A ROUTLEDGE FREEBOOK

Olympic and Paralympic Studies



TABLE OF CONTENTS





01:: Breaking New Ground: Rio 2016

(Chapter 1 taken from Understanding the Olympics, 2/e)



(Chapter 1 taken from *The Paralympic Games Explained*, 2/e)



03:: Researching and Writing about the London Games: An Introduction

(Chapter 1 take from taken from Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, Volume 2)



04:: Home Advantage

(Chapter 14 taken from *Success and Failure of Countries at the Olympic Games*)



05:: These Games are Not for You: Olympic promises, Olympic legacies and marginalized youth in Olympic Cities

(Conclusion chapter taken from *Olympic Exclusions*)



Discover out titles in Olympics and Paralympics Studies



Use discount code OLY16 to receive 20% off all Sport and Leisure titles from Routledge. Visit www.routledge.com/sport to browse our full range of titles from a variety of practice areas.

Introduction

6

The Olympic and Paralympic Games are the world's foremost sporting mega-events. They are also a key subject of study for students and researchers working in Sport Studies, Event Studies and associated disciplines. This FreeBook brings together a collection of chapters from some of our most recent and most significant titles in Olympic and Paralympic Studies, written by leading experts and showcasing key themes, issues and perspectives. With the Rio Games promising to be one of the most interesting and controversial Games in living memory, we hope that this FreeBook will help you make sense of the action on and off the field of play and encourage you to explore our full range of titles in this area. For the full text of all the books featured here, and for other related titles, visit our Olympic and Paralympic Studies page.

Chapter 1 – *Breaking New Ground: Rio 2016*, taken from 'Understanding the Olympics, second edition'

This chapter introduces the politics surrounding the hosting of the Rio 2016 Games. The book offers the most up-to-date overview of the social, cultural, political, historical and economic context to the Olympic Games, introducing all the key themes in contemporary Olympic Studies, such as legacy, development, sustainability, corruption, the media and Olympic futures. John Horne is Professor of Sport and Sociology at the University of Central Lancashire, UK. Garry Whannel is Professor of Media Cultures at the University of Bedfordshire, UK

Chapter 2 – *The History and Development of the Paralympic Games*, taken from 'The Paralympic Games Explained, second edition'

This chapter outlines the history and development of the Summer and Winter Paralympic Games, explains the development and various meanings of the term 'Paralympic', and outlines the impairment groupings that make up the Paralympic Movement. The book is the first complete introduction to the Paralympic phenomenon, exploring every key aspect and issue, from the history and development of the



Paralympic movement to the economic and social impact of the contemporary Games. Ian Brittain is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Business in Society at Coventry University, UK

Chapter 3 – *Researching and Writing about the London Games: An Introduction*, taken from 'Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, volume two'

This chapter discusses the challenges of conducting in-depth and on-site research into the Olympic Games and bringing that research to the wider world. The book is the second of two volumes that examine every aspect of the London 2012 Games in detail, from inception, through the successful bidding process and the planning and preparation phase, to delivery, the post-Games period and legacy. Drawing on unprecedented access to the Games' organising body, LOCOG, this was the first time that a team of world-leading researchers had come together to study, discuss and write about an Olympic Games in such a systematic fashion, and there are important lessons to be learned for researchers studying future Games. Vassil Girginov is Reader in Sport Management/Development at Brunel University, UK.

Chapter 4 – *Home Advantage*, taken from 'Success and Failure of Countries at the Olympic Games'

This chapter examines the advantage that host countries seem to enjoy in terms of winning medals, arguing that if we account for increased participation by looking at the ratio of medals to athletes, then home advantage decays to almost zero. The book investigates why some countries are more successful than others and why sporting success has become a policy priority around the world. Which factors determine failure or success? What is the relationship between these factors? And how can these factors be manipulated to influence a country's performance in sport? Danyel Reiche is an Associate Professor for Comparative Politics at the American University of Beirut



and a Visiting Scholar at the Harvard University Institute for Quantitative Social Science, US.

Chapter 5 – These Games are Not for You: Olympic promises, Olympic legacies and marginalized youth in Olympic Cities, taken from 'Olympic Exclusions'

This chapter argues that the Olympics should be held to account for any social legacy commitments and calls for more extensive research to be undertaken with marginalized populations in host cities. The book offers a critical examination of the legacy commitments that incorporate aid for the young and the poor that are often made when cities bid to host the Games, when little is known about the realities of marginalized young people living in host cities. Do they benefit from social housing and employment opportunities? Or do they fall victim to increased policing and evaporating social assistance? Jacqueline Kennelly is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada.














The following is excerpted from Un*derstanding the Olympics , 2nd edition* by John Horne and Garry Whannel. ©2016 Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

To purchase a copy, click here

INTRODUCTION

After the Olympic and Paralympic Games in London in 2012, the sport historian Martin Polley (2014: 255) remarked that if 'the motto of London 2012 was "inspire a generation" for hundreds of authors this was easily recast as inspire a publication'. A similar situation is arising with Rio 2016. Ahead of the World Cup hosted in 2014, US journalist Dave Zirin published a book called *Brazil's Dance with the Devil* (Zirin 2014). In 2015, ahead of the next sports mega-event to take place in Brazil, journalist Juliana Barbassa has published *Dancing with the Devil in the City of God* (Barbassa 2015). Whereas Zirin's book attempted to provide an overview of the whole country, Barbassa's emphatically focuses on the city that will host the 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, Rio de Janeiro – a city 'on the brink', as her subtitle suggests. The question is: on the brink of what? Her book deliberately alludes to both the opportunities and the challenges facing Rio as it hosts the XXXI Olympics.

The international mass media do like to highlight the challenges faced by countries, especially those outside the global North, when they stage global spectacles such as the Olympics. Hence, with less than a year to go to the opening ceremony, newspapers and broadcasters in the UK reported that the Rio Games faced a budget cut of one-third, the city was a potentially dangerous location for tourists and the environmental costs of the Games were increasing, as the Brazilian currency and economy has weakened (Gibson 2015; Davies 2015). This chapter attempts to provide insight into the background context social, economic, political and sporting – behind the 2016 Games; it examines the relationship of Brazil to the Olympic movement and outlines the challenges faced in breaking new ground in Rio. It explores the unfolding politics of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, both before and after hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In addition, it examines debates about sport for development and the role of the Olympics in this, and how by 'learning from Barcelona', via urban and



sport policy transfers, another of the so-called 'BRICS' nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has sought to make use of sports mega-events.

RIO 2016 IN SOCIAL AND SPORTING CONTEXT

On the evening of Friday 5 August 2016, IOC President Thomas Bach will declare the official opening of the XXXI Olympic Games. At that stage the drama of the preparations for them will (probably) have been resolved and the city and the world will closely follow the performances of the world's top athletes. In this respect Rio 2016 will be no different to many other sports mega-events. Yet interest in the development of the wider economic and political system of the largest nation in South America has been a long-standing feature of scholarly research (see, for example, Levine and Crocitti 1999; McCann 2008). Academic interest in sport in South America has also been given a significant boost by the scheduled hosting of the two largest sports mega-events – the FIFA men's Football World Cup finals and the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games – in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro in 2014 and 2016, respectively. This is not to say that research has not been conducted until recently, but to acknowledge that the English-language literature has started to increase, and looks certain to grow even more rapidly in the coming years (for earlier research, see Arbena 1999). As Polley suggested, the contemporary Olympics do 'inspire' many publications, including this new and revised edition of Understanding the Olympics.

In *Soccer Madness*, Lever (1995/1983: 6) contends that sport generally and, in Brazil, football specifically, has the 'paradoxical ability to reinforce societal cleavages while transcending them'. She argues that sport/football can 'create social order while preserving cultural identity', thus promoting rather than impeding goals of national development (Lever 1995: 22). Anthropologists, historians, human geographers, political scientists and sociologists, among other scholars, have begun to investigate a number of recurring topics that



enable us to begin to understand these and other developments in South America. Football, by far and away the most popular sport throughout South America, features in articles about fans, elite migrant labour, professional organisations and globalisation (Gordon and Helal 2001; Raspaud and Bastos 2013; Vasconcellos Ribeiro and Dimeo 2009). Alvito (2007) notes, for example, that football in Brazil has faced the twin challenges of commercialisation and mediatisation for at least the past 30 years. Mega-events attract accounts about the history of South American involvement, involvement in the Football World Cup and the Olympics and also the impacts of hosting on marginalised communities (Curi 2008; Gaffney 2010; Silvestre and Oliveira 2012; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013; also see Horne and Silvestre 2016 for discussion of wider analysis of sport and leisure in Brazil and South America).

In the past 30 years most of the developed and developing world have joined in the competitive marketing of places as social and economic opportunities seeking capital investment (de Oliveira 2015). Many 'Cariocas' (as Rio de Janeiro locals are called) glued themselves to their TV screens at 11 a.m. local time on 2 October 2009, awaiting the results of a decision about whether or not Rio de Janeiro would host the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. On Copacabana beach, the proposed site of the 2016 beach volleyball competition, a huge party was scheduled whether or not Rio was selected. The decision to award the Olympics to Rio was very much the icing on a decade of steady development. Brazil had been one of the few economies, alongside the other so-called BRICS, that had remained stable and grew during the recession of 2008 and 2009.

The BRICS account for over 2.8 billion (40 per cent) of the world's population, but only command 25 per cent of global GDP, and hence they are also referred to as 'emerging economies'. Given the hosting of the Olympic Games by Beijing (2008), the

Commonwealth Games by Delhi (2010), the FIFA World Cup by South Africa (2010), the Winter Olympic Games by Sochi (2014) and the FIFA



World Cup by Russia (2018), as well as the Brazilian involvement in staging the Pan American Games (2007), the FIFA World Cup (2014) and the Olympics (2016), some have suggested that a 'BRICS style' of hosting sports mega-events may be emerging (Curi *et al.* 2011). Curi *et al.* point out that between 1950 and 2007 no major international sports event was hosted in Rio de Janeiro, the city lost its status as capital to Brasilia in 1960, and when it did stage the 2007 Pan American Games they were the most expensive of that series of competitions ever held. The 2007 Pan American Games were marked by very tight security, including the erection of walls to separate games attendees from the local, poorer, population. Hence bidding to host these events has to be seen in a context where consumption-based development is seen as a solution to city-specific urban problems as much as national ones (Gaffney 2010).

While there were no groups organised in Rio specifically against the Olympic bid, there were several groups on the ground concerned with the legacy these Olympics would bring to Rio, and especially to the marginalised communities living in *favelas* (sometimes referred to as 'slums'). While eviction in low-income, informal areas has become a not-uncommon consequence of mega-event planning worldwide, housing rights violations have reached significant proportions during recent Olympics. It is in this way that sport, and sports mega-events such as the Olympics especially, may appear superficially as credible tools of development. Yet they do so in ways that do not challenge inequalities or neo-liberal development. In fact the hosting of sports mega-events may be a most convenient shell for the promotion of neo-liberal agendas, since they do not deviate from top-down notions of economic and social development.

SPORT AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL

Brazil has been, in less than a century and half, a monarchy, a republic, and a federation. It has been ruled by parliament, civilian presidents, military juntas, general-presidents, and by a civilian dictator.



(Rocha and McDonagh 2014: 61)

A number of journalistic accounts of sport, and especially football in Brazil, are available that discuss the connection between sport, nationalism and politics (see, for example: Humphrey 1986; Goldblatt 2014; Zirin 2014). Here we briefly refer to two of the key academic sources that these journalistic accounts rely on (Lever 1995/1983; Levine 1980) to provide a brief historical contextualisation of the relations between politics and sport in Brazil.

Levine (1980: 233) recognises the possibility of viewing sport, and especially football, as a form of opiate and distraction and thus an agency of social control. He also acknowledges the alternative view that sport provides a source of group identity and social integration, and thus can act as a unifier of local, regional and national populations. He argues, however, that in the case of Brazil, 'futebol's chief significance has been its use by the elite to bolster official ideology and to channel social energy in ways compatible with prevailing social values'. Thus he appears to adopt a perspective more in keeping with that of Antonio Gramsci, or 'hegemony theory' (Rowe 2004).

Lever (1995: 56), adopting a social integration perspective, argues that 'sport promoted national integration in Brazil long before other social organizations criss-crossed the nation'. By 1914 Brazil had a national federation of sports clubs, the *Confederação Brasileira de Desportos* (CBD), or 'Brazilian Sports Confederation', and the football club as an institution dates from the late nineteenth century. Levine (1980: 234) suggests that the development of football in Brazil falls into four broad periods: 1894–1904, the development of private urban clubs for foreigners (especially the British, German and Portuguese); 1905–1933, the amateur phase which nonetheless saw a marked growth in interest; 1933–1950, professionalisation and participation on the world stage, including the hosting of the fourth FIFA World Cup Finals in 1950; and since 1950, world-class recognition and the growth of commercialism. This remains a useful way of understanding the emergence of the sport in Brazil (for greater detail, see Bellos 2002;



Gaffney 2008; Goldblatt 2014).

The first football clubs to be established in Rio reflected the influence of foreigners: Vasco da Gama established in 1898 at the Lusitania club for Portuguese merchants and bankers; Fluminense developed out of the British 'Rio Cricket and Athletic Association' in 1902; Botafogo were a spin-off from a rowing club (1904); and Flamengo, formerly another rowing club, was formed in 1915 when athletes defected from Fluminense. Thus are great sporting rivalries created within the boundaries of one city. Popular interest in the sport was also aided, as in other nations, by the growth of media reporting of the results by the newspaper press from the 1900s and radio from the 1930s.

Levine (1999: 44) notes how government expanded into everyday life, including sport, in Brazil in the 1930s. The federal government seized upon the Brazilian victory in the 1932 South American Cup, and a year later football became a national institution when it was professionalised under the auspices of the CBD. In 1941 the club network in Brazil was linked to the federal government by President Vargas' centralisation programme. A National Sport Council (CND) within the Ministry of Education and Culture was established to 'orient, finance, and encourage the practice of sport in all of Brazil' (Lever 1995: 56).

Lever (1995: 59) argues that from the beginning of the diffusion and adoption of modern sport, 'sport and government more than coexist; their relationship is better described as symbiotic'. While individual Brazilian athletes – such as tennis player Maria Bueno, who won four times at Forest Hills and three times at Wimbledon between 1959 and 1966, and racing driver Emerson Fittipaldi who was at his best in Formula One racing in the 1970s – may have been used to symbolise Brazilian greatness, Lever (1995: 55) states that it 'is through team sports, with their highly organised structure that precedes and outlives any particular set of athletes, that more than momentary unification of a nation is established'. She argues that in Brazil 'politicians have spurred the growth of both spectator and participant



sport; sport, in return, has helped politicians court popularity and has helped the Brazilian government achieve its nationalistic goals' (Lever 1995: 59). In many ways, therefore, her argument can be seen as complementary to that of Levine.

Lever (1995: 59) additionally argues that the modern history of Brazil is 'one of social and economic change through authoritarian centralization'. Sport has played its part in this in various ways. The military coup d'état in 1964 saw the establishment of army presidents. In 1968, as repression intensified, the President, General Emílio Garrastazu Médici, began taking an interest in Flamengo and the national team. When Brazil won the FIFA World Cup for an unprecedented third time in Mexico in 1970, the team was flown directly from Mexico City to the capital Brasilia, and the players were personally received by Médici in the Planalto Palace (Levine 1980: 246). Two days of national celebration followed and shortly after the military took over control of the CBD (eventually renamed the *Confederação Brasileira de Futebol* (CBF) after a demand by FIFA in 1979).

Although there was considerable interest in football in Brazil, it is clear that less attention was paid to developing other 'Olympic sports' until relatively recently (Levine 1980: 249). For example, when it was suggested to President-designate General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo that amateur sport should be given greater emphasis to improve Brazilian performance at the Olympic Games, he retorted that the Olympics were: 'political propaganda for nations who needed that sort of thing' (quoted in Levine 1980: 250). Brazil's achievements at the Summer Olympics continue to be middle-ranking, including never having secured a gold medal in either the men's or women's football competition. The top medal-producing sports have been volleyball, sailing and judo. It was not until 1984 that Brazil won its first Olympic medal in track and field events, when Joachim Cruz won the gold medal in the 800 m in Los Angeles, setting an Olympic record.

Brazilian athletes first participated at the Summer Olympic Games in



Antwerp in 1920, and won a gold, silver and bronze medal (Rubio 2009: 32). However, it was not until London in 1948 that they won another medal. Brazilian athletes have also participated in the Winter Olympic Games since 1992, although they have yet to win a medal in winter sports. Perhaps it is not surprising that London 2012 was the year Brazil secured the largest medal haul to date – given the impetus through additional financing that Olympic sports has been given by hosting the Games in 2016 – although it was in Athens in 2004 that the country won the most gold medals (see Figure 1.1).

Since the re-democratisation process in the late 1980s, sports other than football have slowly attained greater prominence in the national

Year	Host city	Number of athletes	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total	Medal table rank
1988	Seoul	171	1	2	3	6	24
1992	Barcelona	195	2	1	0	3	25
1996	Atlanta	225	3	3	9	15	25
2000	Sydney	205	0	6	6	12	53
2004	Athens	247	5	2	3	10	16
2008	Beijing	277	3	4	8	15	23
2012	London	258	3	5	9	17	22

Figure 1.1 Brazilian athletes, Olympic medals won and medal table rank: 1988–2012. *Source*: adapted from http://olimpiadas.uol.com.br/2008/historia/ (last accessed 30 July 2015).

political agenda, resulting in the creation of a dedicated ministry under the government of President Luis Inacio ('Lula') da Silva of the Workers' Party. Attention and resources have been mostly oriented towards professional sports and were lately dominated by the hosting of mega-events (Schausteck de Almeida *et al.* 2012). The bidding campaigns for the FIFA 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games were fully endorsed by the national government and in the passionate support of President Lula, who on the occasion of the awards declared that football was 'more than a sport for Brazilians, it is a national passion' and that with the Olympics 'Brazil gained its international citizenship . . . [t]he world has finally



recognised it is Brazil's time' (BBC Sport 2007; Rohter 2010: 223). Such claims demonstrate the political capital to be explored in relation to two audiences: the Brazilian electorate and international opinion.

BRAZIL AND RIO HOSTING THE WORLD'S GAMES

In this section we focus attention on the political aspects of the preparation for the staging of two sports mega-events, the men's Football World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio in 2016. We briefly retrace the bidding and preparation history of the events while reflecting on their expected contributions and impacts, a debate that rose to global prominence with the international media coverage of scenes of nationwide protests in 2013.

The 2014 World Cup

Following the controversies surrounding the voting for the 2006 World Cup – when the South African bid was beaten by one vote after the sudden change of mind of one delegate

– FIFA introduced a continental rotating system to designate host countries, starting with Africa and followed by South America (but then subsequently abandoned it). Since last hosting the event in 1950 the new rotation system provided an opportune occasion with which the then chairman of CBF, Ricardo Teixeira, worked in getting the support of the recently elected President Lula. In October 2007 Brazil was confirmed the host of the 2014 World Cup in the unusual situation that the cities that would stage the competition were still to be decided. From a shortlist of 18 cities 12 were finally chosen in May 2009 after FIFA conceded to a request to include more host cities than the usual eight or ten (Gaffney 2016).

The preparations for the World Cup were poised to be one of the main symbols of Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff's, government, following



the announcement of an overall programme package in Lula's last year in office. A suite of agreements with state and municipal authorities were signed, detailing works in stadiums, public transport, airports, tourism infrastructure and roads and highways. In order to facilitate and speed up the tendering of contracts, special regulations were enacted to flexibilise both the tendering process and the cap of municipal and state levels of indebtedness. The progress of works was at times obfuscated by the turbulence in the relationship between FIFA and the Brazilian government, leading to the approval of a general set of laws in relation to the organisation of the event. These included the application of guarantees previously signed by the Brazilian government in relation to tax exemptions, the approval of visas and restrictions on ambush marketing, and also to other items that triggered heated debates such as concessionary tickets, licensing for the sale of alcohol at the venues and the activities of street vendors in the venue surroundings. Minor concessions were made, for example, such as half-priced tickets for students and the elderly, and agreeing to allow the traditional baianas to sell Afro-Brazilian food in Salvador.

The immediate run-up to the 2014 World Cup was plagued by delays, cost overruns, fatalities and nation-wide protests. The national government persisted with the discourse of expected benefits accruing from the event, with constant reference to the legacies that would benefit the majority of the population. There was mounting criticism from the press about the escalating budget figures, particularly the costs of stadia and their proposed post-event use. In one case, the predicted final figure for Brasilia's National Stadium was almost double the original estimate, while the future of the stadium post-World Cup remained uncertain, given the absence of a competitive team in the upper tiers of the Brazilian football competitions. A similar situation beckoned for the stadia in Natal, Cuiabá and Manaus. Up to the completion of the stadia, ten deaths of construction workers were registered as progress was rushed to meet deadlines. Half of the venues were unveiled for the Confederations Cup in 2013, the FIFA rehearsal tournament for the World Cup, despite



ongoing works still visible at many of the venues. Up to that point the expected budget for World Cup-related expenditure had already increased to five times the original estimates. One year to go and facing mounting challenges in several planning areas, the organisation of the event found itself caught in the middle of a massive public protest that swept across the country.

