qualities and expertise contributes to their legitimacy (Geeraert, 2016b; see also Cutler, Haufler and Porter [1999]). First, as the custodians of sport, they are – in principle – the only actors that can take into account the interests of sport as a whole. Other sport stakeholders have separate interests that do not necessarily serve the general (sporting) interest. ISFs effectuate cooperation between (internal) stakeholders, ensuring that they all move in the same (mutually beneficial) direction. Related, whereas (internal) stakeholders are unlikely to reach a stable agreement on policy, ISFs allow for *collective decision-making* by controlling the agenda of sports governance. Second, they are specialised bodies that are supposed to culminate the necessary expertise to govern sporting issues. They provide *specialisation* in that they have the expertise, time and resources to oversee sport competition. They are also useful in that they offer *dispute resolution* between internal stakeholders. Third, they have an important state-like function in bringing *order and structure* the complex sporting world through regulations, licenses, policies, and so on. At the global level, no overarching state authority exists that is capable of fulfilling this role (Geeraert, 2016a, p. 423).

The resultant belief on the part of political institutions in the appropriateness of having private monopolies govern sport has not been severely damaged as a result of sports corruption.⁴ Tellingly, in the aftermath of the FIFA corruption scandal, virtually no politicians suggested that the organisation's governing monopoly should be overthrown. One significant exception to this rule is the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). WADA was conceived as a hybrid, public-private organisation because public authorities requested a more significant role as they were sceptical about the IOC after the 2002 Salt Lake City corruption scandal (Houlihan, 2001, p. 125).

Legitimation efforts by ISFs

For an institution to be legitimate, it must claim and sustain its legitimacy so that it is recognised as rightful. Institutions seeking legitimacy therefore constantly “justify their identities, interests, practices, or institutional designs” (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 159). ISFs have engaged in such processes. They have responded to legitimacy deficits by engaging in legitimation practices, which pertain to “conscious efforts” to enhance and sustain their legitimacy (Welsh and Zaum, 2013, p. 71).

Three broad practices stand out: *self-legitimation*, *horizontal legitimation*, and *institutional reform*:

- Firstly, ISFs engage in *self-legitimation*, which refers to “an action or series of actions – speech, writing, ritual, display – whereby people justify to themselves or others the actions they are taking and the identities they are expressing or claiming”

⁴ However, note that both international and national sports federations' structural legitimacy is increasingly challenged by their inability to promote sport for all and their resultant loss of market share in the sport for all market.

(Barker, 2003, pp. 163-164). As mentioned, ISFs and the IOC often proclaim their legitimacy in their discourse by referring to the autonomy of sport. A good example is a position paper of the Olympic and sports movement on the autonomy of sport, in which it stresses that “[t]he responsibility sport has in society, and the autonomy with which it regulates itself, have led to its credibility and legitimacy. Autonomy thus means preserving the values of sport and the existing structures through which it has developed in Europe and in the world” (IOC, 2008, p. 1).

- Secondly, ISFs engage in *horizontal legitimization*, which pertains to “legitimation by actors who are outside the hierarchical relationship governed by legitimacy” (Zaum, 2013, p. 11). An established strategy in this regard has been to engage in ‘partnerships’ with (international) political actors such as the United Nations and the European Union in order to solidify legitimacy credentials (cf. Williams, 2013, p. 43). By associating with these actors, ISFs gain status and recognitions; they can adopt some of the authority derived from the legitimacy of these institutions (cf. Hurd, 2002, p. 43). ISFs benefit from the fact that the IOC has accumulated international legitimacy by associating itself with the United Nations. Since 2009, the IOC even enjoys observer status in the United Nations General Assembly and in April 2014, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the IOC. The agreement stresses that the United Nations and the IOC “share the same values of contributing to a better and peaceful world through sport” and “calls for respect of the autonomous organisation of sport” (IOC, 2014). ISFs such as FIFA, the International Judo Federation, the International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation, the Badminton World Federation, the International Biathlon Union, the International Association of Athletics Federations, and the International Volleyball Federation and SportAccord, the umbrella organisation of more than 100 ISFs, have engaged in similar partnerships with the United Nations (IOC, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013a; BWF, 2015; IAAF, 2015; UNESCO, 2015).⁵ ISFs, continental federations and umbrella organisations of sport federations have also been keen to associate themselves and engage in partnership agreements with the European Union for reasons of legitimization (Geeraert, 2016b).
- Thirdly, in recent years, a number of ISFs have openly *reformed their internal workings* in order to enhance their legitimacy. For instance, they have engaged in governance reforms, aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability. When doing so, they have often communicated these changes extensively to their internal stakeholders and the general public. The most prominent examples in this regard are the internal reforms that took place within the IOC after the Salt Lake City scandal in 1999 and the recent FIFA reform process that followed numerous reports of corruption (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Pieth, 2014a). Most recently,

⁵ Wilfried Lemke, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace in fact encourages such partnerships: “We need partnership between the world of sport and United Nations to harness the full potential that sport has to be an agent for social change.” (Lemke in IOC, 2010).

Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), the world governing body for sports cycling, has announced that it will engage in governance reforms (UCI, 2015). The problem with these reforms is that a generally accepted and objective benchmark is lacking in order to evaluate if these reforms adequately address accountability and transparency deficiencies or if they merely serve as window-dressing (Geeraert, 2015). In addition, ISFs have formally institutionalised the consultation of internal stakeholders, in particular athletes (Geeraert, Alm and Grohl, 2014; Geeraert, 2016b).

The importance of resolving legitimacy gaps and crises

The legitimisation efforts by ISFs have failed to fully address legitimacy gaps. Only when an institution's legitimacy claims are recognised as rightful does it command legitimacy (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 159). Affected audiences, particularly NGOs, internal stakeholders, and parliamentary assemblies continue to challenge ISFs' output and procedural legitimacy. ISFs fail to reflect these audiences' beliefs on procedural fairness and effectiveness. In certain ISFs, this has led to severe legitimacy crises because "the level of social recognition" that their identities, interests, practices, norms, or procedures "are rightful declines to the point where the actor or institution must either adapt [...] or face disempowerment" (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 158).

The most well-known example is FIFA, but the governance failures including the cases of corruption mentioned above indicate that international sports governance faces a severe legitimacy crisis.⁶ This crisis is chronic, since legitimacy deficits remain severe, but the compensatory use of short-term legitimisation strategies "stave off disempowerment without recalibrating the social bases of legitimacy" (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 168). Consequently, these strategies are not sustainable. The danger therefore exists that international sports governance is increasingly confronted with stability and disorder (cf. Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 170). Indeed, as indicated, ISFs are pivotal actors in international sports governance because of their functional qualities and expertise. The disempowerment of ISFs moreover bears costs for society at large. A failure to address issues such as doping, match-fixing, money laundering, a lack of (environmental) sustainability, corruption, and the illegal trade in African and South American athletes has a negative impact on the wider community.

It is thus extremely important that the legitimacy crisis in international sport is resolved, both for those involved in professional and grassroots sport and those that have nothing to do with sport as such. How do we resolve this crisis? In what follows, it will be shown that ISFs' legitimacy deficit is essentially a problem of *flawed institutional design*.

Put simply, ISFs often lack legitimacy because, in general, they are characterised by 'bad governance'.

⁶ Note that the IOC was confronted with a severe legitimacy crisis after the Salt Lake City corruption scandal (see above).

3. Methodology

3.1 Legitimacy deficits as a problem of institutional design: the principal-agent model

How do we resolve the legitimacy crisis in international sports governance in a sustainable manner?

In order to make sure that ISFs conduct their tasks in such a way that they are recognised as legitimate, their actions and interests need to be recalibrated with the normative expectations of their social constituency of legitimation. Put differently, ISFs' actions need to "resonate with the normative expectations" of those that are affected by ISFs' actions (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 172). This raises the question how we can make sure that ISFs' act in the best interest of stakeholders. In order to answer this question, we must conceptualise and theorise the problem. This study relies on the insights of the Principal-Agent (PA) model, which has proven a powerful tool to analyse relationships where an actor or group of actors (the agent(s)) behaves on behalf of another actor or set of actors (the principal(s)).⁷

In organisational studies, the Principal-Agent model is "fundamentally concerned with institutional design" (Elgie, 2002, p. 189). In brief, actors (the *principals*) delegate tasks to an institution (the *agent*), and expect the institution to behave in their best interest when executing these tasks. However, the principals cannot fully observe and do not have information on the appropriateness of all the actions of the agent. The agent, moreover, has its own private interests that do not necessarily correspond with those of the principals, and which incentivise the agent to behave opportunistically and pursue its own interests. This gives rise to *agency slack* or *independent action by the agent that is undesired by the principal*. Slack can take different forms. It can refer to inertia, inefficiency and/or ineffectiveness, but also to corruption. The challenge of institutional design is thus to construct agencies in such a way so as to minimise slack (Pollack, 1997, p. 101; Elgie, 2002, p. 189; Majone, 1999). Indeed, institutions impose rules-based constraints on actors and therefore structure the behaviour of actors.

This brings us to the question of how institutions can be designed so that agency slack is minimised. This question of institutional design is in essence a problem associated with the Principal-Agent model: how can we structure relationships between the principal and the agent so that the outcomes of the agent's actions comply with the principal's wishes (cf. Majone, 1999, p. 13)? Principal-Agent analysis holds that *control mechanisms* can alter the

⁷ The Principal-Agent model mostly relies on the theoretical assumptions of rational choice theory. Rational choice theory assumes that actors behave rationally and instrumentally in order to maximise the attainment of their self-interests (Snidal, 1985, p. 40). More specifically, this study finds resonance with *rational choice institutionalism*, which holds that institutions impose rules-based constraints on actors and thus structure the behaviour of actors, and these actors hold a fixed set of preferences and behave instrumentally. Importantly, the Principal-Agent model should not be seen as a dogma or aim in itself. A useful alternative option to study actor behaviour in ISFs would be to use a constructivist approach, which explores the existence of informal norms that shape actors' identities and preferences within institutions. Such an approach can even be complementary with the rational choice approach used in this study (cf. Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015b).

incentives of the agent such that acting in line with the principal's interests is more attractive (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack, 1997; Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a). Such control mechanisms should comprise a mixture of *monitoring* and *sanctioning*:

1. By *monitoring* the agent's actions, the principal decreases information asymmetries concerning the agent's actions and interests. This decreases the likelihood that slack will go unnoticed. In addition, knowing that the principal is observing its actions, the agent will be motivated to act in the principal's best interest.
2. *Sanctions* entail imposing costs on the agent. The mere acknowledgement of the credible possibility of a sanction "provides a measure of latent control over the agent's actions" (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 604). If demonstrating slack leads to costs for the agent, then the agent will be incentivised not to act contrary to the principal's interests.

If monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are installed in institutions, acting in the principals' interests will be made a more attractive option. More specifically, five distinct classes of measures that are particularly relevant for the present purposes emerge from the Principal-Agent literature (i.e., monitoring and sanctioning) the agent (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack, 1997; Fearon, 1999). These are (1) *screening and selection mechanisms*, (2) *monitoring and reporting requirements*, (3) *administrative procedures*, (4) *institutional checks*, and (5) *elections*. ISFs that have measures implemented in their institutional design are expected to demonstrate high degrees of legitimacy. Reasons for this are threefold:

1. They allow for the calibration of agent actions with the normative expectations of those that are represented (i.e., the principals) (cf. Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 172).
2. They contribute to outcome legitimacy because they increase institutions' effectiveness. The reason for this is that, firstly, recognition of legitimacy translates into voluntary compliance by stakeholders (Reus-Smit, 2007, p. 170). Secondly, administrative procedures that allow for the inclusion of principals in the decision making process may lead to more effective governance because they can provide specialized knowledge (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004). Thirdly, increased accountability enhances the learning capacity and effectiveness of organisations (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000, Bovens 2007).
3. They enhance institutions' procedural legitimacy because they improve the quality of internal procedures. Firstly, they provide principals' with statutory options for control and thus contribute to the fairness and openness of (and, thus, trust in) the internal working of the institution (Mouffe, 1993; Vaubel, 2006, p. 129). Secondly, control mechanisms and procedures decrease the likelihood of agents engaging in unethical behaviour such as corruption and fraud (Ades and Di Tella, 1997, p. 508).

The Principal-Agent model predicts that, in the absence of control mechanisms, the agent will minimise its efforts on behalf of the principal and even pursue its own interests at the expense of the principal (McCubbins and Page, 1987, pp. 410-411; Pollack, 2003, p. 26). This necessarily leads to legitimacy gaps and crises. This logic can also be inversed. Given the legitimacy gaps and crises in international sports governance, it can be expected that the institutional design of ISFs is flawed in the sense they lack monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. *The remainder of this report tests this hypothesis.* The decision was made to focus on the 35 ISFs whose sports will be represented at the 2016 Olympic Games (see Table 1). Although these federations vary considerably in terms of size, amount of revenue generated and popularity of their respective sports, they are comparable because they represent popular summer and winter sport and benefit from the IOC's redistribution scheme.

Table 2: Population of the study: the 35 Olympic ISFs

English name	Acronym	Summer/winter Olympic sport	Registered Office	Country	Co-operated with research
International Boxing Association	AIBA	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
Badminton World Federation	BWF	Summer	Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia	Yes
International Federation for Equestrian Sports	FEI	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	Yes
International Basketball Federation	FIBA	Summer	Geneva	Switzerland	No
International Bobsleigh & Skeleton Federation	FIBT	Winter	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
International Fencing Federation	FIE	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
International Federation of Association Football	FIFA	Summer	Zürich	Switzerland	Yes
International Federation of Gymnastics	FIG	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	Yes
International Hockey Federation	FIH	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
International Luge Federation	FIL	Winter	Berchtesgaden	Germany	No
International Swimming Federation	FINA	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
International Ski Federation	FIS	Winter	Oberhofen am Thunersee	Switzerland	Yes
International Federation of Rowing Associations	FISA	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	Yes
World Archery Federation	FITA/ WA	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No

International Volleyball Federation	FIVB	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
International Association of Athletics Federations	IAAF	Summer	Monaco	Monaco	No
International Biathlon Union	IBU	Winter	Salzburg	Austria	Yes
International Canoe Federation	ICF	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
International Golf Federation	IGF	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	No
International Handball Federation	IHF	Summer	Basle	Switzerland	No
International Ice Hockey Federation	IIHF	Winter	Zürich	Switzerland	No
International Judo Federation	IJF	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	Yes
International Sailing Federation Limited	ISAF	Summer	Southampton	UK	No
International Shooting Sport Federation	ISSF	Summer	Munich	Germany	Yes
International Skating Union	ISU	Winter	Lausanne	Switzerland	Yes
International Tennis Federation Limited	ITF	Summer	London	UK	No
The International Table Tennis Federation	ITTF	Summer	Lausanne	Switzerland	Yes
The International Triathlon Union	ITU	Summer	Vancouver	Canada	Yes ⁸
International Weightlifting Federation	IWF	Summer	Budapest	Hungary	No
Union Cycliste Internationale	UCI	Summer	Aigle	Switzerland	No
Union International de Pentathlon Moderne	UIPM	Summer	Monaco	Monaco	Yes
United World Wrestling	UWW	Summer	Corsier-sur-Vevey	Switzerland	No
World Curling Federation	WCF	Winter	Lausanne	Switzerland	Yes
World Rugby	WR	Summer	Dublin	Ireland	Yes
World Taekwondo Federation	WTF	Summer	Seoul	Korea	Yes

⁸ In the case of the ITU, an official offered to assist with the data gathering.