In June 2013 public demonstrations in the streets of Brazilian cities, and heavy-handed police response, were widely covered by the international press. What had started as a local protest in São Paulo against an increase in bus fares, which brought some of its main thoroughfares to a halt, quickly triggered demonstrations elsewhere in the country after it was met by a disproportionate response by the police. Thousands poured into the streets of more than 350 cities to express not only their indignation at scenes of police brutality widely circulated in social networks on the internet, but also to release their discontent with corrupt politics and the neglected state of public services. While some expressed their anger with the continuous corruption scandals that marred national politics and Rousseff's (and Lula's) Workers' Party, many manifested their revolt against issues closer to their daily lives: the poor condition of the public health, education and transport systems in Brazil (Vainer 2016).

The emergence of the Workers' Party as the federal government in 2002 coincided with a period of strong economic growth, improvement of social indicators and rising levels of consumption by the poorer sections of Brazilian society that helped them to endure the global financial crisis relatively unscathed (Anderson 2011). The Workers' Party's continuance in power was sealed via a familiar political strategy in Brazil of securing support via shady deals. Exposed during the denouncement of a vote-buying scheme in 2005 that led to the sentencing of some of the party's top ranks, this long-evolving story was also represented on some of the banners on display during the June 2013 protests. Hence, although able to afford more consumer goods, the urban poor have endured an ambiguous existence of formal





Figure 1.2 A protestor in Rio dressed as Batman with a sign that says: 'We want FIFA-standard education and health, schools and hospitals'.

jobs in precarious conditions alongside poor public services. The two agendas thus converged around a related and immediate event: the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2013.

Protesting against the vilified 'FIFA standards' often evoked in official discourses to justify the spending on football venues, Brazilians demanded the same level of quality in the delivery of public services. The ever-rising budget for the event, the finding of irregularities and the suspension of projects served to confirm the general sentiment that only the powerful and rich would benefit. Long-standing campaign groups such as the *Comitês Populares da Copa* ('Popular Committees of the World Cup') highlighted the displacement of thousands of people from low-income communities by works related to the event, with estimates ranging between 170,000 and 250,000 people (Montenegro 2013), and the appropriation of public improvements by private companies as the operation of the venues was privatised (Gaffney 2014). Protest videos posted online went viral. The otherwise football-crazy image that characterised the portrayal of Brazilian fans was nowhere to be seen in the Confederations Cup tournament as chants of 'Não vai ter Copa!' ('There won't be a World Cup') and 'Da Copa eu abro mão, quero meu dinheiro pra saúde e



educação' ('I give up the World Cup, I want my money to go into health and education') echoed in many of the host cities.

While some municipalities backtracked on their decision to raise transport fares, the federal government responded with a public announcement from President Rousseff acknowledging the demands but condemning acts of vandalism. National programmes and new governmental intentions for healthcare, education and transport were announced. If the measures managed to placate widespread demonstrations, other protests smaller in number continued to be carried over in the following months. This was accompanied by a wave of strikes in the professions – especially the police, teachers, road sweepers and public transport operators – for improved pay and working conditions. FIFA continued to refute criticism of its role by stating that it was Brazil's decision to bid for the event and to propose the projects associated with the stadia.

The total cost of expenditure announced by the Brazilian government on the eve of the World Cup in 2014 was \$11.3 billion (the predicted total at the time of writing in October 2015 is now closer to \$15 billion - see Boadle 2014). It was a far cry from initial government statements such as that of the Minister of Sports back in 2007 that it would be the 'World Cup of the private sector', meaning that essential works such as those destined for the venues would be covered by private companies. The final financial breakdown saw almost 83 per cent of the costs attributed to governmental spending or financed by state banks (Folha de São Paulo 2014). It was perhaps no wonder that, with the exception of one or two rather tame decorations celebrating the arrival of yet another World Cup, the vivid signs of popular excitement on the walls and streets of Brazilian cities that might have been expected with the hosting of a World Cup on home soil did not initially materialise in 2014. Gaffney (2016) explores the socio-economic impacts of hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup throughout Brazil, stemming from substantive observations developed during extensive engagement with scholars, activists and media in Brazil, as well as a longitudinal



study that dealt with the urban impacts of the World Cup in all 12 of the host cities. Gaffney found subtle regional variations between host cities, but argues that a condition of permanent crisis, emergency and exception led to a weakening of Brazilian democratic institutions, the deterioration of public spaces and the increased socio-economic polarisation of Brazilian society (see also Vainer 2016).

The Rio 2016 Olympic Games

The 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic project bears some resemblance to the 2014 World Cup, in which big politics and long-time serving sports leaders played a pivotal role in securing the rights to host the event for the first time in a South American country. However, distinct from the World Cup, in which football politics determined the urban agenda of hosting cities, it was the urban politics of Rio de Janeiro city that determined the Olympic project.

Rio de Janeiro had previously unsuccessfully attempted to be host for the 1936 and 1940 Olympic Games, and the separate equestrian competition of the 1956 Olympics. A new bid was prepared for the 2004 Olympic Games, this time as the outcome of an inter-urban policy exchange. The local elections of 1992 brought the conservative candidate Cesar Maia to government, promising to restore urban order and modernise public administration. An important element of Maia's agenda was to elaborate a strategic plan then in vogue in North American and European cities to set a vision for the city in collaboration with other representative groups. The initiative was pursued with the consulting services of policy-makers from Barcelona soon after the organisation of the 1992 Olympic Games. It was out of this relationship that the concept of a Rio Olympic bid was born, as a way to promote urban development and city marketing (Silvestre 2016).

Hastily prepared, the bid attempted to incorporate the general precepts of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games by earmarking



declining urban areas for regeneration and a multi-cluster organisation for the event, using different areas of the city. The event was also expected to turn around the image of a city synonymous with rampant crime and police-led carnage. The bid generated great support from the public while new promises were announced, including a bold social development agenda aimed to improve living conditions by eradicating poverty and upgrading slums. However, the bid failed to impress the IOC inspectors and was not shortlisted in the final voting round. The result frustrated some of the key promoters of the bid, leaving re-elected Mayor Maia and the President of the Brazilian Olympic Committee, Carlos Nuzman, to pick up the pieces and to drastically rearrange the Olympic project.

Working his way through the Olympic system and becoming a member of the IOC, Nuzman translated the message that Brazil had to first prove its credentials by convincing Maia to support a bid to host the 2007 Pan American Games in Rio, the regional multi- sport competition for the Americas. Giving a relatively modest competition the 'Olympic treatment', the original estimates for the event quadrupled as a set of venues were specially built for it, including an Olympic stadium ('João Havelange Olympic Stadium' at Engenho de Dentro), a velodrome, an indoor arena and an aquatics centre. The spatial planning privileged the expanding and wealthy district of Barra da Tijuca with the athlete's village, adding to the local gated-community stock. Criticism, particularly in relation to the inflated costs, was largely held at bay as the experience was justified as an Olympic rehearsal with a new bid quickly announced for the 2016 Games (see Curi *et al.* 2011 for some of the criticisms).

Up to this point the national government had played a supporting and guarantor role. President Lula had confirmed in 2003 the commitment of his government with the preparations for the 2007 Pan American Games and his backing to a short-lived bid for the 2012 Olympics. The contribution of the federal government to the total budget for the 2007 event increased substantially in the run-up period as municipal finances were stretched. The 2016 bid then became more aligned with Brazilian foreign policy discourse, reflecting the country's increasingly prominent role, and having in President Lula an active international 'poster boy'. A team of seasoned consultants, with previous experience in the Sydney 2000 and London 2012 candidatures, helped highlight the acquired organisational expertise, geopolitics, booming national and local economies and branding opportunities in bringing the event for the first time to South America, tailoring the bid to its IOC audience. Rio was then selected in Copenhagen in October 2009 as the 2016 Olympic Games host.

The masterplan for the 2016 Games reinforced the concentration of venues and facilities at Barra da Tijuca, but whereas the Pan American Games brought little contribution to the city's internal system, new transport networks and the regeneration of the port area are part of the expected material legacies of 2016. The new city government of Mayor Eduardo Paes in 2009 reproduced at the local level the political coalition present at the state and national governments, which then facilitated a shared agenda to release municipal, state and federal land for the regeneration of the port area – a project known as 'Porto Maravilha' (Galicia 2015). Despite not featuring any sports facilities itself, the project has been strongly associated as a legacy of the event, with the Olympics providing a deadline for the conclusion of several works that will transform it into a new mixed-use district of corpo-rate towers, museums and residential area. The other highly visible programme associated with the Games is the construction of 250 km of segregated bus rapid transit (BRT) lanes and an extension of the underground railway (metro) system, which together will improve the link between Barra and other parts of the city.

Without proper disclosure of the details of the projects, a range of low-income communities learned of their displacement for Olympic-related works, as municipal staff turned up to mark their houses for demolition (Silvestre and Oliveira 2012). A study by the *Comitê Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro* (Popular

Committee for the World Cup and Olympics in Rio de Janeiro) (2013) estimated that almost 11,000 families had been affected by these works, and were offered temporary rental assistance, financial compensation or relocation to social housing estates in the western fringes of the city. Another element that has substantially affected the lives of the inhabitants of Rio's *favelas* is the security programme of police pacifying units (UPP) launched in 2008. Consisting of a joint effort between the Brazilian Army and the state's elite police squad, it attempts to occupy gang-controlled communities, driving away drug traffickers while constructing police bases inside some favelas. Despite not being directly linked with the mega-event projects, the geographical location of the UPP has been in close proximity to competition sites and tourist areas. Revelations of police abuse, the delayed arrival of public services, gentrification and the continuation of criminal activity have undermined initial positive reception by local residents.

The indignation of part of the population, together with rising living costs, thus helped to fuel the local June 2013 demonstrations, with some estimated 300,000 people taking to the streets of central Rio alone on 20 June (G1 2013). Some concessions were announced by the state governor – for example, backtracking on the decision to demolish the athletics and aquatics centre together with the museum of indigenous people at the Maracanã complex to make way for car parking spaces for the main stadium. The Rio Mayor, Eduardo Paes, announced that evictions were to be temporarily suspended until detailed studies were produced.

The same criticisms levelled at the World Cup for its lavish spending and also for worrying project delays were also directed at Rio's preparation for the Olympics, as a string of negative comments about the readiness of the venues became the focus of press coverage. Two years prior to the opening ceremony, Rio was reported to have just 10 per cent of facilities ready (Jenkins 2014) while the Olympic Park was a desolate site with no erected structures and the sports cluster of



Deodoro was still awaiting tenders for development. Utilising sport for social development has been a notable feature of discourse about sport's social role for many decades, but in recent years it has developed into a specific conception of Sport for Development and Peace, or SDP. The hosting of sports mega-events has 'consistently traded' on the discourse of development, and this is a notable feature of Rio 2016 (Darnell and Millington 2016: 65). There have been some analyses of sport's role in dealing with social problems in Brazil and specifically Rio (Reis and Sousa-Mast 2012). The next section takes the story forward and discusses the way Rio has been made into an Olympic city. It outlines the locations of the 2016 Games and assesses debates over governance and the budget, security issues, transport, the environment and the social impacts of urban regeneration in Rio.

MAKING AN OLYMPIC CITY OUT OF RIO

The preparations for the 2016 Olympic Games are taking place in a particular context for Rio de Janeiro, which overlaps and intersects with other unfolding processes, as Silvestre (2016) notes. The 2016 hosting decision occurred in conjunction with a period of economic growth that in combination with fi and distribution policies stimulated higher consumption levels. Locally, Rio was impacted by the growth of the oil and gas industry, with the installation of new national and foreign companies. A security policy implemented by the state of Rio ended the presence of armed groups in some *favelas* and stimulated a rise in property markets both inside them and in nearby areas. Finally, the city also played a key role in the hosting of the 2014 World Cup, with seven matches including the final played at Maracanã Stadium. Therefore 'it is difficult to fully disentangle the preparations for the 2016 Games from these dimensions' (Silvestre 2016).

Locations


The Olympic events will take place in four clusters around the city -



Maracanã in the north, Deodoro to the west, Copacabana in the south and Barra de Tijuca in the south-west (see Figure 1.3).

The concentration of competitions and the extent of urban interventions vary considerably among them. In the Copacabana zone, where the main tourist district is located, changes are minimal. The outdoor competitions of rowing, beach volleyball and triathlon will use existing and temporary facilities with the city's iconic beaches and mountains as a backdrop. Another zone encompasses the stadia of Maracanã, recently revamped for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the João Havelange Olympic Stadium (known as 'Engenhão'), built for the 2007 Pan American Games, and home to Botafogo FC (see Figure 1.4). The latter has also had to be renovated despite being constructed relatively recently. A novel feature of the Rio Olympics will be the organisation of the opening and closing ceremonies at a different stadium (Maracanã) than where the athletics track and field competitions will be held (Engenhão).

Although the Maracanã, its surrounding sports complex and local area have been the site of struggles and protest since the mid-2000s, it is in the zones of Deodoro and Barra that the most substantial processes of urban change have been taking place (in Chapters 5 and 9 we discuss the increasing role of protest in the planning and realisation of sports mega-events – see Boykoff 2014b; Lenskyj 2000). In Deodoro, to Rio's west, the Olympic facilities will be located within Vila Militar, a planned community of the Brazilian Army. Military facilities will be used for the shooting and equestrian competitions, while training grounds will give way to the hockey and rugby arenas. These facilities are mostly existing or temporary and will not produce major changes in the area. However, other land belonging to the Brazilian Army will be transformed into the 'X-Park', dedicated to extreme sports, which will make use of the BMX tracks and the canoe slalom facility built for the Games. However, post-event plans are still vague and at the preliminary stage, particularly in terms of management and sustainability.



LIST OF VENUES

Olympic 'region' Barra (BR)	Facilities				
	Olympic Park, including: Olympic Tennis Centre; Olympic Hockey Centre; Rio Olympic Velodrome; Handball Arena; Maria Lenk Aquatic Centre; Olympic Training Centre				
	International Broadcasting Centre; Main Media Centre; Media Hotel; Olympic Athletes Village; and Golf Course				
Deodoro (DR)	Olympic Whitewater Stadium; Olympic BMX Centre; Deodoro Arena; Deodoro Modern Pentathlon Park; National Equestrian Centre; Nationa Shooting Centre; Olympic Mountain Bike Park				
Copacabana (CB)	Copacabana Rowing Stadium; Marina da Gloria; Largo Rodrigo de Freitas				
Maracanã (MN)	Maracanā Stadium; João Havelange Olympic Stadium; Maracanāzinho Arena; Sambadromo				

Figure 1.3 Rio 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic venues.

Source: adapted from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venues_of_the_2016_Summer_Olympics_and_ Paralympics (last accessed 25 September 2015).




Figure 1.4 A view from inside the new Maracana Stadium.

As a result of being the main Olympic cluster, Barra is the focus of most of the public policies and private investment. The lifting of certain planning restrictions has allowed the construction of taller Olympic-related housing and hotels. In the post-event scenario, access to the region will be improved with extended metro lines, duplicated highways and new BRT corridors linking Barra to the city centre and the international airport in the north of the city. The Barra zone will be the centrepiece of the Games and 16 competitions will be held there. It is an area of great real estate speculation and where post-event plans have been most clearly defined. The Olympic Park is being developed on the former site of the Formula One racing circuit in a peninsula on the Jacarepaguá lagoon. It will house nine sports arenas, which will stage gymnastics, swimming, cycling, tennis, basketball, handball, fencing, wrestling and taekwondo, as well as the broadcasting and media centres. The spectre of white elephants has



been a constant presence in public discourse and the post- event use of the arenas has been of concern. It is planned that the handball arena and equipment from the aquatics centre will be taken down after the event and reassembled for use at public schools and swimming pools.

The Olympic Park is being developed via a public–private partnership (PPP) in which a consortium of developers is responsible for the delivery of part of the venues and related infrastructure. After the event, 75 per cent of the land will be transferred to developers to make way for private housing, offices, hotels and shopping malls. The remaining 25 per cent will provide facilities for an Olympic Training Centre run by the Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) for the use of elite athletes. It is still unclear, however, how the centre will be funded and managed, and, given the underuse and poor maintenance of the venues built for the 2007 Pan American Games, doubts remain about its future.

The Athletes' Village is being developed next to the Olympic Park by the private sector, with a financial package provided by the state Federal Savings Bank. The project, a co-production by Brazilian construction companies Carvalho Hosken and Odebrecht, envisions the construction of 31 tower blocks of 17 stories each, totalling 3,604 units, accommodating 18,000 athletes and team members. After the Games the site will become a complex of gated communities called *Ilha Pura* ('Pure Island'), currently promoted as a new 'neighbourhood committed with good taste, luxury and sophistication' (Ilha Pura 2015). The quotation below from Carlos Carvalho is indicative of the politics of urban development related to the Olympics in Rio, and arguably elsewhere:

We think that if the standards were lowered, we would be taking away from what the city – the new city – could represent on the global scene as a city of the elite, of good taste. Ilha Pura could not scratch this destiny that has been given to the region. For this reason, it needed to be noble housing, not housing for the poor.

(Quoted in Watts 2015)



Athletes will also be able to make use of training grounds at the adjacent Athlete's Park and a private beach in a cordoned-off area of Barra beach. It remains to be seen what the demand is for Ilha Pura.

Governance and budget

Despite declarations of openness and transparency, the costs of staging an Olympic Games remain susceptible to different interpretations and more often than not several alterations. Figures produced as part of an Olympic candidature (bid) book are often rendered in USD, GBP or euros, and then when converted a few years later into other currencies – in the case of Rio 2016, Brazilian reais (BRL or R\$) – the actual amounts can look discrepant. Rio's book for the Games submitted in 2008 estimated that it would cost a total of \$14.42 billion, divided between the Organizing Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (OCOG) budget for staging the Games (BRL4.4 billion or \$2.82 billion) and a non-OCOG budget for delivering the related infrastructure and services (BRL18.11 billion or \$11.6 billion). This was the highest budget of all candidate cities in 2009, but promotional material stressed Brazil's positioning during the global financial crisis as a 'small island in an ocean of negative economic results' (Ministério do Esporte 2009: 100; cited in Silvestre 2016). According to the frequently asked questions section of the Rio 2016 website in July 2015, the OCOG was relying on a budget of BRL5.6 billion. The website continued: 'The organizing Committee is not responsible for any works. The cost of venue and infrastructure works, adding up to R\$ 23.2 billion, will be managed by the three government levels' – that is federal, state and municipal.¹

While the OCOG intends to have its budget funded by private organisations, the three levels of Brazilian government have assured the IOC that they will cover any funding needed by the Organizing Committee, as is now expected of any Olympic host nation. Also in July 2015, according to journalist Jonathan Watts (2015), the total 'budget of 38.2bn reais (£7.9bn) is slightly lower than that of London and well



below that of Beijing'.

Writing one year prior to the start of the Games, therefore, the costs appear to have increased by 34 per cent of the original budget.²

Initially it was proposed to create a body along the lines of the Olympic Delivery Authority, responsible for the London 2012 Games (see the next chapter). The Olympic Public Authority ('APO' in Portuguese) would be a public consortium formed by the federal, state and municipal governments with centralised powers to deliver the infrastructure and services necessary for the organisation of the event (the non-OCOG attributes). However, as Silvestre (2016) noted:

political wrestling over responsibilities and legal obstacles to ensure complete powers weakened the remit of APO. While bureaucratic processes delayed the approval of the institution at the federal level, the municipality of Rio de Janeiro decided to create its own delivery authority, the Municipal Olympic Company (EOM).

Hence while both bodies are nominally credited with delivering the Games, in practice EOM operates as the main delivery body, while APO has the role of reporting on the federal government activities and the consolidated budget.

In January 2014, APO published the Rio 2016 Games 'Matrix of Responsibilities'. This document details the contribution of each level of government – city, state and federal – to organising and holding the event, listing projects as well as responsibilities for implementing and supplying resources. The information is organised by the clustering of construction works and services related to the Olympic regions: Barra da Tijuca (BR), Deodoro (DR), Maracanã (MN) and Copacabana (CB). Described as a 'living document' to be continually reviewed and updated, the Matrix would be published biannually, with the aim of ensuring transparency and accountability.³

Six months after the first version was released, the APO announced in the second version that the Matrix was well in advance and 71 per cent of the total of 52 projects undertaken for the Games had already had



their contracts signed, and construction work was underway. According to the update:

private investments continue to lead the financing of projects, corresponding to R\$ 4.2 billion (65 per cent) of the total, with the rest of the resources coming from the public sector. 'Public organisations are committed to the staging of a lean and efficient Olympics' stated the APO president.⁴

The list of responsibilities for 'the organisation and realisation' of Rio 2016 in each of the four Olympic regions is outlined in Figure 1.5. As can be seen by the number of projects and size of the anticipated

Olympic 'region'	Number of projects	Types of project	Resources and execution	Estimated cost*
Barra (BR)	25	Olympic Park; Tennis Centre; Velodrome; Handball Arena; Aquatic Centre	Federal government and city government	R\$5,537.9m
		International Broadcasting Centre; Main Media Centre; Media Hotel; Athletes Village; Golf Course	City government and private; private	
Deodoro (DR) 15		Canoe Slalom Stadium; BMX Centre; Fencing Arena; Field Hockey Centre; Mountain Bike; Pentathlon; Rugby; Equestrian; Sports Shooting Centre	Federal government and city government	R\$835.8m
Copacabana (CB)	4	Rowing Stadium; adaptation of marina	Federal, state and city	R\$45.0m
Maracanã (MN)	8	Adaptation of: Sambadromo, Olympic Stadium and Maracanãzinho Arena	Federal, state, city and private	R\$93.0m
Totals	52			R\$6,511.7m

Figure 1.5 Rio 2016: projects, responsibilities and estimated costs.

Source: adapted from www.brasil2016.gov.br/en/news/olympic-public-authority-apo-publishes-updateresponsibility-matrix (last accessed 28 July 2015).

Note

*At July 2014; some costs still to be determined.

spend, Barra is where most of the building is taking place. Also as can be seen, the total cost of over BRL6.5 billion is considerably more than the figure stated on the Rio 2016 website mentioned earlier. This is just one of the reasons why sceptics raise critical questions about the financing of sports mega-events, including Rio 2016.

Olympic promoters respond to criticism in several ways. For example, as if to head off concerns about delays in completing the projects at Barra, in July 2015 the Rio municipal government released an updated version of its video, mixing footage of construction work at 'Barra Olympic Park' with computer-generated images of how the site would look at Games time.⁵ Olympic promoters also refute criticisms of the rising Olympic budget by citing statistics of the participation of the private sector. Accordingly, as mentioned earlier, over 60 per cent of the costs were expected to be covered by private funding. These are largely represented by the construction of the Olympic Village, the new golf course and the PPPs behind the construction of the Olympic Park and the regeneration programme of the port area.

As Silvestre (2016) notes, however, 'despite being touted as enterprises "where there is not a single cent from the public purse" ... interest from developers was only possible with the alteration of planning restrictions and the transfer of land ownership'. The city previously owned the Formula One circuit on which the Barra Olympic Park is being constructed and 75 per cent of that will be transferred to private companies for commercial exploitation, including private housing, hotels and shopping malls. The compensation and relocation of the hundreds of families living next to the Park in Vila Autódromo and the construction of a new racing track at a protected greenfield site in Deodoro are considered as 'existing costs' resulting from the destruction of the Jacarepaguá circuit. However, the costs of evictions are not included in the Olympic budget and stand as reminders of the need for close scrutiny and inclusion of both the social and environmental costs of 'breaking new ground' in Rio (and anywhere else that hosts an Olympic Games).



Security and safety

Even though the 2007 Pan American Games held in Rio were considered to be tightly controlled (Curi *et al.* 2011), in light of continuing IOC evaluations of Rio's security and safety as problematic, an extensive security programme was introduced which, despite not being designed specifically in response to the hosting of mega-events, has become closely implicated with them (Freeman 2014). Starting in December 2008 the UPP programme has sought to take territorial control of *favelas* from organised criminal groups with the installation of police stations and implementing community policing (Alves and Evanson 2011). Prior announcement of an intervention seeks to influence drug gangs to leave the area, thus avoiding armed conflicts with the arrival of the elite police forces. By the summer of 2015 some 40 *favelas* had been targeted and a reduction of violent crimes occurred in the first four years of the programme (see Silvestre 2016; Freeman 2014).

However, as Cano *et al.* (2012) have noted, the selection of *favelas* was not supported by indicators such as crime statistics. Rather, it was highly suggestive of forming a 'security belt' around the Maracanã Stadium and near other Olympic and tourists sites, thus 'ignoring the most violent areas of the metropolitan region, which are the Baixada Fluminense and the North End of Rio' (Cano *et al.* 2012: 194). Other research confirms that the hosting of the World Cup and the Olympics were determinants in guiding decisions over the expansion of UPP operations (see Silvestre 2016). Recent escalating violence and police abuse at some of the 'pacified *favelas'* has made residents doubtful of the longevity of the programme after the event (Puff 2014).

Transport

Having Barra de Tijuca as the main stage of the Games suggested that improved access to the area and transportation was another theme in which the city trailed behind other bids. The 2016 bid promised the



creation of a 'High Performance Transport Ring' and introduced the concept of the BRT system as a feasible way to connect the four Olympic clusters and deliver a new transport network in time for the event (Rio 2016 OCOG 2009). Barra will act as the nodal point of the three segregated bus corridors tied to the Olympic deadline. Totalling 117 km, they consist of the *Transoeste* corridor linking Barra to the West End and a new metro terminal; the *Transcarioca* line, which cuts through the North End towards the international airport; and the *Transolimpica*, linking the Olympic Park with Deodoro.

Critics meanwhile point to the marginalisation of the metro and rail expansion and that the system presents only temporary results as it can be flooded quickly. The experience of the *Transoeste* and *Transcarioca* corridors already in operation seem to corroborate the latter argument. Press coverage of the systems inaugurated in 2012 and 2014, respectively, document overcrowding and safety worries as routine occurrences occurrences (Silvestre 2016).

The environment

Perhaps the greatest gamble of Rio's Olympic-dependent programme of interventions has been the clean-up of the waters of Guanabara Bay in order to provide the best conditions for the sailing competitions. Water pollution has grown exponentially since the 1960s due to industrial activity and the discharge of raw sewage from the 16 municipalities of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region on the shores of the bay. The Olympic bid set out the objective to treat 80 per cent of the sewage by 2016, but recent figures suggest a more modest outcome is likely.

A state-led sanitation plan has been in place since 1995, but it has been marred by the lack of coordination among stakeholders and funding discontinuities, and by 2007 it presented a level of 12 per cent of treated sewage (Rio 2016 OCOG 2014; Neves 2015). Thus the hosting of the Games presented the opportunity to leverage funding and efforts to accelerate the sanitation policy and improve



environmental conditions for the Rio population of 8.5 million people. Despite showing progress leading to the treatment of 50 per cent of sewage in 2013 (Rio 2016 OCOG 2014), in the selection of public policies for the 'Legacy Plan' a modest set of programmes totalling R\$124.67 million was included (Silvestre 2016). These related to sewerage works in the central Rio area, river barriers and collecting barges. The latter two are mitigation efforts to avoid garbage floating near the competition areas, and post-event targets remain uncertain (Brooks and Barchfield 2015).

Reviewed targets also compromised the reforestation pledge to compensate for carbon emissions resulting from works for the Games. After expanding the original plan of planting 24 million trees by a further ten million, a readjusted figure of merely 8.1 million was announced (Silvestre 2016). The figure contrasts with the deforestation of 270 m2 of Atlantic rainforest for the construction of the *Transolímpica* corridor and the duplication of the *Joá* elevated expressway (Silvestre 2016).

Finally, but by no means least, the construction of the Olympic golf course has been identified as 'emblematic of the ways in which Rio's preparations for the 2016 Games are deeply problematic' and responsible for the loss of natural environment (Hodges 2014). The sport, alongside rugby, was included in the Summer Games by the IOC after candidate cities for 2016 had submitted their final bids. The Rio de Janeiro Olympic golf course is located on the shores of the Marapendi Lagoon in Barra, in an area previously protected as a site of natural beauty and 'home to rare butterflies pines and other species not found anywhere else in the world' (Watts 2015). Alleging financial and logistics reasons for not using the two existing private golf clubs, the municipality partnered with a private developer owning land north of the preservation area to build a course from scratch (Silvestre 2016). According to the terms of the PPP, the developer is responsible for the construction and maintenance costs of the venue. In return the municipality reviewed planning restrictions to allow taller luxury



buildings to be built on the private land. After the event the venue will be operated as a public golf course for a period of 20 years before returning to the private owner (Silvestre 2016). A year before the Games, golf course activists, in the shape of Rio's Occupy Golf movement, continued to contest these decisions.

The social impacts and consequences of Olympic-related urban regeneration

Historical episodes of profound urban transformation in Rio have invariably produced substantial costs to the city's poor (Meade 1997; McCann 2014; Perlman 2010). Between 1902 and 1906 Mayor Francisco Pereira Passos is credited with the wholesale transformation of Rio's central area, a feat likened to that of Baron Haussmann in Paris (Benchimol 1990). During the Pereira Passos reforms, tenement houses were targeted, leading to the displacement of the (poorest) residents to nearby hills and substandard housing beside the railway tracks. Another period of intense displacement took place in the 1960s during Rio Governor Carlos Lacerda's term of office. His pledge for transforming the urban space also translated into the wholesale removal of *favelas* in the South End of the city, with families relocated to social housing projects such as Cidade de Deus in the then distant region of Barra (Silvestre 2016). This historical legacy has been repeated with the hosting of the 2016 Games contributing to the displacement of thousands of residents from favelas and low-income neighbourhoods.

The social impacts associated with the hosting of major events are extensive and well documented (Ritchie and Hall 1999; Lenskyj 2002, 2008; Silvestre 2008; Minnaert 2012; Hayes and Horne 2011), with the displacement of residents representing the most dramatic impact (Olds 1998; COHRE 2007; Porter *et al.* 2009; Rolnik 2009). The preparations for the Rio 2016 Games have accumulated a problematic track record in this respect, as substantial parts of, and in some cases entire, *favelas* have been removed to make way for the works



associated with the Games. Faulhaber and Azevedo (2015) examined all the official requests for expropriation since Mayor Paes took office in 2009 and discovered a total of 20,229 households had been affected. The reasons for displacement included works for the Olympic Park, the BRT corridors, works carried out by the secretariat of housing and other secretariats, and those considered 'at risk'. The figure places Eduardo Paes' mandate as responsible for the largest number of evictions in Rio ever, ahead of even Lacerda and Passos.

The case of removal is even more dramatic when the experience of those affected is exposed. Silvestre and Oliveira (2012) documented the initial cases of displacement caused by works for the Transoeste BRT along Americas Avenida in the Barra Region, which became standard practice for other removals. After an area was declared for 'public utility' and a list of properties was published, city officials



Figure 1.6 SMH sprayed on a house in Morro Providencia.

promptly visited a *favela* to inform residents of their eviction and to mark houses with painted signs (see Figure 1.6). 'SMH' – the initials of the housing department of Rio de Janeiro – was painted onto the walls of homes in *favelas* marked for demolition as 'a sort of officially sanctioned graffiti' (Bowater 2015).

Residents are oriented to either accept financial compensation, which only takes the built structure into account, or to be relocated to housing projects mostly situated in the city's western edge – otherwise they risk being left empty-handed. Compensation is often insufficient to acquire a similar dwelling, even at local *favelas*, and the move to distant social housing brings financial and social hardship due to added commuting costs and the abrupt rupture of the social fabric. Those who accept the municipality's offers have their houses immediately cleared, leaving remaining residents to live among rubble and litter. Delay to compensate or relocate has exposed families to vulnerable situations, having to live with family and friends or being rendered homeless (Silvestre and Oliveira 2012).



Figure 1.7 Vila Autódromo 'Welcome to the community' sign.

39

In the first edition of this book we discussed the case of the *favela* of Vila Autódromo (Horne and Whannel 2012: 138–145) in some detail. Since 2010 one of us (JH) has visited Vila Autódromo on several occasions and interviewed residents and members of the residents' association. Official 'Rio 2016' discourse claims that the removal of the *favela* of Vila Autódromo is the only case directly linked with the Games (Anon 2012; Rio 2016 OCOG 2014). It is argued that



Figure 1.8 A banner in the residents association proclaiming the slogans 'Long live Vila Autódromo', 'Rio without forced removals', and 'Our community is not for sale!'

infrastructure-induced displacement, such as the BRT corridors, are the result of policies that would be carried out regardless of hosting the event (Rio 2016 OCOG 2014). Vila Autódromo is located on the edge of the former Jacarepaguá Formula One circuit, initially settled by fishermen in the 1960s and expanded with the arrival of the workforce employed for the construction of the same circuit and nearby Riocentro convention centre in the following decade (see Figure 1.7).

Since the early 1990s the *favela* has been subject to continuous threats of removal, despite having their right to stay recognised by the state of Rio, the landowner of the circuit, in the 1990s. Ownership was transferred to the municipality in 1998 and since then the threats intensified, first with the hosting of the Pan American Games and finally with the Olympic award. Since 2010 residents have fought against removal (see Figure 1.8).

The singular case of Vila Autódromo among other *favelas* prompted the assistance of local architecture and planning schools to help the





Figure 1.9 Celebration party for the award given to the alternative plan for Vila Autódromo.

residents' association to develop a bottom-up alternative proposal for the site's redevelopment (AMPVA 2012). In demonstrating that the upgrading of the *favela* did not compromise the work for the Olympic Park, and that it would cost less than the compensation and relocation to another site, the plan won the Deutsche Bank Urban Age Award in 2013 (Tanaka 2014; see Figure 1.9).

However, the municipality was adamant that it would clear the site, which was now included in the PPP contract for the development of the Olympic Park. Different reasons – ranging from exposure to natural hazards, environmental damage, event security, the construction of the Main Press Centre (MPC), the BRT corridor and the duplication of access roads – were alleged at different times without the details and plans being fully disclosing, despite public requests (Silvestre 2016).





Figure 1.10 The demolition of Vila Autódromo.

In contrast to the options offered for other displaced residents, relocation was to a housing project only 1.5 km away. However, the six-year-long intimidation process and the resulting psychological stress, common in other *favelas* subjected to similar removals and evictions, led most of the residents of Vila Autódromo to accept the deal, leaving only a small group to challenge the municipality's plan (see Figure 1.10). In June 2015 violent clashes with the police gained world-wide attention with the remaining vergonhoso recorde olímpico antes mesmo da abertura dos Jogos' ('We have a shameful Olympic record even before the opening of the Games').⁶ Three months later, in October 2015, further 'lightning evictions' took place and more homes at Vila Autódromo were demolished, leaving fewer than 100 families where there used to be 600.⁷



CONCLUSION

The year 2014 marked several anniversaries for Brazil. It was 50 years since a military coup d'état brought about a 21-year period of dictatorship, and 29 years since its replacement and re-democratisation. During this time, and before, sport has remained firmly connected to politics in Brazil. When Lula became President in 2002 he inherited several problems from his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Public debt had doubled, the current account deficit was twice the average for South America, interest rates were over 20 per cent and the Brazilian currency was depreciating rapidly (Anderson 2011). While Lula introduced policies that materially impacted on the poorer sections of society, such as the 'Bolsa Familia', which involves a monthly cash transfer to poor mothers against proof that they were sending their children to school and getting regular health checks, he also became aware of the potential value of aligning with those interested in hosting sports mega-events.

What was initially thought of as a timely opportunity for domestic and foreign politics, as well as for personal benefit for those at the heart of the project, the 2014 FIFA World Cup turned into an anathema. Anger directed towards FIFA and their expected record profit from the mega-event affected the problematic reputation of the world governing body of football even more, while it continued to struggle with several corruption scandals. International press coverage highlighted many problems with the preparations for the event and the contrasts between the lavish stadiums and precarious social conditions of many Brazilians. However, the forecasts of a doomed event did not materialise, at least not from where it was expected. The press, FIFA, athletes and fans alike positively reviewed the general running of the event. Contrary to the scenes of the previous year, protests did not generate the same amount of support and were fewer and smaller, if still suppressed by a strong police presence. It was rather on the pitch that Brazilian hopes for some positive vision were



crushed, including the biggest defeat in the history of the *seleção*, 7–1 by the eventual World Cup winners, Germany. As Alex Bellos (2014: 388–389) had noted before the competition:

The parallels with 1950 are strong. Brazil has more swagger than it did but it remains an insecure country, desperate to show the world that it is a serious, competent and modern nation. Its own self image could again depend on a single goal.

Or, we might add with the benefit of hindsight, maybe 7!

In 2016, however, the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games will take place in Rio, and so a second opportunity awaits Brazilian hosts to demonstrate to the world their capacity to stage the biggest multi-sport mega-event. As we have suggested, the global impacts on the local via urban politics (Sanchez et al. 2014) and globalisation brings with it an amplification of existing contradictions in society; in contemporary Rio this is especially the case (Barbassa 2015). Writing less than a year before the start of the Games, there are two contrasting views of progress towards the next Summer Olympics that also serve to highlight the contradictions of Rio 2016. Mayor Paes' election has rescued dreams of emulating Barcelona in the global South by associating mobility and urban regeneration projects with the Olympics. The mega-event puts particular emphasis on a wealthy area of the city, which despite representing the possibility of a more compact Games, has marginalised the rest of the city. Barra de Tijuca will strengthen its location as an urban zone with improved public transport access and new housing for the middle classes. However, not only will parts of the city be profoundly transformed, but Paes will also be responsible for having displaced more residents than former Mayor Passos and the Lacerda government of the dictatorship era. As in previous grand projects, the majority of the population living in the north and west zones, along with the Baixada, will continue to be overlooked and endure long commutes in crowded trains and buses.

The Brazilian Ministry of Sport announced in July 2015 that the Brazilian team campaign at the Pan American Games in Toronto



succeeded in winning 41 gold medals and third place in the final medal table. The cost, an estimated BRL3.1 billion in public money between 2012 and June 2015, was half the investment for the Olympic cycle before the London Games. In the same month, a gathering in front of Rio's City Hall was being planned for 5 August 2015, one year before the opening of the Olympics in 2016, on the theme of 'Olimpíada Para Quem' ('Olympics for Whom?'). According to the organisers, the plenary was to protest against the neglect, disrespect and violations of human rights promoted by the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, with the connivance of the IOC. Chega de violações! ('No more violations!') was one of the slogans of the organisers. Concerned that 'the city is sold as a luxury commodity for privileged groups', the event would mark the launch of a public campaign denouncing removals, human rights violations, repression of the work of street vendors, closing of public sport facilities, militarisation of the city, police violence, privatisation and public-private partnership agreements involving public facilities, street sweepers and the dismissal of teachers, treating sport as a business that favours large companies and contractors and real estate, and finally, the lack of transparency and participation. Capturing this mood, some academics have described the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics as 'Rio's ruinous mega-events' (Braathen *et al.* 2015).

NOTES

- 1. www.rio2016.com/en/faq/1784 (last accessed 31 July 2015).
- 2. www.rio2016.com/en/news/news/olympic-public-authoritypublishes-rio-2016-games- matrix-of-responsibilities (last accessed 8 August 2015).
- www.rio2016.com/en/news/news/olympic-public-authoritypublishes-rio-2016-games- matrix-of-responsibilities (last accessed 28 July 2015).
- www.brasil2016.gov.br/en/news/olympic-public-authorityapo-publishes-update- responsibility-matrix (last accessed 28 July 2015).



- 5. www.apo.gov.br/index.php/new-video-shows-constructionprogress-at-barra-olympic- park (last accessed 28 July 2015).
- http://blogdomariomagalhaes.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2015/07/ 28/editora-rebate-eduardo-paes-que-chamou-de-asneira-livrosobre-remocoes (last accessed 28 July 2015).
- www.rioonwatch.org/?p=24921 (last accessed 24 October 2015).

FURTHER READING

Barbassa, J. (2015) *Dancing with the Devil in the City of God: Rio de Janeiro on the Brink*, New York: Touchstone.

Braathen, E., Mascarenas, G. and Sorboe, C. (2015) 'Rio's ruinous mega-events', in

P. Bond and A. Garcia (eds) *BRICS: An Anti-capitalist Critique*, London: Pluto, pp. 186–199.

Broudehoux, A.-M. (2016) 'Mega-events, urban image construction and the politics of exclusion', in R. Gruneau and J. Horne (eds) *Mega-Events and Globalization: Capital and Spectacle in a Changing World Order*, London: Routledge, pp. 113–130. fbmdg) *and Globalization: Capital and Spectacle in a Changing World Order*, London: Routledge, pp. 113–130.








The History and Development of the Paralympic Games

2: The history and development of the Paralympic Games



The following is excerpted from *The Paralympic Games Explained, 2nd edition* by Ian Brittain. ©2017 Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

To purchase a copy, click here

Chapter Aims

- To outline the history and development of the Summer and Winter Paralympic Games.
- To explain the development and various meanings of the term 'Paralympic'.
- To outline the various impairment groupings that make up the Paralympic Movement.