3.2 Data collection

The study relies on the *raw* data collected within the framework of the Sports Governance Observer survey (see Part III of this report).


4. Analysis

This section applies the Principal-Agent model in order to analyse the institutional design of ISFs. The decision-making bodies of ISFs are conceptualised as agents, who fulfil a range of tasks on behalf of three main groups of principals, namely national sports federations, athletes, and national public authorities. If ISFs do not have an institutional design implemented that allows principals to monitor and sanction decision-making body members, the likelihood that the organisations demonstrate slack is high.

4.1 Delegation of authority to ISFs

ISFs fulfil a range of tasks on behalf of a diverse group of principals (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a). This section identifies three groups of principals, which function as ISFs' main constituents: national sports federations, athletes, and national public authorities (see Figure 1). The reason for focusing on these principals is that, in general, ISFs mostly fulfil tasks on their behalf. True, the actual level of representation of these principals varies between ISFs. Certain ISFs even fulfil very important tasks on behalf of other principals (such as clubs) (Geeraert, 2016a).⁹ Yet when analysing ISFs as a group, this study argues and assumes that national sports federations, athletes, and national public authorities are the most prominent principals.

Figure 2. Delegation of authority to ISFs by principals



ISFs fulfil tasks and, therefore, act as agents for three main groups of actors: national sports federations, athletes, and national public authorities:

Firstly, *national sports federations* have initially ceded sovereignty to ISFs to facilitate international competition and to ensure clear and consistent sports rules across federations. They explicitly delegated tasks to ISFs; thus, this relationship is closest to a Principal-Agent relationship in the traditional sense (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a). Because they created

⁹ Note that EU institutions can also be conceptualised as principals of ISFs (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015; Geeraert, 2016). Focus here, however, does not dwell on EU control of ISFs.

ISFs, they enshrined into their statutes control options such as election procedures, report-reporting requirements, and so on. The main way in which national federations can control ISFs is through these statutory options for control. National federations are therefore – in principle – the most powerful principals of ISFs: other principals lack statutory options for controlling ISFs.

Importantly, national federations are not always inclined to control their ISFs' decision-making bodies. The reason is that senior sports officials have means at their disposal to manipulate the preferences of member federations, such as awarding funding or the privilege of hosting sporting events (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998, pp. 144-151; Schenk, 2011; Forster and Pope, 2004). National federations may thus become rather benevolent in order to be able to receive such benefits. This underscores the importance of institutional design: firstly, robust control mechanisms can mitigate the issue; and secondly, the institutional design of ISFs may allow other principals to monitor ISFs' decision-making bodies.


Secondly, ISFs also act on behalf of sports stakeholders such as *athletes* and *clubs*: they devise rules and policies, which athletes and clubs must abide by. These principals are formally linked to an ISF through a chain of delegation: individual athletes form clubs, clubs form national sports federations to organise competition, and national sports federations create continental and international sports federations. In this chain, in principle, only the principals closest to ISFs, national sports federations, hold statutory options for control. They are the *proximate principals* (Nielson and Tierney, 2003, p. 249). This means that especially athletes are put in a complicated position regarding control. Even though ISFs are increasingly regulating their profession, athletes seem to lack direct control options over their principals. In order to control their ISFs, they need to voice their grievances to their club, their club then has to pass these on to its national federation, and the national federation has to contact the ISF. Consequently, in order for athletes to control ISFs, there must be almost perfect control in each link of the delegation chain. This is rather unrealistic: according to Nielson and Tierney, “agency slack increases as the delegation chain grows longer” because some degree of slack is likely to occur in each link in the delegation chain (Nielson and Tierney, 2003, p. 249). This is problematical, because athletes can be conceptualised as *ultimate principals*: the chain of delegation emerged from their initial delegation and is therefore ultimately intended to facilitate athletes' competition.

Thirdly, as sports commercialised and globalised, *national public authorities* (and, by extension, the general public) have become increasingly important principals (Geeraert, 2016b). In short, public authorities demonstrate a tacit or explicit tolerance of ISFs' regulation and policy-making on their behalf (cf. Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, p. 5). Firstly, national public authorities constitute a part of a chain of delegation that links to ISFs. In certain countries, public authorities explicitly and formally delegate the task of regulating national-level sport to national sports federations (Vocasport, 2004, p. 53). In

other countries, delegation to national sports federations is more informal in nature.¹⁰ Since national federations are part of a system controlled by ISFs, public authorities also implicitly delegate authority to these organisations. Secondly, delegation from national public authorities to ISFs also takes place directly. States (implicitly) delegate legislative powers to sports bodies, including, for instance, important parts of employment rules for athletes (Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a, p. 1451). Moreover, although national sports federations are the official candidates, national governments *de facto* take part in the bidding race for the organisation of international sports events and invest significant resources to prepare candidacy (Walters, 2011). ISFs, then, perform the task of selecting a suitable host on their behalf.

Regulatory norm production within ISFs, however, operates with such great autonomy from public authorities that it is not realistic “to assert that the agents work under the control or supervision of a national constitutional principal in any meaningful hierarchical sense” (Lindseth, 2004, p. 4). As depicted in Figure 1, most ISFs are based in Switzerland, where they have so far benefitted from a quasi-unregulated system.

Figure 3: Host countries of the 35 Olympic ISFs



The Swiss Civil Code provides only very basic minimum requirements for associations, while the overall Swiss legal framework allows for large degrees of both fiscal and organisational autonomy and limited prosecution of private corruption. Recently introduced amendments to the Unfair Competition Act and the Swiss Criminal Code make corruption in international sports organisations a criminal offence, and Swiss authorities can actively prosecute offenses on the condition that there is a public interest. These amendments were introduced specifically in response to recent FIFA corruption scandals. The Swiss government initially suggested stricter amendments. Following lobbying by the private sector, which would equally be affected by the law, the amendments were toned down to include the condition of public interest. Other national public authorities are

¹⁰ Granted, some (neoliberal) states have no interest in regulating sport. This does not imply, however, that there has been no delegation of (regulatory) tasks. Here, delegation to national federations is implicit and informal in nature. That delegation nevertheless does take place is evidenced by the fact that national public authorities can, in principle, overrule national federations and even take over the regulation of sport.

generally faced with regulatory overstretch in relation to ISFs: they do not hold statutory options for control.

In what follows, *the institutional design* of the 35 Olympic sports federations is analysed. Focus here is on the presence of formal control mechanisms, which prevent ISF officials from pursuing their own interests at the expense of their principals.¹¹ More specifically, the presence of five distinct organisational arrangements that allow for monitoring and sanctioning ISFs are explored, namely (1) *screening and selection mechanisms*, (2) *monitoring and reporting requirements*, (3) *administrative procedures*, (4) *institutional checks*, and (5) *elections* (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Pollack, 1997; Fearon, 1999). It must be noted that most of these mechanisms are intended to enable national sports federations to control ISFs. This is logical, given that these actors have created ISFs and function as *proximate principals*. In fact, it would even be rather impractical to formally allow too many actors to control ISFs (cf. Nielson and Tierney, 2003). Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated, the institutional design of ISFs may also allow public authorities, the public in general, athletes and other stakeholders to control these organisations, thereby mitigating the likelihood of slack.

4.2 Screening and selection mechanisms – main findings

Before contracting agents, principals can engage in screening processes; these processes reduce information asymmetries about agents' preferences and capabilities. They allow principals to "sort out good agents from bad ones" (Strøm, 2000, p. 271). Appointing agents with preferences that do not diverge from those of the principals decreases the likelihood of slack because agents will have fewer motives to act opportunistically. It is necessary that screening processes take place on the basis of both professional criteria, ensuring that the agent is capable of performing the delegated tasks, and integrity criteria, ensuring that he/she does not have unethical motives. It is of course nearly impossible to fully observe the agent's preferences and characteristics. Yet installing robust screening and selection mechanisms increases the likelihood that the right persons are appointed at the outset.

The survey indicates that the vast majority of ISFs lack adequate screening and selection mechanisms:

- In corporate governance, establishing a nominations committee to screen potential candidates for executive functions is standard practice (Pass, 2004). Such committees typically perform both professional and integrity checks, and they include independent (external) experts (Independent Governance Committee, 2014). The survey shows that only four federations (11%) have a nominations committee in place that performs integrity and professional checks.
- Principals should have sufficient time to inform themselves about candidates standing for election. It is therefore important that the candidates are announced in

¹¹ Emphasis is therefore placed on formal rules and procedures implemented in the institutional design of ISFs. It must be noted, however, that informal and even exogenous control options may be at the disposal of principals (Calvert *et al.* 1989: 606; Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015a)

good time. However, a majority of 19 federations (54%) announce the candidates standing for election one month or less before the elections take place. 32 federations (91%) announce candidates standing for elections less than 2 months before they take place.

- A lack of information about candidates' policy intentions can be resolved by obliging candidates to present their programme. In only one federation (ITU), candidates are obliged to provide their manifesto.

4.3 Monitoring and reporting requirements – main findings

As mentioned, principals can decrease information asymmetries concerning actions and interests by monitoring agents' actions. Consequently, agents will be motivated to act in their principals' best interest. Both (democratic) governments and private companies usually have the statutory obligation to provide their principals reports on aspects of their activities (Saalfeld, 2000; Pass, 2004). Such monitoring and reporting requirements oblige agents to report on progress at predefined stages (cf. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1989).

The monitoring and reporting requirements implemented in ISFs' institutional design are mostly intended to inform national sports federations because these actors function as *proximate principals* (see above). However, a wider reporting may enable interested third parties, such as athletes, clubs, NGOs, citizens, interest groups or other actors to examine the actions of ISFs (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Consequently, it not only enables principals to rely on third parties to alert them to agency transgressions; third party monitoring also decreases slack because it decreases the likelihood that acting contrary to the wishes of principals will go unnoticed.

The majority of ISFs do not report to the general public. Even though the majority of federations report to their member federations, the quality of reporting is lacking in a large number of federations:

- As they gather ISFs' proximate principals, general assemblies have a very important monitoring function (cf. Strøm, 2000). They should convene regularly – the corporate governance standard is once a year – in order to review annual reports. The general assemblies of 18 federations (51%) meet once a year, while there are clear procedures enshrined in the statutes for convening emergency and special meetings. Regarding 17 federations (49%), however, the general assemblies meet once every two years or less.
- Regarding the publication of important governing documents, all ISFs were found to publish their statutes/constitution and sports rules (i.e., the rules of the game and competition rules, such as the setting of the duration of a world championship or the qualification rules for athletes).
- Only eight federations (23%) publish the agenda and minutes of its general assembly on their website. Yet 26 other federations (74%) provide these documents to their member federations.

- Only four federations (11%) publish governing body decisions on their website and (sometimes) explain the rationale behind key decisions.
- Only three (9%) federations publish basic biographical information on their governing body members that includes at least six of the following items: date of birth, position in the organisation, nationality education, professional background, tasks within the organisation, and activities in other sport organisations. Furthermore, 26 federations (74%) publish biographical information that cover three to five of these items.
- Only six federations (17%) publish annual general activity reports on their websites that include information on assets, accounts, revenue, sponsoring, and events. 15 federations (43%) are known to distribute a general activity report to their member federations. The rest of the federations (14 or 40%) either do not provide a complete and founded report to their member federations or no evidence of such a report could be found.
- Only eight federations (23%) publish (basic) reports of their standing committees online. Five other federations (14%) provide basic reports of a part of their standing committees. The majority of federations, 22 federations (63%) to be specific, do not publish any reports on standing committees.
- None of the federations publishes reports on remuneration, including per diem payments and bonuses, of its board members and senior officials.
- Only one federation (FIFA) publishes a detailed report of their major event online.
- A minority of 12 federations (35%) publishes externally audited annual financial reports on its website. A total of 22 federations (63%) have been found to provide externally audited annual financial reports to their member federations.
- Out of 19 federations for which data was available, seven federations (37%) allow the media to participate and record at their general assembly meetings.

4.4 Administrative procedures – main findings

Administrative procedures constitute the procedures agents must follow when executing their tasks (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1989). More specifically, they lay down the steps agents must follow when conducting their tasks and, thus, limit the agents' actions *a priori*. By establishing administrative procedures, principals control agents without investing too much resources. Next to procedural requirements, administrative procedures may also involve enfranchising principals in the decision-making process, which assures that agents are responsive to their interests.

The survey shows that the majority of ISFs do not have adequate administrative procedures in place:

- A quorum (i.e., a minimum number of attendees required to conduct business and to cast votes) prevents that a small group of actors is able to monopolise power. No federation has both a quorum installed at (at least) 50% for the legislative body and one at 75% for the decision-making body. Ten federations (29%) have a quorum in place in both their legislative and decision-making bodies, with the quorum for the legislative body set at a minimum of 50%. Six federations (17%) have no quorum installed for either their legislative or decision-making body.
- Research suggests that governing body activity, measured by meeting frequency, is an important dimension of board operations (Vafeas, 1999). Governing bodies that meet frequently are more likely to perform their duties diligently and in accordance with principals' interests (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). In only four federations out of 29 federations for which data was available (14%), the governing bodies meet quarterly at the least. In seven federations (20%), the governing body meets once a year or less. In seven other federations (20%), the governing body meets more frequently than once a year, but less or equal to once every six months.
- A code of ethics defines unacceptable behaviour within an organisation. It constitutes a set of rules that limits the autonomy of agents to behaviour that is deemed ethical. Put differently, a code of ethics aims to limit slack in the form of unethical behaviour. For the 32 federations for which data was available, a majority of 18 federations (56%) was found to have a code of ethics that includes crucial components such as the prohibition of bribery and procedures covering the offer or receipt of gifts. Seven federations (22%) do not make any reference to a code of ethics in their governing documents or on their websites.
- Conflicts of interest rules impose the notification and disclosure of conflicting interests and, in certain cases, mandatory recusal from decisions. Conflicts of interest may arise in particular in certain high-risk areas relating to ISFs. For instance, governing body members may directly benefit from the choice of the organisation of events, commercial deals or the distribution of funds to member federations (Pieth, 2011, p. 30). A minority of six (17%) federations have clear conflict of interest rules in place that include disclosure requirements and the duty to abstain from voting in particular cases, and define appropriate thresholds. Seven (20%) federations do not have conflict of interest rules in place at all.
- The allocation of major events constitutes a high-risk area for ISFs in relation to corruption. Allowing agents to make hosting decisions has proven to lead to corruption and the concentration of power in the past. Moreover, when hoping to secure the hosting of an event, member federations (principals) will be less inclined to hold their agents to account. Even though corruption is not ruled out in this case, an important step towards improving the allocation process of major events is by allowing member federations to vote on the appropriate host. In 18 of the 29 federations for which data was available (62%), the governing body selects the host. Importantly, in none of the federations, the selection of host candidates takes place

according to a transparent and objectively reproducible process, in which bidding dossiers are reviewed independently and assigned a score on the basis of pre-established criteria.

- An overwhelming majority of 34 ISFs have responded to athletes' lack of control options by formally granting athlete representatives consultative status in their organisational structures. Yet in order to enable monitoring senior officials' conduct, athletes' representatives should have access to decision-making (cf. Arnstein, 1969; Woods, 1999; Young, 2000). In addition, there must be a clear connection between the representatives and the athletes, which can be achieved by having athletes elected by their peers (Fearon, 1999; Saward, 2005). In a majority of 23 federations (66%), the chairman/woman of the athletes' commission is a member of the decision-making body. However, in only eight federations (23%), athletes elect the chairman/woman of the athletes' commission. In eight other federations (23%), the chairman/woman of the athletes' commission is elected by the congress.

4.5 Institutional checks – main findings

Principals can also install institutional checks. This control mechanism hinges on the fact that an agent is established and charged with monitoring the activities of another agent and sometimes holds veto power (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991, pp. 33-34). Institutional checks are usually employed in order to prevent embezzlements, insider trading, corruption, and abuse and concentration of power. Yet in order for institutional checks to work effectively, they must have the authority to veto or block the actions of the agent and be independent from the agent (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991, pp. 33-34). Examples of such checks are internal and external audits and ethics committees (Banks, 1989; Weber, 1993).

The majority of federations do not have robust institutional checks in place:

- Ethics committees monitor compliance with the principles in the ethics code. They head investigations upon receiving reports of violations. Only when a robust ethics committee is in place does a code of ethics have a positive impact on ethical behaviour (Weber 1993, p. 430). 12 federations (34%) do not have an ethics committee in place. Moreover, in only five federations (14%), the ethics committee is robust, meaning that it is independent from the governing body and has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative.
- An external audit is usually conducted by an organisation independent from the organisation that is being audited. External audits scrutinize annual financial accounts and examine and assess risks associated with finance. A vast majority of 33 federations (94%) is externally audited according to internationally recognised standards
- Supplemental to external audit, the internal audit provides external auditors with business, activity and process knowledge, and inform them on the risks facing the organisation. In addition, the internal audit assesses the quality of the internal

control system, including risk management (IIA, 2013). An internal audit committee usually provides oversight to the internal audit. Only six federations (17%) have an internal audit committee that has a clearly defined role and has the authority to oversee the internal audit and assesses the quality of the internal control system.

- A minority of eight federations (23%) have an independent committee in place that allows national federations, club, players, or official directly affected by a decision-making body decision to appeal that decision.

4.6 Elections – main findings

Elections provide an important incentive for agents to behave according to their principals' interests (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989, p. 602; Fearon, 1999; Pollack, 2003, p. 108). The credible threat of being replaced by a challenger in case of slack incentivizes agents to conform to their principals' wishes and to refrain from opportunistic behaviour (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Besley and Case, 1995). Moreover, elections offer principals the possibility to "weed out bad types and retain good types" (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011, p. 171); thus selectively retaining 'good' agents (Smart and Sturm, 2013, p. 93).

- In a vast majority of 24 federations (69%), all decision-making body members, including the president, are elected. In 23 federations (66%), elections take place according to clear and objective procedures (i.e., procedures that cover information on people qualified to vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where applicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds) and secret ballots are used. Secret ballots prevent retaliation by elected decision-making body members against member federations that did not vote for them. When anticipating retaliation, member federations' voting may be influenced.

An important issue regarding voting is the presence of term limits, namely a restriction on the number of terms an incumbent may serve. At first sight, term limits are difficult to reconcile with the logics of the Principal-Agent model. After all, principals cannot retain good agents for a period longer than the restricted period. Most importantly, however, incumbents in their final term no longer operate under the threat of being replaced: they are forced to retire anyway. In the absence of this threat, they are, in principle, no longer incentivised to act in accordance with their principals' wishes (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992; Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011). Why, then, would an ISF impose term limits? Even though imposing term limits seems counterintuitive, there are a number of good reasons for doing so, certainly within the context of sports governance.

Firstly, incumbents hold manifold advantages over challengers and are therefore more likely to be re-elected (Tabarrok, 1994). Such incumbency advantages are often cumulative (they grow with years of service) and include access to resources, fear of the uncertainty associated with electing an alternative candidate with voters, name recognition, overall power, and seniority (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 479; Cain and Levin, 1999, pp. 174-179; Tabarrok, 1994, p. 344). Seniority produces incumbency advantage – with seniority comes

power, which can be deployed to be re-elected, but also constitutes an advantage in itself. In the case that continental sports federations elect governing body members, they will be inclined to vote for incumbents because they have more experience. Voters reason that they therefore have more power in the international federation's governing body and that electing an alternative candidate will give them a comparative disadvantage in relation to other continental federations (cf. Tabarrok, 1994, p. 344). Altogether, the incumbency advantage leads to high rates of re-election. Geeraert, Alm and Groll (2014b, p. 300) provide evidence for this thesis in relation to the past presidents of the 35 Olympic ISFs. They demonstrate how 60% of the presidents had been in office for more than eight years on average. Why are long tenures problematical for ISF presidents and senior officials? When re-election becomes more likely, even a certainty, agents will no longer be incentivised to act in their principals' best interest since the threat of being replaced by a challenger no longer looms (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 480; Tabarrok, 1994, p. 334). Moreover, certain re-elections result in apathetic voters and, thus, principals that are no longer incentivised to hold agents to account (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 480).

Secondly, term limits prevent slack in the form of accumulation, concentration and abuse of power. Incumbents are able to accumulate power over the years they spend in office (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, p. 479). They may even be tempted to abuse this power through covert activity in order to stay in office (Beerman, 2011, p. 1116-1117).

Thirdly, incumbents are more likely to target voters who benefit the most from their policies and therefore risk favouritism of a group of principals (Tabarrok, 1994, p. 345; Maltz, 2007, p. 131). This is particularly problematic in international sports governance, where, given their global scope, ISFs' members constitute a very heterogeneous group. Continuously targeting and favouring a particular section of this group may result in a guaranteed re-election – indeed, even bad agents can be difficult to replace in the absence of term limits. The most blatant example of such a practice can be found within FIFA, where a sort of 'patronage system' existed in which "[f]riends received personal favors or were able to raise funds for their national associations, their confederations or their local infrastructure in exchange for support for their benefactor" (Pieth, 2014b, p. 8). Surely, alternation prevents such a system from developing (Tabarrok, 1994, p. 345; Maltz, 2007, p. 131). Term limits even induce agents to act in the general interest instead of favouring a particular group of principals (Tabarrok, 1994, p. 344; Glazer and Wattenberg, 1996; Smart and Sturm, 2013)

Fourthly, term limits provide for more diversity among agents because they allow for new (historically underrepresented) types of people to be elected to office (Cain and Levin, p. 175-176; Tabarrok, 1994, p. 335). Term limits therefore contribute to a solution for the underrepresentation of, for instance, women in ISF governing bodies (Geeraert et al., 2014b, 298-299).

Fifthly, term limits enable fresh ideas for solving problems to enter the organisation (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992, pp. 480-481). They therefore constitute a remedy for the perceived inertia in international sports governance (Katwala, 2000).

- None of the federations has rules in place that limit the terms of office of the president to two terms of four years and governing body members to two terms of four years. However, 11 federations (31%) have some form of limitation in place. Yet they apply only for either the president or the governing body members or the limitation allows the president or the governing body members to stay in office for a (consecutive) period of more than eight years or limitations are in place for a number of consecutive terms only.

5. Conclusion

This study confirmed the hypothesis that the institutional design of ISFs is generally flawed. By relying on the Principal-Agent model, the analysis demonstrated that the majority of the 35 Olympic ISFs do not have an institutional design implemented that allows principals to monitor and sanction decision-making body members. Therefore, senior sports officials are not sufficiently incentivised to act in accordance with their principals' interests.

Firstly, as proximate principals, member federations hold the most statutory options for controlling ISFs' decision-making bodies compared to national public authorities and athletes. Yet these controls are not on a sufficiently high level. The vast majority of ISFs lacks solid screening and selection mechanisms, monitoring and reporting requirements, administrative procedures, institutional checks, and elections. Moreover, national sports federations have been known to become rather benevolent in order not to miss out benefits such as funding and the privilege of hosting important events. This problem is reinforced in the absence of adequate control mechanisms.

Secondly, the position of athletes within ISFs' structures needs to be enhanced. Athletes' position in sports governance has been complicated by the fact that they are linked to ISFs through clubs and national federations. ISFs have made efforts to involve athletes in consultative committees, yet administrative procedures need to be installed that allow athletes to be included in decision-making. Furthermore, institutional checks should be installed that allow athletes to contest decisions by the decision-making body. Only then will athletes be able to effectively monitor ISFs.

Thirdly, in order to ensure that ISFs' decision-making bodies act in the general interest, the quality of institutional checks needs to be enhanced so that unethical behaviour is prevented. In addition, term limits need to be installed and reporting requirements need to be implemented that oblige the publication of important reports and information so that third parties such as NGOs, news media, and representative organisations of sports stakeholders can monitor ISFs on behalf of ISFs' principals.

Enhancing the institutional design of ISFs allows for the calibration of ISFs' actions with the normative expectations of principals. Only then will ISFs adequately address the legitimacy gaps they are confronted with, and only then will they be able to fulfil their pivotal role in international sports governance.

Part III. Sports Governance Observer survey

1. Introduction

How can the institutional design or the governance of ISFs be improved? One of the obstacles towards achieving better governance in ISFs is the lack of a generally accepted, comprehensive and practical set of good governance indicators (Geeraert, 2015). The Sports Governance Observer (SGO) aims to provide a modest step towards filling this void. More specifically, it aims to inform ISFs on how they can organise their affairs in a sustainable and effective manner as well as monitor their governance practices. The SGO is an easy to use benchmarking tool based on composite indicators that can be used to assess good governance in ISFs. The tool is based on a checklist of good governance indicators that was developed by the AGGIS group (2013), which is further elaborated in this section by means of a scoring system. Importantly, the Sports Governance Observer is based on *basic* indicators for good governance. A thorough assessment of good governance practices in ISFs requires an in-depth study on a case-by-case basis.

Through its scoring system, the Sports Governance Observer functions as a tool for self-assessment as well as external benchmarking. This is facilitated by a comprehensive methodological sheet, designed for each individual indicator, which includes clear requirements for each scoring category as well as an explanation of the importance of the relevant indicator.

The final part of this report continues as follows. The second section presents the methodology behind the Sports Governance Observer, which allows for the construction of an SGO index as a measure of good governance. The third section introduces the methodological sheets of the Sports Governance Observer, which include the scoring system as well as explanations of the importance of each individual indicator. The fourth and final section shows the results of the application of the Sports Governance Observer to the 35 Olympic ISFs.

2. Methodology

2.1 Constructing the SGO index

To capture its empirical complexity, it is necessary to break down the notion of good governance, measure its components and aggregate them (Nardo, Saisana, Saltelli & Tarantola, 2005). The Sports Governance Observer is comprised out of four composite indicators (dimensions), namely *transparency*, *democracy*, *checks and balances* and *solidarity* (see below).

Each dimension is a combination of individual indicators (36 in total) that represent different dimensions of the respective composite indicator. Each of the 36 individual indicators is quantified by using a pre-established scoring system (ranging from 1 for 'not fulfilled at all' to 5 for 'state of the art'). Especially large federations should be expected to score 4-5 on a given indicator. The individual indicators were selected and quantified

under a *fit-for-purpose* principle and, thus, on the basis of a thorough review of academic (management, political science and (sports) governance) literature. Importantly, focus here is mostly on rules-based or *de jure* rather than outcome-based or *de facto* indicators of good governance (see Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008).¹²

The indicators were subsequently applied to the 35 Olympic ISFs. This allowed for constructing an **SGO index** for each of the 35 federations according to the following formula:

$$SGO\ index_{fed\ x} = \frac{\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{12} Trans_i}{12} + \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{10} Dem_j}{10} + \frac{\sum_{k=1}^7 Check_k}{7} + \frac{\sum_{l=1}^7 Sol_l}{7} \right) - 1}{4} \times 100$$

This formula results in a *percentage score* that represents the average of the percentage scores from the four governance dimensions (transparency, democracy, checks and balances and solidarity) and the underlying 36 individual governance indicators.

In other words, the SGO index indicates to what degree the federations comply with the 36 indicators constituted in the four governance dimensions. Consequently, a federation getting the highest possible score (5) on all included indicators in this survey would achieve an SGO index of 100%.

The SGO index of the 35 federations combined is calculated according to the following basic formula that gives the average percentage score of all federations:

$$SGO\ index_{35\ feds} = \frac{\sum_{x=1}^{35} SGO\ index_{fed\ x}}{35}$$

The decision was made not to assign weights to the individual indicators on the basis of their relative importance. Hopkins asserts: “[s]ince it is probably impossible to obtain agreement on weights, the simplest arrangement [equal weighting] is the best choice” (Hopkins, 1991, p. 1471). It must be noted that this stance has been contested (Cherchye, Moesen, Rogge and Van Puyenbroeck, 2006). Yet for the sake of simplicity, and in order to avoid methodological obstacles related to missing data, the SGO index is based on equal weighting.