Before proceeding with this chapter it is important to point out that the academic study of the history of the Paralympic Games is still in its infancy, especially compared to the historical study of events such as the Olympic Games. It is only in the last ten years that any serious attempts have been made to document their history and development. Also, unlike the Olympic Games, there is still no single archival or library source that adequately documents the subject. This problem has been further compounded by the fact that record keeping for these Games, especially prior to 1988, was quite basic, with much material connected to these early Games either simply lost, thrown out or in the case of the very first Paralympic Games in Rome in 1960, destroyed in a fire. Many of the reasons for this lack of record keeping will become clear throughout the text, but the main reasons appear to be that no one involved in these early Games believed that the Paralympic Games would ever reach a size or importance that would make them worthy of academic historical documentation and study and that the Games were organised on shoe-string budgets by volunteers who had little or no time to ensure the Games were adequately documented (Brittain et al., 2013). The area in which this has had the greatest impact has been in arriving at accurate figures for athlete participation numbers at the early Games. Even where 'full' results are available, often in the case of team events and relays, only the country name is given rather than the names of the individual team members, making it impossible to come up with accurate figures for participating athletes either by country or gender. There is, however,



now general agreement regarding the number of participating nations at each

Games and the facts and figures that appear in this chapter are the result of over ten years of research in this area by the author.

Disability sport prior to the 1940s

Sainsbury (1998) cites several examples of sports and leisure clubs for the disabled in the early part of the twentieth century, including the British Society of One-Armed Golfers (1932) and the 'Disabled Drivers' Motor Club (1922). Indeed the first international organisation responsible for a particular impairment group and its involvement in sport – Comité International des Sports des Sourds (CISS) – was set up by a deaf Frenchman, E. Rubens- Alcais, in 1924 with the support of six national sports federations for the deaf. In August 1924 the first International Silent Games was held in Paris with athletes from nine countries in attendance (DePauw and Gavron, 2005). Now called the Deaflympics there are summer and winter versions which occur in the year following their Olympic and Paralympic counterparts.

The impact of World War II on disability sport

Prior to World War II, the vast majority of those with spinal cord injuries died within three years following their injury (Legg *et al.*, 2002). Indeed, Ludwig Guttmann, the universally accepted founder of the modern day Paralympic movement, whilst a doctor in 1930s Germany encountered on a ward round a coal miner with a broken back. Guttmann was shocked to learn from the consultant that such cases were a waste of time as he would be dead within two weeks (Craven, 2006). This was usually from sepsis of the blood or kidney failure or both. However, after World War II sulfa drugs made spinal cord injury survivable (Brandmeyer and McBee, 1986). The other major issue for individuals with spinal injuries was the major depression caused by societal attitudes to them, which, at the time, automatically



assigned them to the scrapheap of life as useless and worthless individuals.

Ludwig Guttmann was a German-Jewish neurologist who fled Nazi Germany with his family in 1939 and eventually settled in Oxford where he found work at Oxford University. In September 1943 the British Government commissioned Guttmann as the Director of the National Spinal Injuries Unit at the Ministry of Pensions Hospital, Stoke Mandeville, Aylesbury (Lomi *et al.*, 2004). This was mainly to take care of the numerous soldiers and civilians suffering from spinal injuries as a result of the war. Guttmann accepted under the condition that he would be totally independent and that he could apply his philosophy as far as the whole approach to the treatment of those patients was concerned, although many of his colleagues were apparently surprised by his enthusiasm for what they perceived as an utterly daunting task. Apparently, they could not understand how Guttmann could leave Oxford University to be 'engulfed in the hopeless and depressing task of looking after traumatic spinal paraplegics' (Goodman, 1986). Prior to World War II there is little evidence of organised efforts to develop or promote sport for individuals with disabling conditions, especially those with spinal injuries who were considered to have no hope of surviving their injuries. Following the war, however, medical authorities were prompted to re-evaluate traditional methods of rehabilitation which were not satisfactorily responding to the medical and psychological needs of the large number of soldiers disabled in combat (Steadward, 1992). According to McCann (1996), Guttmann recognised the physiological and psychological values of sport in the rehabilitation of paraplegic hospital inpatients and so it was that sport was introduced as part of the total rehabilitation programme for patients in the spinal unit. The aim was not only to give hope and a sense of self-worth to the patients, but to change the attitudes of society towards the spinally injured by demonstrating to them that they could not only continue to be useful members of society, but could take part in activities and complete tasks most of the non-disabled society would struggle with (Anderson, 2003).



According to Guttmann (1952) they started modestly and cautiously with darts, snooker, punch-ball and skittles. Sometime later, apparently after Dr Guttmann and his remedial gymnast, Quartermaster 'Q' Hill had 'waged furious battle' in an empty ward to test it, the sport of wheelchair polo was introduced. This was perceived a short time later, however, as too rough for all concerned and was replaced by wheelchair netball (Scruton, 1964). This later became what we now know as wheelchair basketball. The next sport to be introduced into the programme at Stoke Mandeville was to play a key role in all areas of Dr Guttmann's rehabilitation plans. That sport was archery. According to Guttmann archery was of immense value in strengthening, in a very natural way, just those muscles of the upper limbs, shoulders and trunk, on which the paraplegic's well-balanced, upright position depends (Guttmann, 1952). However, it was far more than just that. It was one of the very few sports that, once proficient, paraplegics could compete on equal terms with their non-disabled counterparts. This led to visits of teams from Stoke Mandeville to a number of non-disabled archery clubs in later years, which were very helpful in breaking down the barriers between the public and the paraplegics. It also meant that once discharged from hospital the paraplegic had an access to society through their local archery club (Guttmann, 1952). According to Guttmann these experiments were the beginning of a systematic development of competitive sport for the paralysed as an essential part of their medical rehabilitation and social re-integration in the community of a country like Great Britain where sport in one form or another plays such an essential part in the life of so many people (Guttmann, 1976).

An inauspicious beginning to a worldwide phenomenon

For an event that would later go on to become the largest ever sporting event for people with disabilities and the second largest multi-sport event on the planet after the Olympic Games, the event now known globally as the



Paralympic Games had a rather inauspicious beginning. It began life as an archery demonstration between two teams of paraplegics from the Ministry of Pensions Hospital at Stoke Mandeville and the Star and Garter Home for Injured War Veterans at Richmond in Surrey. It was held in conjunction with the presentation of a specially adapted bus to the patients of Stoke Mandeville by the British Legion and London Transport. Perhaps more auspicious was the date chosen for the handover of the bus and the archery demonstration, Thursday, 29 July 1948, the exact same day as the opening ceremony for the Games of the Fourteenth Olympiad at Wembley in London less than thirty-five miles away. It is difficult to assess whether this initial link to the Olympic Games was a deliberate one, or just coincidence, but it was a link that Guttmann himself would cultivate very overtly over the following years and decades. Guttmann later stated that the event was an experiment as a public performance, but also a demonstration to society that sport was not just the domain of the non-disabled (Guttmann, 1952). The aim of the bus was not only to allow patients to travel around the country to various activities and events, but also to allow them to get back out into the community and enter more into the life of the town. The bus would also be used to take competitors to many more archery competitions over the coming years against teams of both disabled and non-disabled archers.

Dr Guttmann's 'Grand Festival of Paraplegic Sport', as the second incarnation of the Games were described, were held on Wednesday, 27 July 1949. Building upon much hard work done by Dr Guttmann, his staff and the impact of various Stoke Mandeville patients moving to other spinal units around the country and taking their new found enthusiasm for sport with them the number of spinal units entered rose to six (The Cord, 1949). A grand total of thirty-seven individuals took part in these Games and with the exception of the archers from the Polish Hospital at Penley every competitor had, at some time, been a patient of Dr Guttmann. In addition to a repeat of the previous year's archery competition, 'net-ball' was added to the programme for these Games. This was a kind of hybrid of netball and basketball played in



Date	Teams	Competitors	Sports	New sport
Thurs 29 July 1948	2*	16	1	Archery
Weds 29 July 1949	6*	37	2	'Netball'
Weds 27 July 1950	10*	61	3	Javelin
Sat 28 July 1951	11*	126	4	Snooker
Sat 26 July, 1952	2	130	5	Table tennis
Sat 8 August 1953	6	200	6	Swimming
Sat 31 July 1954	14	250	7	Dartchery
Fri and Sat 29– 30 July 1955	18	280	8	Fencing, basketball replaced netball
Fri and Sat 27–28 July 1956	18	300	8	-
Fri and Sat 26–27 July 1957	24	360	9	Shot putt
Thurs–Sat 24–26 July 1958	21	350	10	Throwing the club
Thurs–Sat 23–25 July 1959	20	360	11	Pentathlon

History of the Paralympic Games 11

* Number of Spinal Units participating

wheelchairs and using netball posts for goals.

The next three years saw competitor numbers at the Games continue to grow as more and more spinal units from around the country began to enter teams. Guttmann, however, had far grander plans and continued with the hope that he could move the Games on to an international footing. One local paper claimed this had moved a step closer in 1951 with representation of competitors with a variety of nationalities including a Frenchman, an Australian, some Poles and a Southern Rhodesian. With the exception of the Poles, who were residents of the Polish hospital at Penley, the others were all individual patients resident at British Spinal Units. The first step to Guttmann's dream was to occur the very next year, 1952, when a team of four paraplegics from the Military Rehabilitation Centre,



Aardenburg, near Doorn in the Netherlands became the first truly international competitors at the Games. Over the next four years the international nature of the Games rose dramatically so that in 1956 there were eighteen nations represented at the Games and a total of twenty-one different nations had competed since 1952 (Scruton, 1956).

Spreading the word

It might appear hard to understand how an event that started life with just sixteen wheelchair archers in 1948 as a demonstration to the public that competitive sport is not the prerogative of the non-disabled could, just ten years later, find itself with several dozen international teams in attendance. In fact the Games grew to such an extent that despite several extensions to the accommodation it became necessary to introduce a national Stoke Mandeville Games from 1958 onwards from which a British team would be selected to take part in the international Games a month or so later (Scruton, 1957). There appear to be five possible mechanisms that played key roles in spreading the word regarding the Stoke Mandeville Games to various corners of the globe:

1. In the early years much of the driving force for the growth appears to have been down to former patients of Dr Guttmann's who were transferred to other spinal units and took what they had learnt, and

their enthusiasm for it, with them. Many of them returned year after year to take part in the Games. To a slightly lesser extent this is also true of the doctors and surgeons from all over the world who visited Stoke Mandeville to train under Dr Guttmann and then returned home and incorporated sport into their treatment programmes, such as Dr Ralph Spira from Israel (Brittain & Hutzler, 2009).

2. In 1947 the very first edition of *The Cord* was published. This contained articles and advice of benefit to paraplegics



everywhere and often gave space to reports on the sporting events at the hospital. Because practical information of assistance to paraplegics was in short supply copies of this journal often got sent abroad to individuals and organisations carrying news of the Games and Dr Guttmann's rehabilitation methods far and wide. The journal continued to be published up to 1983.

- 3. Dr Guttmann himself was a major player in spreading the word about the Games. He would often travel abroad to conferences, to give lectures and even to give evidence in court cases and would take every opportunity to tell people about the Games and his use of sport as a rehabilitative tool. He would often challenge particular key individuals in other countries to bring a team to the Games the following year as was the case with Sir George Bedbrooke at the Royal Perth Hospital on a visit in 1956. Australia sent their first team to Stoke Mandeville the following year (Lockwood and Lockwood, 2007).
- 4. Dr Guttmann also appears to have been very astute when it comes to politics and what it takes to get an event noticed. Right from the very first Games in 1948 he made sure that high ranking political and social figures and later sports stars and celebrities were present at the Games in order to attract profile and media attention.
- 5. The final mechanism used by Dr Guttmann to cement the importance of the Games in people's minds, despite the lukewarm response it received when he first suggested it, was his constant comparisons to the Olympic Games. It's effect and design appears to have been two-fold. First, to give his patients something tangible to aim for and to give them a feeling of self-worth and, second, to catch the attention of the media and people and organisations involved with paraplegics worldwide.



The birth of the Paralympic Games

Guttmann's persistence in forging a link between the Stoke Mandeville Games and the Olympic Games, which will be outlined in greater detail in Chapter 2, took a giant leap forward at the annual meeting of the World Veterans Federation in Rome in May, 1959. Following discussions with various individuals from the Instituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) and Dr Maglio of the Spinal Unit, Ostia, Rome, it was agreed to host the 1960 Games in Rome a few weeks after the Olympic Games were to take place in the same city (The Cord, 1960).

Despite a few problems in Rome, mainly around access to accommodation, the Games were considered a resounding success. Immediately the possibility of Tokyo, already chosen by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to host the Olympics in 1964, also hosting the Stoke Mandeville Games was voiced. An invitation to the Japanese to host the Games in 1964 led to a team of eight officials and their first ever athletes attending the Stoke Mandeville Games in 1962 and, ultimately led to their acceptance to host the 1964 Games. Present at the Tokyo Games was Dr Leonardo Ruiz, from the Instituto Mexicano de Rehabilitación, as part of an observation team looking at the possibilities for the Games to be held in Mexico City, hosts for the Olympic Games of 1968. According to the minutes of the International Stoke Mandeville Games Committee dated 21 July 1965 a letter from the head of the rehabilitation centre stating that things were progressing well was read out. Due to the worries about the impact of the altitude on paraplegics it was decided that the Americans should take a team to Mexico City to investigate. However, when their team manager, Ben Lipton, tried to arrange this he received a letter from the President of the rehabilitation centre stating that due to financial constraints and accessibility issues with facilities, Mexico City would be unable to host the Games. Following offers from both New York, and Tel Aviv it was decided that the 1968 Games would be held in Israel.



Following the Games in Israel, it was again hoped that the Games would return to being hosted by the Olympic host city in 1972, which was to be Munich. Unfortunately, the Olympic Organising Committee declined the application on the basis that the Olympic village was to be converted into housing immediately after the Games and it was, apparently, too late to change this. The Germans did, however, offer the alternative of the University of Heidelberg, which was accepted. The Olympic Games of 1976 were scheduled to take place in Montreal, Canada, but once again it was decided by the Montreal organisers to decline the invitation to host the Games, especially in view of the fact that it had been decided to hold a combined International Stoke Mandeville Games Federation (ISMGF) and International Sports Organisation for the Disabled (ISOD) Games consisting of paraplegics, blind and amputee athletes, which added to both the size and the complexity of the Games. The Games eventually took place in Toronto. In July 1977 the decision was taken to award the 1980 Paralympic Games to Arnhem in the Netherlands, following a lack of response from the Olympic organisers in Moscow. The Olympic Games of 1984 were set to take place in Los Angeles. However, no evidence can be found that any attempt was made by ISMGF or ISOD to secure the use of the Los Angeles venues for their own games. Following a bid by Ben Lipton, Chairman of the US National Wheelchair Athletic Association (NWAA) in 1980, America was still selected to be the host country. These Games were, however to be split into ISMGF Games, to be organised by the NWAA and ISOD Games to be organised by ISOD at a separate venue at around the same time. According to the final report of the VIIth World Wheelchair Games (1984) in October 1980 Ben Lipton had issued a position paper stating the reasons for NWAA's decision to hold separate games. With the decision finally taken for this plan to go ahead, the wheelchair Games were set to take place at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in July, with the ISOD 'International Games for the Disabled' taking place in Nassau County, New York in June. However, political and fundraising problems around the wheelchair Games forced the University of Illinois to withdraw



their support for the Games in early 1984 and the wheelchair Games were transferred at very short notice to Stoke Mandeville. From 1988 onwards the Summer Paralympic Games have been held in the same host city as the Olympic Games beginning about two weeks after the Olympic Closing Ceremony. The only exception to this was the Paralympic Games for Intellectually Disabled Athletes that was held in Madrid in 1992 as a precursor to Intellectually Disabled athletes being added to the programme alongside the other four impairment groups in Atlanta four years later.

The Winter Paralympic Games

The idea for a Winter Paralympic Games was first suggested at the annual general meeting of the International Sports Organisation for the Disabled in 1974. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, the idea came from the Swedish delegation, a country with a strong winter sports tradition. With less than eighteen months in which to make the necessary arrangements the resulting Games were quite small in size, but hailed as a great success nonetheless. These first Games only catered for athletes with amputations or visual impairments. The first six incarnations of the Games all took place in Europe, where winter sports were highly developed and winter sports for athletes with disabilities first began in the 1950s. Athletes with spinal injuries joined the second Games in Geilo, Norway and they were quickly joined by cerebral palsied and Les Autres athletes in Innsbruck, Austria four years later. The Winter Games did not occur at the Olympic host city venues until their fifth incarnation in Tignes-Albertville in 1992, although demonstration events for disability skiing were held at the Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games as early as 1984. A complete chronology of the Summer and Winter Paralympic Games from 1960 to 2014, including a breakdown of national participation by continental association, can be found in Table 1.2.



Study Activity

Study Table 1.2. Make a list of possible reasons why participation in the Paralympic Games historically has varied so much between continents? What can the IPC do to ensure maximum possible participation from all continents?

Development of sport for other impairment groups

Before continuing it is important here to give a brief history of the development of sport for the other main impairment groups e.g. the blind, amputees, etc. In 1960, recognising the need to organise international sports for disability groups other than paraplegics the International Working Group on Sports for the Disabled was set up under the aegis of the World Veterans Federation whose headquarters was in Paris. Unfortunately, due to language difficulties and differences of opinion the organisation failed and was dissolved in 1964 (Guttmann, 1976). In its place the International Sports Organisation for the Disabled (ISOD) was founded at a meeting in Paris in 1964 (Scruton, 1998). ISOD remained under the patronage of the World Veterans Federation until 1967, when it became an independent organisation and its headquarters were transferred to Stoke Mandeville. In the same year the British Limbless Ex- Servicemen's Association (BLESMA) organised the first ever international sports competition for amputees at Stoke Mandeville. Guttmann, now Sir Ludwig Guttmann after being knighted by the Queen for services to the disabled in 1966, became President of both ISMGF and ISOD and this dual role would play a major part in bringing the disability groups together in one Games. Initially ISOD represented a number of disability groups, but by 1981 both the blind and the cerebral palsied had broken away to form their own international federations. In 2004 ISOD, then representing Amputees and Les Autres merged with the International Stoke Mandeville Wheelchair Sports Federation (ISMWSF) to form the International Wheelchair and Amputee Sports Federation (IWAS). As stated above, initially ISOD represented a number of



100	Year Location	No. of countries	Europe	Americas Africa	Africa	Asia	Oceania	No. of Athletes	Impairment Groups Included
960	1960 Rome, Italy	21	16	2	1	1	1	~328	SCI
964	1964 Tokyo, Japan	21	12	2	2	3	2	~378	SCI
1968	Tel Aviv, Israel	28	16	4	3	3	2	~730	SCI
1972	Heidelberg, West Germany	42	23	7	S	S	2	~984	SCI
1976	Örnsköldsvik, Sweden	16	12	2	1	1	0	198	A, BVI, SCI
926	1976 Toronto, Canada	40	19	10	ŝ	5	3	~1369	A, BVI, SCI
1980	Geilo, Norway	18	12	2	1	1	2	299	A, BVI, SCI
1980	Arnhem, The Netherlands	42	22	8	S	S	5	~1973	A, BVI, CP, SCI
1984	Innsbruck, Austria	21	16	2	0	1	2	419	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
84	1984 Stoke Mandeville, UK &	41	19	10	3	9	3	~1097	SCI
	New York, USA	45	25	9	e	6	2	~1750	ALA, BVI, CP
1988	Innsbruck, Austria	22	17	2	0	1	2	377	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
88	1988 Scoul, South Korea	60	27	11	4	16	2	3059	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
1992	Tignes-Albertville, France	24	18	2	0	2	2	365	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
1992	Barcelona, Spain &	83*	33	16	11	20	2	3001	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
	Madrid, Spain	75	28	22	13	11	1	-1600	ID
1994	Lillchammer, Norway	31	24	2	0	ŝ	2	471	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
966	1996 Arlanta USA	103	41	18	16	25	"	2759	AT A BVI CD ID SCI

Table 1.2 A chronology of the Summer and Winter Paralympic Games

60

866	1998 Nagano, Japan	31	22	7	T	t	4	100	ALA, BVI, CK, ID, SCI
000	2000 Sydney, Australia	122*	41	20	20	33	7	3882	ALA, BVI, CP, ID, SCI
002	2002 Salt Lake, USA	36	25	3	1	5	2	416	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
004	2004 Athens, Greece	135	42	24	28	36	S	3808	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
900	2006 Torino, Italy	38	25	4	1	9	2	474	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
2008	Beijing, P.R. China	146	45	24	30	40	7	4011	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
010	2010 Vancouver, Canada	44	30	5	1	9	2	502	ALA, BVI, CP, SCI
012	2012 London, UK	164	47	28	39	42	8	4237	ALA, BVI, CP, ID, SCI
014	2014 Sochi, Russia	45	30	9	0	7	2	538	ALA, BVI, CP, ID, SCI

disability groups and together with ISMGF co-operated in the organisation of the Summer Paralympic Games in Toronto, 1976 and Arnhem, 1980. They also initiated the first ever Winter Paralympic Games in Örnsköldsvik, Sweden in 1976 which was just for amputee athletes and those who were blind or visually impaired.