Despite their increasing use, composite indicators are the subjects of controversy. Of particular concern is “the inescapable subjectivity involved in their construction” (Cherchye, Moesen, Rogge and Van Puyenbroeck, 2006, p. 111). This study acknowledges this issue but seeks to mitigate it by opting for full transparency with regard to the scoring system of the Sports Governance Observer.

¹² Note that outcomes may differ from rules.

2.2 Data collection and analysis

Data collection took place during 2014 and the first part of 2015. It focused on obtaining basic data on the organisational structures and arrangements of the 35 ISFs in order to assign scores to each of the 36 indicators of the Sports Governance Observer. The main data sources were therefore the federations' statutes, byelaws, internal regulations (if available) and website. In addition, the Secretaries-General of the 35 federations were contacted by means of a total of one letter and three e-mails with the question to review and supplement the collected data. This process proved difficult, as the majority of federations were either unresponsive or uncooperative. The response rate was 43%, with 15 federations providing their comments and amendments.

One federation (AIBA) specifically declined to cooperate, 19 federations did not respond to our request (see Table 1). Importantly, the federations were asked to review the unprocessed data in the form of a questionnaire; they did not have the opportunity to scrutinise their scores on each indicator. The final scoring based on the quantified indicators was thus conducted without input from the federations.

The decision was made to omit the data on internal controls (indicator 3.3) from the analysis because it was deemed unreliable. In the end, data was gathered for 1,064 of the 1,260 indicators (84%). Because of the large quantity of missing data for the fourth dimension (38%), the decision was made to exclude the dimension from the calculation of the SGO index for a federation when a threshold of 5/7 of fulfilled indicators for the dimension is not reached. Consequently, the solidarity dimension is excluded for 17 federations.

3. The four dimensions of the Sports Governance Observer

The good governance indicators of the sports governance observers are dispersed over four dimensions, namely transparency, democratic processes, checks & balances, and solidarity.

Transparency pertains the "degree of openness in conveying information" (Ball, 2009, p. 297). It is widely regarded as a panacea for good governance and failures of governance are often linked to a lack of transparency (OECD, 2004, p. 50; Hood and Heald, 2006). Transparency allows external actors to monitor the workings of an organisation and therefore decrease the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.

Democratic processes concern rules and norms inherent to a democratic grammar of conduct (Mouffe, 1993). In particular, they refer to participation in policy processes by those who are affected by the policy (Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970). Democratic processes increase the accountability and effectiveness of organisations (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989; Fearon, 1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004).

Checks & balances or mutual control procedures are paramount to prevent the concentration of power in and they ensure that decision-making is robust, independent and free from improper influence. They ensure that no senior official or department has absolute control over decisions, and clearly define the assigned duties (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000).

Solidarity refers to expressing responsibility towards internal and external stakeholders. This involves practices relating to contributing to a better society and a cleaner environment by integrating social and environmental concerns in operations and interactions with stakeholders.

In what follows, the dimensions, indicators and scoring system of the Sports Governance Observer are presented.

3.1 Dimension 1. TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

Indicator 1.1

The organisation publishes its statutes/constitution; byelaws; sport rules; organisational chart; and strategic objectives on its website

Explanation

Making these documents available online is a crucial first step in order to ensure that the inner workings of an international sports federation (ISF) are open to public and stakeholder scrutiny. Firstly, statutes constitute a set of fundamental principles according to which an organisation is governed. Secondly, byelaws are the rules that govern the internal management of an organisation. Thirdly, sports rules encompass sport rules *sensu stricto* – i.e., the rules of the game – and competition rules, such as the setting of the duration of a world championship or the qualification rules for athletes. Fourthly, an organisational chart is a diagram that shows the structure of an organisation, including the relationships between and the relative ranks of its parts and positions. Finally, strategy formulation comprises the task of analysing an organisation's external and internal environment and then selecting appropriate strategies.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	None of the mentioned documents are available on the organisation's website and
2	Weak	The organisation publishes only one or two of the mentioned documents
3	Moderate	- The organisation publishes only one or two of the mentioned documents, but provides its internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) other documents (making a total of at least four documents) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website <u>Or</u> - The organisation publishes only three of the mentioned documents, including the statutes <u>Or</u> - The organisation publishes four of the mentioned documents including the statutes and the organisational chart but they are not retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of the website
4	Good	The organisation publishes at least four of the mentioned documents including the statutes and they are retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of the website
5	State of the art	The organisation publishes all of the mentioned documents and they are retrievable through the home page (or sub-levels of the home page accessible through the home page) of the website

Indicator 1.2

The organisation publishes the agenda and minutes of its general assembly on its website

Explanation

Publishing the agenda and minutes of statutory meetings allows for public scrutiny of the relationship between senior sports officials and member federations. Minutes consist of a record or summary of all motions, proposals, resolutions and any other matter formally voted upon (including the vote thereon).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	Not available on the organisation's website
2	Weak	Little information is published (e.g. only the agenda)
3	Moderate	- The agenda and minutes are published, but they are not timely published (e.g. no minutes from recent statutory meeting) <u>OR</u> two or more of the following: - Incomplete (they do not reflect all the discussed items, participation rate, <i>etc.</i>), - not objective - not understandable <u>or</u> - The agenda and minutes are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website. They are timely provided, complete (they reflect all the discussed items, participation rate, <i>etc.</i>), objective and understandable
4	Good	The agenda and minutes are published, but they are <u>either</u> - Incomplete (they do not include all the discussed items, participation rate, <i>etc.</i>), - not objective - not understandable - not timely published
5	State of the art	The agenda and minutes, timely published on the organisation's website, are complete (they reflect all the discussed items, participation rate, <i>etc.</i>), objective and understandable

Indicator 1.3

The organisation publishes decisions taken at its executive body meetings on its website

Explanation

By producing regular narrative accounts that seek to justify its decisions, actions and results in the eyes of its internal stakeholders and the general public, an ISF can prevent that it becomes a closed and secret club (Fox and Miller, 1995; Dryzek, 2000; Newman, 2005).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation does not produce any information regarding its executive body meetings
2	Weak	The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board's decisions. The published information is one of the following: • not timely published • not complete (it does not reflect all the discussed items) • not objective • not understandable <u>and</u> • the organisation does <i>not</i> explain the rationale behind any key decisions
3	Moderate	The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board's decisions. The published information is <i>one</i> of the following: • not timely published • not complete (it does not reflect all the discussed items) • not objective • not understandable • it does <i>not</i> explain the rationale behind any key decisions. <u>or</u> Summaries of the organisation's executive board's decisions are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website. They are timely provided, complete (they reflect all the discussed items, participation rate, <i>etc.</i>), objective and understandable
4	Good	The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board's decisions. The published information is • timely published • complete (it reflects all the discussed items) • objective • understandable The organisation explains the rationale behind certain key decisions.
5	State of the art	The organisation publishes summaries of its executive board's decisions. The published information is • timely published

		• complete (it reflects all the discussed items) • objective • understandable The organisation explains the rationale behind <i>all</i> key decisions.
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Indicator 1.4

The organisation gives the media access to its general assembly meetings

Explanation

Allowing media access to statutory meetings enhances public scrutiny.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	Media access is not allowed
2	Weak	Media access is restricted and recording is not allowed
3	Moderate	Media access is restricted and recording is restricted
4	Good	• Statutory meetings are open to media • They are open to being photographed, broadcast, webcast or otherwise recorded and/or transmitted by audio or video means
5	State of the art	• Statutory meetings are open to media • They are open to being photographed, broadcast, webcast or otherwise recorded and/or transmitted by audio or video means • Public notice of the time and place of a meeting scheduled is given to the news media. In addition, it is conspicuously posted on the organisation's website

Indicator 1.5

The organisation publishes basic information about its board members and senior officials on its website

Explanation

Basic biographical information gives the general public insight into senior officials' background, affiliations and education.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No information
2	Weak	The available information is extremely basic and/or is only available for a very small group of senior officials
3	Moderate	The information covers 3 or more but not all of the following items: • date of birth • position • nationality • education • professional background • tasks within the organisation • current activities in other sports organisations • official functions and political posts <u>or</u> • cover all of the items but is not available for all the senior officials
4	Good	The published information includes at least six of the items listed above
5	State of the art	The published information includes all or more of the items listed above

Indicator 1.6

Contact details to board members and senior officials are published on the organisation's website

Explanation

The starting point of an accountability relationship is the ability to ask questions, so that the actor that is being held accountable has to explain and justify his/her conduct (Bovens, 2007).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No contact information
2	Weak	- Only a general email address is available on the organisation's website - Details on how to reach the individual senior officials are not provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders
3	Moderate	Details on how to reach the individual senior officials are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website
4	Good	- A general contact address for officials is available on the organisation's website - The email address and phone number of the secretariat is available on the organisation's website - Details on how to reach the individual senior officials are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website
5	State of the art	- The email address and phone number of the secretariat is available on the organisation's website - Email addresses of individual senior officials are available on the organisation's website

Indicator 1.7

The organisation publishes information about its member federations on its website

Explanation

Publishing general information about member federations provides insight into the impact of an ISF.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No information is available
2	Weak	Only two or less elements from score 5 are published or members are pre-sented without any additional information
3	Moderate	- All elements from score 4 are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website <u>or</u> 3 or more, but not all elements from score 4 are published
4	Good	Information on the member federations includes: - Founding year - Affiliated since - Website - Email address - Address - President - General secretary
5	State of the art	Information on the member federations includes: - Founding year - Affiliated since - Website - Email address - Address - President - General secretary - Nr of affiliated athletes

Indicator 1.8

The organisation publishes its annual general activity report on its website

Explanation

Annual reports outline the organisation's accomplishments. Therefore, they constitute a vital element of accountability since they provide the general public with in-depth and comprehensive information on the activities carried out by the ISF and its attained goals.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No general reports are published
2	Weak	- General activity report is published but does not meet all of the conditions in score 4 <u>Or</u> - It is not provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders <u>Or</u> - It is provided to the member federations, but it does not includes all elements in score 4
3	Moderate	- General activity report meets the conditions in score 4, but it is not published on an annual basis <u>And/or</u> - The most recent report is not available <u>And/or</u> - It is not easily accessible through the website and/or the annual reports from the previous 3 years are not available <u>Or</u> - It includes all elements in score 4 but is not published online but provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website
4	Good	General activity report is published online annually and includes complete and founded information on accounts, assets, revenue, sponsoring and events
5	State of the art	General activity report is published annually and includes complete, objective and understandable information on accounts, assets, events, revenue, sponsoring, development of the sport and programmes

Indicator 1.9

The organisation publishes reports of its standing committees on its website

Explanation

Standing committees, such as finance, ethics and athlete committees, have an important supporting function in the governance of ISFs. Publishing reports on their activities is therefore an important part of reporting transparency.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No reports are published
2	Weak	Annual reports of less than 50% of the standing committees are published online
3	Moderate	- Annual reports of 50% or more of the standing committees are published <u>Or</u> - Reports of all standing committees are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website <u>Or</u> - Reports meet the conditions in score 4, but they are not published on an annual basis <u>and/or</u> - The most recent report is not available <u>and/or</u> - It is not easily accessible through the website and/or the annual reports from the previous three years are not available
4	Good	Annual reports of 75% of the standing committees are published online
5	State of the art	Annual reports of all the standing committees are published online

Indicator 1.10

The organisation publishes an externally audited annual financial report on its website according to recognised international standards¹³

Explanation

A contemporary financial compliance system includes all financial transactions in an audit-ed bookkeeping and financial reporting system and applies strict bookkeeping and audit-ing standards. In order to make ISFs publicly accountable, this information should be made available to the general public, especially since ISFs often operate under a large *de facto* autonomy.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No financial reports are published
2	Weak	- Annual financial reports are published, but they are not externally audited <u>or</u> - Only basic financial information is published as part of a general report
3	Moderate	- Externally audited financial reports according to recognised international standards are published, but the latest report is not available <u>Or</u> - Externally audited annual financial reports are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website and reports from the past 3 years are available
4	Good	- The organisation publishes an externally audited annual financial report on its website according to recognised international standards, but the reports from the past 3 years are not all available <u>Or</u> - Comprehensive information is published as part of general report
5	State of the art	The organisation publishes an externally audited annual financial report on its website according to recognised international standards and the reports from the past 3 years are available

¹³ E.g. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)

Indicator 1.11

The organisation publishes regulations and reports on remuneration, including per diem payments and bonuses, of its board members and senior officials on its website

Explanation

Senior sports officials have a responsibility to cautiously handle financial assets. A commitment to developing sport, a public good, does not resonate well with personal enrichment. However, personal enrichment is a particular risk associated with ISFs due to the large degrees of autonomy under which senior sports officials operate.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No information is published
2	Weak	- Regulations are in place, but not available on the website - No reports are available
3	Moderate	- Regulations are available - Reports on remuneration do not exist <u>Or</u> - Regulations and reports on remuneration are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website and reports from the past 3 years are available
4	Good	- Regulations are available - Reports exist, but they are not available
5	State of the art	- Regulations are available - Reports are available

Indicator 1.12

The organisation publishes main event reports with detailed and relevant information on its website

Explanation

Events are often the biggest source of revenue for ISFs and they can increase the popularity of the sport across borders. They have the potential to have both positive and negative effects on the wider community. Since they cannot be organised without public support, they must be open to close public scrutiny. Key elements of an event report include financial information, media coverage, sponsors, infrastructure, attendance rates and athlete participation.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No report is available
2	Weak	The report only includes 1 or 2 of the elements mentioned below
3	Moderate	- The report includes more than 2 of the elements mentioned below <u>Or</u> - Event reports are provided to the organisation's internal stakeholders (member federations, athletes, clubs,...) through newsletters or via a protected member section of the organisation's website
4	Good	The event report includes sections on - Governance - Revenue - Sponsors - Media coverage - Infrastructure - Attendance - Athlete participation
5	State of the art	The event report includes sections on - Governance - Revenue - Sponsors - Media coverage - Infrastructure - Attendance - Athlete participation - And, an objective assessments of economic, social and environmental impacts

3.2 Dimension 2. DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Indicator 2.1

There are elections of the president and the governing bodies and, where appropriate, the standing committees

Explanation

A principal way for constituents to hold office holders accountable is through elections. Faced with the possibility of not being re-elected, incumbents will be inclined to act in the best interest of those who hold voting power.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No elections are in place
2	Weak	- Only the president is elected or the governing body members - He/she subsequently appoints the other members of the governing body <u>Or</u> - The president is elected - A portion of the governing body members are elected by the congress or by continental federations - The president can co-opt members whose appointment is not approved by the congress <u>Or</u> - The president is not elected - A portion of the governing body members are elected by the congress or by continental federations
3	Moderate	- The president is elected - The majority of governing body members (with the exception of the secretary general) are elected by the congress or by continental federations - The governing body can co-opt members whose appointment is not approved by the congress
4	Good	- The president is elected by the congress - All the other governing body members (with the exception of the secretary general) are elected by the congress or by continental federations
5	State of the art	- The president is elected by the congress - All the other governing body members (with the exception of the secretary general) are elected by the congress or by continental federations - A nomination committee is established. This committee receives nominations and ensures checks relating to professional and integrity criteria on all candidates

Indicator 2.2

Elections are on the basis of secret ballots and clear procedures detailed in the organisation's governing document/s

Explanation

Elections on the basis of secret ballots ensure that no voter fears reprisals. Clear procedures add to the objectivity of elections.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No clear procedures and no secret ballots
2	Weak	- No secret ballots <u>Or</u> - Procedures are in place but they do not cover information on people qualified to vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where applicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds
3	Moderate	- No secret ballots - Procedures are in place and they cover information on people qualified to vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where applicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds
4	Good	- Secret ballots (or, secret ballots can be requested) - Procedures are in place and they cover information on people qualified to vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where applicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds
5	State of the art	- Secret ballots - Procedures are in place and they cover information on people qualified to vote; majority or percentage needed to win the election and, where applicable, weighting of votes; quorum; and election rounds - The procedures are controlled by a body within the organisation (e.g. nomination committee)

Indicator 2.3

The organisation offers to the candidates standing for election opportunities to present their programme/manifesto

Explanation

In order to make an informed vote, it is important for voters to have a clear picture on candidates' policy agenda, preferences and interests.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The candidates standing for election do not have opportunities to present their programme/manifesto. They are not obliged to announce their candidacy before the election takes place
2	Weak	Candidates who wish to stand for election are obliged to announce their candidacy in less than 4 months before the elections take place
3	Moderate	Candidates who wish to stand for election are not obliged to announce their candidacy in good time (announced less than 4 months before the election) and the congress is informed of their candidacy OR they are not obliged to present their programme/manifesto to the congress
4	Good	• Candidates who wish to stand for election must announce their candidacy in good time, also to the congress (at least 4 months) • They must present their programme/manifesto to the congress
5	State of the art	• Candidates who wish to stand for election must announce their candidacy in good time, also to the congress (at least 4 months) • They must present their programme/manifesto to the congress • Contributions from private actors to the campaign of a presidential candidate are forbidden; a system of campaign financing is in place which provides officially announced candidates, which have sufficient backing by a number of member federation, with funding; this system is controlled by a nomination committee

Indicator 2.4

The decisions on allocation of major events are made through a democratic, open, transparent and objectively reproducible process

Explanation

The allocation of the hosting of major events constitutes a high-risk area in relation to corruption and conflicts of interest. Such risks can be managed by making the bidding process democratic, objective, open and transparent.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	None of the criteria below are fulfilled
2	Weak	- Only one or two of the criteria below are fulfilled <u>and/or</u> - The Congress does not decide
3	Moderate	- More than two of the criteria below are fulfilled (but not all those in the 'good' variable) <u>And</u> - the final candidate is elected by the congress
4	Good	- Clear conflict of interest rules are in place (those can be part of a general conflict of interest regulations, applicable not only to the allocation of events) - The criteria for a bid for major events are communicated to its members in good time (min. 1 year before the event is awarded) - The bidding dossiers are reviewed, evaluated and scores are assigned on the basis of pre-established and objective criteria - Only bids achieving a minimum score are shortlisted - The governing body confirms the shortlist and the final candidate is elected by the congress
5	State of the art	- Clear conflict of interest rules are in place (those can be part of a general conflict of interest regulations, applicable not only to the allocation of events) - The organisation adopts a geographical rotation policy - The criteria for a bid for major events are communicated to its members in good time (min. 1 year before the event is awarded) - The bidding dossiers are reviewed, evaluated and scores are assigned on the basis of pre-established and objective criteria - External procurement experts assist with this evaluation - Only bids achieving a minimum score are shortlisted - The governing body confirms the shortlist - The final candidate is elected by the congress

Indicator 2.5

The organisation defines a quorum in its governing document/s for its legislative and decision making bodies

Explanation

A quorum (i.e., a minimum number of attendees required to conduct business and to cast votes) prevents a small group of officials from monopolising power.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No quorum in place
2	Weak	- a quorum is in place in either the legislative or the decision making body <u>or</u> - A quorum set at 50% or less is in place in both bodies
3	Moderate	- A quorum is in place in either the legislative or the decision making body - For the legislative body, it is at 50% OR for the decision making body, it is at 75%
4	Good	- A quorum is in place in both the organisation's legislative and decision making bodies - For the legislative body, it is at 50% OR for the decision making body, it is at 75%
5	State of the art	- A quorum is in place in the organisation's legislative and decision making bodies - For the legislative body, it is at 50%, <u>and</u> for the decision making body, it is at 75%

Indicator 2.6

The organisation's elected officials have a term limit

Explanation

Term limits remedy high rates of re-election stemming directly from advantages incumbents enjoy over challengers (with seniority comes power). Moreover, they prevent that office holders lose touch with their constituents – voter become apathetic when they assume that the re-election of incumbents is inevitable. Term limits therefore make sure that elections provide new ideas for solving problems and they prevent the concentration of power (Cohen and Spitzer, 1992).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No limitations are in place
2	Weak	An age limit is in place.
3	Moderate	- Limitations are in place, but only for either the president or the governing body members and/or the limitation allows the president or the governing body members to stay in office for a (consecutive) period of more than 8 years <u>Or</u> - Limitations are in place for a number of consecutive terms only.
4	Good	The following limitations to terms of office are in place: - President: 2 terms of 4 years - Governing body members: 2 terms of 4 years
5	State of the art	The following limitations to terms of office are in place: - President: 2 terms of 4 years - Governing body members: 2 terms of 4 years - Judicial body members: 1 term of 6 years - Chairmen of standing committees: 1 term of 8 years In addition, only a fraction (e.g. one third) of the members of the board of directors is elected each time (preventing a hostile takeover and/or a sudden loss of expertise and experience)

Indicator 2.7

The organisation's general assembly meets at least once a year

Explanation

As a minimum, the target should be set at one general assembly meeting per year in order to give member federations the possibility to scrutinise the financial accounts and general policy of the past year.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation's general assembly meets less than once every 2 years
2	Weak	The organisation's general assembly meets once every 2 years
3	Moderate	The organisation's general assembly <i>de facto</i> meets at least once a year
4	Good	The organisation's general assembly <i>has</i> to meet at least once a year
5	State of the art	The general assembly has to meet at least once a year and there are clear procedures enshrined in the statutes for convening emergency and special meetings

Indicator 2.8

The organisation's governing body meets regularly

Explanation

The principal task of a governing body is to oversee the management of an organisation (Carver and Carver 2001). Research suggests that governing body activity, measured by meeting frequency, is an important dimension of board operations (Vafeas, 1999). Governing bodies that meet frequently are also more likely to perform their duties diligently and in accordance with shareholders' interests (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The governing body meets once a year or less
2	Weak	The governing body meets once every 6 months or less
3	Moderate	- The governing body meets less than quarterly - Governing body meetings are scheduled
4	Good	- The governing body meets quarterly at the least - Governing body meetings are scheduled
5	State of the art	- The governing body meets more regularly than quarterly - Governing body meetings are scheduled - There are procedures for convening emergency or special meetings

Indicator 2.9

The organisation encourages gender equity with regard to its leading officials

Explanation

Diversity in governing bodies is needed in order to ensure that everybody's best interests are being looked after (Katwala, 2000, p. 9). Importantly, studies have demonstrated that female inclusion in boards enhances organisations' performance (Brown, Brown and Anastasopoulos, 2002; Fondas and Sassalos, 2000, Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004; Terjesen, and Singh, 2009). Female directors also function as important role models, encouraging other women to pursue similar careers (Sealy and Singh, 2010).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation has no gender equity policy
2	Weak	The organisation has a gender equity policy, but not for the entire organisation <u>or</u> it does not promote gender equity in all leadership positions
3	Moderate	The organisation has - a gender equity policy for the entire organisation, which promotes gender equity in all leadership positions <u>or</u> - a quota for female governing body members
4	Good	- The organisation adopts a 25% or higher quota for female governing body members - The organisation has a gender equity policy for the entire organisation, which promotes gender equity in all leadership positions
5	State of the art	- The organisation adopts a 25% or higher quota for female governing body members - The organisation has a gender equity policy for the entire organisation, which promotes gender equity in all leadership positions - The organisation has a policy in place which stresses gender equity throughout sport at all levels

Indicator 2.10

The organisation provides opportunity for athletes to be represented within the organisation

Explanation

Including athletes in policy processes makes policies more effective because they come to see ISFs' decisions as their own decisions and provide specialised knowledge (Woods, 1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004). Athlete inclusion also reduces the likelihood of legal challenges, but only if they perceive their representatives participating in the policy process as legitimate (Saward, 2005, Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). However, mere consultation offers no assurance that athletes' concerns and ideas will actually be taken into account; this requires access to decision-making and decision-making power (Arnstein, 1969; Woods, 1999, Young, 2000).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation makes no formal efforts to involve athletes in its decision making processes
2	Weak	- Athletes are represented within the organisation, but the chairman/woman of the athletes committee is not a member of the organisation's governing body <u>and/or</u> - Athletes are represented but there is no athletes committee in place
3	Moderate	- Athletes are represented within a specific athletes' committee. - The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is a member of the organisation's governing body - The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is not elected by the congress or by athletes <u>Or</u> - he/she does not have voting authority
4	Good	- Athletes are represented within a specific athletes' committee. - The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is a member of the organisation's governing body - The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is elected by congress
5	State of the art	- Athletes are represented within a specific athletes' committee. - The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is a member of the organisation's governing body - The chairman/woman of the athletes committee is elected by athletes

3.3 Dimension 3. CHECKS AND BALANCES

Indicator 3.1

The organisation has an internal audit committee

Explanation

The internal audit committee plays many important roles within an organisation, including providing oversight to the internal audit. Internal audit is supplemental to external audit. It can provide external auditors with business, activity and process knowledge, as well as information on the risks facing the organisation. According to the Institute of Internal Auditors, internal auditing evaluates and improves the effectiveness the nature of three specific processes:

- “Risk management processes – identification and evaluation of potential risks that might affect the achievement of objectives of an organisation and determination of adequate corrective actions. A link can here be made to critical success factors.
- Control processes – policies, procedures, and activities which ensure that risks are kept within the limits defined by management in the risk management process.
- Governance processes – procedures which allow stakeholders to evaluate risk and control processes defined by management” (IIA 2013).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation has no internal audit committee
2	Weak	• An audit committee is present, but its tasks are not clearly defined in the statutes. <u>Or</u> • A finance committee is present which only has the competence to review and recommend the draft budget, to prepare financial statements, and/or to study the external auditor’s report.
3	Moderate	• The tasks and role of the committee are clearly defined in the organisation’s statutes • The committee oversees the internal audit • The committee assesses the quality of the internal control system, including risk management
4	Good	• The tasks and role of the committee are clearly defined in the organisation’s statutes • The chair of the committee is an external expert • The committee members have the necessary expertise to perform their functions • The committee oversees the internal audit

		The committee assesses the quality of the internal control system, including risk management
5	State of the art	- The tasks and role of the committee are clearly defined in the organisation's statutes - The chair of the committee is an external expert and a (non-executive) member of the governing body - The committee members have the necessary expertise to perform their functions - The committee oversees the internal audit - The committee draws up its own budget and is able to decide on the support of external advice at its own discretion - The committee reviews the financial statements - The committee assesses and monitor the quality of the internal control system, including risk management

Indicator 3.2

The organisation is externally audited according to internationally recognised standards

Explanation

An independent external audit of ISFs' finances provides stakeholders with the necessary objective information on the organisation's financial performance.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No external audit
2	Weak	The organisation's finances are externally audited, but not according to internationally recognised standards
3	Moderate	The organisation's finances are externally audited according to internationally recognised standards, but not on an annual basis
4	Good	The organisation's finances are externally audited according to internationally recognised standards
5	State of the art	- The organisation is externally audited according to internationally recognised standards - The audit includes a review of - the application and effectiveness of risk management procedures and risk assessment methodologies; - a review of financial reports and accounting records, and; - compliance with internal policies.

Indicator 3.3

The organisation adopts an integrated internal control and risk management system

Explanation

Internal controls ensure that ISFs work in an effective manner with regard to operational and financial performance goals (COSO, 2013).¹⁴ An important part of an internal control system is risk assessment. There are specific corruption-related risks in relation to ISFs. Examples include funding being distributed to member federations, the hosting of events, commercial contracts and financial controls over member associations (Pieth, 2011).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No internal control system
2	Weak	Internal financial controls are not on a sufficiently high standard (COSO system or similar)
3	Moderate	Internal financial controls, applying the COSO system or similar, are on a sufficiently high standard
4	Good	- Internal financial controls, applying the COSO system or similar, are on a sufficiently high standard - In addition, the organisation adopts systematic controls to corruption risks connected with ISGBs
5	State of the art	- Internal financial controls, applying the COSO system or similar, are on a sufficiently high standard - In addition, the organisation adopts systematic controls to corruption risks associated with ISFs, including: - payments to member federations - payments to parties that are close to member federations Such payments are controlled either directly or indirectly (Pieth, 2011, p. 21): - Directly (each payment is controlled until it reaches the ultimate payee, for instance by entering into a direct contractual relationship with the latter; implementation and performance are then controlled through own accounting system, etc.) - Indirectly (through access to audited financial statements; restricting cash payments to the absolute minimum; allow payments only to bank addresses or bank accounts which are defined in formal agreements; disallow any payments to bank addresses which are not in the country of residence or domicile of the payee; monitor the financial statements of the payees, which document the proper allocation of the funds)

¹⁴ Important elements of an integrated control system (such as the presence of an accounting committee) are included in other indicators. This indicator focuses on the presence of financial controls.