The term 'Paralympic'

There is often confusion as to where the term 'Paralympic' derives from. Girginov and Parry (2005) claim that it is a misconception that the word 'paralympic' derives from the term paraplegic. In its current modern-day usage this is true, but historically this claim is inaccurate. The earliest written use of the term appears in the summer issue of *The* Cord in 1951, when David Hinds, a Paraplegic at Stoke Mandeville hospital wrote an article entitled 'Alice at the Paralympiad', which was a skit on Alice in Wonderland. However, what this article does not explain is how the term came about. A possible clue comes from two articles in a special edition of The Cord celebrating ten years of the Spinal Unit in 1954. In one article Dora T. Bell, the physiotherapist attached to the unit, refers to the 'Paraolympics of Stoke Mandeville' and in a second article Ward Sister Merchant refers to the 'Paraplegic Olympics'. It would appear then that this early usage of the term is an amalgamation of the words paraplegic and Olympics, which was shortened further to 'Paralympics', possibly because it is smoother and shorter to pronounce. What is also clear from the increasing usage of the term 'paralympic' by the media during the 1950s is that it was used to refer to all the Games held annually from 1948–1959 as is reinforced by the heading in the New York Times of 21 August, 1960 which stated 'US to send 24 Athletes to Rome for Annual 'Paralympics' Event'.

The deliberate linking of the Stoke Mandeville Games with the host city of the Olympic Games every fourth year had an almost immediate impact on press usage of the term Paralympics. A good example of this is the local newspaper, the *Bucks Advertiser and Aylesbury News*, the



first paper to use the term Paralympic back in 1953. In reporting on the Games at Stoke Mandeville from 1961 to 1963 it reverted to describing them as the International Stoke Mandeville Games. It appears that once the much clearer link between the Stoke Mandeville Games and the Olympic Games had been made by moving them away from Stoke Mandeville to the same city chosen to host the Olympic Games the usage of the term 'paralympic', still in its 'Paraplegic Olympics' context, became much more specific. It now only referred to the edition of the International Stoke Mandeville Games held in the Olympic year.

The modern day usage of the term 'Paralympic' came about as a result of the participation in the Games of impairment groups other than those with spinal cord injuries in Toronto in 1976. As they now included blind and visually impaired and amputee athletes they could no longer be called the International Stoke Mandeville Games, nor could the term 'paralympic' as it was then understood (Paraplegic Olympics) be applied. The next few versions of the Games used varying adaptations of the term Olympics for the Disabled, which led to quite heated discussions with the International Olympic Committee over the use of Olympic terminology. In the end the IOC agreed to the use of the term 'Paralympic' being used for the Games from 1988 onwards, where at the same time the Games finally returned to being hosted by the same city as the Olympic Games. A pattern that has occurred ever since. However, the use of the term 'Paralympic' derives from the Greek preposition 'para' meaning 'next to' giving a meaning of parallel or next to the Olympic Games.

Impairment groups at the Paralympic Games

The participants at the current Summer and Winter Paralympic Games are drawn from five impairment groups:

Athletes with spinal cord injuries

Athletes with spinal cord injuries includes all those athletes having a



spinal cord lesion, spina bifida or polio. Athletes with spinal cord injuries can also

be split into two broad categories of paraplegics which involves a 'neurologic affliction of both legs' and quadriplegics or tetraplegics which involves a 'neurologic affliction of all four extremities' (Auxter *et al.*, 1993).

Cerebral palsied athletes

Cerebral palsy is a condition in which damage inflicted on the brain has led to motor function disorder (Auxter *et al.*, 1993). According to French (1997) there are three types of cerebral palsy. There is spastic that is characterised by tense muscles which are contracted and resistant to movement, *arthetoid* that is characterised by involuntary movements of the affected body parts and *ataxia* that is characterised by a disturbance or lack of balance and coordination.

Amputees and les autres athletes

The classification system for athletes with amputations includes those athletes with acquired or congenital amputations. Les autres, literally meaning 'the others' includes all motor disabilities except amputees, medullar lesions and cerebral palsy, for example muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, arthrogryposis, Friedrich's ataxia and arthritis (Bazylewicz, 1998). This grouping also includes athletes with dwarfism.

Blind and visually impaired athletes

This group of athletes ranges from individuals who are totally blind to individuals who can recognise objects or contours between 2 and 6 metres away that a person with normal vision can see at 60 metres (i.e. 2/60 to 6/60 vision) and/or a field of vision between 5 and 20 degrees.

Intellectually disabled athletes

The Paralympic Movement identifies intellectual impairment as

a disability characterized by significant limitation both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual,



social and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before the age of 18. (American Association on Intellectual and Development

Disability, 2010)

The diagnostics of intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior must be made using internationally recognised and professionally administered measures as recognized by Inas (International Sports Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disability).

Although athletes with an intellectual disability had previously competed at the Paralympic Games they were banned from participation from 2001 to 2009 and only returned to participation at London 2012. For an explanation of the situation regarding intellectually disabled athletes in the Paralympic Games please see Chapter 10.

Upcoming Paralympic Games

Rio de Janeiro 2016 Summer Paralympic Games

The opening ceremony for the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Summer Paralympic Games will take place on 7 September, with the closing ceremony scheduled for 18 September. It is expected that a maximum of 4,350 athletes from an maximum of 178 nations will participate in 528 medal events spread across the following twenty-two sports: athletics, archery, boccia, canoe, cycling (road and track), equestrianism, football (five-a-side), football (seven-a- side), goalball, judo, powerlifting, rowing, sailing, shooting, swimming, table tennis, triathlon, volleyball (sitting), wheelchair basketball, wheelchair fencing, wheelchair rugby, wheelchair tennis. Canoe and triathlon are making their debut at the Paralympic Games in Rio.

Athletes from five impairment groups are scheduled to compete in Rio. These are amputee and les autres athletes, blind and visually impaired athletes, cerebral palsied athletes, intellectually disabled athletes and athletes with spinal cord injuries. Further details on the Rio 2016 Summer Paralympic Games can be found at www.rio2016.com.

Pyeongchang 2018 Winter Paralympic Games

The opening ceremony for the Pyeongchang 2018 Winter Paralympic Games in South Korea will take place on the 9 March, with the closing ceremony scheduled for 18 March. Athletes will participate in the following sports: Alpine skiing, ice sledge hockey, Nordic skiing (biathlon and cross country), snowboarding and wheelchair curling.

Athletes from five impairment groups are scheduled to compete in Pyeongchang. These are amputee and les autres athletes, blind and visually impaired athletes, cerebral palsied athletes, intellectually disabled athletes and athletes with spinal cord injuries. Further information on the Pyeongchang 2018 Winter Paralympic Games can be accessed at www.Pyeongchang2018.com.

Tokyo 2020 Summer Paralympic Games

Tokyo was announced as the host city for the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games at the 125th IOC Session in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 7 September 2013 and will become the first city to have hosted the Paralympic Games twice, having first hosted them in 1964. The opening ceremony for the Tokyo 2020 Summer Paralympic Games will take place on 25 August, with the closing ceremony scheduled for 6 September. It is expected to include the following twenty-two sports: athletics, archery, badminton, boccia, canoe, cycling (road and track), equestrianism, football (five-a-side), goalball, judo, powerlifting, rowing, shooting, swimming, table tennis, taekwondo, triathlon, volleyball (sitting), wheelchair basketball, wheelchair fencing, wheelchair rugby, wheelchair tennis. Badminton and taekwondo will be new to the programme, whilst football (7-a-side) and sailing have been dropped from the programme for failing to meet the minimum inclusion criteria for the Games.

Currently athletes from five impairment groups are scheduled to compete in Tokyo. These are amputee and les autres athletes, blind



and visually impaired athletes, cerebral palsied athletes, intellectually disabled athletes and athletes with spinal cord injuries. Further information on the Tokyo 2020 Summer Paralympic Games can be accessed at www.Tokyo2020.jp/en.

Beijing 2022 Winter Paralympic Games

Beijing in China was selected to host the 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games at the 128th IOC Session held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia from 30 July to 3 August 2017, making it the first city to host both an Olympic and Paralympic Summer and Winter Games. The opening ceremony for the 2022 Winter Paralympic Games in China will take place on 4 March, with the closing ceremony scheduled for 13 March. Athletes will participate in the following sports: Alpine skiing, ice sledge hockey, Nordic skiing (biathlon and cross country), snowboarding and wheelchair curling.

Athletes from five impairment groups are currently scheduled to compete in Beijing. These are amputee and les autres athletes, blind and visually impaired athletes, cerebral palsied athletes, intellectually disabled athletes and athletes with spinal cord injuries.

2024 Host city?

A decision on the host city for the 2024 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games will be made at the 130th IOC Session in Lima, Peru in September 2017. The shortlisted candidates following visits by the IOC Evaluation Commission, which included a member of the IPC Governing Board, are Budapest, Los Angeles, Paris and Rome.

Conclusion

International disability sport has come an amazingly long way since its early beginnings as a rehabilitative tool at a hospital in England over sixty years ago. It has developed into a huge international mega-event that has done a great deal to raise the awareness of what some people



with disabilities are capable of and is increasingly making disability sport and athletes with disabilities an important and visible part of the international sporting calendar.

Chapter review questions

- 1. What factors led Dr Guttmann to introduce sport as part of the rehabilitation process and what were his aims in doing so?
- 2. What were the key mechanisms by which interest in the Stoke Mandeville Games spread?
- 3. Explain the different uses of the term 'Paralympic' and how each came about.
- 4. Name the six different impairment groupings that have participated in the Paralympic Games.

Suggested further reading

Brittain, I., 2014, From Stoke Mandeville to Sochi: A history of the summer and winter Paralympic Games, Common Ground Publishing: Champaign, IL.

International Paralympic Committee, 2006a, *Paralympic Winter Games* 1976–2006: Örnsköldsvik–Turin, RLC, Paris, France.

Scruton, J., 1998, *Stoke Mandeville: Road to the Paralympics*, Peterhouse Press: Aylesbury, UK.





Researching and Writing about the London Games: An Introduction

3: Researching and Writing about the London Games: An Introduction



The following is excerpted from Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Volume Two: Celebrating the Games edited by Vassil Girginov. ©2016 Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

To purchase a copy, click here


The London Olympic and Paralympic Games in numbers and words

An understanding of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games would be incomplete without reference to their scale and impact. The Games have truly lived up to the definition of mega-events as "large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance" (Roche, 2000, p. 1). For 17 days London 2012 became 'the beating heart of the world', to use the words of the Inter- national Olympic Committee (IOC) President Jacques Rogge, disrupted people's routines, generated a great deal of public enthusiasm and involvement, supplied incredible drama around athletes' and organisers' performances and was visited by 120 national leaders. The significance of the Games went well beyond sport, and despite the ambitions of the organisers to make London everyone's Games, more than 40 different groups protested them, including some Paralympic athletes. The Games have already made a range of immediate economic, cultural and sporting impacts, but it will take years to evaluate and understand more fully both their positive and negative legacy for British society and the Olympic Movement.

It would seem appropriate in the introductory chapter of the second volume of the *Hand- book of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games: Celebrating the Games* to offer a snap- shot of the basic Olympic metrics to help the reader better grasp the scale and complexity of this event (Tables 1.1 and 1.2), as well as to set the background to the analyses that follow. To complement the quantitative data, the reader is also invited to consider the global emotional response around the London Games on Twitter, captured by the original project '*Emoto*' (www.emoto2012.org), through an interactive online visualisation and physical data sculpture in the form of a 9.5-metres-long Sentigraph (Figure 1.1).

However, it should be remembered that official data about the Games produced by the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and







Researching and writing about the London Games

Athletes	10,500 Olympic	Victory	800 Olympic
	4,269 Paralympic	ceremonies	503 Paralympics
Countries	204 (85 with medals)	Social followers	4.7 million
	164 (75 with medals)	(Twitter, Facebook,	
		You Tube)	
Sports	26 Olympics	LOCOG website	431 million
	20 Paralympic	Games-time visits	
Medal events and medals	304 Olympic events	Meals served	14 million
	962 medals		
	503 Paralympic events		
	1,522 medals		
Tickets and revenue	£10.99 million	Torch relay	8,000 miles,
	(£8.21 million Olympic		8,000 torch bearers
	and $\pounds 2.78$ million		1,018 communities
	Paralympic) £587 million generated		
Cultural Olympiad	18 million participants	Games transport	1,300 busses
			4,500 cars
Doping samples tested	5,000 Olympic	Technical officials	2,961
174 874 G	1,250 Paralympic	Team officials	5,770
LOCOG Games time staff	8,635	Games volunteers	70,000
Domestic sponsorship	£739 million	Games contractors	100,000
Cash contribution from	\$675 million	Licensed	£78 million 20 product
the IOC for staging the		merchandise sales	categories 10,000 items
Games		Retail space	80 + outlets across
			34 venues
			35 non-venue shops
Accredited media	21,000	Broadcasting hours	100,000
personnel		and TV channels	500
UK TV audience	51.9 million (9 out of	Global TV	3.6 billion
	10 people) watching at	audience	
	least 15 minutes of Games	Protesting the	over 40 different groups
	coverage on the BBC	London 2012	
Opening ceremony	27.02 million on BBC 1,	Games	
viewers	or a 81% share of the UK		
	viewing audience		

Table 1.1 Key facts about the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games

Source: LOCOG (2013); IOC (2013)

Paralympic Games (LOCOG) and the UK government serve above all to frame them in a way that is consistent with the Games' political and delivery visions. Accurate and reliable data, as well as well-informed analyses, are critical for understanding the Olympics and what has been done in their name. In the words of Sir Michael Scholar, the Chair of the UK Statistics Society, the importance of official statistics to society is similar "to that of 'clean water' or 'sound money' – things without which society starts to fall apart – and often they have been described as the 'backbone' of democratic debate" (Bumpstead and Alldritt, 2011, p. 1). From this perspective, LOCOG's (2013, p. 5) claim in its post-Games annual report seems rather self-promoting and premature that "the London 2012 Organising Committee delivered everything promised in London's bid: . . . and Games that will produce sustainable social, economic and sporting legacies long into the future".

First time the host gov- ernment uses the Games to make six substantial promises to affect social change on a mass scale	The first fully integrated Olympic and Paralympic Games	First attempt to opera- tionalise Olympic inspiration through the Inspire Mark – 2,700 UK projects awarded	International Inspiration Programme for children in 20 developing countries
First OCOG to measure its carbon footprint over the entire project term	The first Organis- ing Committee to be independently certified to the British Standard	In June 2012 ISO 20121 became the global sus- tainability standard for the event sector	First OCOG to capture the knowledge-creation process from inception to closing down
First nationally coordi- nated meta-evaluation of the Games legacy com- missioned by the UK	8901: Specification for a Sustainability Management System	Debut of 3D TV – 230 hours coverage	The first Games when women were allowed to represent all countries in
government	for Events	First fully digital Games – Sociolympics	all sports

Table 1.2 Innovative initiatives and solutions: London Olympic firsts

Putting the aspirations of Olympism in Britain to the test

The first volume of the Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games: Making the Games focussed on the political and organisational efforts involved in the planning of the Games. Extensive consideration was also given to the engagement of various sectors of society with the Olympics and to a range of critical issues that have emerged in this process. The first volume discussed issues related to collective reflections about the kind of society we live in and our sense of direction, as well as the changing relationship between the two previous Olympic Games held in London in 1908 and 1948 and British society.



The second volume of the *Handbook*: *Celebrating the Games* continues these themes and places a greater emphasis on the Olympic experiences of various constituencies. The main thrust of the current volume is to scrutinise whether the aspirations of Olympism in Britain stood the test. As stated in the concluding chapter of volume 1, "It should be remembered that the ideas of Olympism, as politically appealing they may seem, have hardly ever been comprehensively tried out in any country, and definite claims about the role of Olympism in modern society have inevitably been limited to suppositions. London is striving to achieve exactly that – to put the aspirations of Olympism in Britain to the test" (Girginov, 2012a, p. 308). However, the expression 'putting to the test' should not be interpreted as synonymous with legacy and impacts.

It seems rather astonishing that the Olympic Games, which represent the highest expression of Olympism – a project for social change that uses education and sport as its main tools – have never been studied from within and from a multidisciplinary perspective. The complexities of Olympic research were long recognised (MacAloon, 1992), but for a number of political and practical reasons, scholars have generally failed to engage with the Organising Committee of a Games in order to understand the intricate web of actions and interactions taking place in the process of materialising the Olympic aspirations in the context of the host society. This issue was particularly pertinent in the case of London 2012, as for the first time in history the host government made a commitment to use the Games to introduce social change on a mass scale and to change the lives of British people. What is more, the London organisers' ambitions for social change have been extended to the youth of the world. The official framing of the London Games as a project for social change was a perfect vindication of Coubertin's dreams, and a significant enhancement of the mission of the Olympic Movement, and significant in the success of London's bid.

The current two-volume collection set out to meet this challenge and to put to the test the Olympic aspirations of Britain through a



longitudinal and multidisciplinary study of the London Games. In 2009 the editor approached LOCOG with a view to securing their collaboration in conducting a comprehensive study on the making of the Games. The project received the approval and financial support of Podium, the unit that was established by the Higher Education Funding Council of England to serve as a conduit between LOCOG and the sector. The plan was to deploy a team of 10 eminent UK researchers with track records in their fields, who would be given access to all key functional areas of LOCOG so that they could capture in real time the interactions of various actors in the making of the Games. The outcome of the project was intended to be a comprehensive report to LOCOG that was designed to complement the Official Games report, which LOCOG was contractually obliged to produce. Naturally, the research was also intended to inform the present two-volume collection.

To our delight, LOCOG's initial reaction was very positive, as they saw the project as an opportunity to deliver part of the main promise of the Games – to leave knowledge legacy. A related important consideration was the prevailing feeling in LOCOG that the Official Games report was serving no real purpose other than to be a piece of expensive corporate propaganda. There was a genuine desire of those responsible for producing the report to change the format and the content of this publication and to turn it into a valuable resource for the Olympic Movement. From LOCOG's point of view, the only way to undertake the project was by giving it the status of an 'official Olympic product', which would then compel various organisational members to cooperate with the research team. To that effect LOCOG created a new product category of 'academic publication', but the negotiations took more than a year and a great deal of paperwork was produced, and numerous meetings and communications were exchanged in the process. The Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games was going to be the only academic book on LOCOG's publishing programme featuring 67 titles, which is the most extensive one ever delivered by a Games organiser, and the first ever book produced resulting from collaboration between an Organising Committee and a



team of academic researchers.

However, the logistic, editorial and opportunity costs of the project presented insurmountable challenges, and eventually, the editor and the publisher decided to withdraw from the 'official Olympic product' designation. The *Handbook* was published as an independent project. This also meant that LOCOG's officials were no longer obliged to cooperate with the research team, but despite this setback, several key officials supported the project throughout and provided valuable insights. Unfortunately, a great opportunity to produce an original and detailed account of the making of the London Games was compromised.

The London Games as a loud and a silent place of Olympic history

The moral of this story is twofold and goes at the heart of Olympic enterprise. Firstly, this story illustrates the highly instrumental rationality of the Games as a project, which is in sharp contrast with their social mission. The tension is one between the elitist nature of Olympic competition and the egalitarian character of Olympism, or between exclusion and inclusion. Once awarded to London, successful delivery of the Games became the order of the day, and anything else was seen as a distraction from the main goal. As Raco (2012, p. 454) commented with regard to the politics that brought the Olympics to London, "what matters was delivery, not deliberations. It was 'getting things done' in a challenging and complex environment and using a major event to show the UK's development enterprise to the world". In similar vein, speaking to a meeting of the European Olympic Committees in Istanbul in 2008, IOC President Jacques Rogge said: "The games are not any more in a growth mode, they are in a conservation mode, and that the future financial backing of the IOC by broadcasters and sponsors, who pump billions of dollars into the Olympics, will depend on successful staging of the games" (National, 2008).



The main mechanism for ensuring that nothing interferes with the delivery of the London Games was 'bracketing' (see chapter 5 by Girginov and Olsen for a more detailed discussion), or separating the realization of the task of staging the Games from its environment. From LOCOG's point of view this entailed shelving any extravagant ideas and extensive 'wish lists' and concentrating on the core activities that would make the Games possible. As a result, additional demands such as a scholarly project to capture the knowledge of the Games become an opportunity cost for LOCOG, as it was not part of their contractual obligations to the IOC.

Bracketing has taken various forms, ranging from bespoke legislation to framework regulations, government ring-fencing of the Olympic budget, exclusion zones and downright coercion. However, bracketing is not just a technical term, but also a discursive practice, the main role of which is to actively frame a meaning of the Games that would emphasise the social and political significance of certain themes and actions while silencing others. Discursive practices also serve another important function as they determine what counts as valuable knowledge and what does not. The phenomenon of knowledge codification and turning it into a 'product' to be sold on the Olympic market by "self-selected members of a caravan of experts" started in earnest in Sydney 2000 and is captured in The Australian Olympic Caravan: A Unique Olympic Events Industry (Cashman and Harris, 2012, p. 10). The summer of 2012 provided ample opportunities for asserting public discourses and popular ideologies, or what Max Picard (1948/1952) termed "loud places of [Olympic] history": from 'Britain is Great' to the exploits of Team GB athletes and the socially bonding power of the Games, which provided a conversation currency that made strangers on the train talk to each other. Equally, the absence of discourse about other issues attested to their irrelevance. Both the UK government and LOCOG have been actively involved in framing London 2012 both as a loud and silent place of Olympic history.