Indicator 3.4

The organisation has or recognises an Ethics/Integrity Code for all its members and officials

Explanation

An ethics code defines unacceptable behaviour within an organisation. International organisations have issue checklists of components that should be part of such a code (e.g. International Chamber of Commerce 2008). ISF's codes of ethics need to include rules on gifts and hospitality, political and charitable contributions, as well as the contracting of third parties (Pieth, 2011).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No ethics code within the organisation
2	Weak	Ethics code available, applicable to staff and senior officials, is available but it does not include all the components in 4
3	Moderate	The ethics code, applicable to staff and senior officials, includes the components in 4, but it is not clearly separated from the disciplinary code for athletes
4	Good	The ethics code includes the following components: • The prohibition of bribery and extortion at all times and in any form • Procedures covering the offer or receipt of gifts, hospitality or expenses in order to ensure that "such arrangements (a) are limited to reasonable and bona fide expenditures, and (b) do not improperly affect, or might be deemed to improperly affect, the outcome of a procurement or other business transaction" (ICC, 2008, art. 5)
5	State of the art	In addition to the above components, the ethics code includes: • Rules on charitable contributions • Rules on the selection, contracting and supervision of third parties Furthermore, the organisation provides: • Training • A helpline

Indicator 3.5

The organisation has clear conflict of interest rules

Explanation

Conflicts of interest require notification and disclosure and, in certain cases, mandatory recusal from decisions. Conflicts of interest may arise in particular in certain high-risk areas relating to ISFs. For instance, governing body members may directly benefit from the choice of the organisation of events, commercial deals or the distribution of funds to member federations (Pieth, 2011, p. 30).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	No conflict of interest rules are in place
2	Weak	Rules are in place but they are not sufficiently clear and/or they do not include at least one of the conditions in 4
3	Moderate	General conflict of interest rules are in place but they do not include all conditions in 4
4	Good	• Clear and consistent conflict of interest rules are in place. • They include the duty to abstain from voting in cases of conflict of interests regarding • hosting decisions • commercialisation decisions <u>and</u> • define an appropriate threshold • Furthermore, they include disclosure requirements and clearly describe the consequences for transgressors
5	State of the art	In addition to the points in 4, the organisation makes financial contributions to its member federations dependent upon the application of conflict of interest standards within these organisations

Indicator 3.6

The organisation has an independent body (e.g. Ethics Committee) to check the application of the rules referred in indicators 3.4 and 3.5

Explanation

In order to ensure compliance with the code of ethics and conflict of interest rules, a committee should be in place that has the task of assessing compliance and of heading investigations upon receiving reports of violations. Only then, ethical behaviour can fully enter the daily decision-making and behaviour of ISF senior officials and staff (Weber, 1993, p. 430). Staff and governing body members need to explain and justify their conduct to the committee, which should have the power to pose questions and pass judgement, after which transgressors of the code face consequences (Bovens, 2007).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	There is no ethics committee or similar in place to check the application of the rules referred in indicators 3.4 and 3.5
2	Weak	- The committee (or the general disciplinary body) cannot initiate proceedings on its own initiative (i.e., without referral by the President, the Secretary General or the governing body) <u>and/or</u> - the committee members are <i>not</i> independent from the governing body and/or staff <i>cannot</i> report irregular behaviour committed by employees in the knowledge that they are afforded protection and safety (whistle-blower protection)
3	Moderate	- The committee has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative - The committee members are <i>not</i> independent from the governing body <u>and/or</u> - staff <i>cannot</i> report irregular behaviour in the knowledge that they are afforded (whistle-blower) protection
4	Good	- The committee members are independent from the governing body - The committee has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative - Staff can report irregular behaviour in the knowledge that they are afforded (whistle-blower) protection
5	State of the art	- The committee members are independent from the governing body - The committee has the power to initiate proceedings on its own initiative - The committee has its own budget - The committee members are objectively recruited - The committee members are appointed by the congress - Staff can report irregular behaviour in the knowledge that they are afforded (whistle-blower) protection - Pre-set sanctions (e.g. disciplinary reprimands) are determined in order to address minor breaches

	The committee is separated into an investigatory and an adjudicatory chamber or a similar separation of powers is provided
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Indicator 3.7

The organisation's decisions can be contested through internal channels specified in its governing document/s

Explanation

The right of any national association, club, player, official or member to appeal any decision by which they are directly affected constitutes an important check.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation's decisions cannot be contested
2	Weak	- The members of the appeal committee belong to the governing body or to any of the standing committees of the organisation - And/or not every national association, club, player, official or member directly affected by a decision shall be entitled to appeal - Executive body decisions cannot be appealed internally
3	Moderate	- Any national association, club, player, official or member directly affected by a decision shall be entitled to appeal - The members of the appeal committee may not belong to the governing body or to any of the standing committees of the organisation <u>or</u> - The conditions in 4 are fulfilled, but the secretary general or president has the discretionary authority to refer cases to the committee.
4	Good	- Any national association, club, player, official or member directly affected by a decision shall be entitled to appeal - The members of the appeal committee may not belong to the governing body or to any of the standing committees of the organisation - The members of the appeal committee may not sit on the committee if the case being dealt with concerns themselves or players, clubs, officials or any other members of the national association to which they belong
5	State of the art	- Any national association, club, player, official or member directly affected by a decision shall be entitled to appeal - The members of the appeal committee may not belong to the governing body or to any of the standing committees of the organisation - The members of the appeal committee may not sit on the committee if the case being dealt with concerns themselves or players, clubs, officials or any other members of the national association to which they belong - The parties concerned are entitled to a hearing if they so desire

3.4 Dimension 4. SOLIDARITY

Indicator 4.1

The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development of grass-roots activities

Explanation

As the custodians of sport, a public good, ISFs have a responsibility for fostering the global development of grass-roots activities. According to Eurostrategies *et al.* (2011), “grassroots sport covers all sport disciplines practiced by non-professionals and organised on a national level through national sport” (Eurostrategies *et al.*, 2011, p. 13).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation does not allocate specific resources for the global development of grass-roots activities and does not promote the global development of grass-roots activities
2	Weak	The organisation promotes the global development of grass-roots activities, but does not allocate specific resources
3	Moderate	The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development of grass-roots activities, but it does not consolidate these under a comprehensive strategy (approved or not approved by the Congress)
4	Good	• The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development of grass-roots activities and it consolidates these under a comprehensive strategy (not approved by the Congress)
5	State of the art	• The organisation allocates specific resources for the global development of grass-roots activities • The different programmes are consolidated under a comprehensive strategy, approved by the Congress

Indicator 4.2

The organisation has a well-defined Social Responsibility (SR) strategy and/or programme

Explanation

In the broad sense, (Corporate) Social Responsibility (SR) can be defined as “a continuing commitment by an organisation to behave ethically and contribute to economic development, while also improving the quality of life of its employees, the local community, and society at large” (Watts and Holme, 1999).¹⁵ SR does not cover a single, comprehensive activity (Lindgreen, Swaen and Johnston, 2009). By taking a strategic approach to social responsibility, organisations can determine what activities they devote to SR. By planning out SR as part of an organisation’s overall plan, it is ensured that (commercial) activities do not overshadow the need to behave socially responsible. This indicator looks at SR in a more narrow sense and focuses on contributing to society, while leaving out the elements that have been treated in other indicators.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation does not make efforts towards achieving the area’s in score 4 and 5
2	Weak	The organisation makes certain efforts towards achieving the area’s in score 4 and 5, but it does not have a well-defined SR strategy and/or programme(s)
3	Moderate	• The organisation makes certain efforts towards achieving the area’s in score 4 and 5, but it does not have a well-defined SR strategy and/or programme(s) • The organisation makes serious efforts (investments, programmes and/or international cooperation) to mitigate the negative externalities of international organised sports (e.g. human trafficking, doping prevention, match fixing, money laundering, etc.)
4	Good	The organisation has a well-defined SR strategy and/or programme(s) The strategy or programme(s) cover one of the following areas: • Mitigating environmental degradation (not including degradation through event(s)) • Improving the social, cultural, educational or psychological circumstances of marginalised and/or fractured communities (not including anti-discrimination and sexual harassment; legacy requirements for events; development of grassroots sports) <u>In addition</u>, the organisation makes serious efforts (investments, programmes and/or international cooperation) to mitigate the negative externalities of international organised sports (e.g. human trafficking, doping pre-

¹⁵ By referring to “Social Responsibility”, ISO 26000 extends the idea of “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) from private businesses to other organisations, such as NGOs or ISFs.

		vention, match fixing, money laundering, etc.)
5	State of the art	The organisation has a well-defined SR strategy and/or programme(s) The strategy or programme(s) cover all of the following areas: • Mitigating environmental degradation (not including degradation through event(s)) • Improving the social, cultural, educational or psychological circumstances of marginalised and/or fractured communities (not including anti-discrimination and sexual harassment; legacy requirements for events; development of grassroots sports) <u>In addition</u>, the organisation makes serious efforts (investments, programmes and/or international cooperation) to mitigate the negative externalities of international organised sports (e.g. human trafficking, doping prevention, match fixing, money laundering, etc.)

Indicator 4.3

The organisation has legacy requirements for communities in which its events are hosted

Explanation

Large sport events can have both positive and negative effects on communities in which they are hosted. ISFs have a responsibility to ensure that their events live up to their full potential, ensuring positive and minimising long-term negative effects.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	There are no legacy requirements.
2	Weak	• The organisation adopts legacy requirements for the hosting of its major event • These requirements are not specific and clear
3	Moderate	• The organisation adopts social <u>or</u> sporting legacy requirements • These requirements are specific and clear • Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on the fulfilment of these requirements
4	Good	• The organisation adopts social <u>and</u> sporting legacy requirements for the hosting of its major event • These requirements are specific and clear • Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on the fulfilment of these requirements by means of a scoring system
5	State of the art	• The organisation adopts social <u>and</u> sporting legacy requirements for the hosting <u>all</u> its events • These requirements are specific and clear • Bids to host all events are evaluated based amongst others on the fulfilment of these requirements by means of a scoring system • The fulfilment of these requirements is evaluated <i>ex post</i>

Indicator 4.4

The organisation adopts an environmental management system (ISO 14001, EMAS or similar) for its major events

Explanation

Environmental management systems are (usually voluntary) tools for public administrations as well as private companies. They are intended to help organisations to optimise their production processes, reducing environmental impacts and making more effective use of resources (European Commission, 2008, p. 9). Consequently, they are suited as a tool for reducing the environmental impacts of sport events.¹⁶

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation does not adopt environmental requirements for its major events
2	Weak	- Legacy requirements for the hosting of the organisation's major event are adopted - These requirements are not specific and clear
3	Moderate	- Legacy requirements for the hosting of the organisation's major event are adopted - These requirements are specific and clear - Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on the fulfilment of these requirements
4	Good	- An environmental management system (ISO, EMAS or similar) is adopted for the organisation's major events - Bids to host the major event are evaluated based amongst others on the fulfilment this requirement
5	State of the art	The organisation obliges an environmental management system (ISO, EMAS or similar) for its major events

¹⁶ For instance, several sport events and many sport facilities have already received EU eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS) certification. TOROC, the Organising Committee for the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin, has produced a handbook on how to apply EMAS to sporting events which includes concrete steps towards registration and examples of activities (see TOROC, 2006).

Indicator 4.5

The organisation offers consulting to member federations in the areas of organisations and management through workshops, one to one advice or similar

Explanation

ISFs can assist national sports federations to become more professional in their approach, and more able to maximise their organisational advantages. For instance, ISFs can disseminate best practice on a range of issues related to good governance (Holt, 2006, p. 158).

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation does not offer any form of consulting to member federations in the areas of organisations and management
2	Weak	The organisation provides basic information on its website in the areas of organisations and management, directed towards its member federations
3	Moderate	The organisation disseminates documentation in the areas of organisations and management among its member federations
4	Good	The organisation offers consulting to member federations in the areas of organisations and management through workshops, one to one advice or similar
5	State of the art	The organisation adopts a comprehensive strategy for consulting to member federations in the areas of organisations and management through workshops, one to one advice or similar

Indicator 4.6

Representatives from economically weaker member federations can apply for support to attend the general assembly

Explanation

The congress has an important monitoring function with regard to the governing body (Strøm, 2000). Yet it can be rather costly for national sporting delegates to attend congress meetings. In order to achieve a high attendance rate, ISFs can reimburse travel expenses and hotel stays for economically disadvantaged members federations. In addition, new communication technology can be used as an enabler.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation does not provide support for economically weaker member federations
2	Weak	The organisation provides support for federations, but it is not specifically directed towards economically weaker federations
3	Moderate	- Representatives from economically disadvantaged member federations can apply for support to attend the general assembly or new communication technology (e.g. proxy voting) is used as an enabler - There are however no clearly defined application procedures available
4	Good	- Representatives from economically disadvantaged member federations can apply for support to attend the general assembly or new communication technology is used as an enabler - There are clearly defined application procedures available
5	State of the art	- Representatives from economically disadvantaged member federations can apply for support to attend the general assembly - Reimbursed expenses are internally audited and reported - New communication technology is used as an enabler - There are clearly defined application procedures available

Indicator 4.7

The organisation adopts a clear anti-discrimination policy

Explanation

Discrimination and harassment can be based on race, ethnic origin or skin colour, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, ability, religious or political convictions, illness, sensory impairments, learning difficulties, age, and so on. ISFs have a responsibility to combat discrimination and harassment in all levels of sport.¹⁷ In addition, internal anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies contribute to providing a work environment free of discrimination and/or harassment.

Operationalisation

Score		Conditions
1	Not fulfilled at all	The organisation does not adopt any of the discussed policies.
2	Weak	The organisation takes certain measures towards fighting one of the following: • Internal anti-discrimination and anti-harassment measures; • Measures directed towards combating discrimination in sport.
3	Moderate	The organisation only adopts one of the following: • A clear internal anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy; • A clear policy directed towards combating discrimination in sport.
4	Good	• The organisation adopts a clear internal anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy; • The organisation adopts a clear policy directed towards combating discrimination in sport.
5	State of the art	• The organisation adopts a clear internal anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policy; • The organisation adopts a clear policy directed towards combating discrimination in sport; • The policies address discrimination based on at least 3 of the following: • Race, ethnic origin or skin colour • Nationality • Gender • Ability • Sexual orientation • Religious or political convictions • Illness • Sensory impairments • Learning difficulties • Age.

¹⁷ According to the Olympic Charter, “[t]he practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit” (IOC, 2013a).

4. Results of the Sports Governance Observer survey

This section presents the results of the application of the Sports Governance Observer on the 35 Olympic ISFs. After a brief presentation of the overall results, the SGO indexes and the dimension scores of the individual federations are presented. Furthermore, the methodological sheets of the Sport Governance Observer and the federations' scores on individual indicators allow for a concise overview of the main strengths and weaknesses of each federation.


4.1 Overall results

It must be stressed that the SGO index reflects the presence of basic criteria of good governance. Medium-size federations should be expected to have an SGO index close to 75%, while large federations should achieve a score higher than 75%. The SGO index of the 35 federations combined is 45.4%, with 26 federations (74%) scoring less than 50%. This overall score points at severe governance problems in ISFs. While having a high SGO index does not rule out the occurrence of corruption, it can be expected that the absence of basic criteria of good governance increases the likelihood of opportunistic and unethical behaviour.

Table 3: SGO Index and SGO scores – all 35 federations

All 35 federations		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.99	49.6%
Democratic process	2.81	45.2%
Checks and balances	2.68	42.0%
Solidarity	2.79	44.9%
Overall		45.4%

Figure 4: 35 Olympic international sports federations



The scoring scale

1. Not fulfilled at all	2. Weak	3. Moderate	4. Good	5. State of the art

As table 3 and figure 4 show, the federations generally achieve modest to weak scores on all dimensions, but especially worrisome is the general lack of decent checks and balances in the federations. For instance, only five federations (14%) have a robust ethics committee; only six federations (17%) have adequate conflict of interest rules in place; and none of the federations has adequate term limits in place.

Furthermore, only four federations (11%) perform integrity and professional checks on candidates standing for elections; only six federations (17%) publish decent general activity reports online; none of the federations selects event hosts on the basis of a transparent and objective process; only five federations (14%) have a robust ethics committee; and none of the federations has adequate term limits in place.

Regarding solidarity, problems are particularly situated in a lack of sustainability requirements for major events.

AIBA – International Boxing Association

The SGO index for AIBA is 46.6%.

Main strengths are:

- Good election procedures for senior officials
- Adequate conflict of interest rules and ethics code


Main weaknesses are:

- moderate to weak public transparency
- No frequent general assembly and decision-making body meetings
- Lack of internal audit and ethics committee.

Table 4: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – AIBA

AIBA		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.80	45.0%
Democratic process	3.13	53.1%
Checks and balances	2.67	41.7%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		46.6%

Figure 5: AIBA – International Boxing Association



BWF – Badminton World Federation

The SGO index for BWF is 56.2%.

Main strengths are:

- Good reporting transparency
- Adequate athlete representation
- Good social responsibility programme


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Ethics and audit committees.

Table 5: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – BWF

BWF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.25	56.3%
Democratic process	3.00	50.0%
Checks and balances	3.17	54.2%
Solidarity	3.57	64.3%
Overall		56.2%

Figure 6: BWF – Badminton World Federation



FEI – Fédération Equestre Internationale

The SGO index for FEI is 75.6%.

Main strengths are:

- Excellent checks and balances
- Very transparent organization
- Robust election procedures.


Main weakness is

- The procedure for allocation of events

Table 6: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FEI

FEI		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	4.08	77.1%
Democratic process	3.80	70.0%
Checks and balances	4.50	87.5%
Solidarity	3.71	67.9%
Overall		75.6%

Figure 7: FEI – Fédération Equestre Internationale



FIBA – International Basketball Federation

The SGO index for FIBA is 39.6%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid ethics code
- Social responsibility and development programmes
- Excellent consulting services to member federations


Main weaknesses are:

- Inadequate election procedures
- No frequent general assembly meetings
- No robust ethics committee.

Table 7: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIBA

FIBA		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.70	42.5%
Democratic process	2.56	38.9%
Checks and balances	3.00	50.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		43.8%

Figure 8: FIBA – International Basketball Federation



FIBT – International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation

The SGO index for FIBT is 40.9%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid ethics code
- Good athletes representation


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak reporting transparency
- Lack of term limits
- Weak ethics committee

Table 8: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIBT

FIBT		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.55	38.6%
Democratic process	2.70	42.5%
Checks and balances	2.67	41.7%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		40.9%

Figure 9: International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation



FIE - International Fencing Federation

The SGO index for FIE is 51.1%.

Main strengths are

- Good reporting transparency
- Athletes representation
- Election procedures


Main weaknesses are

- Lack of internal checks

Table 9: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIE

FIE		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.90	72.5%
Democratic process	3.40	60.0%
Checks and balances	1.83	20.8%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		51.1%

Figure 10: FIE – International Fencing Federation



FIFA – Fédération Internationale de Football Association

The SGO index for FIFA is 67.8%.

Main strengths are:

- Robust internal audit committee
- Good ethics committee
- Solidarity and development programmes

Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Lack of gender equity policy
- Inadequate procedure for allocation of world cups
- Weak legacy and sustainability requirements for world cups

Table 10: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIFA

FIFA		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.92	72.9%
Democratic process	3.10	52.5%
Checks and balances	3.83	70.8%
Solidarity	4.00	75.0%
Overall		67.8%

Figure 11: Fédération Internationale de Football Association




FIG – International Gymnastics Federation

The SGO index for FIG is 45.3%.

Main strengths are:

- Athlete representation
- Development programme
- Consultancy programme for member federations


Main weaknesses are:

- The allocation procedure for main event
- Weak ethics code and conflict of interest rules
- Lack of decent audit and ethics committees

Table 11: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIG

FIG			
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)		SGO Index
Transparency	2.91		47.7%
Democratic process	3.10		52.5%
Checks and balances	2.67		41.7%
Solidarity	2.57		39.3%
Overall			45.3%

Figure 12: FIG - International Gymnastics Federation



FIH – International Hockey Federation

The SGO index for FIH is 43.2%.

Main strengths are:

- Athlete representation
- Adequate ethics code
- Development and social responsibility programmes


Main weaknesses are:

- No event reports
- No internal audit and ethics committees

Table 12: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIH

FIH		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.60	40.0%
Democratic process	2.75	43.8%
Checks and balances	2.83	45.8%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		43.2%

Figure 13: FIH – International Hockey Federation



FIL – International Luge Federation

The SGO index for FIL is 34.2%.

Main strengths are:

- Annual general assembly meetings
- Elections of senior officials


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Lack of gender equity policy
- Absence of decent internal checks

Table 13: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIL

FIL		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.55	38.6%
Democratic process	2.56	38.9%
Checks and balances	2.00	25.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		34.2%

Figure 14: FIL – International Luge Federation



FINA – Fédération Internationale de Natation

The SGO index for FINA is 43.8%.

Main strengths are:

- Elections of senior officials
- Quorums for legislative and decision-making bodies
- Robust ethics code


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of decent internal audit and ethics committees
- Weak allocation procedure for main event

Table 14: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FINA

FINA		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.80	45.0%
Democratic process	2.63	40.6%
Checks and balances	2.83	45.8%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		43.8%

Figure 15: FINA – Fédération Internationale de Natation



FIS – International Ski Federation

The SGO index for FIS is 61.4%.

Main strengths are:

- Very good reporting transparency
- Solid election procedures and ethics code
- Excellent solidarity


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak ethics and internal audit committee
- Lack of term limits
- No regular general assembly and decision-making body meetings

Table 15: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIS

FIS		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	4.08	77.1%
Democratic process	2.40	35.0%
Checks and balances	3.33	58.3%
Solidarity	4.00	75.0%
Overall		61.4%

Figure 16: FIS - International Ski Federation



FISA – International Rowing Federation

The SGO index for FISA is 54.5%.

Main strengths are:

- Overall transparency
- Solid ethics code
- Good athlete representation
- Good social responsibility and development programmes


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of quorums for legislative and decision-making bodies
- Weak ethics and audit committees

Table 16: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FISA

FISA		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.92	72.9%
Democratic process	2.80	45.0%
Checks and balances	3.43	60.7%
Solidarity	2.57	39.3%
Overall		54.5%

Figure 17: FISA – International Rowing Federation



FIVB – Fédération Internationale de Volleyball

The SGO index for FIVB is 38.1%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid ethics code
- Development programme


Main weaknesses are:

- Not all senior officials are elected
- Weak ethics and audit committees
- No regular legislative and decision-making body meetings

Table 17: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – FIVB

FIVB		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.63	40.6%
Democratic process	2.44	36.1%
Checks and balances	2.50	37.5%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		38.1%

Figure 18: FIVB – Fédération Internationale de Volleyball



IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federations

The SGO index for IAAF is 52.5%.

Main strengths are:

- Good athlete representation
- Election of senior officials
- Robust ethics commission
- Solid development and social responsibility programmes


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak audit committee
- Lack of quorums for legislative and decision-making bodies

Table 18: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IAAF

IAAF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.00	50.0%
Democratic process	2.70	42.5%
Checks and balances	3.60	65.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		52.5%

Figure 19: IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federation



IBU – International Biathlon Union

The SGO index for IBU is 38.5%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures
- Solid development programme


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of event reports
- Lack of term limits
- Weak internal audit and ethics committees
- Weak ethics code and conflict of interests rules

Table 19: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IBU

IBU		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.92	47.9%
Democratic process	2.50	37.5%
Checks and balances	2.17	29.2%
Solidarity	2.57	39.3%
Overall		38.5%

Figure 20: IBU – International Biathlon Union



ICF – International Canoe Federation

The SGO index for ICF is 42.5%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures
- Quorums in legislative and decision-making bodies
- Very good athlete representation


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak procedures for deciding host of main event
- Lack of audit and ethics committees
- Lack of term limits
- No annual general assembly meetings

Table 20: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ICF

ICF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.90	47.5%
Democratic process	3.00	50.0%
Checks and balances	2.20	30.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		42.5%

Figure 21: ICF – International Canoe Federation



IGF – International Golf Federation

The SGO index for IGF is 27.8%.

Main strengths are:

- Presence of quorums in legislative and decision-making bodies
- Transparency of governing body documents


Main weaknesses are:

- Overall lack of democratic processes and internal checks

Table 21: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IGF

IGF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.33	33.3%
Democratic process	2.00	25.0%
Checks and balances	2.00	25.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		27.8%

Figure 22: IGF – International Golf Federation



IHF – International Handball Federation

The SGO index for IHF is 48.3%.

Main strengths are:

- Elections of senior officials
- Good athletes representation
- Solid ethics code, ethics committee, and conflict of interest rules


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak internal audit committee
- Weak allocation process for major event
- Lack of term limits

Table 22: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IHF

IHF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.50	37.5%
Democratic process	2.70	42.5%
Checks and balances	3.60	65.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		48.3%

Figure 23: IHF – International Handball Federation



IIHF – International Ice Hockey Federation

The SGO index for IIHF is 52.8%.

Main strengths are:

- Elections of all decision-making body members
- Solid internal audit committee
- Ethics code
- Development programme


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak athlete representation
- No nominations committee
- No ethics committee.

Table 23: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IIHF

IIHF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.33	58.3%
Democratic process	3.00	50.0%
Checks and balances	3.00	50.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		52.8%

Figure 24: IIHF – International Ice Hockey Federation



IJF – International Judo Federation

The SGO index for IJF is 36.2%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures for senior officials and athlete representation
- Food social responsibility programme


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak main event allocation procedure
- Lack of decent ethics code and conflict of interest rules
- Lack of ethics and audit committees

Table 24: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IJF

IJF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.67	41.7%
Democratic process	2.50	37.5%
Checks and balances	2.33	33.3%
Solidarity	2.29	32.1%
Overall		36.2%

Figure 25: IJF – International Judo Federation



ISAF – International Sailing Federation

The SGO index for ISAF is 55.2%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures for senior officials
- Good athlete representation
- Robust ethics committee
- Good social responsibility programme


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak reporting transparency
- No quorum for decision-making and legislative bodies
- No decent conflict of interest rules

Table 25: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ISAF

ISAF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.88	46.9%
Democratic process	3.50	62.5%
Checks and balances	3.25	56.3%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		55.2%

Figure 26: ISAF – International Sailing Federation



ISSF – International Shooting Sport Federation

The SGO index for ISSF is 27.3%.

Main strengths are:

- Good athlete representation
- Election of senior officials


Main weaknesses are:

- Overall weak solidarity and checks and balances

Table 26: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ISSF

ISSF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.73	43.2%
Democratic process	2.40	35.0%
Checks and balances	1.67	16.7%
Solidarity	1.57	14.3%
Overall		27.3%

Figure 27: ISSF – International Shooting Sport Federation



ISU – International Skating Union

The SGO index for ISU is 41.5%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures and ethics code
- Environmental requirements for major events
- Solid development programme


Main weaknesses are:

- No annual general assembly meetings
- Weak main event allocation procedure
- Lack of decent ethics and internal audit committees

Table 27: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ISU

ISU		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.58	39.6%
Democratic process	2.70	42.5%
Checks and balances	2.50	37.5%
Solidarity	2.86	46.4%
Overall		41.5%

Figure 28: ISU - International Skating Union



ITF – International Tennis Federation

The SGO index for ITF is 37.0%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures and ethics code
- Development programme and solidarity programme


Main weaknesses are:

- No gender equity policy
- Weak athlete representation
- Lack of decent ethics and internal audit committees

Table 28: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ITF

ITF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.20	30.0%
Democratic process	2.89	47.2%
Checks and balances	2.67	41.7%
Solidarity	2.17	29.2%
Overall		37.0%

Figure 29: ITF – International Tennis Federation



ITTF – International Table Tennis Federation

The SGO index for ITTF is 45.8%.

Main strengths are:

- Good reporting transparency
- Solid election procedures, solidarity and event programmes
- Consultancy to member federations


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of legacy requirements for main events
- Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit committee

Table 29: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ITTF

ITTF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.50	62.5%
Democratic process	3.00	50.0%
Checks and balances	1.83	20.8%
Solidarity	3.00	50.0%
Overall		45.8%

Figure 30: ITTF – International Table Tennis Federation



ITU – International Triathlon Union

The SGO index for ITU is 30.4%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures


Main weaknesses are:

- Very weak procedures for the allocation of the major event
- Lack of term limits
- Irregular decision-making body meetings
- Lack of event reports
- Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit committee

Table 30: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – ITU

ITU		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.33	33.3%
Democratic process	3.00	50.0%
Checks and balances	1.67	16.7%
Solidarity	1.86	21.4%
Overall		30.4%

Figure 31: ITU – The International Triathlon Union



IWF – International Weightlifting Federation

The SGO index for IWF is 30.4%.