The absence of discourse, or silence, about certain issues is achieved



through the exercise of censorship, whether self-imposed, agent centred, coercive or cultural. As Green (2005, xviii) elaborates, "censorship represents the downside of power: proscriptive, rather than prescriptive; the embodiment of the status quo . . . All censorship, whether governmental or cultural, can be seen as springing from a single origin – fear. The belief that if the speech, book, play, film, state secret, or whatever, is permitted free exposure, then the authorities will find themselves threatened to an extent that they cannot tolerate". Green's observation allows for interpreting various forms of bracketing afforded to the London Games as censorship employed to ensure that a range of issues that may upset the rhythm of the 'beating heart of the world' are properly silenced.

Sheriff (2000, p. 114) proposed a method for deconstructing silence that he called "*cultural censorship*, a term that distinguishes it from the assumedly individuated processes that are often called 'self-censorship' as well as from the official, agent-centered, and coercive (rather than customary) practices associated with political censorship". In Sheriff 's analysis cultural censorship can be seen as a set of analytically neglected but nevertheless explicable behaviours, in which (unlike the activity of speech, which requires one actor) "silence demands collaboration and the tacit communal understandings that such collaboration presupposes" (p. 114). Furthermore, "although it is contractual in nature, a critical feature of this type of silence is that it is both a consequence and an index of an unequal distribution of power, if not of actual knowledge" (p. 114).

From Sheriff's point of view, researching and writing about the Games can intentionally or unintentionally be subjected to cultural and agent-centred censorship. The long build-up to the Games, and the hype generated in the preceding 12 months by the 'Olympic caravan' and government institutions, have established a shared tacit communal understanding among key stakeholders that failure to deliver the Olympics is not an option. Even when debacles did occur, as in the case of G4's last-minute failure to deliver on its multimillion-pounds contract to supply security guards, debates and decisions were reasonably silenced and deferred for much later. The agent-centred censorship was exercised mainly in the form of a non-disclosure agreement, which all LOCOG and Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) employees or people dealing with the organization were required to sign. This was because information about the Games is restricted, and any information obtained through interviews, observations or access to a company's documents was deemed confidential. There is a contradiction between this restriction on the flow of information and the moral and philosophical position "enshrined in the International Olympic Committee's Code of Ethics 'stipulating that transparency . . . must be respected by all Olympic Movement constituents'" (Girginov, 2012b, p. 130).

The second point of the *Handbook* story exemplifies Sheriff's comment, which raises a fundamental issue about the ownership of knowledge and more widely of the Games. This issue has serious implications for accomplishing the vision of the Games as an instrument of social change. The Olympic Games belong to humanity, and an Organising Committee is only their custodian for a period of seven years.

One of the main silenced discourses of London 2012 with far-reaching implications for the Olympic Movement has been about the real cost of this undertaking and its substitution with a convenient separation of the operational from the capital costs of the Games. Here the operational cost becomes associated with private capital, whereas the capital cost is related to public investments. Over the past 30 years the IOC has come under a great deal of criticism regarding the escalating cost of the Games and the significant overspends that have been socialised and passed on to the host taxpayer to pick up. In an interview to the Greek newspaper *Kathimerini* the IOC President, Jacques Rogge, admitted that the 2004 Athens Games have contributed to the current financial crisis of Greece: "You can fairly say that the 2004 Olympic Games played their part . . . If you look at the



external debt of Greece, there would be up to two or three per cent of that which could be attributed to the Games" (Georgiakis and Nauright, 2012, p. 1).

Consequently, the IOC has adopted a line and has always insisted that its global commercial programmes and those of the Organising Committees generate sufficient revenue to cover the operational costs of the Games and make a profit. Decisions about the capital cost of the Games are in the competence of relevant public authorities, and any cost related to such decisions is to be borne by the host city and country, but the IOC neither has nor insists on specific requirements as to what these capital investments should be. Paul Deighton, the CEO of LOCOG, makes it clear that "the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Limited (LOCOG) is responsible for the planning, promotion and staging of the London 2012 Games" (LOCOG, 2008, p. 4). To that end, LOCOG set an operational budget of £2.4 billion.

However, the real operational budget of LOCOG reached some £3 billion, including £514 million for venue security and £137 million for "operational provisions", as well as extra money for more lavish ceremonies, all of which came from the public purse (National Audit Office, 2012). LOCOG's 2012 annual report presented this significant amount of public funding in rather ambiguous terms and chose to report it not as a £826 million public contribution, but as a fraction: "In addition, the Company received approximately £0.8 billion funding for additional scope covering Games requirements, which the Government identified that LOCOG was best placed to deliver" (LOCOG, 2013, p. 51).

Increases in LOCOG's operational cost, whatever their rationale – from security threats to beautification of the Olympic Park – do not tell the full picture about the increasingly blurred boundaries between private and public responsibilities in delivering the Games. For example, the construction of the Olympic Village, which is a responsibility of LOCOG, was originally envisaged as a centrepiece of a £1 billion



private investment in London's urban regeneration plan. However, when the Australian developer Lend Lease pulled out of the deal, in 2011 LOCOG sold the village to the Qatari ruling family's property firm at a taxpayer loss of £275 million. The jewel of the Olympic Park, the Olympic Stadium, represents another illuminating example of the transfer of public investments into private hands under the banner of 'Olympic legacy'. After years of uncertainty and negotiations, finally, the future of the stadium has been secured, but at a considerable cost to the public purse. Under the deal announced by the government on 22 March 2013, West Ham football club (owned by WH Holding Limited) will pay only £15 million for a 99-year lease on a stadium whose conversion costs will be £150 million to £190 million and whose overall cost could go over £630 million. The former UK Sport Minister, Richard Caborn, who helped win the London bid (see chapter 3 by Masterman in volume 1), described the deal as "the biggest mistake of the Olympics, and lessons should be learned from this" (*Telegraph Sport*, 2013).

The case of LOCOG clearly demonstrates that the discursive and practical model of separation between the Games' operational and capital cost is untenable. A study by Flybjerg and Stewart (2012) on the bid and final budgets of 38 Summer and Winter Olympic Games between 1960 and 2012 provides support for this conclusion. Two points deserve attention. First, the authors cautioned that "with an average cost overrun of 178 per cent in real terms, the extent of cost overruns in the Olympic Games appear to be significantly higher than in other types of megaprojects" (p. 12). By way of comparison, cost overruns in transport projects were on average between 27% to 45% and in IT projects 27%. Second, London has reversed the trend from the past seven Games towards lower cost overruns with a cost overrun of 133% compared to Nagano 1998 (58%), Sydney 2000 (108%), Salt Lake City 2002 (40%), Athens 2004 (97%), Torino 2006 (113%), Beijing 2008 (35%) and Vancouver 2010 (36%) (Flybjerg and Stewart, 2012, p. 12).



Another significant point of the aforementioned study concerning the process of knowledge learning is that the authors were unable to find reliable data for 11 editions of the Games. As they put it, "this is an interesting finding in its own right, because it means, in effect, that for 41 per cent of Olympic Games between 1960 and 2010 no one asked how the budget held at these Games, thus hampering learning regarding how to develop more reliable budgets for the Games" (Flybjerg and Stewart, 2012, p. 9). Although the London 2012 budget was the most hotly discussed and heavily scrutinized topic, the 133% cost overrun of the Games has given even greater prominence to the debate about public-private and the operational versus capital cost of the Olympics. The public sector plays a critical role in the planning and delivery of the Games, and its role cannot be reduced to "an intelligent client for delivery bodies", as Making of the Games: What the Government Can Learn from London 2012 report suggests (Norris, Rutter and Medland, 2013, p. 5).

Alison Stewart was one of the very few researchers who were granted access to LOCOG to analyse the knowledge transfer process, and this is what she wrote in the *Harvard Business Review* about her experiences a few days before the end of the Games:

My view is that the whole purpose of the activity should be reframed. Rather than pushing for greater knowledge transfer, each instalment of the Games should aspire to greater transparency and accountability. Secrecy clouds many aspects of Games administration, and there are many good reasons to dispel it. The justification at the local level for incurring some additional expense would be clear. And meanwhile, greater transparency would yield many side benefits for knowledge gathering. In any clear accounting of a complex, multiyear project, the lessons are there to be learned.

(Stewart, 2012)

There are two possible scenarios for the way forward for OCOGs



(Organising Commit- tees of the Olympic and Paralympic Games). One is for the IOC to increase its contribution to Games organisers, but this will be hugely problematic as the two main stakeholders of the Olympic Movement, the International Sport Federations and the National Olympic Commit- tees, will not easily agree to have their revenues cut. The history of financial dealings within the Olympic Family testifies to that (Barney, Wenn and Martyn, 2002). The other alternative is to turn OCOGs into truly public-private partnerships with much greater transparency and accountability. This will allow for a great synergy between the mission of Olympism to affect social change and the running of the Games as a project. The appointment of Lord Coe, the Chair of LOCOG, as the government's adviser on legacy issues, based within the Cabinet Office, suggests that a similar scenario is possible and could have been embedded in the makeup of LOCOG.

A related discourse, or a loud place of Olympic history that was largely silenced, was LOCOG's reported operational loss of £53 million. LOCOG stated that deferred revenue of £78 million "is anticipated to be sufficient to cover the brought forward loss and the costs to dissolution, to put the Company in a break even position to enable a solvent liquidation" (LOCOG, 2013,

p. 55). This sentence from LOCOG's post-Games financial report does not square with the self- congratulatory message of its Chair, Lord Coe, in the introduction to the same report: "Our simple vision to use the Games as a catalyst for change has touched and transformed the lives and communities of millions of people across London, the UK and around the world" (LOCOG, 2013, p. 4). It suggests that a loud claim and the key strategic objectives of LOCOG's Olympic programme vision to achieve a sustained improvement in UK sport before, during and after the Games, in both elite performance – particularly in Olympic and Paralympic sports – and grass- roots participation, has been replaced with the much more modest ambition to break even. In practical terms, this also means that the British Olympic Association will not receive any financial benefit from the Games. In contrast, the Australian Olympic Committee was able to secure a \$93 million profit from the Sydney Games for elite sport.

This discussion also makes any claims by LOCOG over the ownership of Games knowledge hugely problematic. Since the Sydney Games in 2000, the IOC has rationalised and codified the process of knowledge creation and transfer through the Olympic Games Knowledge Management programme. The programme was designed to benefit future Games organisers and the Olympic Movement in general. While it is understandable that some of the knowledge generated in the process of organising a Games has commercial value, it is debatable why most of this knowledge should be embargoed and not publicly available. One critical question is: Why will private individuals (who have worked for LOCOG and have gained valuable knowledge and experience in good part due to public funding and interactions with public and voluntary bodies) have the opportunity to sell their knowledge in the marketplace, while other interested parties are denied the opportunity to benefit freely from this knowledge? LOCOG has made a precedent in Olympic history in agreeing to transfer its documentation to the National Archives, but most of this information will not be publically available for various periods of time between 5 and 15 years. Selected information such as the LOCOG's customer database of 5.3 million people was handed over to a partnership of Sport England, UK Sport and London & Partners. This database gives sport an opportunity to connect with people who took an interest in the London Olympic and Paralympic Games and who will continue to receive regular emailed bulletins about sport, volunteering and culture.

Furthermore, it would appear that the Games knowledge generation and sharing has been subjected to a double standard of secrecy and openness. While LOCOG followed its status as a private company not governed by the Freedom of Information Act, the ODA, which was responsible for building the infrastructure without which there would have been no Games, has established a dedicated online platform called 'Learning Legacy'. Its aim was to share the knowledge and lessons learned from the London 2012 construction project to raise the bar within the UK construction sector. To that effect, the ODA has made available on the Learning Legacy website a range of free materials around the four main themes of archaeology, master planning and town planning, procurement and sustainability. These included tools and tem- plates used on the programme, reports written by contractors, peer-reviewed case studies and academic research papers. John Armitt, ODA Chairman, described their approach to knowledge sharing and learning as "this is the first time a construction project in the UK has sought to capture the intellectual capital on this scale" (Armitt, n.d.).

The insistence on secrecy with regard to the Olympics is also in sharp contrast with the UK government's position on open access to all knowledge created through publically funded research. The Finch Report (Finch, 2012, p. 5) has made a compelling case: "The principle that the results of research that has been publicly funded should be freely accessible in the public domain is a compelling one, and fundamentally unanswerable". Classifying knowledge derived in good measure through public investment and know-how as available and not available to the public is also at odds with the IOC's proclaimed position on knowledge management. As the IOC Executive Director for the Olympic Games, Gilbert Felli, stated: "Managing knowledge is at the core of our mission . . . Successful knowledge management . . . enables you to perform and it contributes largely to organisational excellence. But it goes beyond the field of play and the event itself. It encompasses sustainability and legacy aspects, making sure that whatever is built for the Games is always designed with legacy in mind" (Felli, 2011).

Nonetheless, the academic community did manage to get together in scrutinizing the Lon- don Games and the wider phenomenon of Olympism, albeit in a rather different way. For the first time ever an academic publisher commissioned over 40 Olympic- and Paralympicfocussed journal special issues from a wide range of disciplines to be published during 2012 and 2013. Journals from nine broad fields of scientific enquiry across arts, humanities, social sciences and engineering were invited, including education, engineering, environment, culture, leisure, media, policy and planning, tourism and sport. The bibliometric and thematic analysis of the first 23 published Olympic special issues conducted by Girginov and Collins (2013) indicates that they covered 2,535 pages of varying sizes and formats and contained 174 articles including relevant editorials. These were prepared by 308 writers from 19 countries, of whom 35% were women. Of these, 36% were written by authors from non-sport disciplines and backgrounds who had not published regularly on sport or Olympism.

The analysis also addresses four substantial questions including the following: How did the possibility emerge for the wider academic community to take an interest in Olympic and Paralympic matters? How did objects enter and exit the Olympic and Paralympic gaze? Which topics and issues have emerged as a result of the research activities of Olympic and Paralympic scholars? and Which Olympic/Paralympic-related phenomena have themselves changed over the course of being studied? The full analysis of this project can be seen in Girginov and Collins (2013).

Did the Olympic aspirations of Britain stand the test? If we were to answer this question using loud places of Olympic history such as the verdict of the National Audit Office (2012, p. 8), the answer would be "by any reasonable measure the Games were a success and the big picture is that they delivered value for money". However, as the contributions to this volume demonstrate, although the London Games were successful as a project, they fell short of using the unique political commitment to affect social change and to redress long-standing silent issues within the Olympic Movement.

Structure of the book

The second volume is structured in five parts and contains 21 chapters. Part 1 – Britain Welcomes the World – includes two contributions designed to examine the arrangements that were put in place to ensure that London was well prepared to welcome the huge influx of athletes, media representatives, tourists and spectators of the Games. First, Ozlem Edizel, Graeme Evans and Hua Dong analyse how London dressed up for the party by looking specifically at the *Look of the Games*, a £35 million programme funded by the city of London and designed to allow all 33 London boroughs to create a celebratory atmosphere. While the authors acknowledge the innovative character of the inclusive Games designs, they question the effect of the *Look of the Games* programme on local residents and their concerns about the role of this event in introducing wider social change in East London.

The next chapter is by Dan Bulley and Debbie Lisle, who scrutinise the hospitality programme of the Games. The authors offer a critical analysis of an 'Olympic first' which saw the outsourcing of the hospitality training to McDonald's, one of the top sponsors of the IOC and LOCOG, and raise questions about the way it reproduced modes of segregation, asymmetry and hierarchy that were so central to the London 2012 bid document by training hosts to give some guests a warmer welcome than others.

Part 2 – Experiencing the Games – is made up of eight contributions. In chapter 4, Geoff Nichols and Rita Ralston show both the loud and silent places of the Olympic volunteer programme. Subject to examination are not only LOCOG's management of volunteers before and during the Games, but also other programmes to develop volunteers and the ways local government used the Games as a catalyst to develop volunteering. A number of issues are raised concerning the shortcomings of volunteers' training, volunteer withdrawal and the governance of the Games in terms of its impact in delivering volunteering legacy.

In chapter 5, Vassil Girginov and Nils Olsen use personal encounters

with key staff to analyse LOCOG as a unique temporary organisation and the high-velocity environment in which strategic and operational decisions have to be made. Chapter 6, by Raymond Boyle and Richard Haynes, interrogates the role of the host broadcasters BBC and Channel 4 in shaping viewing experiences. Their analysis offers a critical discussion on the construction of the television coverage of the Games and wider issues related to the future availability of this event on free terrestrial television in the UK, as well as about the link between watching and participating in sport.

Andy Miah, in chapter 7, scrutinizes the first social media Olympics, or the London 2012 digital presence across a range of platforms, by considering examples of social media celebration by Games promoters and Twitter activism by Olympic opponents. Miah identifies how social media created novel opportunities for communicating news about the Games, and activated communities of celebration and protest, and offers some insight into how the shift in media production may affect the way future Olympic Games hosts stage their Games and how the media respond.

Chapter 8 is by Ian Jones, who explores some of the key issues related to sport tourists visiting the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Jones outlines and explains four key elements of visitor behaviour at the 2012 London Games, including the extent and nature of visitors, their main motivations for visiting the Games, visitors' exhibited behaviours and their experiences and satisfaction at the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The analysis suggests that Olympic tourists were both similar to other tourists and unique in their experiences, which were generally positive.

Chapter 9, by a team of retail experts including Charles Dennis, Tamira King, Richard Mitchell, Harvey Ells, Christopher Dutton and Hanya Pielichaty, offers a rare critical analysis of the shopping experiences of Olympic visitors. The authors use a combination of ethno- graphic and quantitative methods to examine the massive retail operation that was launched by LOCOG. The programme included 5,900 square metres of



retail space within the Olympic Park and 35 non-venue London 2012 shops, totalling 7,000 square metres nationwide, and product ranges included 20 categories and over 10,000 different items covering Team GB and Paralympics GB. The authors submit that the retail offer from the Games organizers compared relatively poorly with that of major retailers (including the 2012 stores in official department store provider John Lewis) and the experience of the Games themselves.

In chapter 10, Jean-Loup Chappelet uses his own experiences at the Games to interrogate an emerging issue for Games organisers concerning spectators' experiences. LOCOG had the task of convincing more than 12 million Brits and foreigners, a new Olympic record, to come and watch the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Chappelet tracks the whole process from purchasing a ticket, to getting to the venues and participating in the experience, for both the paying and accredited spectator. He pays particular attention to the meticulous preparation based on detailed market analyses and impeccable implementation and concludes that "London has undoubtedly opened the way for a new Olympic Spectator Experience in which spectators are seen as clients who must be satisfied at all costs because, in addition to creating a festive atmosphere, spectators can generate a large percentage of the Games budget (almost as large as domestic sponsorship and larger than the IOC's contribution from television rights and advertising)". LOCOG ticket sales generated £587 million, or 27% of the total operating budget of the Games, second after the revenue from domestic sponsorship (£739 million, 31%). Part 2 of the volume concludes with chapter 11, in which Gavin Poynter examines the tension between the brief sporting festival that the Games is and the long-term urban renewal associated with the event's legacy. Poynter concludes that "the transient delights of the festival period captured the public imagination in ways that contrasted sharply to public responses, especially local community responses, to the albeit more complex discourse of legacy that politicians and organizers had deployed constantly in the pre-event phase to justify bidding for and hosting the Games".

Part 3 focusses on the role of science, technology and Olympic celebrities and includes three chapters. In chapter 12,Vicky Goosey-Tolfrey, Barry Mason and Brendan Burkett unpack the UK Sport's Research and Innovation programme (2008–2012), which invested nearly £8 mil- lion in numerous science, medicine and engineering projects across Olympic and Paralympic sports. In particular, the authors scrutinize the role of technology in supporting Paralympic athletes and emphasize the critical importance of the human-equipment interface for the disabled athlete. Equal consideration is also given to the logistical and ethical challenges in designing and implementing new technology in helping athletes to excel.

In chapter 13,Andrew C. Billings and Youngju Kim offer insights about media framing and the shaping of modern media messages, using the US-based telecast on NBC, with particular attention to gender, nationality, race and ethnicity. They argue that there is a community that still wants to witness major happenings in live formats and often in large group environments. These groups gather online using different formats, but in doing so they don't abandon the traditional media, but instead bolster it by a second (or in some cases, third) screen. It is argued that Olympic media will only expand in both scope and influence, and in the process the importance of examining how people view issues such as nationality, gender and ethnicity will escalate.