- Main strengths are:
- Strong development programme
- Strong ethics code and conflict of interest rules


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event
- Lack of term limits
- Irregular decision-making body meetings
- Lack of event reports
- Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit committee

Table 31: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – IWF

IWF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.82	45.5%
Democratic process	2.60	40.0%
Checks and balances	2.83	45.8%
Solidarity	2.00	25.0%
Overall		39.1%

Figure 32: IWF – International Weightlifting Federation



UCI – Union Cycliste Internationale

The SGO index for UCI is 47.6%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics commission
- Strong development programme


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of good audit committee
- Lack of decent term limits
- No quorum for legislative and decision-making bodies

Table 32: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – UCI

UCI		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.27	56.8%
Democratic process	2.44	36.1%
Checks and balances	3.00	50.0%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		47.6%

Figure 33: UCI – Union Cycliste Internationale



UIPM – Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne

The SGO index for UIPM is 46.2%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures and athletes representation
- Overall strong solidarity


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event
- Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit committee

Table 33: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – UIPM

UIPM		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.75	43.8%
Democratic process	3.10	52.5%
Checks and balances	1.83	20.8%
Solidarity	3.71	67.9%
Overall		46.2%

Figure 34: UIPM – Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne



UWW – United World Wrestling

The SGO index for UWW is 42.1%.

Main strengths are:

- Strong development and anti-discrimination programmes


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Lack of decent event reports
- Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event
- Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit committee

Table 34: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – UWW

UWW		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.00	50.0%
Democratic process	2.22	30.6%
Checks and balances	2.83	45.8%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		42.1%

Figure 35: UWW – United World Wrestling



WA – World Archery Federation

The SGO index for WA is 45.3%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures and athlete representation


Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Lack of decent event reports
- Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event
- Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit committee
- No regular legislative and decision-making body meetings

Table 35: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WA

WA		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.00	50.0%
Democratic process	2.60	40.0%
Checks and balances	2.83	45.8%
Solidarity	N/A	N/A
Overall		45.3%

Figure 36: WA – World Archery Federation



WCF – World Curling Federation

The SGO index for WCF is 39.3%.

Main strengths are:

- Solid election procedures


Main weaknesses are:

- Overall very weak internal checks and solidarity

Table 36: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WCF

WCF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.08	52.1%
Democratic process	3.20	55.0%
Checks and balances	2.00	25.0%
Solidarity	2.00	25.0%
Overall		39.3%

Figure 37: WCF – World Curling Federation



WR - World Rugby

The SGO index for WR is 45.8%.

Main strengths are:

- Good reporting transparency
- Overall good solidarity
- Solid election procedures


Main weaknesses are:

- Weak main event allocation procedure
- Lack of decent ethics and internal audit committee
- Lack of ethics code and decent conflict of interest rules

Table 37: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WR

WR		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	3.00	50.0%
Democratic process	2.90	47.5%
Checks and balances	2.00	25.0%
Solidarity	3.43	60.7%
Overall		45.8%

Figure 38: WR - World Rugby



WTF – World Taekwondo Federation

The SGO index for WTF is 44.2%.

Main strengths are:

- Very strong election procedures
- Solid ethics code
- Consulting to member federations

Main weaknesses are:

- Lack of term limits
- Lack of decent event reports
- Weak procedures for the allocation of the major event
- Lack of decent ethics code, conflict of interest rules, and ethics and internal audit committee
- No regular decision-making body meetings

Table 38: Overall SGO Index and SGO scores – WTF

WTF		
Dimension	SGO score (on a scale from 1-5)	SGO Index
Transparency	2.92	47.9%
Democratic process	2.90	47.5%
Checks and balances	2.83	45.8%
Solidarity	2.43	35.7%
Overall		44.2%

Figure 39: WTF – World Taekwondo Federation




Table 39: Scores of the 35 Olympic ISFs on the individual indicators of the Sports Governance Observer

	AIBA	BWF	FEI	FIBA	FIBT	FIE	FIFA	FIG	FIH
Transparency									
1.1	3	4	5	4	3	3	5	3	4
1.2	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	5	3
1.3	3	3	4	3	1	4	5	3	3
1.4		1	5				5	1	
1.5	3	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	2
1.6	5	5	5	2	5	5	4	3	3
1.7	3	3	5	5	5	3	4	3	3
1.8	2	4	5	3	1	4	4	3	3
1.9	1	5	5	1	1	5	1	3	1
1.10	3	5	5	2	3	5	5	3	3
1.11		3	2		3		2		
1.12	2	2	3	2	1	2	4	2	1
Mean	2.80	3.25	4.08	2.70	2.55	3.90	3.92	2.91	2.60
Percentage	45.0%	56.3%	77.1%	42.5%	38.6%	72.5%	72.9%	47.7%	40.0%
Democratic process									
2.1	5	4	5	3	4	4	4	4	4
2.2	5	3	5	2	4	4	4	4	2
2.3	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	3	2
2.4		2	2		3	2	3	2	
2.5	4	2	4	2	3	4	1	2	2
2.6	3	1	3	3	1	1	1	3	3
2.7	1	5	5	2	5	5	5	2	2
2.8	2	3	4	3	1	4	4	3	3
2.9		3	3	3	1	3	2	3	
2.10	3	5	5	3	4	5	4	5	4
Mean	3.13	3.00	3.80	2.56	2.70	3.40	3.10	3.10	2.75
Percentage	53.1%	50.0%	70.0%	38.9%	42.5%	60.0%	52.5%	52.5%	43.8%
Checks and balances									
3.1	1	2	4	2	1	1	5	2	1
3.2	4	4	5	5	4	4	5	4	4
3.3									
3.4	4	4	5	4	4	2	4	2	4
3.5	4	3	4	3	3	1	3	2	3
3.6	2	1	4	2	2	2	4	1	1
3.7	1	5	5	2	2	1	2	5	4
Mean	2.67	3.17	4.50	3.00	2.67	1.83	3.83	2.67	2.83
Percentage	41.7%	54.2%	87.5%	50.0%	41.7%	20.8%	70.8%	41.7%	45.8%
Solidarity									
4.1		4	4	4			4	4	4
4.2	2	5	4	4			5	1	4
4.3		2	3				2	1	
4.4		2	3				2	1	
4.5		5	5	5			5	4	
4.6		4	3				5	5	
4.7		3	4				5	2	5
Mean		3.57	3.71				4.00	2.57	
Percentage		64.3%	67.9%				75.0%	39.3%	
Total	2.86	3.25	4.02	2.75	2.64	3.04	3.71	2.81	2.73
SGO index	46.6%	56.2%	75.6%	43.8%	40.9%	51.1%	67.8%	45.3%	43.2%

	FIL	FINA	FIS	FISA	FIVB	IAAF	IBU	ICF	IGF
Transparency									
1.1	3	4	5	4	4	4	5	3	5
1.2	3	3	4	5	3	3	3	5	1
1.3	3		5	3		3	2	3	1
1.4	2		5	5			2		
1.5		2	4	3	2	5	3	3	2
1.6	3	5	5	5		3	5	5	2
1.7	3	5	3	3	4	3	4	3	5
1.8	3	2	3	4	2	3	3	2	
1.9	1	3	5	5	3	1	1	1	1
1.10	3	1	4	5	1	3	3	3	3
1.11	3	1	3	3		3	3		
1.12	1	2	3	2	2	2	1	1	1
Mean	2.55	2.80	4.08	3.92	2.63	3.00	2.92	2.90	2.33
Percentage	38.6%	45.0%	77.1%	72.9%	40.6%	50.0%	47.9%	47.5%	33.3%
Democratic process									
2.1	4	4	4	3	2	4	4	4	2
2.2	3	2	4	3	5	3	5	4	2
2.3	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	1
2.4	3	2	3	3		3	3	2	1
2.5	2	4	2	1	2	1	2	4	4
2.6	1	3	1	2	3	3	1	1	1
2.7	5	1	2	5	2	2	2	2	2
2.8			2	3	1	1	3	3	
2.9	1		2	2	3	3	1	3	3
2.10	2	2	2	4	1	4	2	5	2
Mean	2.56	2.63	2.40	2.90	2.44	2.70	2.50	3.00	2.00
Percentage	38.9%	40.6%	35.0%	47.5%	36.1%	42.5%	37.5%	50.0%	25.0%
Checks and balances									
3.1	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2
3.2	1	4	4	4		4	4	4	4
3.3									
3.4	1	4	4	4	4	4	2		
3.5	1	3	3	3	2	4	2	3	1
3.6	1	2	2	2	2	4	2	1	1
3.7	5	2	5	5			2	2	
Mean	2.00	2.83	3.33	3.33	2.50	3.60	2.17	2.20	2.00
Percentage	25.0%	45.8%	58.3%	58.3%	37.5%	65.0%	29.2%	30.0%	25.0%
Solidarity									
4.1		4	4	4	4	4	4		
4.2		2	5	5	2	4	2		
4.3			5	2			1		
4.4			4	2			1		
4.5			4	2	5		4		
4.6			4	1			3		
4.7			2	2			3		
Mean			4.00	2.57			2.57		
Percentage			75.0%	39.3%			39.3%		
Total	2.37	2.75	3.45	3.18	2.52	3.10	2.54	2.70	2.11
SGO index	34.2%	43.8%	61.4%	54.5%	38.1%	52.5%	38.5%	42.5%	27.8%

	IHF	IIHF	IJF	WR	ISAF	ISSF	ISU	ITF	ITTF
Transparency									
1.1	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	3	3
1.2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4
1.3			2	3		2	3	2	3
1.4			1	3			1		3
1.5	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1.6		4	5	2	2	5	2	2	5
1.7	4	5	4	5	4	3	3	1	3
1.8	2	2	3	5	2	2	2	3	4
1.9	1	5	1	1	3	1	3	1	5
1.10	3	3	3	5	4	3	4	3	5
1.11			3	1		3	3		3
1.12	2	1	2	2		2	2	2	2
Mean	2.50	3.33	2.67	3.00	2.88	2.73	2.58	2.20	3.50
Percentage	37.5%	58.3%	41.7%	50.0%	46.9%	43.2%	39.6%	30.0%	62.5%
Democratic process									
2.1	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
2.2	3	3	4	5	5	2	4	4	4
2.3	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3
2.4	2	3	2	2		2	2	2	3
2.5	3	3	3	4	1	2	4	4	1
2.6	1	2	1	1	3	1	3	1	1
2.7	2	5	2	5	5	2	2	5	5
2.8	3	3	1	2		2	3		4
2.9	3		1	1	3	2	1	1	2
2.10	4	2	5	3	4	4	2	2	3
Mean	2.70	3.00	2.50	2.90	3.50	2.40	2.70	2.89	3.00
Percentage	42.5%	50.0%	37.5%	47.5%	62.5%	35.0%	42.5%	47.2%	50.0%
Checks and balances									
3.1	2	4	2	2	4	2	1	2	2
3.2	4	4	4	4	4	1	4	4	4
3.3									
3.4	4	4	2	1		2	4	4	1
3.5	4	3	2	2	1	1	2	2	2
3.6	4	1	2	1	4	2	2	2	1
3.7		2	2	2		2	2	2	1
Mean	3.60	3.00	2.33	2.00	3.25	1.67	2.50	2.67	1.83
Percentage	65.0%	50.0%	33.3%	25.0%	56.3%	16.7%	37.5%	41.7%	20.8%
Solidarity									
4.1		4	2	4		2	4	4	4
4.2		2	4	2	4	1	2	4	4
4.3			1	3		1	2	1	1
4.4			1	3		1	1	1	1
4.5			3	4	4	1	4	1	4
4.6			3	4		3	4		4
4.7	2		2	4		2	3	2	3
Mean			2.29	3.43		1.57	2.86	2.17	3.00
Percentage			32.1%	60.7%		14.3%	46.4%	29.2%	50.0%
Total	2.93	3.11	2.45	2.83	3.21	2.09	2.66	2.48	2.83
SGO index	48.3%	52.8%	36.2%	45.8%	55.2%	27.3%	41.5%	37.0%	45.8%

	IWF	UCI	UIPM	UWW	WA (FITA)	WCF	WR	WTF	Mean
Transparency									
1.1	5	4	3	4	3	3	4	5	
1.2	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	
1.3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
1.4	1	5	3		3	5	3	5	
1.5	2	5	3	3	2	1	2	1	
1.6	2	2	3	5	5	3	2	5	
1.7	4	3	2	3	4	3	5	4	
1.8	3	3	3		3	3	5	3	
1.9	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	1	
1.10	5	4	3	3	3	3	5	2	
1.11			3	3		3	1	2	
1.12	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	
Mean	2.82	3.27	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.08	3.00	2.92	2.98
Percentage	45.5%	56.8%	43.8%	50.0%	50.0%	52.1%	50.0%	47.9%	49.6%
Democratic process									
2.1	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	5	
2.2	4	4	4	2	4	4	5	5	
2.3	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	
2.4	2	2	2		2	2	2	2	
2.5	2	1	4	2	2	3	4	2	
2.6	1	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	
2.7	5	5	5	2	2	5	5	5	
2.8	2		2	1	1	3	2	1	
2.9	2	1	2	3	2	3	1	3	
2.10	2	2	5	3	5	3	3	2	
Mean	2.60	2.44	3.10	2.22	2.60	3.20	2.90	2.90	2.81
Percentage	40.0%	36.1%	52.5%	30.6%	40.0%	55.0%	47.5%	47.5%	45.3%
Checks and balances									
3.1	2	1	2	2	3	2	2	2	
3.2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	
3.3									
3.4	4	4	1	3	2	1	1	4	
3.5	4	4	1	2	3	2	2	3	
3.6	2	4	1	2	3	1	1	2	
3.7	1	1	2	4	2	2	2	2	
Mean	2.83	3.00	1.83	2.83	2.83	2.00	2.00	2.83	2.66
Percentage	45.8%	50.0%	20.8%	45.8%	45.8%	25.0%	25.0%	45.8%	41.5%
Solidarity									
4.1	4	4	3	4	3	2	4	4	
4.2	1	1	3		3	2	2	2	
4.3	1		4			1	3	2	
4.4	1		3			1	3	1	
4.5	3	5	4			4	4	1	
4.6			5			2	4	4	
4.7	2		4	5	2	2	4	3	
Mean	2.00		3.71			2.00	3.43	2.43	2.83
Percentage	25.0%		67.9%			25.0%	60.7%	35.7%	45.7%
Total	2.56	2.91	2.85	2.69	2.81	2.57	2.83	2.77	2.82
SGO index	39.1%	47.6%	46.2%	42.1%	45.3%	39.3%	45.8%	44.2%	45.5%

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