Chapter 14, by David L. Andrews and Oliver J.C. Rick, looks through the lens of the British popular media and focusses on the place of celebrities in the making and experiencing of the London 2012 spectacle. The vivid analysis demonstrates that the spectacle of the Olympic Games provides a seductive and effective platform for the production and dissemination of celebrated personae. Andrews and Rick conclude that "the Olympic Games are a complex integrative and intertextual spectacular formation, both subject to the domineering logic of personification associated with contemporary celebrity culture, and an agent responsible for the production of an economy of embodied spectacles as produced *within* (performative, delivery and ceremonial) and *through* (promotional, pernicious and social) a variety of the dimensions of the Olympic spectacle".

Part 4 of the book is concerned with various attempts to seize the platform provided by the London Olympics. First, Andrea N. Eagleman analyses online media coverage of the 2012 Summer Games on the main online platforms in six different countries on six different continents, covering Australia, Brazil, China, Great Britain, Kenya and the United States, to deter- mine each country's media depictions of the Games. Eagleman identifies four broad topics that were covered across all six countries, including the London organisers (and related agencies), the Royal family, world politicians and Olympic organisations. She considers that relatively few attempts had been made by the editorial teams to seize the Olympic platform for purposes other than sport and the Games.

Chapter 16, by Debbie Sadd, concentrates on the attempts of various groups to protest against the Games, as well as the evolution of the genres and types of protests. There were more than 40 groups protesting against the London Olympics, and Sadd charts the agenda, forms and achievements of the most prominent. She also poses some critical questions about the form of protests that are likely to happen around Rio de Janeiro in 2016.

Finally, in chapter 17, Alan Tomlinson provides a fascinating account of the overt and covert efforts of politicians, onlookers, Games Makers (i.e., Olympic volunteers) and corporate sponsors to seize the Olympic platform to promote their own agenda.

Three chapters make up part 5 of the book. Chapter 18, by Martin Polley, documents the extraordinary array of publishing that has taken place in conjunction with the London Games, including hagiographies, activity and commemorative books, travel guides, celebratory texts and academic writings. Polley discuses in great detail the three main themes emerging from the academic literature – history, politics and



drugs - and the learning legacy of the Games.

In chapter 19 Emma Poulton offers a rare critique of the films dedicated to the London Games. Using a framework for different modes of documentary, she subjects to scrutiny the official film of London 2012, *First* (Director Caroline Rowland, 2012), and questions the future of the documentary tradition within the Olympics, which faces competition from other media such as YouTube, Google+ and Instagram.

Chapter 20, by Mike Weed, builds on his analysis of the London legacy ambitions in volume 1 (chapter 7) and, using a programme theory approach, asks how far the legacy outcomes claimed by the coalition government can genuinely be considered to be additional and attributable to legacy strategies that are distinctive and different as a result of an association with the Games. The chapter concludes that "what is being claimed as legacy as part of a political project to justify the £9.3 billion public sector investment in the 2012 Games far outstrips the additional outcomes that can be genuinely attributed to legacy strategy".

Finally, in the concluding chapter, Vassil Girginov summarises the chequered story of the London Games by focussing on the relationship between the London Games as a project and a movement for social change. It is argued that although London has tried to reconnect the staging of the Games with their philosophical roots, at the same time it perpetuated the universalising tendencies promoted by the Olympic Movement and revealed the uncertainties within the IOC as to what its main priorities should be.

References

Armitt, J. (n.d.). 'Lessons Learned'. Learning Legacy website. Retrieved on 24 July 2013 from http:// learninglegacy.independent.gov.uk/.

Barney, R.,Wenn, S. and Martyn, S. (2002). Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic



Commercialism. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Bumpstead, R. and Alldritt, R. (2011). 'Statistics for the People? The Role of Official Statistics in the Democratic Debate'. Paper presented at the 58th World Congress of the International Statistical Institute, Dublin, 21–26 August 2011.

Cashman, R., and Harris, R. (2012). *The Australian Olympic Caravan from 2000 to 2012.* Sydney: Walla Walla Press.

Felli, G. (2011).'Learning from the Past, Getting Ready for the Future'. Retrieved on 2 April 2013 from http://www.olympic.org/news/ learning- from-the- past-getting-ready- for-the-future/143493.

Finch, J. (2012). Accessibility, Sustainability, Excellence: How to Expand Access to Research Publications. Report of the Working Group on Expanding Access to Published Research Findings. Retrieved on 3 April 2012 from http://www.researchinfonet.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/06/Finch- Group-report-FINAL- VERSION.pdf.

Flybjerg, B. and Stewart, A. (2012). *Olympic Proportions: Cost and Cost Overrun at the Olympics* 1960–2012.

Saïd Business School Working Papers. Oxford: Oxford University.

Georgiakis, S. and Nauright, J. (2012). 'Creating the "Scarecrow": The 2004 Athens Olympic Games and the Greek Financial Crisis'. Retrieved on 4 April 2012 from http://rht.gmu.edu/assets/docs/RHT/ Working%20Paper%20THE%20SCARECROW%20(Georgiakis%20 Nauright).pdf.

Girginov,V. (2012a).'Making the 2012 London Games: Taking Stock and Looking Forward to Celebrating the Games'. InV. Girginov (Ed), Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.Vol. 1, Making the Games, pp. 307–313. London: Routledge.

Girginov,V. (2012b).'Governance of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games'. In V. Girginov (Ed), *Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.* Vol. 1, *Making the Games*, pp. 130– 134. London: Routledge.



Girginov, V. and Collins, M. (2013). 'Knowledge Creation: Bibliometrics and General Trends'. *Routledge Special Issue Collection on the Olympic and Paralympic Games.* Retrieved on 2 April 2013 from http:// www.tandf.co.uk/journals/explore/Olympic-Special-Issues-Analysis.pdf.

Green, J. (2005). Introduction. In J. Green and N. Karolides (Eds), Encyclopaedia of Censorship: New Edition.

New York: Facts on Fire.

International Olympic Committee (IOC). (2013). Marketing Report London 2012. Lausanne: IOC. London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG). (2008). *On Track.*

Annual Report 2007–2008. London: LOCOG.

London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG). (2013). *London 2012 Report and Accounts. Annual Report 2011–2012.* London: LOCOG.

MacAloon, J. (1992).'Sport, Science and Intercultural Relations: Reflections on Recent Trends in Olympic Scientific Meetings', *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies*, 1: 1–28.

National. (2008).'IOC Must Control Cost of Olympic Games', 21 November. Retrieved on 1 April 2013 from http://www.thenational.ae/ sport/ioc-must-control-cost-of-olympic-games#ixzz2OgpewB3U.

National Audit Office (NAO). (2012). *The London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games: Post-Games Review*. London: NAO.

Norris, E., Rutter, J. and Medland, J. (2013). *Making of the Games: What the Government Can Learn from London 2012.* London: Institute for Government.

Picard, M. (1948/1952). *The World of Silence.* Trans. Stanley Godman. South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions. Raco, M. (2012). 'The Privatization of Urban Development and the London Olympics 2012', *City*, 16 (4): 452–461.

Roche, M. (2000). Mega-Events and Modernity. London: Routledge.



Sheriff, R. (2000). 'Exposing Silence as Cultural Censorship: A Brazilian Case', American Anthropologist, 102 (1): 114–132.

Stewart, A. (2012).'Olympic Host Cities Need Transparency, Not Knowledge Transfer', *Harvard Business Review* (7 August). Retrieved on 1 April 2013 from http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/08/olympic_host_ cities_need_trans.html.

Telegraph Sport. (2013). 'Biggest Mistake of the London Olympics – Richard Caborn's Assessment of West Ham's Olympic Stadium Deal', 22 March. Retrieved on 3 April 2013 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ sport/football/teams/west-ham/9948092/Biggest-mistake-of-the-London-Olympics-Richard-Caborns-assessment-of-West-Hams-Olympic- Stadium-deal.html.





4: Home Advantage





The following is excerpted from Success and Failure of Countries at the Olympic Games by Danyel Reiche. ©2017 [Year] Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

To purchase a copy, click here

One factor that is often linked with Olympic success is the home advantage. Countries that host the Summer and Winter Olympic Games usually win more medals than at previous Games abroad. Tables 14.1 and 14.2 show the perform- ance of the host countries at the Summer and Winter Olympic Games starting in 1988. I begin with the Games in 1988 since the 1980 and 1984 Games were affected by political boycotts (the absence of some if its main rivals explains the huge number of medals the United States won in 1984). The tables show that the United States at the 1996 Summer Games, and Italy at the 2006 Winter Games could not improve their performance while hosting the Games (but remained more or less at their previous level of medal winnings). Apart from these two cases, countries did improve their performance while hosting the Games, and some of these improvements were quite significant. This applies particularly to those host countries that were not Olympic powerhouses before hosting, such as South Korea, Spain, and Greece. For them, hosting the Olympics in 1988, 1992, and 2004 was connected with major sporting successes. Greece, where the ancient Olympics took place, was the first nation to host the modern Olympic Games in 1896. Out of the 111 medals that Greece has won in the history of the Summer Olympics, 62 of them were won at the 1896 and 2004 Games, about 56% of all medals Greece has ever won.

However, even leading Olympics countries sometimes heavily benefit from hosting the Games. While the United States retained a high medal count at the Summer Olympics 1996 in Atlanta (although winning slightly fewer medals than four years earlier), it greatly benefitted from hosting the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. After winning only 13 medals at each of the Winter Olympics in 1994 in Lillehammer, Norway, and 1998 in Nagano, Japan, the United States won 34 medals while hosting in 2002.

China increased the number of medals won from 63 in 2004 in Athens, to 100 at its home games in Beijing in 2008; Great Britain improved



Summer Olympics Host Country	Medals Won While Hosting Games	Medals Won at Prior Three Games		
South Korea – 1988		1976 – 6	1980 – 0	1984 – 19
Spain - 1992	22	1980 – 6	1984 – 5	1988 – 4
United States – 1996	101	1984 – 174 (Hosted)	1988 – 94	1992 - 108
Australia – 2000	58	1988 - 14	1992 - 27	1996 - 41
Greece – 2004	16	1992 – 2	1996 - 8	2000 - 13
China - 2008	100	1996 - 50	2000 - 59	2004 - 63
Great Britain – 2012	65	2000 - 28	2004 - 30	2008 - 47
Brazil – 2016	?	2004 - 10	2008 - 15	2012 - 17

Table 14.1 Home Advantage at the Summer Olympic Games

Sources: Adapted from "A Map of Olympic Medals," New York Times, August 4, 2008, www.nytimes. com/interactive/2008/08/04/sports/olympics/20080804_MEDALCOUNT_MAP.html?_r=1&. "London 2012 Olympics Medal Tracker Overall," ESPN Summer Olympics, http://espn.go.com/olympics/ summer/2012/medals.

Winter Olympics Host Country	Medals Won While Hosting Games	Medals Wo	n at Prior Th	ree Games
Canada – 1988	5	1976 – 3	1980 – 2	1984 – 4
France - 1992	14	1980 - 1	1984 - 3	1988 - 2
Norway - 1994	26	1984 – 9	1988 - 5	1992 - 24
Japan – 1998	10	1988 - 1	1992 - 7	1994 – 5
United States - 2002	34	1992 - 15	1994 - 13	1998 - 131
Italy - 2006	11	1994 – 20	1998 - 10	2002 - 13
Canada - 2010	26	1998 – 15	2002 - 17	2006 - 24
Russia - 2014	33	2002 - 13	2006 - 20	2010 - 15
South Korea – 2018	?	2009 - 11	2010 - 14	2014 - 8

Table 14.2 Home Advantage at the Winter Olympic Games

Sources: Adapted from "A Map of Olympic Medals," *New York Times*, http://2010gzmes.nytimes. com/medals/map.html. "Sochi 2014 Olympics Medal Tracker Overall," *ESPN Winter Olympics*, http://espn.go.com/olympics/winter/2014/medals.

from 47 medals in 2008 in Beijing to 65 in 2012 in London; Australia enhanced from 41 medals in Atlanta in 1996 to 58 medals in Sydney in 2000; France even increased its medals won from two at the Winter Games in 1988 in Alberta to 14 medals at the home Games in 1992 in Albertville; and Japan doubled its medals from five in 1994 in Lillehammer to 10 in 1998 in Nagano.

Russia's performance in Sochi 2014 is another clear example of the

home advantage of more established sporting countries: Russia won 33 medals, 13 of them gold, and ended up being the most successful nation in the medal ranking. However, just four years earlier at the 2010 Games in Vancouver, Canada, Russia only won 15 medals (three of them gold), and was 11th in the medal ranking. Russia's performance in Sochi was better than many of its other Winter Olympic appearances: In 2006 in Turin, Italy, Russia won 22 medals (eight gold) and was 4th in the medal ranking. In 2002 in Salt Lake City, USA, Russia won 13 medals (five gold) and was 5th in the medal ranking. In 1998 in Nagano, Japan, Russia won 18 medals (nine gold) and was 3rd in the medal ranking.

Reasons given for the home advantage in academic literature are that "host countries can tailor facilities to meet the needs of their athletes and may gain an edge if home crowd enthusiasm sways judges" (Bernard and Busse 2004, 414). In addition, "athletes of the host countries are more adapted to the climate or the host countries are more inclined to select events in which their athletes have a comparative advantage" (Lui and Suen 2008, 15). Finally, host countries usually put more resources into Olympic success. Rathke and Woitek give for the host's advantage the explanation that "Hosting the Olympic Games considerably increases the public support for (and therefore the money and effort invested in) sports in the years before the Games" (Rathke and Woitek 2008, 521). For example, after London's successful bid to host the 2012 Summer Games, an extra GBP£200 million of public money was provided for elite sport development leading up to 2012 (Green 2007, 940). The Canadian government approved in 1982 the "best ever" campaign for the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics and the creation of the country's first multi-sport training centre in Calgary. The federal government committed CAD\$25 million for ten winter Olympic sport organizations to ensure that Canada would have a "best ever" performance in 1988 (Green 2007, 931).

Balmer et al. investigated the host advantage at the Winter Games

from 1908 until 1998 and concluded, based on a comparison of the medals or points won by a hosting country with the medals or points won by the same nation- state when visiting other Olympic Games, "significant evidence of home advantage was identified" (Balmer et al. 2001, 137). However, the authors observed differences among the disciplines at the Winter Games: "Grouping events based on whether they were subjectively judged or not demonstrated that subjective judgments as a form of assessment produced significantly greater home advantage than events with objectively measurable performance or outcome (e.g. time, goals or distance)" (Balmer et al. 2001, 137). Examples for disciplines that depend on subjective judgments are figure skating and freestyle skiing, where the outcome is determined entirely by the scores of judges; ski jumping also features an element of judging (style marks), as does Nordic combined. Balmer et al. speculate that:

This finding may reflect the better performances of athletes competing in front of a supportive partisan audience. However, this would result in consistently elevated home advantage over all events, whenever crowds were present. An alternative explanation is that the judges responded more positively to crowd noise when judging home competitors' performances.

(Balmer et al. 2001, 137)

The same authors published a paper on the significance of the home advantage at the Summer Olympic Games between 1896 and 1996. Only male data were analyzed, and a points system was used, with three points allocated for a gold medal, two points for silver and one point for bronze. Five event groups were selected for the study: Athletics and weightlifting (predominantly objectively judged), boxing and gymnastics (predominantly subjectively judged), and team games (involving subjective decisions). The results confirmed the previous Winter Olympic Games findings:



Highly significant home advantage was found in event groups that were either subjectively judged or rely on subjective decisions. In contrast, little or no home advantage (and even away advantage) was observed for the two objectively judged groups. Officiating system was vital to both the existence and extent of home advantage. Our findings suggest that crowd noise has a greater influence upon officials' decisions than players' performances, as events with greater officiating input enjoyed significantly greater home advantage.

(Balmer et al. 2003, 469)

While the host effect is only temporary, Kuper and Sterken noticed that this is a factor that is not limited to the Games hosted by the respective country:

At the recent versions of the Games countries that will host the next version of the games perform better. Korea doubled its medal share at the 1984 games and hosted the Olympics in 1988. Australia performed significantly better at the Atlanta Games in 1996. And Greece doubled its medal normal share at the Sydney 2000 Games. This is a time-to-build argument: it takes long run planning to create a group of optimal performing athletes.

(Kuper and Sterken 2003, 4)

Successful home games also result in a virtuous circle. As Green wrote on the Australian success at the Sydney Games in 2000, "to not support the country's elite athletes after the success at Sydney 2000 was politically unthinkable" (Green 2007, 942).

In a paper on the home advantage at the Olympic Games that I wrote with Stephen Pettigrew, we argue that the academic literature largely ignores the importance of participation rates in explaining the home advantage (Pettigrew and Reiche 2016). We argue that prior work on this topic has two major shortcomings. First, these studies fail to



define an appropriate comparison for estimating the impact of hosting the Games. Most of the studies estimate the home advantage by comparing host countries to all other (e.g. Johnson and Ali 2000; Kuper and Sterken 2003). In other words, the research estimates the home advantage by comparing host countries like Great Britain to non-hosts. Other studies compare hosts only to their previous success, but do so by pooling across many years (Lui and Suen 2008, 1–16). Such research compares Great Britain's medal count when it hosted in 2012 to its medal count in 1896, when it did not. Rather than comparing hosts to all other countries, we compared the medal counts of Olympic hosts to their own medal count in the previous Olympics four years earlier.

Second, previous work largely neglects the fact that the qualification rules for athletes from host countries are significantly less strict, resulting in more medal opportunities for the host country. For example, Great Britain had 530 athletes competing at the London Games in 2012, compared to 304 in Beijing in 2008. In Sochi in 2014, 215 athletes represented Russia, compared to 175 in Vancouver four years earlier.

Our work accounts for these two shortcomings of the empirical literature. We find weak to no evidence of a hosting advantage in the history of the Olympic Games. In particular, there is not a statistically significant increase in the number of total medals or gold medals won by a country when they host. We do find huge increases in the number of athletes for host countries. When we account for increased participation by looking at the ratio of medals to athlete, we find that the home advantage decays to almost zero.

Our paper examined the history of the Olympic Games after World War II. We started with the 1952 Summer Games in Helsinki (Finland) and the Winter Games in the same year in Oslo (Norway), and included all 16 Summer Games through 2012 in London and all 17 Winter Games until Sochi in 2014 in our analysis. The size of the host country's team grows significantly in the year that they host. Of our data set of 33 Summer and Winter Games after World War II, there is



only one instance (the United States in the 1980 Winter Games) of a country decreasing its number of participants in the year that it hosted, compared to the previous Games. In Summer Games, on average, the host country's team is 162.2 athletes larger than in the previous Summer Games. In Winter Games, the difference is 28.1 athletes.

The main reason that host nations have larger teams is that the qualification standards for the host country are substantially easier. For team events, the host countries do not have to participate in qualification tournaments. For example, South Korea's men's and women's ice hockey teams will make their Olympic debuts in 2018 when PyeongChang is the host city (Klein 2014). Great Britain's men's and women's handball teams team made their Olympic debut in London in 2012, 76 years after the sport was introduced at the Olympics (Walker 2012).

Automatic qualification also applies to individual sports. In the triathlon, for example, 55 men and 55 women could qualify for the Summer Olympics 2012, with a maximum of three starters per country. The United Kingdom had one guaranteed starter in both competitions, with the option of further participants depending on the British results in the qualification events (International Triathlon Union 2012).

The importance of automatic qualification rules is clear. While the German men and women's soccer teams were toward the top of the FIFA rankings, neither team qualified to participate at the London 2012 Olympics (Ahrens 2012). Great Britain participated in soccer for the first time since 1960, despite both of its teams being outranked by Germany. Similarly, Germany has had tremendous success in handball in recent years, with regular victories at European club competitions and a world championship in 2007, but it did not qualify for handball events in London. Great Britain qualified despite having never participated in the event at previous Games.

Automatic qualification therefore increases the opportunities to win medals for the host country. In 2012, Great Britain had a team that was 74% larger than



it was in 2008 (304 athletes in 2008, 530 in 2012) and turned the increase in participation into 18 additional medals (47 in 2008; 65 in 2012).

From the nation-states that are ranked in the top 10 of the all-time Olympic medals ranking, only the former German Democratic Republic never hosted the Games. Seven countries from the top 10 hosted the Summer as well as the Winter Games. The three countries that hosted Summer but not Winter Games are Sweden, the United Kingdom (which does not have favorable winter sport conditions), and China, which is a relatively young winter sport nation that was awarded the 2022 Winter Olympics by the IOC in July 2015. However, only 19 countries ever hosted the Summer Olympics (data includes all Games until 2020), and only 12 have hosted the Winter Olympics (data includes all Games until 2018).

Our finding is especially important given the politics of the bidding process for the Olympics. In total, only 23 countries ever hosted either the Summer and/ or the Winter Olympics. The Olympic powerhouse, the United States, is also the country that hosted the Olympics most often (eight times in total). No other country hosted more Summer Olympics (four times), and no other country was more often the host of the Winter Games (four times as well) (see Tables 14.3 and 14.4). The remaining 182 National Olympic Committees that were recognized by the International Olympic Committee in July 2015 have never hosted the Olympics. While some emerging countries such as South Africa and India might be hosts in the future, a vast majority of countries will never be able to host the Games due to economic, geographic, climate, or other factors. From the perspective of these small or less developed countries, our findings should be encouraging. We cannot say whether they would receive a hosting bump in their medal count, since we have no data upon which to base that prediction. We can say, however, that large, economically prosperous countries, by virtue of hosting the Games, are not receiving a large hosting boost in their medal count which small countries are precluded from receiving. While host nations



Table 14.3 Summer Olympic Games Host Countries

Summer Olympics Host Country	Number of Games Hosted	
United States (St. Louis, 1904/Los Angeles, 1932/Los Angeles, 1964/Atlanta, 1996)	4	
Great Britain (London, 1908/London, 1948/London, 2012)	3	
Greece (Athens, 1896/Athens, 2004)	2	
France (Paris, 1900/Paris, 1924)	2	
Germany (Berlin, 1936/Munich, 1972)	2	
Australia (Melbourne, 1956/Sydney, 2000)	2	
Japan (Tokyo, 1964/Tokyo, 2020)	2	
Sweden (Stockholm, 1912)	1	
Belgium (Antwerp, 1920)	1	
Holland (Amsterdam, 1928)	1	
Finland (Helsinki, 1952)	1	
Italy (Rome, 1960)	1	
Mexico (Mexico City, 1968)	1	
Canada (Montreal, 1976)	1	
Russia (Moscow, 1980)	1	
South Korea (Seoul, 1988)	1	
Spain (Barcelona, 1992)	1	
China (Beijing, 2008)	1	
Brazil (Rio De Janeiro, 2016)	1	

Sources: Adapted from "Olympic Dates and History," *World Atlas*, www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/ infopage/olympic.htm. "Olympic Games Countries and Host Cities," *Top End Sports*, www.topend sports.com/events/summer/hosts/list-countries.htm.

Table 14.4 Winter Olympic Games Host Countries

Winter Olympic Host Country	Number of Games Hosted	
United States (Lake Placid, 1932/Squaw Valley, 1960/Lake Placid, 1980/Salt Lake City, 2002)	4	
France (Chamonix, 1924/Grenoble, 1968/Albertville, 1992)	3	
Switzerland (St. Moritz, 1928/St. Moritz, 1958)	2	
Norway (Oslo, 1952/Lillehammer, 1994)	2	
Italy (Cortina d'Ampezzo, 1956/Turin, 2006)	2	
Austria (Innsbruck, 1964/Innsbruck, 1976)	2	
Japan (Sapporo, 1972/Nagano, 1998)	2	
Canada (Alberta, 1988/Vancouver, 2010)	2	
Germany (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 1936)	1	
Yugoslavia (Sarajevo, 1984)	1	
Russia (Sochi, 2014)	1	
South Korea (PyeongChang, 2018)	1	

Sources: Adapted from "Olympic Dates and History," *World Atlas*, www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/ infopage/olympic.htm. "Olympic Games Countries and Host Cities," *Top End Sports*, www.topend sports.com/events/summer/hosts/list-countries.htm. have a significantly larger Olympic team than in years when they are not hosting, they do not do a good job of winning additional medals with those extra athletes. This is perhaps largely a consequence of the fact that these extra participants will tend to be of lower quality, given that the qualification rules are more lax for host nations.

While our research has proven that there is no statistically significant home advantage at the Olympic Games in general, there might be a home advantage in the history of specific events. For example, at the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014 Russian figure skater Adelina Sotnikova surprisingly won the gold medal over South Korean Yuna Kim. Many experts heavily criticized the result from the competition in Sochi and argued that it was the result of the judges being influenced by the home crowd ("Yuna Kim Sochi Scandal" 2014).








These Games are Not for You: Olympic promises, Olympic legacies and marginalized youth in Olympic Cities, taken from 'Olympic Exclusions'





The following is excerpted from Olympic Exclusions: Youth, Poverty and Social Legacies by Jacqueline Kennelly. ©2016 Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

To purchase a copy, click here

Olympic promises, Olympic legacies, and marginalized youth in Olympic cities

In 2014, Rio mayor Eduardo Paes claimed that "The Olympics are being done, above all, to change the lives of people of this city for the better"; yet Rio's poorest have been subject to intensive displacement and gentrification of the city in the lead-up to the 2016 Summer Games (Tavener 2015). The 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, Korea, have been promoted to the local population with the claim that they will create 230,000 jobs and generate US\$20 billion in investments and consumption (Sang-hun 2011). Given that the population of PyeongChang is only 50,000 strong, these numbers defy belief. In Tokyo, host to the 2020 Summer Games, plans are already underway for massive security spending, including the mobilization of 50,000 police and other security officials ("2020 Olympic Planners Gear up for High-Tech Security" 2015). While the focus is on 'fighting terrorism,' evidence from previous Games suggest that local marginalized people, such as ethnic minority youth and the homeless, will also become likely targets. In each of these cities, lip service has been paid to their Olympic Games serving as an 'inspiration' to a generation of young people, just as has been claimed since the inception of the modern Games in 1896.

Olympic proponents continue to claim social benefits from the Games, yet the checks and balances that might ensure such outcomes are noticeably lacking. Meanwhile, local marginalized populations are forced to contend with the shadow legacy of Olympic security. Young people continue to represent the symbolic recipient of Olympic largesse, in word if not in deed. Here, an essential question must be asked: if cities require social goods such as housing, employment, and opportunities for the young, why are they turning to the Olympics in order to gain them? This is particularly pertinent given that the majority of funding for Olympic Games now comes from the public



purse. Why spend public money on giant sporting events that last only three to six weeks when that money could be dedicated to actually tackling social problems within the city?

The answer is that the Olympics – or what Helen Lenskyj calls 'the Olympic industry' – is not primarily concerned with social legacies. Rather, as I have argued throughout, Olympic proponents make use of the *language* of social legacy in order to persuade local populations to support their bids. The IOC looks favourably on bids that incorporate social legacy components because they have been the subject of substantial public scrutiny and embarrassment, most notably through critical reports authored by the UN Rapporteur on Housing and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE). But the interests of the Olympics are not the interests of local marginalized populations. As economist Andrew Zimbalist (2015, 121) notes, "In either democratic or authoritarian countries, the tendency is for event planning to hew closely to the interests of the local business elite. Construction companies, their unions (if there are any), insurance companies, architectural firms, media companies, investment bankers (who float the bonds), lawyers, and perhaps some hotel or restaurant interests get behind the Olympic or World Cup project. All stand to gain handsomely from the massive public funding."

Some commentators on the effects of the Olympics on marginalized populations suggest that the negative impacts of the Games need to be addressed because they "tarnish the legacy of the Games" (Dahill, 2010–11, p. 1128). Such analyses assume that the Olympics is a positive institution whose errors can be rectified in order to properly distribute the positive opportunities that accompany hosting the Olympic Games. I find this assessment difficult to accept. After five years spent with homeless and marginally housed young people living in Olympic cities, witnessing their struggles for housing, jobs, safety and dignity, I do not see the Olympics as being the solution to their troubles. Rather, the Games have largely exacerbated the problems they already faced. From what I have seen, the solution to the negative



social legacy impacts of Olympic Games is simply to prohibit them from taking place, at least at the size and scale and with the same footloose propensity that currently characterize them.

Since this is not likely to happen, at least in the foreseeable future, some suggestions for ameliorating the worst of the negative effects are in order. I draw here on the work of other critical Olympics scholars, as well as the reports authored by COHRE and the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, reiterating the suggestions with which I agree, and adding a few of my own. An important place to start is with introducing real accountability measures into the bidding process, so that organizing committees cannot simply use social legacy goals to promote their bid without being held responsible for ensuring their implementation. Both Raquel Rolnik and Helen Jefferson Lenskyj suggest that the IOC incorporate mechanisms into the bidding process that would ensure social legacy goals are actually met. As Lenskyj (2008, 152) points out, the IOC already has the basic template for such a mechanism in the form of their Agenda 21: Sport for Sustainable Development: "It would be a relatively simple step to make Agenda 21 a binding instrument and thus a key criterion in the evaluation of future Olympic bids." However, she notes her pessimism about the likelihood of this occurring, given that it contradicts "the profit motives of multinational corporate sponsors of the Olympics." Rolnik (2009, 20) recommends that the IOC "evaluate the bid candidatures against compliance with international standards on the right to adequate housing and guarantee that only those in conformity with the standards are selected." COHRE reiterates this recommendation, as their first of ten guidelines for promoting and protecting housing rights in the context of a mega-event: "Respect, ensure respect for, and implement all international housing rights laws and standards in all aspects

of hosting a mega-event" (COHRE 2007, 208). From an economic perspective, Andrew Zimbalist (2015, 130) suggests that the IOC accept the use of "older, more modest stadiums," encourage "repeat hosting," and make "a more serious and professional effort to identify



which bids made the most sense for a city's develop- ment." He also suggests that the IOC could "opt to share more of the generated revenue from the games with the host city or country" (131).

At the bidding stage, I would add the following recommendations: since "one of the explicit selection criterion in the IOC's rule book is broad support from the local population," (Zimbalist 2015, 125), each host city should be required to hold a referendum for *all residents* (not just citizens) about whether they are willing to host the Olympics. Importantly, both sides ought to have equal resources to make their case. As it currently stands, the big-money interests tend to align with the Yes side, and are able to fund splashy campaigns to persuade populations of the value of the Games, as happened in the Vancouver plebiscite in 2003. The No side gets scraped together by activists and concerned citizens, generally without deep pockets. If both sides were to have equal resources, perhaps there would be an opportunity for a genuine public debate about the relative merits and limitations to the Games. As one part of this educated debate, funds ought to be made available for a non-interested economic impact statement to be prepared, one that is not prone to the 'mischievous practices' that plagued Vancouver's and London's economic impact studies. Likewise, realistic assessments of the actual numbers of jobs that will be created, and for whom, ought to be part of the discussion, along-side discussions about opportunity costs (i.e. what is lost by spending public money on the Olympics, in lieu of other important social priorities). Finally, serious scrutiny of plans for security and its costs ought to be carried out, including an assessment of the long-term impacts of expanded security infrastructure on host city residents, particularly marginalized populations.

The above are a minimum set of requirements if the Olympics are to continue to draw 60% (as in Vancouver) to 85% (as in London) of their funding from the public purse. But another recommendation that ought to be seriously considered is in many ways much easier: do not permit public money to be spent on the Olympics. The 1984 Los



Angeles Games were able to do this (though some public funds were still dedicated to infrastructure repair projects); with the level of corporate sponsorship that the Olympics now boasts, surely it is possible for the Games to be a private venture that is privately funded? This, at least, would remove the temptation to farcically claim that social legacies are a likely outcome of the Games, and might even force Olympic organizers to work within their budgets. Public funding must also be removed from the policing of the Games, since security budgets alone account for a huge portion of public expenditures.

In addition to the above broad recommendations about the Olympics, I have specific recommendations for researchers, civil society, and residents of future bid and host cities. These can be summarized as follows.

- For researchers: develop long term, qualitative research that works with marginalized populations in Olympic host cities.
- For civil society: beware of co-optation by the Olympic industry.
- For bid city residents: if you don't want the Olympics in your town, make a lot of noise about it.
- For host city residents: hold your government to account for commitments to social legacies and over-spending on the Olympics.

Each of these is expanded below.

Recommendation 1: Conduct qualitative research with marginalized residents

There is a serious dearth of sustained qualitative research with Olympic host city residents; while studies such as mine can fill in some of the gaps in our knowledge, there is a great deal we do not know. Other people who are known to be negatively impacted by the Games include sex trade workers, homeless adults, poor and working class communities, Roma, indigenous peoples, and other ethnic minority



groups. Long-term, high-quality, ethnographic research with these communities in Olympic host cities would provide us with a much broader base of insight from which to work in mitigating the negative social consequences of the Olympics. Ongoing social scientific research on the impacts of the Olympics for marginalized residents can also better shape other research initiatives designed to ameliorate the worst of the effects. Importantly, the research needs to be more than a short snapshot approach – sustained engagement with the populations in question will yield much more useful, and accurate, information. For instance, a 2012 article in the International Journal of Drug Policy reports on a qualitative research study designed by members of the BC Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS and the Department of Medicine at UBC. The study sought to determine whether the increased numbers of police in Vancouver during the Olympics had a negative health impact on injection drug users. The study was a direct result of critical Olympics research that had documented the likelihood that marginalized populations were more likely to be targeted by police and security personnel during the Games. However, the study focused only on the period during the Games; its conclusion was that the police were suitably restrained and that their presence did not negatively impact injection drug users. What the study misses was the impact of policing in the year *prior* to the Games, when, according to my study, the majority of negative police interactions occurred for marginalized residents.

Gaps in our knowledge about the impacts of the Games for marginalized host city residents include details about employment, the effects of the Games on housing and in producing gentrification pressures, and the timing and nature of marginalized residents' interactions with police and security personnel. Employment questions raised by my study include: who is getting what kinds of jobs? How are the jobs divided by gender? How many of the jobs are going to the long-term unemployed? How many are going to young people? How many of the jobs are short-term and how many lead to longer term employment? For housing, how do pre-existing policy trajectories get



amplified and accelerated when the Olympics come to town? What are the longer-term impacts in terms of affordability and what are the displacement pressures created by gentrification? Questions about policing and security include the longer term impacts of amplified policing for marginalized residents, not only during the Games but also before and after. What pre-existing incursions on civil liberties get rallied for the Olympics security cause (such as the dispersal laws in London), and what does this mean for the people who are targets of these laws? More sustained research on topics such as these will build a powerful evidence base that can be drawn upon by civil society, social movements, and policy actors in their efforts to prevent the Olympics from happening in their own city, or at least in mitigating the worst of the social impacts.

The importance of research with marginalized populations is not only one of providing empirical evidence about the actual effects of the Games. There is also a moral and ethical imperative to provide space for those who do not often get space, to speak their experiences and share their truths. The youth in my study discussed this in our final round of focus groups in London, in 2013:

Respondent 1: Yeah, what you've been doing, I think it's good because it's like you get to hear from the young people, how they're actually feeling.

Respondent 2: If only the actual [housing] council did things like this.

Respondent 1: It's mad because as much as you probably won't believe, but you make us feel like we matter, we count, our opinions matter and how we feel actually matters.

Respondent 2: I hope the research goes to good use and they read about it or something.

Interviewer: Do you feel that people listen, that you have a voice?

Respondent 1: No, not in here.

Respondent 2: No.



Respondent 3: Not at all, not even the key workers.

Respondent 1: You don't get a voice, I think in London, the youth don't have a voice at all, I'd love to be the voice of the youth, because I've got so much I could say . . . We need to be heard because it's like they wake up and I think they think like this, "When I was a youth I wanted a park, when I was a youth I wanted to ride a bike so let's put the Barclays Bike there so they can ride it" or "let's add another park there," you know, "let's add some shops there," you know, that's not what we want, how about you come and talk to us, find out how we are and what we want.

It is important not to romanticize 'youth voice' or the voices of marginalized people, nor our own role as researchers and the process of translation. Nonetheless, there is both a pragmatic and ethical dimension to ensuring that long-term, high quality research is conducted, which engages with the experiences of those most affected by the Olympics in host cities.

Recommendation 2: Beware civil society co-optation by the Olympic industry

In both Vancouver and London, well-organized elements of civil society worked with the Olympics bid committees to ensure that social legacy goals were incorporated into the bid – yet ultimately, while these collaborations and commitments helped the bid committees win, there were no mechanisms in place to ensure that the commitments were met. In other words, civil society organizations, in collaborating with the Olympics with the well-intended desire to leverage the Games for social goods, may end up being co-opted by the Games and not produce the social legacy benefits they so desire. Leveraging the Olympics is a risky business, and has no guarantee of success. A better strategy, as happened in Chicago and Boston, 1 is to work collaboratively with other civil society and activist organizations to prevent the Olympics from happening in your city – because the IOC doesn't want to grant it to a city where significant protests are likely to



occur. These collaborations can then become the basis for ongoing pressure applied to city and national governments to address the actual social needs of your communities.

Recommendation 3: If you don't want the Olympics, make a lot of noise

For residents of cities who are considering bidding for the Games, the best way to prevent this from happening is to create a massive spectacle of opposition. The IOC does not want to award the Games to cities where it will face opposition; so the best strategy before the bid is won is to create a great deal of opposition. Street rallies, letters to the editor, letters to politicians, letters to the IOC – even visiting the IOC, as No Games Chicago did – these are all strategies for preventing your city from winning an Olympic bid. Be persuasive and factual; there is a great deal of evidence available now, through books and the internet, to build a well- researched case about why the Olympics will be bad for your city. Use this to win popular support, and demonstrate that popular support however you can. Build coalitions across diverse interests to oppose the Games, and be sure to incorporate the voices and perspectives of those who will be most negatively affected, such as homeless people, sex trade workers, and indigenous peoples. A broad-based coalition can then be transformed into an effective political alliance for advocating for the types of social changes that are needed within your city.

Recommendation 4: If your city is hosting the Olympics, hold your government to account

Chances are, if you are a resident of a host city for a future Olympic Games, the bid committee made promises to the IOC about benefits that would accrue to the city in terms of jobs, housing, transit and the like. Find out what those commitments were (many bid documents and the IOC reports can be accessed



through the olympic.org website), and hold your government to account for keeping those promises. Work in solidarity with marginalized populations to try to prevent displacement, either forcibly or under secret cover such as police sweeps before the Games begin. Keep the media apprised of your efforts. Don't expect the Olympic organizing committee or your government to be sympathetic.

The way forward

At this point in time, I do not expect that either my more radical (ban the Olympics) or more moderate (ban public funding of the Olympics) recommendations will be taken up. As Jules Boykoff (2014) notes, the political opportunity structure necessary to effectively oppose the Olympics is not currently in place – though it is shifting. We can see this in the plethora of critical scholarship emerging about the Games, the fact that bids for future Games are declining, and the vivacity of 'No Games' campaigns in Chicago (candidate city for 2016) and Boston (seeking candidacy for 2024).

While the focus of this book has been the impact of the Olympics on marginalized youth, it is also important to reiterate that the conditions they face were not wrought by the Games. While my study suggests that the Olympics exacerbated many of the poor conditions that they already faced (such as lack of housing, poor prospects for decent employment, and targeted policing), it was not the Olympics that created these conditions in the first place. We must look to the wider contexts of capitalism and neoliberalism, decades-long retrenchment of social safety nets, and the recent imposition of severe austerity measures since the 2008 economic crash, in order to understand the causes of their marginalization in the first place. Inequality is growing, and while the Olympics demonstrably makes such inequality worse in many ways, it is not the Olympics that created it.

I have sought to make the case throughout that the Olympics draws on discourses of social legacy in order to justify itself, and, increasingly,



its use of public funds. But we need to take a step back from this argument to ask: why does it take a mega-event to mobilize support for social commitments? Citizens and city councils ought not to require corporate-driven mega-events in order to 'leverage' public funds for transport systems, housing, and infrastructure spending. This money is public money for a reason – it ought to be used for public benefit. Something has gone very wrong when government funding can only be assured if a city takes on the enormous risks and hassles of hosting a gigantic sporting event. To move forward from here, we will need to direct concerted effort and attention towards shifting the conditions that have brought us to this unfortunate place.

Note

1 For more on the successful No Games Chicago campaign, see https://nogames.wordpress.com. For more on the successful No Games Boston campaign, see www.nobostonolympics.org.

Bibliography

All website URLs were accessed between September 2014 and December 2015.

"2020 Olympic Planners Gear up for High-Tech Security." 2015. Japan Today. January 10. www.japantoday.com/category/kuchikomi/view/ 2020-olympic-planners-gear-up-for- high-tech-security.

Boykoff, Jules. 2014. *Activism and the Olympics: Dissent at the Games in Vancouver and London*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

COHRE. 2007. "Fair Play for Housing Rights: Mega-Events, Olympic Games and Housing Rights." Centre On Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE). www.ruig-gian.org/ressources/Report%20Fair%20Play% 20FINAL%20FINAL% 20070531.pdf.

Dahill, Elizabeth Hart. 2010. "Hosting the Games for All and by All: The



Right to Adequate Housing in Olympic Host Cities." *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 36: 1128.

Lenskyj, Helen Jefferson. 2008. Olympic Industry Resistance: Challenging Olympic Power and Propaganda. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Rolnik, Raquel. 2009. "Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in This Context." United Nations General Assembly. www.ohchr.org/en/issues/housing/ pages/housingindex. aspx.

Sang-hun, Choe. 2011. "Pyeongchang, Sleepy South Korean Town, Was Built Into Olympic Host." *The New York Times*, July 7. www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/sports/olympics/ 08iht-oly08.html.

Tavener, Ben. 2015. "The Olympics Are Screwing Rio de Janeiro's Poorest Citizens Out of Housing." *VICE News*. April 16. https://news.vice.com/article/the-olympics-are-screwing-rio-dejaneiros-poorest-citizens-out-of-housing.

Zimbalist, Andrew. 2015. *Circus Maximus: The Economic Gamble Behind Hosting the Olympics and the World Cup*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

